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La présente thèse  en sémantique  lexicale  examine  le  phénomène de  la polysémie  (c.-à-d. 
l'existence de multiples emplois inter-reliés pour un même mot), et ce de deux points de vue: 
d'une part, celui du statut de la polysémie dans le lexique, et d'autre part, celui des causes " de 
la variation de la polysémie entre les langues. Les tenants d'approches par sens multiples - en 
particulier ceux  qui  travaillent  dans  le  cadre  de  la  Sém~ntique cognitive  - attribuent  la 
polysémie  d'un  mot  donné  à  un  réseau  complexe  de  sens  organisés  autour  d'un  sens 
prototypique et concret, ces  sens  étant reliés par des  relations  telles  que  la  similarité et la 
métaphore.  Mais  ces  approches  par sens  multiples  souffrent  d'un manque  de  parcimonie 
(prolifération  des  sens, redondances  entre  connaissances  sémantiques  et connaissances  du 
monde, redondances entre les sens individuels), et elles n'offrent pas de moyen adéquat pour 
rendre compte des différences de polysémie que l'on observe d'une langue à l'autre. 
La présente  étude  se  penche  sur  les  verbes  déictiques  anglais  et  français  qui  permettent 
d'exprimer des  situations de  'mouvement' (COME, GO, VENIR et ALLER) par le  biais de 
trois questions : 1) ces verbes ont-ils de multiples sens lexicaux ou un sens lexical unique; 2) 
pourquoi montrent-ils  les  ressemblances d'emploi que l'on observe en comparant les  deux 
langues, et 3)  pourquoi montrent-ils les différences d'emploi que l'on observe ? En utilisant 
des  données  provenant  de  plusieurs  dictionnaires,  d'un  petit  corpus  et  des  intuitions  de 
locuteurs,  nous  avons  identifié  pour  chaque  verbe  un  grand  ensemble  de  significations 
possibles  qui  appartiennent  à une  grande  variété  de  domaines,  et  nous  avons  identifié  le 
contenu sémantique lexical invariant de chacun de ces verbes en les analysant dans le cadre 
de  l'approche  monosémiste  de  Bouchard  (1995)  ainsi  que  celui  de  l'approche  néo-
saussuréenne de Bouchard (2002, à paraître). 
Nous montrons que chacun de ces verbes est monosémique au niveau  lexical, ne possédant 
qu'une seule représentation sémantique abstraite dont les composantes sont ancrées dans des 
propriétés  de  la  cognition  générale.  Plus  spécifiquement,  COME  et  VENIR  expriment 
l'orientation abstraite vers le centre déictique (défini  comme un point qui est accessible à un 
Sujet de  Conscience),  tandis  que  GO  et ALLER expriment l'orientation abstraite vers une 
relation avec l'anti-centre déictique, le complément du centre déictique. Nous démontrons en 
détail  comment  tous  les  emplois  sémantiques  discutés  dans  cette  étude  découlent  de  la 
manière  dont  ces  représentations  sémantiques  indépendantes  de  tout  domaine  particulier 
interagissent avec  des  inférences  basées  sur des  connaissances  extralinguistiques. Le degré 
élevé de polysémie contextuelle de ces éléments découle du  caractère très abstrait de  leurs Xll 
composantes sémantiques ('orientation', 'Sujet de  Conscience',  'accessibilité', localisation' 
et R,  une relation combinatoire maximalement générale).  Comme il  existe de  nombreuses 
façons  pour  un  élément  d'interagir  avec  ces  composantes  (selon  la  nature  des  entités 
impliquées dans la situation), ces verbes peuvent donner lieu à un nombre pratiquement sans 
limites de manifestations différentes en fonction du contexte. Nous montrons par ailleurs que 
les ressemblances observées dans ces paires d'équivalents français-anglais découlent de leur 
contenu sémantique commun, tandis que les nombreuses asymétries que l'on observe dans les 
emplois de ces paires s'expliquent par une seule différence au niveau du sens invariant: les 
verbes  anglais  contiennent  une  relation  de  localisation,  alors  que  les  verbes  français 
correspondants  contiennent  la  relation  combinatoire  générale  R.  Étant  donné  que  les 
représentations sémantiques de ces verbes sont très abstraites, l'interaction entre cette petite 
différence au niveau du contenu sémantique, d'une part, et les connaissances contextuelles et 
les connaissances du monde, d'autre pa1i,  donne lieu à d'abondantes différences de  surface. 
D'autres  différences  émergent  de  l'interaction  entre  ces  sens  uniques  et  les  différences 
grammaticales et lexicales entre l'anglais et le français. 
Ainsi,  nous  démontrons  qu'une approche monosémique permet d'offrir une  analyse de la 
polysémie et de la variation qui est à la fois  compréhensive et parcimonieuse.  Les résultats 
obtenus appuient l'idée selon  laquelle les mots  tendent à être monosémiques au niveau du 
lexique ainsi que l'idée selon laquelle les composantes sémantiques lexicales (à la fois celles 
qui  sont  récunentes  d'une  langue  et l'autre  et celles  qui  varient)  sont  ancrées  dans  des 
propriétés de la cognition générale. 
Mots-clés  : sémantique lexicale, polysémie,  monosémie,  variation,  verbes  de  déplacement 
déictiques, anglais, français ------ --------------~ 
ABSTRACT 
The present disse1iation in lexical semantics examines the phenomenon of polysemy (i.e.  the 
existence of multiple, related senses  for  a  single word)  from two  angles:  first,  polysemy's 
status  in  the  lexicon,  and  second,  the  causes  for  cross-linguistic  variation  of polysemy. 
Advocates of multiple-meaning approaches - in particular those working in the framework of 
Cognitive  Semantics  - attribute  a  word's  polysemy  to  a  complex  network  of meanings 
centering around a prototypical, concrete meaning and linked by such relations as sirnilarity 
and  metaphor.  But  these  multiple-meaning  approaches  suffer  from  a  Jack  of parsimony 
(proliferation of meanings, redundancies between semantic and world knowledge as well as 
between individual  meanings), and  they provide no  adequate means  to  account for  cross-
linguistic differences in polysemy. 
The  present  study  focuses  on  English  and  French  deictic  verbs  capable  of expressing 
situations of 'motion' (COME, GO, VENIR and ALLER) and pursues three questions:  1) Do 
these  verbs  have  multiple  or unified  lexical meanings?;  2)  Why do  they  show  the  cross-
linguistic  similarities  that  we  observe  in  their  uses?;  3)  Why do  they  show  the  precise 
differences  we  observe in their uses?  Based on data from  dictionaries, a small corpus and 
speaker intuitions, I identified for each verb a broad set of possible senses spanning across a 
wide variety of domains and identified the invariant lexical semantic content of the each of 
these verbs by analysing them within the dual framework of Bouchard's (1995) monosemist 
approach and the Sign The01-y of Language (Bouchard, 2002, in press). 
I show that each of these verbs is lexically monosemous, possessing a single, abstract lexical 
semantic  representation  whose  components  are  rooted  in  prope1iies  of general  cognition. 
More specifically, COME and VENIR express abstract orientation toward a relation with the 
deictic center (defined as  a point that is  accessible to a Subject of Consciousness), whereas 
GO and ALLER express abstract orientation toward a relation with its complement, the anti-
deictic center.  I demonstrate in detail how all of the semantic uses  discussed in this  study 
arise  from  the  way  these  domain-independent  semantic  representations  interact  with 
inferences  based  on  contextual,  background  and  world  knowledge.  The  high  degree  of 
contextual  polysemy  of  these  items  follows  from  the  highly  abstract  character of their 
invariant  semantic  components  ('orientation',  'Subject  of Consciousness',  'accessibility', 
'localization', and the maximally general combinatorial relation  R). Since there are  many 
ways in which an element can interact with these components (  depending on the nature of  the 
entities involved in the situation), these verbs can thus take on a virtually limitless number of XlV 
manifestations depending on context. In addition, 1 show that the sense-similarities observed 
in these pairs of  cross-linguistic quasi-equivalents follow from their shared semantic content, 
while the many cross-linguistic asymmetries observed in the uses of  the se pairs follow from a 
single difference in invariant meaning: the English verbs contain localization (L) as  an end-
relation, while their French counterpmts contain the maximally general combinatorial relation 
R.  Because  the  semantic  representations  of these  verbs  are  highly  abstract,  this  slight 
difference in semantic content interacts with knowledge of context and the world to give rise 
to  abundant surface  differences. Further differences  emerge  from  the  way  these  invariant 
meanings interact with the differing English and French grammatical and lexical systems. 
1 thus demonstrate that a monosemous approach makes it possible to  provide an account of 
polysemy  and  variation  that  is  both  far-reaching  and  parsimonious.  The  results  obtained 
provide strong supp01t for the idea that words tend to be lexically monosemous and that their 
semantic  components  (both  those  that  recur  cross-linguistically  and  those  that  vary)  are 
rooted in properties of general cognition. 
Key  words:  lexical  semantics,  polysemy,  monosemy,  cross-linguistic  variation,  deictic 
motion verbs, English, French INTRODUCTION 
The present dissertation is situated in the field of lexical semantics and deals with the subject 
of polysemy.  More  specifically,  I  will  address  the  problem  of the  representation  of 
polysemous  words  in  the  lexicon from  a  cross-linguistic  perspective.  This  study  aims  to 
answer the following questions: 
•  Do highly polysemous English and French deictic motion verbs such as COME, GO, 
VENIR and ALLER have multiple or unified meanings? 
•  Question 2: Why do these verbs show the cross-linguistic similarities that we observe 
in their semantic uses? 
•  Question 3: Why do  these verbs show the differences (i.e. cross-linguistic variation) 
that we observe in their uses? 
Background of  the problem: the polysemist vs. monosemist debate 
The phenomenon of polysemy has  been a central concem of lexical semantics for the past 
decades.  Polysemy  is  traditionally  defined  as  the  existence,  for  a  single  lexical  form,  of 
multiple,  intenelated semantic  uses,  also  called senses
1
•  The  notion of polysemy  is  often 
opposed to  homonymy, which is  characterized by multiple, unrelated meanings for a single 
fonn (Lyons,  1977; Kleiber, 1999). On the one hand, an oft cited example of a homonymous 
word is BANK, which can mean 'financial institution' or 'riverside', among other things. On 
the  other  hand,  an  example  of a  highly  polysemous  word  is  BREAK,  whose  numerous 
possible senses  include  'damage'  (He  broke  the  eggs  by dropping them),  'intenupt, stop' 
(The campaign aimed to  break the cycle of  crime) and 'violate, disobey' (He  broke the law), 
1 In this text, I will use the terms sense and (semantic) use interchangeably. 2 
used  that  are  related  in  that  they  all  share  the  notion  of disruption  of the  continuity  or 
integrity of sorne event or entity. 
Because  polysemy  is  a  widespread  phenomenon  characterizing  the  majority  of words 
(Bogaards, 2001, p.  326), any theory of the representation of word meaning must be able to 
account for  it.  One issue that has  divided  semanticists  in recent decades  is  the  following 
question: to what extent is  polysemy a reality in the lexicon? That is, to  what extent do  the 
multiple senses of a polysemous word correspond to multiple semantic representations in the 
lexicon
2? 
The solutions that scholars have proposed fall along a continuum between two poles that can 
be  labeled polysemist and monosemist
3
.  Strong polysemist approaches (e.g. Mel'cuk et al., 
1995; Miller,  1995)  treat senses as  separate representations in the lexicon. More moderate 
polysemist approaches  (e.g. Kleiber,  1999,  2008)  recognize  that  at  least  some  senses  are 
predictable via general rules and therefore derived in context, while nonetheless holding that 
many senses are unpredictable and therefore lexically stored. Semanticists working within the 
Cognitive  Semantics  fl"amework  (e.g.  Lakoff,  1987;  Langacker,  1987,  1991; Fillmore and 
Atkins, 2000; Evans, 2005) argue that a po1ysemous word's senses forma comp1ex network 
in which the non-central senses are linked to central senses via relations such as  similarity, 
metaphor and metonymy. On the one band, cognitive semanticists argue that polysemy is not 
arbitraty  but  rather  motivated  via  general  mechanisms  (  e.g.  metaphor)  rooted  in  general 
cognition. On the other band, however, they view these senses as largely unpredictable and 
consider that they must be stored in the network of lexical knowledge (Lakoff, 1987, p.  438). 
Simi1arly,  while  Conceptual  Semantics  (e.g.  Jackendoff,  1990,  2002)  postulates  shared 
2 In thjs study, I will use the term polysemy to re fer broadly to the property of having multiple possible 
interpretations  that are interrelated. Thus, my use of this term is  neutra! with regard to  whether these 
interpretations correspond to stored meanings or are produced in context. The term monosemy, on the 
other band, will be used to refer to the existence of  a single meaning in the lexicon. 
3  The  terms  used  to  characterize  these  tendencies  vary. For example,  Ruhl  (1989)  uses  the  terms 
maximalist and minima  list.  I have chosen to a  void these because of the ambiguity of  the latter term in 
linguistic theory. ----------------------- -- ------------------------~-----
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conceptual material for  a word's senses  across  different domains, it nonetheless  considers 
that sense-specifie information must be stored in order to account for the specifie behaviour 
of each use. 
In  contrast,  tenants  of monosemist  approaches  argue  that  if contextual  and  background 
information is  taken into  account,  word senses are  largely predictable.  They thus consider 
that many words have only a single meaning from which all senses are derived in context. 
Sorne  monosemists  (e.g.  Pustejovsky,  1995)  propose  rich  semantic  representations  that 
include much encyclopaedic detail. Others (e.g. Ruhl, 1989; Bouchard, 1995) argue that word 
meaning is  highly  abstract,  and  that the  concrete detail  observed  in  specifie  word  senses 
comes from context and/or extra-linguistic knowledge. The latter offer severa! arguments in 
fa  v  or of abstract monosemous representations, including:  1)  the need to  redu ce redundancy 
between linguistic meaning and world knowledge for reasons of scientific parsimony; 2) the 
regular/predictable  character  of  polysemy;  3)  blurry  sense  boundaries;  and  4)  the 
uncontrolled sense proliferation that results from a multiple-meaning approach. 
Particularly compelling evidence  in  favor of the strong monosemist position is offered by 
Bouchard (1995), who shows that even highly polysemous words such as the general French 
motion verbs VENIR, ALLER, ARRIVER, PARTIR, ENTRER and SORTIR can be reduced 
to  a  single,  abstract meaning.  For each  verb,  he  thus  proposes  a  single  formai  semantic 
representation and  shows how individual senses result from the interaction of each verb's 
core meaning with the speaker's knowledge of context and how objects behave in the real 
world.  Crucially, Bouchard shows that no  sense-specifie infonnation need be stored in the 
lexicon in order to produce these specifie interpretations
4
. 
4 This theoretical approach, which will be adopted as a component of the theoretical framework of the 
present dissertation, will be discussed in more detail in section 1.2.2. 4 
2  Explaining the cross-linguistic variation of  polysemy 
One crucial test of  a lexical semantic themy is whether it is able to exp  lain not only language-
interna!  semantic variation (i.e.  why a  single  word can have  different senses in different 
contexts),  but  also  cross-linguistic  variation  (i.e.  why  a  given  word  and  its  translation 
equivalent in another language do not share all of the same senses). Thus, a theory of word 
meaning should be able to account for the absence of complete overlap between the uses of 
two  given translation  equivalents.  For example,  English  JUMP  and French  SAUTER are 
rough  translation  equivalents  because  they  share  cettain  senses,  as  illustrated  in  the 
following. However, as (1) through (8) show, not aU semantic uses are shared. 
( 1)  Marie jumps constant/y from one subject to another. 
(2)  Marie saute constamment d'un sujet à l'autre. 
(3)  The manjumped over thefence. 
(4)  L'homme a sauté par-dessus la clôture. 
(5)  The nightclub was jumping. 
(6)  *La boîte de nuit sautai{ 
(7)  *The bomb jumped. 
(8)  La bombe a sauté. 
This gives rise to an apparent paradox: on the one hand, from an intra-language perspective, 
polysemous word senses appear related and thus suggest the possibility of predictability. On 
the other hand, from a cross-linguistic perspective, this sense-relatedness appears random and 
unpredictable, since the exact intra-language patterns of relatedness often do not repeat from 
one language to another. 
5  In the  present  dissertation, use  of the  asterisk  indicates  general  unacceptability,  regardless  of the 
cause (semantics, syntax, etc.). 5 
In a  strong polysemist approach  that views  word senses  as  completely distinct meanings 
stored as a list in the lexicon, it is  virtually impossible to account for this absence of cross-
linguistic overlap of sense inventories. One can only draw up two lists of senses, point out 
that each list has certain members that are absent from the other list, and attribute this to the 
fact that languages are free to choose the set of meanings to  which they map a given form. 
But such a treatment is merely descriptive, not explanatory. 
In the  Cognitive  Semantic approach, polysemy is  seen as  motivated by general cognitive 
mechanisms  such as  metaphor.  Cross-linguistic comparisons within this  framework  argue 
that  lexical  semantic variation stems from differences  in the  ways  specifie  languages  use 
these general cognitive deviees. In particular, since languages are seen as  anchored both in 
human experience of the world and culture-specifie ways of conceptualizing this experience 
(Cruse and Croft, 2004, p. 195), differences in polysemy are attributed in pati to the fact that 
not all metaphors are universal. However, this assumption leaves several important questions 
unanswered. For example,  why do  two  given languages  not use  the  same metaphors, and 
when they do, why do they not always manifest them through identical polysemy patterns? 
As I will show, such analyses, though perhaps useful in ad hoc descriptions, are not powerful 
explanatory tools. 
Compared  to  multi-meaning  theories,  monosemist  approaches  provide  a  much  more 
promising  framework  for  going  beyond  pure  description  to  explanation.  From  a  cross-
linguistic perspective,  such an approach  has  the  potential  to  explain  parsimoniously why 
translation equivalents (such as French VENIR and English COME) differ with regard to the 
set of senses that each can express: if each of these verbs has only a single, abstract meaning, 
and the two verbs do not possess exactly the same meaning representation, the interaction of 
each of these abstract semantic representations with context and world knowledge will give 
rise  to  multiple  surface differences  in  semantic behaviour. Thus,  by comparing the  single 
meaning of one verb with that of its translation equivalent, we should, in princip  le, be able to 
full y  account for the differences  in uses  (i.e.  lack of sense  overlap)  that these two words 
manifest. 6 
As mentioned above, Bouchard's (1995) monosemous approach is  supp01ted by convincing 
within-language  evidence  showing  that  it  offers  a  powerful  explanation  of contextually 
determined variation of word mear1ing  within a given language. The problem, at present, is 
that no  monosemist the01y  (to my knowledge) bas been subjected to  a rigorous  test for  its 
ability  to  explain  cross-linguistic  variation  of polysemy.  Sorne  preliminaty  evidence  is 
offered in Zuercher (20 1  0)
6
,  where I  show th at all of the observed differences  in semantic 
behaviour between French VENIR and its  rough Malagasy equivalent AVY follow directly 
from two  simple differences at the level of these verbs' respective abstract core meanings. 
These findings  suggest that abstract monosemy can indeed provide simple explanations to 
multiple surface differences in the semantic behaviour of  cross-linguistic lexical counterparts. 
Given that this evidence is lirnited, what is now needed is a more in-depth study pursuing this 
problem. 
Thus,  the  present  dissertation's  main objective  is  to  test  the  cross-linguistic  explanatory 
adequacy of the strong monosemist position through the comparison of the English deictic 
motion verbs COME and GO with their main French equivalents VENIR and ALLER. 
As  the  present dissettation  aims  not only  to  account for  the  intra-language variation of a 
word's semantic interpretation but also to explain why this polysemy varies across languages, 
I adopt as  the second component of my theoretical framework Bouchard's (2002,  in press) 
neo-Saussurean  Sign Theory of Language,  an  approach  which  offers  a  strong  conceptual 
basis for the explanation of cross-linguistic variation in general. According to  this approach, 
language is a set of  mappings between two systems (the CI, or conceptual-intentional system, 
and  the  SM,  or  sensorimotor  system),  and  explanations  of linguistic  phenomcna  should 
therefore  be  sought  in  the  properties  of these  two  systems.  Grounding  his  the01y  in  a 
Saussurean vision of language as  a set of signs (words and combinatorial signs), Bouchard 
argues  that many (perhaps all)  properties of language - including the patterns of language 
6 Additional preliminary cross-linguistic evidence is offered in Bouchard's (1995) brief discussion of 
French and English manner-of-movement verbs and transitivity. 7 
variation we observe - can be explained by properties of the CI  and SM  systems  and the 
ways they interface. 
Crucially, this themy holds  that many cases of cross-linguistic  variation can be  explained 
based on properties of these  two  general systems,  properties  that  are  logically  anterior to 
language. In particular, Bouchard (2002)  shows that many types  of syntactic variation that 
Generative Grammar attributes to putative non-substantive elements of the lexicon are in fact 
explicable based on properties of the CI and the SM. For example, he  demonstrates that the 
precise patterns of variation we observe between languages like French and English for the 
structure of the noun phrase (e.g. adjective-noun order, omission of the determiner, omission 
of the noun) all follow in a straightforward manner from the  way Number is  expressed in 
these two languages. Language, he argues, offers severa! different, equally optimal ways to 
mark Number and to mark dependency relations between words. Crucially, since all of these 
means of expression are arbitr<J.ry,  languages are free to  choose among them, and this gives 
rise to the cross-linguistic syntactic variation we observe (Bouchard, 2002, p. 34-40). 
1 will show in the present study that using the same line of reasoning, we can explain why 
polysemous  words  show  precisely the  cross-linguistic similarities  and  differences  that  we 
observe. More specifically, interface propetiies of the linguistic sign and design properties of 
general human cognition are sufficient to account for why polysemous English deictic motion 
verbs (e.g. COME, GO) share certain semantic uses with their cross-linguistic equivalents in 
French (  e.g. VENIR, ALLER), while other uses are possible in one language and impossible 
in the other. 
Thus,  in  line  with  Bouchard's  (1995)  monosemist  approach,  the  present  study  will  take 
monosemy as the default property ofwords in the lexicon, and in line with Bouchard's (2002, 
in press) Sign Them·y of Language, 1 will take the Saussurean sign and properties of general 
cognition as the basis for inquiry into cross-linguistic variation. r--- --------------------------------------------- --------- ---
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3  Significance of the problem 
The research problem being investigated in the present dissertation is motivated not only by 
considerations within semantic theot-y,  but also  by unsolved problems  in fields  of inquiry 
such as  psycholinguistics,  second language acquisition and teaching,  and natural  language 
processmg. 
First, from the perspective of semantics, the present study aims to bring fresh evidence to the 
ongoing debate on the lexical status of polysemy by testing a monosemist approach that is 
thus far suppotied by convincing language-internai evidence. In order to  determine whether 
the monosemist approach to  the  lexicon bas adequate explanatory power, it is  necessary to 
test its ability to explain cross-linguistic variation, a task which to my knowledge bas not yet 
been undetiaken prior to this dissertation. 
The results of this study are also relevant to  the question of how word meaning is  organized 
in the mental lexicon. The insight provided by linguistic studies such as  the present one are 
ail the more crucial given that available experimental findings from psycholinguistics do not 
yet provide  an  unequivocal  picture  of the  psychological  reality  of word  senses.  See,  for 
example,  Klein  and  Murphy  (2001),  whose  results  support  a  multiple-euh-y  view  of 
polysemous  words,  and  Beretta  et  al.  (2005),  who  report  results  supporting  a  single-
representation  approach.  Given  the  variation  in  the  available  findings,  and  given  the 
methodological limitations of psycholinguistic inquiry into the structure of the lexicon (e.g. 
psycholinguistic measures of type of meaning storage may actually reflect not pm·ely lexical 
knowledge,  but  rather  the  result  of the  interaction  between  lexical  and  extra-linguistic 
knowledge), linguistic evidence of the kind provided in the present dissertation is  crucial to 
provide a complete pic ture of  how word meaning is stored in the lexicon. 
In addition,  the  present study's  research  problem is  directly  relevant  to  second  language 
acquisition and pedagogy, for cross-linguistic variation in polysemy poses a challenge to  L2 
leat·ners  (see  Bogaards,  2001;  Elston-Güttler  and  Williams,  2008;  Pavlenko,  2009).  By 
identifying the underlying causes for cross-linguistic variations in polysemy, we can begin to 
shed light on the nature of the task that faces the leamer of L2 vocabulary and the possible 9 
causes of certain difficulties L2 leamers encounter. The results of the present study may also 
help point out problematic assumptions in cunent models of the bi lingual mentallexicon. 
Finally,  this  dissetiation's  research  problem  also  bears  relevance  to  the  field  of natural 
language  processing,  for  polysemy  poses  a  significant  challenge  for  automatic  tasks  like 
disambiguation, machine translation and information retrieval (see Victorri and Fuchs, 1999, 
p. 17-21,  as  well as  Ravin and Leacock, 2000, p.  23-27).  Studies such as  the  present one, 
which  contribute  to  the  understanding  of  the  content  and  nature  lexical  semantic 
representations,  can  provide  insight  into  the  kinds  of generalizations  to  look  for  when 
modelling  word  meaning from  a  computational perspective,  in  the  interest  of developing 
better lexical databases to improve the performance ofNLP software. 
The present dissertation is  structured as  follows. Chapter 1 examines the general problem of 
the  status  of polysemy  in  the  lexicon and  how it  has  been addressed  in  the  literature.  In 
particular, I describe the two opposing general tendencies in the treatment of sense variation 
(the  polysemist  and  monosemist perspectives),  going  on  to  show  the  consequences  these 
approaches have for the analysis of the polysemy of deictic motion verbs and arguing that a 
monosemist approach offers greater explanatory potential both within a given language and 
from  a cross-linguistic perspective.  In Chapter II,  I tum to  the  question of cross-linguistic 
variation. Here, after presenting the foundations of the Sign Themy of Language (Bouchard, 
2002, in press), 1 identify the consequences this approach has for my own research problem 
and  formulate my hypotheses based on this  approach, concluding with a description of the 
methodology  adopted  to  test  these  hypotheses.  In  Chapter  III,  I  present  a  monosemous 
analysis  of the  semantic  content  of the  verbs  COME  and  GO  as  well  as  their  French 
counterpatis  VENIR  and  ALLER,  identifying  the  single  semantic  representation 
corresponding to each of these verbs. The remainder of my dissertation (Chapters IV and V) 
is  devoted  to  providing  a detailed  analysis  of the  senses  attested  for  these  verbs.  In this 
analysis,  1 demonstrate that each of the patiicular semantic uses  follows  directly  from  the 
interaction between the verb's intrinsic monosemous content and  information provided the 
surrounding  sentential/discourse  context  as  well  as  by  the  speaker's  and  hearer's  shared 
extra-linguistic knowledge.  Moreover, 1 demonstrate that while the highly similar semantic 
content  of cross-linguistic  pairs  (COME  vs.  VENIR,  GO  vs.  ALLER)  accounts  for  the 10 
numerous uses shared by these verbs, the asymmetries observed in the possible uses of these 
verbs follow from a slight difference in intrinsic semantic content as well as from differences 
in the grammatical and lexical systems of the two languages. - - - - ---
CHAPTERI 
THE STATUS OF POL  YS  EMY IN THE LEXICON 
The present chapter examines the general problem of the status of polysemy in the lexicon 
and its consequences for the study of highly multifunctional items like motion verbs. I first 
review the dominant positions (polysemist vs.  monosemist) in the  debate  on the nature of 
lexical semantic representations, showing that the arguments in favor of monosemy are more 
compelling (section 1.1). Following this (section 1.2), I briefly discuss the existing research 
on  the  semantic  representations  of polysemous  motion  verbs,  showing  that  cognitive 
semanticists'  assumption of the  centrality  of space  and  metaphor  in  the  lexicon  severely 
limits the explanatory power oftheir analyses. I then present Bouchard's (1995) monosemist 
approach to  lexical meaning, highlighting the advantages of this approach for the analysis of 
motion verbs.  Finally, in section  1.3  I  compare the multiple-meaning and single-meaning 
approaches to  polysemy in  terms  of their adequacy to  explain  cross~linguistic variation. In 
particular,  I  show  that  while  existing  polysemist  studies  offer  no  satisfact01y  means  to 
explain why pairs of translation equivalents diverge in their polysemy, preliminaty evidence 
from French and Malagasy (Zuercher, in press) shows that adopting a monosemist approach 
allows  us  to  provide  a  powerful,  parsimonious  account  for  these  cross-linguistic  sense 
asymmetries.  I  conclude  this  chapter  by  formulating  the  present  dissertation's  research 
questions. 
1.1  Polysemist vs. monosemist appro·aches in lexical semantics 
The  phenomenon of polysemy occupies  a  central  place  in contemporary  lexical  semantic 
research.  As  discussed above, one major problem raised by polysemy is  the question of its 
lexical status:  when a given lexical form (e.g. BREAK) possesses more than one sense (e.g. 
'ruptme',  'damage'  or  'intetrupt'),  to  what  extent  are  these  multiple  semantic  uses 12 
attributable to distinct semantic representations in the lexicon? The diverse answers proposed 
by scholars in response to this question can be situated along a continuum between two poles. 
On the one hand, polysemist approaches claim that each of a word's senses corresponds to a 
distinct representation in the  lexicon,  and  on the ·other hand,  the  monosemist perspective 
attributes these multiple uses  to  a single, unified lexical semantic representation.  Thus, for 
monosemists, polysemy is (at least to a large extent) a phenomenon of parole rather than a 
phenomenon of langue: it is not something encoded in the lexical component of the language 
system, but rather a property that arises in contextualized language use. 
In the  following  subsections,  I  will  describe  the  dominant  theoretical  approaches  to  the 
lexical  status  of polysemy,  showing  that  multiple-meaning  approaches  present  severa! 
important disadvantages with respect to single-meaning approaches. 
1.1.1  Polysemist approaches 
The  strong  polysemist  perspective,  embodied  most  typically  by  traditional  lexicography, 
views many words as  being associated with a large number of meanings whose boundaries 
are  clear-cut  and  which  are  stored  in  the  1exicon.  For example,  in  the  Explanatory  and 
Combinatorial Lexicology approach (the lexicological branch of the general Meaning Text 
The01·y, Mel'cuk et al.,  1995), each word sense corresponds to a distinct lexeme, and the set 
of ali  of a  word's  related  senses  is  called  a  vocable.  The  sem;mtic  relations  linking  the 
different lexemes appear as  meaning components in the lexemes' definitions.  For example, 
the  lexicalized  meanings of the  vocable  BUREAU includes  the  lexemes  identified  in (9) 
through  (11),  and  the  relatedness  of these  lexemes  is  expressed  via  the  shared  sense 
component (  called a "semantic bridge") 'destiné à faire des travaux écrits', which appears in 
the definition of  each ofthese elements (Mel'cuk et al.  1995, p. 158). ------ --- - ---
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(9)  BUREAU!: " table destinée à faire des travaux écrits dessus' 
(10)  BUREAUII: 'pièce destinée à faire des travaux écrits dedans' 
(11)  BUREAUIII.l : 'organisme destiné à faire des travaux écrits' 
To determine whether or not a given semantic distinction is reflected via separate meanings 
in the lexicon, this approach proposes the use of a set of criteria. For example, the Criterion 
of Compatible Cooccunence (also called the Green-Apresjan Criterion) states that if a given 
word can be used with two cooccuning elements in the same sentence, where each of these 
cooccuning elements evokes a different interpretation of the word in question, th  en the latter 
has  only  a  single  lexicalized  meaning.  For  example,  in  (12),  the  possibility  of using 
BOMBARDER simultaneously with  A  VION (leading us  to  interpret the verb as  meaning 
'lancer des  bombes') and with NAVIRE (calling for  the interpretation  'lancer des  obus') 
shows  that  only  a  single  lexical  semantic  representation  is  needed  to  cover  these  two 
interpretations.  In  contrast,  the  unacceptability  (i.e.  zeugma  effect)  produced  by  the 
simultaneous  use  of the  verb  FLAMBER with  GOSIER  and  VISAGE  in  sentence  (13) 
suggests that the verb FLAMBER bas at least two lexicalized meanings (p. 64-65). 
(12)  Des avions et des navires bombardaient le port inlassablement. 
(13)  *Son gosier et son visage flambaient. 
The strong polyserrUst perspective is also often espoused in lexical data bases used in natura1 
language  processing,  such  as  WordNet  (Miller,  1995).  This  data  base  makes  very  fine-
grained  sense  distinctions,  resulting  in  a  staggering  number  of  entries  for  highly 
multifunctional items. For example, WordNet (version 3.1) attributes 75 distinct meanings to 
the English verb BREAK
7
.  As noted by Ravin and Leacock (2001, p.  21), one disadvantage 
of this  way  of representing  word  meaning  is  that  it eclipses  recunent trends  of sense-
relatedness and thus makes generalizations about po1ysemy difficult. 
7 Version 3.1, http://wordnet. princeton.edu/ 14 
Other scholars adopt a more moderate version of the polysemist perspective. For example, 
Kleiber (e.g.  1999), while insisting on the reality of polysemy as  a property in the  lexicon, 
nonetheless contends that certain word senses are the product of the interaction of a general 
lexical meaning with world knowledge about properties of entities involved in the situation. 
For  example,  he  notes  that  COMMENCER,  a  verb  that  normally  takes  an  event 
complement,as in (14), can also take a complement denoting an object, as in (15). 
(14)  Jean a commencé à lire/écrire un livre. 
(15)  Jean a commencé un livre. 
Since in sentence (15) a commencé un livre is  interpreted as  'started ta  read/write a book', 
whereas  in ( 14)  the  verb  merely  contributes  the  concept  'begin',  the  verb  appears  to  be 
lexically polysemous.  However,  Kleiber argues  that the verb bas  only a  single  lexicalized 
meaning that  is  responsible  for  both uses.  He  characterizes  this  meaning as  describing  an 
oriented  movement  along  some  dimension  of an  entity,  this  movement  resulting  in  the 
division of the entity into two  (intemally homogenous) parts. If the entity in question is  an 
event (e.g. an À+ INF complement as in (14)), the movement is along the dimension oftime, 
resulting in the event being divided into two parts:  one part that is  already realized  and one 
part that has yet to  be realized. If instead the complement refers to  a concrete object as  in 
(15), we obtain a reading involving either 'creation' (such that the entity is divided into a pmi 
that is  already created and a part that is  yet to  be created) or  'modification' (such that the 
entity is divided into a part that has been modified and a pmi that has yet to be modified). In 
the case of the complement un  livre,  the modification of the object is  accomplished through 
the  tuming  of pages  involved  in  the  process  of reading  (this  page-tuming  progressively 
modifying the height of the stack of read pages compared to  that of the  unread pages).  In 
other words,  the  different  interpretations  attributable  to  COMMENCER in  (14)  and  (15) 
follow from a single lexicalized meaning (1999, p. 200-209)
8
. 
8 As K.leiber points out and as I show below, this analysis contrasts with Pustejovsky's (1995) analysis 
of the polysemy of BEGIN. 15 
However, Kleiber raises serions doubts about the idea of extending the notion of monosemy 
to the lexicon in general: 
[L]a quête d'un amont sémantique pour rendre compte de la diversité des «emplois» d'une unité 
lexicale est une opération légitime, qui permet, s'il y a effectivement un tel  invariant, de débusquer 
les vocables faussement labellisés polysémiques. Ce qui nous semble, par contre, beaucoup moins 
légitime, c'est de généraliser la chose et de postuler qu'il en va ainsi de toute unité lexicale, la 
polysémie alors n'existant plus du tout. (2008, p. 89, my emphasis) 
[C]e  que  1  'on ne  saurait refuser,  c'est que  certaines  interprétations  multiples  ont  des  propriétés 
empiriques  particulières  qui  font  qu'elles sont linguistiquement pertinentes au  niveau  de  l'unité 
lexicale elle-même et non plus seulement du discours. (2008, p. 97) 
Thus, while acknowledging that sorne semantic uses are the result of pragmatic mechanisms 
interacting  with  a  general  lexical  meaning,  Kleiber nonetheless  considers  many cases  of 
multiple uses to be attributable to lexicalized polysemy. For example, he argues that the two 
meanings of SOURIS,  'animal'  and  'computer peripheral', cannat be reduced to  a  süigle 
category and therefore must be encoded as two separate lexical meanings (p. 91 ). 
Other  scholars,  while  attributing  polysemy  to  stored  knowledge  about  specifie  senses, 
nonetheless claim that this lexical knowledge is anchored in general, overarching conceptua1 
structures spanning across specifie conceptual domains.  This is  the perspective adopted in 
Cognitive Semantics
9
,  one of the most prorninent theories in current theoretical research on 
polysemy. In this theoretical perspective, a given word's po1ysemy is generally conceived of 
as a complex network of individual meanings built around one or severa[ base meanings or 
prototypes (Lakoff,  1987; Langacker, 1987, 1991; Fillmore and Atkins, 2000; Evans, 2005). 
According  to  Lakoff ( 1987),  polysemy  is  motivated:  on  the  one  band,  the  senses  of a 
polysemous word do not make up an arbitrary grouping, but rather a category of meanings 
related through general cognitive principles. On the other band, scholars such as Lakoff argue 
in  favor  of the  hypothesis  of "full  specification"  rather  than  "minimal  specification": 
individua1 word senses are lm·gely unpredictable and thus must be stored (p. 420-424, p. 438). 
9 Throughout the present disseration, I use the term "Cognitive Semantics" in a broad sense to refer to 
ail semantic work carried out within the general Cognitive Linguistic approach. 16 
In this approach, each word senseis held to correspond to a distinct image schema (a general 
schema based on spatial  experience  but independent  of modality) stored in the  mind,  and 
these image schemas are ananged in a radial network branching out from the most central, 
prototypical senses to less central senses
10 (p. 416-461). One type of  relation among senses is 
similarity, i.e. the property of having a set of meaning components in common. For example, 
in  the  radial  network  of senses  belonging  to  the  preposition  OVERll,  Lakoff  (1987) 
distinguishes, amongst others, the two senses in (16) and (17) via two different image schema 
representations,  given  in  Figures  1.1  and  1.2,  respectively.  These  image  schemas  are 
distinguished by the presence (example (16)) or absence (example (17)) of contact between 
the  trajector  (roughly,  the  moving  entity  conceptualized  as  a  figure)  and  the  landmark 
(roughly, the  ground relative to  which the  figure is  moving). But these two  schemas  also 
share characteristics, such as the fact that the landmark is both vertical and extended (p. 419-
422).  Thus,  in  Lakoffs  Cognitive  Semantic  perspective,  lexical  semantic  knowledge  is 
highly  detailed,  with  a  considerable  amount  of redundancy  between  separately  stored 
meanings  (i.e. between the multiple image schemas in a polysemous word's radial network). 
(16)  The plane jlew over the hill. 
(17)  Sam walked over the hill. 
10 This  view of word  senses as  chained to each other by shared properties is based on Wittgenstein 's 
(1953)  idea  of "family resemblances"  (Lakoff,  1987,  p.  435).  In  Wittgenstein's view, although the 
multiple  senses  of  a  word  are  related  to  each  other  (like  the  members  of a  family),  there  is  not 
necessarily a single set of features that is cornmon to al! the senses. 
11  Lakoffs  discussion  is  based  on  Brugman's (1981)  image  schema  analysis  of the  polysemy  of 
OVER. 17 
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Figure 1.1  Schema l.VX.NC (Lakoff, 1987, Fig. 3, p. 421) 
Figure 1.2  Schema l.X.C (Lakoff, 1987, fig.  5, p. 422) 
In the Cognitive Semantic framework, accounts of polysemy rely heavily on the mechanism 
of metaphor
12
,  conceived of as  an asymmetrical mapping between two  conceptual domains 
(i.e. semantic fields), the source domain and target domain. When we use a given metaphor, 
we  attribute the characteristics  of the  source domain to  the  entities  of the  target  domain. 
Conceptual metaphors, which are purely conceptual structures and which do not have a form, 
12  While scholars like Lakoff ( 1987) assign a central role to metaphor in the structuring of polysemy 
and of language in  general, Talmy (2000) proposes instead the notion ofjictivity, which he  claims is 
more general and better adapted to describing both linguistic  and non-linguistic cognition (p.  168). In 
pa1iicular, he proposes to handle extended uses of movement expressions through the notion of  fictive 
motion (p. 99-175). Crucially, both types of approaches (metaphor and fictivity) attribute a central role 
to space in semantics. ---- ·-· ----------------------------- ---- -
18 
are manifested through  linguistic metaphors, which are words or expressions of a specifie 
language (Croft and Cruse, 2004, p.  195-197). For example, Lakoff(1987, p. 439) argues that 
the sense of over in (18) is  a linguistic metaphor based on the spatial sense in  (17) and two 
conceptual metaphors:  1) OBSTACLES ARE VERTICAL LANDMARKS and 2) LIFE IS A 
JOURNEY.  In  other words,  in this  example "the divorce is  an obstacle (metaphorically, a 
vertical  extended  landmark)  on  the  path  defined  by  life's joumey".  Here,  the  concept of 
motion from the  source domain of space is  used to  characterize an  event occurring in the 
abstract target domain 'life'. 
( 18)  Harry still hasn 't gotten over his divorce. 
Cognitive  Semantic  research  on  polysemy  has  focused  largely  on  prepositions  (see 
Vandeloise,  1986;  Brugman  and  Lakoff,  1988;  Tyler  and  Evans,  2003;  Meex,  2004). 
However,  other studies  have  dealt with verbs,  in  particular  verbs  of position/posture (see 
Gibbs,  2002;  Lemrnens,  2002; Newman and  Rice,  2004),  perception (e.g. Johnson,  1999; 
Sjostrom,  1999;  Lien,  2005)  and motion (see Radden,  1996;  Di  Meola,  1994, 2003; Shen, 
1996; Yin, 2002; Da Silva, 2003; Sivonen, 2005; Femandez Jaen, 2006)
13
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The  Cognitive  Semantic  approach  to  polysemy  has  a  marked  advantage  over  traditional 
polysemist approaches: rather than treating word senses as  lists of definitions, it views them 
as schematic conceptual representations whose relations are motivated by principles rooted in 
general  cognition.  Thus,  senses  are  treated  not  simply  as  a  list  of distinct  meaning 
representations within the lexicon (and therefore separated from extra-linguistic knowledge), 
but rather as connected to each other and to non-linguistic knowledge via general structures. 
However, this approach has severa! important weaknesses. First, the idea of motivation raises 
a serious problem: if the relations structuring the network of senses for a given polysemous 
word (founded on cognitive mechanisms such as metaphor, metonymy, etc.) can be identified 
13  Given the present dissertation's focus on deictic  motion verbs, I retum to the  latter group below in 
section 1.2. 19 
but not predicted, the  value of these  relations  is ad hoc  and  descriptive,  not predictive or 
explanatory. 
Second, as  in  strong polysemist approaches, the Cognitive Semantic assumption that senses 
are  largely  conventional  and  unpredictable  necessarily  leads  to  extremely  complex 
knowledge  associated with lexical items, as  well as  a great deal of inter-sense redundancy. 
For example,  the two  senses  illustrated  in  examples  (16)  and  (17)  above  differ only  with 
respect to the property of 'contact' and share all of their other characteristics (  e.g. movement 
above and across a landmark, the vertical and extended character of this landmark). This type 
of inter-sense redundancy arises frequently in analyses within this  approach, and  it leads to 
the necessity of postulating a highly complex network of schemas for a single word, such as 
the partial network ofmeanings proposed in Lakoff (1987, p. 436) for the preposition OVER, 
reproduced  here  as  Figure  1.3.  In  this  network,  each  node  represents  a  distinct  sense 
(  conesponding to  its own image schema), and the letters and numbers represent the specifie 
semantic prope1iies of  each sense
14
. 
14  Langacker ( 1987) argues, however, that individual nodes should not be seen as "discrete containers, 
each holding a separate body of 'content'", but rather that the nodes share conceptual material, each 
node  "structur[ing]  and  organiz[ing]  this  content  in  its  own  way,  combining  it  with  additional 
specifications not appropriate for al! the others" (378). 20 
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Figure 1.3  Network ofmeanings for the preposition OVER (Lakoff, 1987, fig.  27, p. 436) 
A  third  problem  lies  in  the  imprecise  character of image  schemas.  According  to  Lakoff, 
image schemas are more abstract than mental images of specifie situations, and thus they can 
only be  given an approximate formai representation (1987,  p.  453).  But as  Kleiber (1999) 
argues in his criticism ofLangacker's analysis of the polysemy of  the verb BEGIN, the use of 
an  image  schema  approach  to  representing  word  senses  amounts  to  representing  surface 
effects rather than the actuallexical meaning of a word. This, he argues, makes it difficult to 
limit the  number of possible  senses  attributed to  a given word,  leading  to  an undesirable 
proliferation  of semantic  representations:  "Une  telle  conception  de  la  polysémie  verbale 
devient  vite  incontrôlable  et  aboutit à  une  multiplication  des  sens  que  l'on peut estimer 
excessive." (p. 163). 21 
A final problematic feature of this approach lies in the assumption that space pla  ys a central 
role in  language. Cognitive semanticists argue that language, which occurs in the body, is 
heavily  influenced  by  spatial  experiences.  Thus,  concrete,  spatial  senses  are  seen  as  the 
central, prototypical meanings around which abstract, "extended" senses are organized (see 
the  analysis  of OVER  in  Brugman  and  Lakoff,  1988). But  such  a  spatio-centric  view of 
language rests on dubious assumptions: as Bouchard (1995, p.  47-52) points out, spatial uses 
are easier to  describe than abstract uses, yielding the illusion that they are more basic and 
central in the lexicon. 
Another prominent semantic them·y which proposes a "moderate" polysemist approach to the 
lexical status  of polysemy is  Jackendoffs (e.g.  1990,  2002)  Conceptual Semantics. Unlike 
cognitive  semanticists,  Jackendoff  acknowledges  that  non-spatial  senses  of polysemous 
words  are  not  necessarily  derived  from  spatial  senses.  Thus,  he  points  out  that  unlike 
Cognitive  Semantics,  which  views  word  senses  as  being  derived  (via  mechanisms  like 
metaphor) from  a prototypical meaning, in Conceptual Semantics  such senses  are "parallel 
inst~ntiations of a more  abstract schema".  For example,  while TO  can be  used  to  express 
space,  possession,  ascription of properties  or  change  of schedule  (examples  (19)  through 
(22)), these different uses are manifestations of a single, "field-neutral" function describing 
the notion 'path' (2002, p. 356-359). 
(19)  The messenger wentfrom Paris to Istanbul. 
(20)  The inheritance went to Fred. 
(21)  The light wentlchanged  from green to red. 
(22)  The meeting was changed  from Tues day to Monday. 
However, while acknowledging the  existence of a domain-independent concept behind the 
different  senses  of a given word, Jackendoff nonetheless  claims  that specifie  senses  show 
unpredictable  propetiies  and  constraints.  For  example,  although  the  verb  GO,  like  the 
preposition TO, can be used in the demains of space, possession, and ascription of  properties, 
it differs from TO 's use in (22) in that it cannot be used to talk of a change of schedule:  *The 
meeting went from  Tuesday  ta  Monday.  Jackendoff thus  argues  in  favor of the storage of 22 
these senses in the lexicon: "All these little details have to be learned; they cannot be part of 
the general mapping that relates these fields  to each other. This means that each word must 
specify in which fields  it appears and what peculiar properties it has  in each" (Jackendoff, 
2002,  p.  359)
15
•  Consequently,  although  Conceptual  Semantics  does  not  adopt  the 
derivational,  spatio-centric  view  of  polysemy  adopted  by  Cognitive  Semantics,  both 
theoretical  approaches  consider  sense-specifie  information  to  be  (at  least  in  part) 
unpredictable and thus lexically stored. 
1.1.2  Monosemist approaches 
Proponents  of the  monosemist  perspective  argue  that  polysemist  approaches  like  those 
discussed  above  present  several  important  disadvantages.  First,  as  several  scholars  (  e.g. 
Vandeloise,  1986; Ruhl,  1989; Bouchard,  1995; Sperber &  Wilson,  1995;  Levinson, 2000) 
have pointed out, communication relies on a great deal of contextual/background knowledge 
and  inference.  Crucially,  it  would  be  highly  uneconomical  and  redundant  to  store  this 
abundant extra-linguistic knowledge in the lexicon. For example, Ruhl (1989, p. 7)  observes 
that  some  dictionaries  devote  a  distinct  definition  to  the  semantic  use  in  which  BREAK 
describes the rupturing of a blood vessel resulting in blood flowing (as in  break an artery). 
Ruhl argues that this  interpretation is the result of highly specifie world knowledge (about 
arteries,  blood,  etc.)  interacting  with  a  highly  general  lexical  meaning.  To  place  such 
15 Similarly, while the cognitivist Langacker (1987), argues on the one hand in favor of overarching, 
abstract  concepts, pointing out the  "effective  equivalence,  for purposes of linguistic  expression,  of 
physical motion, perceptual motion, and the abstract motion of processes like counting or reciting the 
alphabet" (p.  176). On the other hand, he argues in favor of the storage of multiple sense nodes in a 
network.  Moreover, he considers that while some such networks contain "a single 'superschema' fully 
compatible with all other members of the category," su ch an overarching representation is  not al  ways 
present (p. 378-381). 23 
information  in  the  lexicon  is  to  deny  the  role  of world  knowledge  and  pragmatics  m 
generating interpretations for words in context
16
. 
Second, as  Pustejovsky (1995)  points out, polysernist approaches lead  to  the  uncontrolled 
proliferation of meanings postulated for a given word, since a word can constantly be used in 
novel  contexts  with  an  unlimited  nurnber  of possible  variations  in  contextual  detail.  For 
example, the  uses of FAST illustrated  in  (23)  and  (24)  (p. 44-45), would most likely not 
appear in a traditional  dictionary  list of meanings  for  this  word. Sirnilarly, Ruhl  (1989, p. 
115) shows that while the verb HIT prototypically describes impact involving elements like a 
band or a bullet (as reflected in traditional dictionary definitions), the possibilities are in fact 
much broader: the element involved can by anything from a hammer, as in (25), to a voice, as 
in  (26).  Crucially,  if separate  meanings  were  to  be  attributed  to  capture  such  situational 
details as those illustrated here, the result would be an explosion in the number of meanings 
postulated for the words in question
17
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(23)  The Autobahn is thefastest motorway in Germany. 
(24)  1 need a fast garage for my car, since we leave on Saturday. 
(25)  Barbara did the carpentry. You should hear her swear when she hits her thumb. 
(Robert Hein1ein, as cited by Ruhl, 1989, p.  115) 
(26)  A/ways hit the message-bea  ring words firmly. 
Third,  both  Ruhl  and  Pustejovsky  further  point  out  that  polysemist  approaches  are 
undermined  by  the  fact  that  sense  boundaries  are  often  fuzzy  and  indeterminate  (see 
Pustejovsky's notion of  the "penneability ofword senses"). For example, Ruhl (1989, p. 114) 
observes that although sentences like (27) and (28) are highly similar in the semantic use of 
16 Moreover, as shown in  my discussion of Lakoff s analysis of OVER above,  the inclusion of such 
world  knowledge  in  lexical  meaning  also  leads  to  redundancy  between  senses:  storing  individual 
senses  would  inevitably  require  that  we repeatedly  store  whatever  semantic  content  they  have  in 
conunon. 
17 In addition, Pustejovsky (1995) points out that same sense can often correspond to multiple syntactic 
categories, leading to an even greater proliferation of meanings. 24 
the verb  HIT,  the notion of physical contact is  more clearly involved in  (27)  than in  (28), 
where AIR is used metonymically for 'be heard' or 'be realized'. 
(27)  Steam emerging from scores of  safety valves turned into vapor as saon as  it hit 
the cold air. (Joseph Kraft, as cited by Ruhl, 1989, p.  115) 
(28)  But the man who creates music is hearing something else, is dealing with a roar 
rising from the void and imposing arder on  it as it fûts the air. (James Baldwin, 
as cited by Ruhl, 1989, p.  115) 
For these  reasons,  Ruhl  (1989,  p.  3-5)  argues  that  it is  preferable to  adopt a  "monosernic 
bias",  i.e.  the  default hypothesis  that a given word  has  only a single meaning.  Only after 
having canied out a minute examination of a large set of occwTences of the word in highly 
diversified  contexts, and  only  when  it  proves  impossible  to  reduce  these  uses  to  a  single 
meaning can we conclude that these uses are due to distinct meanings in the lexicon. 
Monosemist analyses  vary  both  in  the  nature  of the  content attributed  to  a  word's  single 
lexical meaning and in the way in which word senses are obtained from this meaning. Sorne 
scholars  postulate that  a word's single  lexical meaning  conesponds  directly  to  one  of its 
senses,  the  remaining  senses  deriving  from  this  meaning  in context.  This  is  the  case  for 
Picoche (e.g.  1986,  1994,  1995), who adopts the Psychomécanique du  langage framework 
(see Guillaume et Valin,  1971) and  seeks for  each word a single signifié de puissance, an 
underlying meaning that is responsible for the word's various semantic uses. The latter, it is 
claimed,  are  derived  via  "movements  of thought"  by  which  the  speaker  progressively 
enriches or subtracts from the word's underlying conceptual content.  A major weakness of 
this type  of approach  is  that,  as  Picoche herself acknowledges,  it  does  not  adopt  a  strict 
formalism and the resulting semantic descriptions are not falsifiable, for the exact method of 
description adopted for one word cannot be reproduced for another word (1995, p.  124-125). 
For this reason, although the approach provides a certain description of the underlying unity 
behind a word's multiple senses, it does  not make  it possible to  predict for  a given word 25 
precisely which senses are acceptable and which are impossible and to measure the predictive 
strength of  this approach against competing theories 
18
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Victorri and Fuchs (1996) also adopta monosemist perspective, arguing that a word's various 
uses emerge in context. These au thors explore the semantics of the French adverb ENCORE, 
describing this word's core meaning via a schema corresponding to  the basic temporal use 
(  e.g. Je suis bien jeune encore); the other senses are claimed to be derived from this schema 
by  the  variation  of elements  such  as  the  domain  in  which  the  contextualized  word  is 
interpreted. Thus, encore has a temporal use when interpreted in the domain of time, but the 
result is a non-temporal interpretation when context brings us to  apply the word's schema to 
"another domain on which a cognitive activity of the subject is exercised". For example, in a 
sentence like Un pinguoin, c'est encore un oiseau,  the schema is applied to a set of classes, 
and the sentence thus receives a "notional" rather than a temporal construal (p.  115-116). 
Another approach proposing to derive a word's polysemy in context from a single lexicalized 
meanmg  is  Pustejovsky's  (1995)  Generative  Lexicon  the01·y.  Pustejovsky  devotes  much 
attention  to  the  phenomenon  of regular  or systematic  polysemy  (also  explored,  e.g.,  by 
Apresjan,  1974, and Nunberg,  1995), arguing that if cettain repeated patterns of polysemy 
prove to  be predictable,  they  must not be attributed  to  multiple meanings  in the  lexicon. 
Instead,  this  scholar  proposes  a  single  semantic  entry  containing  severa!  layers  of 
information, including what he calls a "qualia" structure.  There are four types of qualia:  1) 
constitutive (e.g. for the word RAND, the part-whole relation with a body), 2)formal (e.g. for 
the word MAN, the property 'male', which distinguishes a man within the class ofhumans), 
18 An approach that shows similarities with that ofPicoche is  the one adopted by Desclés (e.g. 2005; 
see also Deslcés et al.,  1998; Desclés and Guentcheva, 2005), who combines aspects of the polysemist 
and  monosemist  perspectives.  On  the  one  hand,  as  in  mainstream  Cognitive  Semantic  analyses, 
Desclés  describes  word senses as  forming a network of interrelated senses (in his terms,  semantico-
cognitive  schemas). On  the  other  hand,  as  in the  monosemist perspective, this  scholar proposes to 
factor out the differences between individual senses in order to arrive  at a conunon denominator,  an 
abstract  "semantico-cognitive  archetype"  which  he  claims  functions  as  the  "root''  of the  word's 
semantic  network.  As  Desclés  et  al.  (1998,  p.  31)  point  out,  this  element  is  comparable  to  the 
Guillaumian signifié de puissance observed in Picoche's work. 26 
3) telic (e.g. for the word BOOK, the fact that a book bas the function ofbeing read), and 4) 
agentive (e.g.  for  BOOK,  the  fact that the  object is  brought into  being through  the  act of 
writing). 
In addition, Pustejovsky proposes a limited number of general mechanisms serving to derive 
new senses from a single lexical meaning. One such mechanism, type coercion, accounts for 
the  semantic  use  of BEGIN observed  in  (29)  below,  paraphrasable  as  (30).  According  to 
Pustejovsky, the verb BEGIN selects an argument that is an event. Since BOOK is not of the 
type 'event' but does contain an event in its qualia (the telic property 'read'), the type of the 
complement is "coerced", and the argument is  interpreted as  an event, i.e.  'reading a book' 
(p.  115-117). In other words, type coercion generates a new interpretation for BOOK based 
on the intrinsic semantic properties of  BEGIN and BOOK. 
(29)  John began a book. 
(30)  John began reading a book. 
One weakness of Pustejovsky's Generative Lexicon approach lies  in the  complexity of its 
lexical  entries  and  the  precise  nature  of the  information  they  contain.  For  example, 
Pustejovsky's  entry  for  BOOK contains  the  agentive  specification  that  a  book is  created 
through the event 'writing'. However, knowledge about how books come into being be  longs 
to our encyclopedie knowledge of the way entities work in the real world. Hence, if we were 
to  imagine  a  situation (for example,  in  a movie)  in which  a book were  caused  to  appear 
magically (and thus without having been written by anyone), this manner of creation would 
not  prevent  us  from  calling  the  object  in  question  a  book.  Cmcially,  this  inclusion  of 
encyclopedie  information  in  a  lexical  entry  leads  to  redundancy  with  respect  to  world 
knowledge, which constitutes a problem from the perspective of  parsimony. 
In contrast to the above proposais, semanticists who adopta stronger monosemist perspective 
argue that word senses are not derived or generated from  a base sense, but rather obtained 
from a highly abstract meaning which is  not identical to  any of the word's specifie senses. 
This  abstract  core  meaning  combines  compositionally  with  pragmatic,  extralinguistic 
knowledge in  order to produce the word's individual contextualized interpretations. That is, 
strong monosemists seek to  show how a word's different senses can be calculated based on 27 
the nature of the elements in the sentence environment and based on contextual knowledge 
(lexical  and grmmnatical environment,  nature  of arguments)  as  well  as  the  speaker's  and 
hearer's shared knowledge of the world
19
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For  example,  Piron  (2006)  offers  an  abstract  monosemous  account  of the  French  verb 
ENTENDRE, claiming the verb's  semantic core is  a schema composed of a succession of 
five  parts (p.  124-125). Only the first component ('emission') is  obligatory, and  the others 
can be "deployed" successively. Hence, while  the  semantic use shown in  (31)  (which the 
author calls 'émission d'un accord collusoire') involves only the 'emission' component of  the 
verb's meaning (p. 301-306), the prototypical 'auditory'  use of ENTENDRE illustrated in 
(32) involves the full deployment ofall of the facets ofENTENDRE's meaning (p. 148-207). 
(31)  Ils ne sont pas parvenus à s 'entendre sur ce dossier. 
(32)  J'ai entendu du bruit dans le bureau d'à côté. 
Cmcially, according to Piron, contrary to what our intuition may suggest, the most concrete, 
percept-based sense of ENTENDRE (that of auditory perception) does not correspond to the 
verb's meaning in the lexicon; rather, the verb's meaning is much more abstract and contains 
no intrinsic notion of  perception. 
Ruhl (1989), too, adopts a strong monosemist approach to lexical meaning. In his analysis of 
highly multifunctional English words such as  BREAK, HIT and T AKE, he shows that each 
of these words possesses numerous possible uses  but only a single, highly abstract lexical 
19 It should  be noted  that certain  scholars  go  so  far as to  reject the  existence of a  definite  lexical 
meaning altogether.  For example, Cruse (2000) affirms that "it is not possible in general to adequately 
specify  the semantic properties of words in a context-free form" (2000, p.  30), deeming that "there is 
no such thing as the 'meaning of a word' in isolation from particular contexts" (2000, p. 51). However, 
as Kleiber points out in his criticism of what he calls the « radical constructivism » perspective,« [o]n 
ne  peut  construire  avec  rien  et  donc  l'existence  de  morceaux  sémantiques  stables  ou  sens 
conventionnel  est  nécessaire  au  fonctionnement  interprétatif.  Ce  n'est  pas  parce  que  le  sens  d'un 
énoncé est quelque chose de construit discursivement que tout ce qui  mène à cette interprétation est 
également du construit durant  l'échange  [  ... ]  [S]ans sens  conventionnel ou stable,  il  n'est guère de 
construction sémantique possible» (Kleiber, 1999, p. 35).  Like Kleiber, I reject the notion of unstable 
meaning, assuming instead that each word in the lexicon must be  describable by at least one stable 
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meaning.  This meaning, he  claims,  is  inaccessible to  conscious observation; moreover,  he 
argues that conscious thought dist01ts this meaning by focussing nanowly on specifie, often 
prototypical situations and referents. Ruhl postulates pragmatic mechanisms  responsible for 
the specifie interpretations we attribute to words in context. For example, the use of BREAK 
in  break an  artery  is  obtained  via  the  mechanism of pragmatic metonymy:  based  on our 
knowledge of the real-world properties ofblood vessels and blood, we derive from BREAK's 
highly general meaning the notion of the wall of an mtety being mptured, and from this we 
infer the result of that event (i.e. blood flowing). Another such mechanism, which Ruhl calls 
pragmatic specialization, consists in the  enrichment and  consequent narrowing down of a 
word's meaning. This is what we find in a sentence like The thieftook thejewels, where the 
\ 
highly  general  meaning  of the  verb  T  AKE  is  used  to  describe  the  specifie  concept  of 
'stealing'. Cmcially,  the  verb  itself contains  no  notion of theft;  rather, this  inf01mation is 
inferred from  contextual and  world knowledge (in this  case, knowledge about what thieves 
typically do) (p.6-7). 
In the present section, I have offered a review of the major theoretical positions on the status 
of polysemy in the lexicon, first describing theoretical approaches that view polysemy as the 
existence of  multiple meanings in the lexicon, and th en describing tho se which view words as 
generally having only a single meaning (either a base sense or a highly abstract core) from 
which all senses are derived in context using extra-linguistic knowledge. As  1 have shown, 
the former perspective presents  severa! important weaknesses which the latter allows us  to 
overcome. 
1.2  The semantics of polysemous deictic motion verbs 
In  the  preceding  section,  1  discussed  the  major  differences  between  polysemist  and 
monosemist  approaches,  showing  that  on  the  basis  of general  considerations  such  as 
theoretical  parsimony,  a  (strong)  monosemist  perspective  is  preferable  to  a  polysemist 
approach.  As  this dissertation deals  specifically with the polysemy of deictic motion verbs, 
the  present section is  devoted to  the consequences  that  these  contrasting visions  of word 
meaning  have  for  the  study  of deictic  motion verbs.  The  first  subsection  examines  the ----~-------------------, 
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consequences of a multi-meaning approach, painting out several important weaknesses. The 
second  section  then  examines  a  monosemist  approach  that  overcomes  these  theoretical 
shortcomings. 
1.2.1  Deictic motion verb polysemy in the Cognitive Semantic perspective 
Although verbs expressing motion
20 have received abw1dant attention in the lexical semantic 
literature, the majority of such studies are  limited to the description and analysis of spatial 
uses of these  verbs.  The  existing studies  that  do  attempt to  account for  the  polysemy of 
motion verbs have predominantly been carried out in the Cognitive Semantics framework
21
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Although  a  few  studies  deal  with  non-deictic  verbs  (see  Da  Silva,  2003,  on Portuguese 
DEIXAR 'leave, let'; Desclés, 2005, on French AVANCER; Desclés and Guentcheva, 2005, 
on French MONTER and  its  Bulgarian equivalents;  Sivonen, 2005,  on Finnish KIERTAA 
'circle, go  around'), most have focused  on motion verbs with  deictic prope1iies,  i.e. verbs 
which can describe motion relative to the speaker or the situation of utterance (see Radden, 
1996, for  English  COME and GO;  Shen,  1996,  for Mandarin LAI  'come'; Viberg,  1999, 
·2003,  for  Swedish KOMMA and  GA;  Yin, 2002, for Japanese KURU  'come'; Di  Meola, 
1994, 2003, for German KOMMEN 'come' and GEHEN 'go'; Fenyvesi-Jobbagy, 2003, for 
Danish KOMME 'come'; Matsumoto, 2010, on English GO). 
In this framework,  scholars typically seek to  explain the different senses of the motion verb 
by  proposing  space-based  schematic  representations  to  describe  the  verb's  prototypical 
20 As Baons (1987) points out, the French term mouvement (like the English term movement) is in fact 
vague, sin ce it can apply not only to motion along a path (i.e. change of location) but also to changes in 
position that do  not involve change of location.  To  avoid confusion,  he proposes the tenn verbe de 
déplacement to  describe the class of verbs involving change of location. Accordingly, throughout the 
present dissertation, I use  the  term motion verb  rather than movement verb, because only the former 
exclusive! y applies to change of location. Outside of  this term, the words movement and motion will be 
used interchangeably. 
21 One exception is Jackdendoff(e.g. 1990), who deals with non-movement uses of motion verbs (e.g. 
change of possession,  extension  in  space) as  involving the  same  conceptual function  GO as  in  the 
movement  use.  However,  this  author  does  not  (to  my  knowledge)  ever  offer  a  far-rcaching 
examination of  the full range ofthese verbs' possible senses. 30 
motion  sense(s).  In  the  network  of the  verb's  polysemy,  the  different  (central  and  non-
central)  spatial senses  share many of the  same general features  in tbeir schemas,  but vary 
through propetiies such as the profiling of particular zones of the schema. In addition, non-
spatial  senses  are  considered  to  be  related  to  spatial  senses  via  extensions  based  on 
mechanisms such as metaphor. 
One  work that  is  representative of this  approach is  Radden's (1996)  study of the  English 
deictic verbs COME and GO.  Radden claims that our embodied experience of space makes 
the domain of  spa  ce (and the more specifie domain of  motion) central to our understanding of 
the world, and that consequently the multiple meanings of verbs such as  COME and GO are 
organized around the  spatial senses.  He thus proposes to  account for  the abstract senses of 
these verbs as  metaphorical extensions from the spatial senses. Abstract senses, it is argued, 
consist in  the  characterization of non-spatial situations in terms  of the  spatial domain. For 
example, Radden argues that the temporal sense in (33) is based on the conceptual metaphor 
TIME PASSING IS  MOTION: "time moves toward the observer from the future and, after 
passing him, moves on to the past". Likewise, for GO, the 'future' sense in (34) is the result 
of a metaphoric extension based on the conceptual metaphor TIME P  ASSING IS MOTION 
OVER A  LANDSCAPE.  In both cases, time  (the target domain)  is  described  in tenus of 
motion (the source domain).  The sense illustrated in  (35)  is  claimed to  be the  result of a 
metaphoric extension from COME's spatial "termination" schema illustrated in Figure  1.4, 
which  describes  motion  from  the  perspective  of the  end  of the  path,  via the  conceptual 
metaphor ACHIEVING A PURPOSEFUL CHANGE IS  REACHING A DESTINATION. In 
addition, Radden proposes that the sense of GO  in (36)  is  a metaphorical extension of GO's 
'diversion' motion schema in (given in figure  1.5) in  which a moving object is  caused to 
divert  from  its  original  path;  this  extension  occurs  via  the  conceptual  metaphor 
UNEXPECTED CHANGE IS DIVERSION. 31 
(33)  this coming weekend 
(34)  1 am going to be a lawyer. 
(35)  We have come to a conclusion/agreement. 
--------------7) D 
Figure 1.4  COME: termination schema (adapted from Radden, 1996, p. 43, figure 3) 
(36)  John went mad. 
(37)  G03 : diversion 
Figure 1.5  G03: diversion schema (adapted from Radden, 1996, p. 43, figure 3) 
This type of analysis of motion verb polysemy poses severa! important problems. First, such 
analyses are founded on a dubious inversion of the conceptual hierarchy between change and 
motion.  Change is  a  general  concept,  and motion is  a  type of change,  but this  approach 
assumes that  change is  conceptualized (at  least linguistically)  in terms  of motion (Radden 
1996, p.  425).  Since languages  abound with words  that Jack any  spatial senses at ail  (see 
Evans', 2005, analysis of the radial network of the word TIME), it is clear that language is 
not  fully  dependent  on  space  and  motion  in  its  representation  of abstract  phenomena. 
Moreover, since abstract concepts such as 'time' and 'change' exist independently of space in 
language, it is questionable to  assume to  that these concepts are somehow less  basic than 
motion. 32 
Another problem with the Cognitive Semantic approach to motion verb polysemy is its heavy 
reliance on lists of conceptual metaphors.  While sorne of the  metaphors used in  Radden's 
analysis  come  from  other studies,  he proposes  a  list  of seven  conceptual  metaphors  (all 
submetaphors of CHANGE IS  MOTION) which were "discovered" through the analysis of 
COME and GO; in othcr words, the latter are proposed in an ad hoc fashion to accommodate 
senses  not  covered  by  known  metaphors,  opening  the  door  to  a  virtually  unlimited 
proliferation of conceptual metaphors as  other words and other senses are analysed in future 
studies. Crucially, in addition to the complexity of the networks of word-specific knowledge 
assumed by Cognitive Semantic analyses (see the discussion of OVER above), the Cognitive 
Semantic  approach  adopted  by  Radden  also requires  that  we  assume  the  existence  of a 
complex system of metaphorical knowledge to  support many of the inter-sense connections 
in  these  networks.  This  is  clearly  disadvantageous  from  the  point of view  of theoretical 
parsnnony. 
To my knowledge, the only existing study to offer an in-depth, quasi-exhaustive analysis of 
the polysemy of deictic motion verbs like COME and GO is  Di Meola's (1994, 2003) study 
of the German verbs KOMMEN and GEHEN.  Like Radden, Di Meola's study is  rooted in 
the Cognitive Semantic framework and thus considers that each of these verbs has as its base 
meaning a prototypical motion sense (for GEHEN, movement away from the observer, and 
for KOMMEN,  movement toward the observer).  Di Meola (1994, p.  42)  represents  these 
meanings  via  the  schemas  in  Figures  1.6  and  1.7,  where  0  represents  the  viewpoint  (or 
deictic Origo)
22
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22 I retum to the notion of  origo (i.e. deictic center) in section 3.2. 33 
SOURCE  GOAL 
I  ...............................................  I 
0  PATH 
Figure 1.6  Base meaning ofGEHEN (Di Meola, 1994, p. 42) 
SOURCE  GOAL 
1 ..............................................•  1 
PATH  0 
Figure 1.7  Base meaning ofKOMMEN (Di Meola, 1994, p. 42) 
The other senses  (deictic  senses  involving a  non-prototypical interpretation of the  deictic 
center,  non-deictic  motion  senses,  abstract  senses)  are  derivationally  linked  to  this  base 
meaning and thus form a network of meanings. As the au  thor points out, in one extended use 
KOMMEN can describe motion that is  restricted by an obstacle,  as  illustrated in sentence 
(38). 
(38)  Sie hatten Mühe, zu ihren Platzen zu kommen. (ex. 22,  2003, p. 48) 
'They had trouble getting to their places.' 
This use, he daims, is derived first by passing from the notion of viewpoint to the notion of 
focus, and then by inferring from the latter the notion of restriction. Although he daims this 
derivational relation is based originally on inference, he nonetheless treats  this semantic use 
as a distinct, conventionalized meaning: 34 
With the first step the place where the (deictic) observer was positioned now becomes the place 
the (non-deictic) attention is focused on[  ... ] The second step leads from focus to restriction[  ... ] In 
the case of the verb kommen  we know that the trajector has reached the  GOAL.  On the basis of 
conversational implicature (which becomes conventional) the speaker/hearer argues as follows: if 
we  focus  on  the  GOAL,  the  fact  of reaching  it  must  be  relevant  (non-obvious);  therefore  an 
external force must have influenced the movement (hindering the trajector[  ... ]) (Di Meola, 2003, p. 
55-56, my emphasis). 
In the  case  of abstract  uses  these  deictic  verbs,  Di  Meola  (1994),  like  other  cognitive 
semanticists, has recourse to  the  mechanism of metaphor.  For example,  to  account for  the 
'news  as  an  abstract object in movement'  sense  illustrated in  (39),  the  author claims  that 
transfer  of information  is  presented  as  movement  based  on  the  conceptual  metaphor 
MEANINGS  ARE  OBJECTS  (p.  90).  Sirnilarly,  in  the  case of the  'intellect as  origo' use 
shown in (  40),  he  argves  that mental change  is  presented as  movement,  via the  metaphor 
CHANGES ARE MOVEMENTS INTO OR OUT OF BOUNDED REGIONS (p.  113). 
(39)  Fast tdglich kommen aus den Labors neue Gerüchte. 
'Nearly each day, new mmors are coming from the laboratories.' (my translation) 
(40)  Die Albernheit seines(..) Planes kam ihm zum Bewusstsein. 
Lit. 'The foolishness of  his plan came him into consciousness.' 
'He became aware of the foolishness of  his plan.'  (my translation) 
Cmcially,  in  keeping  with  other  Cognitive  Semantic  analyses,  the  full  array  of senses 
examined in Di Meola's work are considered to be part of lexical knowledge. Thus, although 
this study of KOMMEN/GEHEN is  exemplary in that it takes into account an exceptionally 
wide  range  of semantic  uses  and  provides  a  fine-grained  description  of these  senses,  it 
nonetheless presents the same basic  shortcomings inherent in the  other Cognitive Semantic 
analyses of polysemy: multiple storage of the same information, heavy reliance on metaphor, 
lack of  predictive power and lack of  parsimony. 
1.2.2  A monosemist approach to motion verb polysemy 
I  have  shown  in  the  preceding  sections  that  a  single-meaning  approach  to  polysemy  is 
preferable to multiple-meaning approaches (section 1.1  ) and I have shown, in particular, that 
the  dominant  approach  to  the  polysemy  of motion  verbs  (Cognitive  Semantics)  fails  to 
provide  an  adequate,  economical means  of explanation of the  polysemy  of motion verbs 35 
(section 1.2.1).  A question therefore arises:  is  it possible, by adopting a strict monosemous 
perspective  and  thus  avoiding  reliance  on  rich  metaphorical  knowledge  and  complex 
networks of lexical semantic knowledge, to  provide a more powerful account of the  great 
diversity of  senses observed for deictic motion verbs like COME and GO? 
In the present section, I show that a strong monosemist perspective, in particular the approach 
proposed  by  Bouchard  (1995),  does  indeed  provide  a  framework  which  is  bath  more 
parsimonious and more powerful than a polysemist theory like Cognitive Semantics. I first 
identify the basic theoretical assumptions and principles of this  the01-y  (which I adopt as  a 
component of the  theoretical  framework of the  present  dissertation)  and  then  summarize 
Bouchard's  analysis  of French  motion  verbs,  showing  that  this  analysis  overcomes  the 
weaknesses inherent in multiple-meaning theories of  the lexicon. 
1.2.2.1  Basic assumptions of  the them-y 
The  present  dissertation' s  analysis  will  be  carried  out  in  the  framework  proposed  by 
Bouchard (1995), a strong monosemist approach which adopts the default hypothesis that a 
ward possessing multiple, interrelated semantic senses has only a single lexical meat1ing (see 
Ruhl's  "monosemic  bias").  In  arder  to  eliminate  all  redundancy  between  semantic 
representations and extralinguistic knowledge (i.e.  contextual and encyclopaedic knowledge 
shared by speaker and hear·er), Bouchard proposes simple, highly abstract lexical entries that 
are emptied of all situational information. Thus a verb's senses, rather than being stored in 
the  lexicon,  are  calculated  compositionally  by  combining  the  stable,  abstract  semantic 
representation with extra-linguistic knowledge
23
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One  significant  advantage  of  this  approach  lies  m  the  fact  that  it  proposes  formal 
representations for the core meaning of a  ward, making it possible to  illustrate clearly and 
explicitly how the  different senses of a  ward can be calculated in context.  Crucially, this 
23  For an alternative analysis  of general motion verbs  such as  VENIR and ALLER that also proposes 
abstract lexical semantic representations, see Lamarche (1998). 36 
formalization enables us to  rigorously test the validity of the postulated meaning for a given 
word and thereby to test the strong monosemist view in general. 
In order to account for conespondences between semantics and syntax, Bouchard postulates a 
leve!  of representation  called  grammatical  semantics  (G-Semantics)  containing  only  the 
information relevant to  gramrnar.  He distinguishes this leve! from information belonging to 
situational semantics (S-Semantics),  i.e.  elements of background knowledge that belong to 
the  specifie  situation  in  which  a  word  is  used.  Bouchard  argues  that  lexical  semantic 
representations  contain  only  those  properties  that  are  relevant  to  G-Semantics.  Thus,  he 
rejects the assumption (defended, e.g., by tenants of Cognitive Semantics) of the centrality of 
space  in word  meaning.  The  invariant  lexical  meaning of a verb  like  French VENIR,  he 
claims,  does not contain any  spatial information at all:  it is  highly abstract,  and  all of the 
word's  semantic  uses  (both  concrete and abstract)  are  calculated from  this  representation 
rather than being derived from one of the verb's concrete senses. 
1.2.2.2  Analysis of French motion verbs 
Bouchard (1995) illustrates his  approach through a detailed case study of six French verbs 
(VENIR, ALLER, ARRIVER, PARTIR, ENTRER and SORTIR), identifying for each verb a 
single semantic representation.  He ernphasizes that these  verbs do  not  intrinsically express 
motion,  insisting  instead  that  each  verb's  semantic  representation  expresses  the  abstract 
notion of orientation.  The latter is  claimed  to  be  an "organizing concept" that the  human 
mind imposes on experience rather than an objective relation belonging to a specifie domain 
of externat reality, such as space or time (p. 67-68). 
Thus,  the  meaning of the  verb  VENIR is  represented  by  the  tree  structure  in Figure  1.8, 
which can be rewritten as the bracketed form in (4li
4
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24 Adapted from Bouchard (1995, p. 202). 37 
A" 
0 
Figure 1.8  Semantic representation ofVENIR (Bouchard, 1995, p.  121) 
(41)  VENIR: [X 1 COPULA [X2 COPULA o]] 
This tree structme consists of one copula relation embedded within another. The lower part, 
[X2 copula o], expresses that the variable X2 is  in a relation with the deictic center o, defined 
as  'me-here-now'. The upper tier of the representation expresses that the variable X1 relates 
to  the  lower  relation.  Bouchard  claims  that  the  tree  structme  itself bas  meaning:  given 
properties of dominance inherent to the tree structme formalism, the tree expresses that xl is 
oriented toward the  relation  [X2  copula o].  Since  the  upper  variable  X1  binds  the  lower 
variable X2,  the resulting meaning of the structure as  a whole is:  'X is  oriented toward its 
being in a relation with the deictic center' (p.  121). 
Extra-linguistic knowledge about the nature of the arguments in the sentence plays a crucial 
role in calculating the  specifie situation to  which the sentence refers.  For example,  in the 
sentence Max vient de Paris demain, the fact that the word Max typically refers to a human-
a concrete, anima te entity-brings us to interpret the deictic center in tenns of its spatial facet 
'here'. The most natural way  for  a  human  (a  concrete  entity  with volition)  to  realize  an 
orientation  towards  the  spatial  point  'here'  is  to  undergo  motion  (p.  127-128).  For the 
sentence  Cette  route  vient  de  Montréal,  om  encyclopaedic  knowledge  of the  spatial 
properties of bridges and cities brings us to interpret this orientation once again in the domain 
of space,  but  this  time  as  a  static  extension  in  space  rather than  as  motion  (p.  138).  In 38 
contrast, in a sentence such as  Max  vient de partir, where the  complement of VENIR is  a 
verb  (i.e.  a tense-bearing element) describing an event;  this  leads us  to  interpret VENIR 's 
orientation and the deictic center temporally (the latter thus being construed according to  its 
temporal facet 'now') (p.  139-144). In the case of a sentence like Ce mot vient du grec, both 
the generic  tense  and  the  lexical elements  in  the  sentence  bring us  to  interpret the  deictic 
center in its abstract 'me' fa cet (  construed generically as a "self in the set of all selves"), with 
the complement du grec expressing a permanent property of the entity ce mot (p.  136-137). 
Bouchard  argues  that  other  general  motion  verbs  in  French  have  similar  tree  structures, 
differing  from  VENIR only with respect to  the  nature  of the  lower argument (the  deictic 
center o,  the anti-deictic center ffi, or a variable y)  or the presence of negation on the lower 
relation,  as  shown  in  the  semantic  representations  (given  here  in  bracket  fonn)  in  (  42) 
through (46) (adapted from Bouchard, 1995, p. 202). 
(42)  ALLER: [X 1 COPULA [X2 COPULA ffi]] 
(43)  ARRIVER: [X1 COPULA"[X2 COPULA y]] 
(44)  PARTIR: [X1 COPULA [X2 NOT-COPULA y]] 
(  45)  ENTRER: [X 1 COPULA [X2 DANS y]] 
(46)  SORTIR: [X 1 COPULA [X2 NOT-DANS y]] 
Bouchard is thus able to account for numerous similarities and differences between the sense 
inventories of these verbs based on minimal differences in intrinsic content. For example, the 
core meaning proposed for ALLER differs from that of VENIR by only a single element: in 
the case of ALLER, the orientation is towards a relation with the constant ffi, the anti-deictic 
center. The latter is defined as the complement of the deictic center o, that is, any point other 
than the  'me-here-now' (p.  150). This minimal difference in content is  sufficient to  explain 
why  the  uses  of  ALLER  ('motion',  'spatial  extension',  'time',  etc.)  differ  from  the 
conesponding uses of VENIR,  and why certain uses  are possible for one verb and not the 39 
other  (e.g.  VENIR expresses  both  'future'  and  'past', whereas  ALLER can  express  only 
'future')
25
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Thus,  Bouchard's  monosemous  analysis of French motion verbs  demonstrates  that highly 
multi-functional verbs need not have multiple lexical meanings: rather, each verb is shown to 
have only a single, abstract meaning from which specifie senses are derived based on extra-
linguistic knowledge. The semantic representations proposed for these verbs not only accow1t 
for  the  multitude  of senses  that  are  possible  for  a  given  verb;  they  also  account  for  the 
differences in  semantic behaviour from one verb to  the  next,  surface differences that result 
from  very  slight  differences  in  each  verb's  respective  invariant  content.  Crucially,  by 
adopting the  asswnption that such verbs  have  no  spatial content at  ail  and  by  taking into 
account the contribution of extralinguistic knowledge, Bouchard's approach provides a more 
powerful  explanation for  the polysemy of motion verbs  than the  spatio-centric,  metaphor-
based aaalyses discussed in section 1.2.1 above. 
1.3  Cross-linguistic variation of  motion verb polysemy 
The  present  section  examines  the  consequences  of  the  polysemist  and  monosemist 
perspectives  for  the  problem of explaining  why  motion verbs  vary  cross-linguistically  in 
terms of their polysemy (i.e. why translation equivalents share sorne, but not ali of the  same 
semantic uses).  First,  in section  1.3.1  I examine the consequences of the multiple-meaning 
view  of polysemy,  focusing  on  the  Cognitive  Semantics  approach  and  showing why  this 
perspective does not provide adequate means to explain why motion verbs' sense inventories 
differ cross-linguistically. Then, in section 1.3.2 I present preliminary evidence showing that 
the monosemist approach provides the necessary tools to explain cross-linguistic variation of 
polysemy through minimal differences in lexical semantic content. 
25  As  I will show in the analysis of the present dissertation (Chapters III-V), the same holds for cross-
linguistic  comparisons:  very  slight  differences  between  the  meaning  representations  of a  cross-
linguistic  translation pair  like  VENIR and  COME account for  numerous  differences  in  the  senses 
inventories of these verbs. 40 
1.3 .1  Limitations of  multiple-meaning approaches 
As  shown above  (sections  1.1  and  1.2), theories which postulate multiple meanings in the 
lexicon  suffer  both  from  lack  of parsimony  and  from  explanatory  inadequacy  from  a 
language-interna! perspective. As  I will show in this  section, a multiple-meaning approach 
also proves inadequate for the task of explaining why polysemy varies from one language to 
the next. 
As has been pointed out by several scholars, motion verbs (in particular deictic motion verbs 
like COME and GO) do not necessarily have identical semantic content from one language to 
the next. Several studies (Wilkins and Hill,  1995, on Mpamtwe Arremte and Longgu; Botne, 
2005, on Chindali; Choi-Jonin and Sarda, 2007, on Korean and French; Antonopoulou and 
Nikiforidou, 2002, on Greek) provide strong evidence that the cross-linguistic equivalents of 
verbs like COME and GO, while satisfactory as approximate translations in certain contexts, 
differ in many of their uses. Crucially, however, these studies focus solely on motion uses of 
these verbs and th us do not attempt to pro  vide an explanation for the variation in these verbs' 
full polysemy. 
As  mentioned  above  (section  1.2.1),  studies  that  attempt  to  account for  the  polysemy  of 
deictic  motion  verbs  have  predorninantly  been  carried  out  in  the  Cognitive  Semantics 
framework.  One  problem  that  this  approach  encounters  in  the  context of cross-linguistic 
variation  of polysemy  is  the  lack of constraints  on  image  schemas.  In  an  image  schema 
approach,  different  spatial  senses  can  be  accounted  for  by  variations  regarding  which 
elements of the schema are profiled (i.e. given special prominence with respect to the rest of 
the schema, see Langacker, 1987, 1991 ).  For example, Shen (1996) and Yin (2002) observe 
that Mandarin LAI and Japanese KURU, respectively, can be used to  describe the beginning 
part of  the motion event, as illustrated in (47) and (48). According to these authors, this 'start-
to-come'  sense results from the profiling of the first  part of the path in the  image schema. 
That is, while in the prototypical use of these verbs, the whole path is profiled (as in Figme 
1.9), in the 'start-to-come' use, only the first part is pro fi led (as in Figure 1.1 0). 41 
(  47)  Ta yijing lai le, xianzai zheng zai lu-shang ne 
he already come PERF now PROG at way-on (LOC) PRT 
'He has left for here already, and he is  on the way right now.'  (Shen,  1996, p. 
510) 
(  48)  Kare wa Nihon e kuru tochuu da  tt  a ga kaetta 
he TOP Japan to come halfway past but go back-PAST 
'He began coming to Japan, but he went back halfway. ' (Yin, 2002, p. 70) 
lm2  !ml 
Figure 1.9  Image schema ofLAI's prototypical use (adapted from Shen, 1996, p. 509) 
~--G 
lm2  !ml 
Figure 1.10  Image schema ofLAI's 'start-to-come' use (adapted from Shen 1996, p.  511) 42 
However, as  Shen points out, English COME does not possess this  sense, as  shown by the 
unacceptability of sentence (49).  Crucially, Shen's analysis does not allow us to explain the 
presence of this sense for Chinese LAI and its absence for English COME. That is, assuming 
that  the  prototypical use of English  COME is  describable by  an  image  schema similar to 
Figure 1.9  above, there is  no reason why the path in COME's representation should not be 
able  to  undergo  the  same  partial  profiling as  in  the  schemas  of its Chinese  and  Japanese 
counterpatis. Thus, explanations of sense differences through variations in profiling offer no 
means  to  explain  and  predict  such  cross-linguistic  differences  in spatial  uses  as  the  one 
illustrated here. 
(  49)  *He has come already, and he is on the way right no w.  (Shen, 2002, p. 51 0) 
Aside from problems arising from the use of profiling of different parts of image schemas, 
another  important  obstacle  for  cross-linguistic  explanation  in  a  Cognitive  Semantic 
perspective  concems the  use  of metaphor as  an  explanatory deviee.  Given  the  Cognitive 
Linguistic view that languages are anchored not only in human experience of the world, but 
also  in  the  specifie  ways  in  which  each  cultme  conceptualizes  this  experience,  cettain 
metaphors  are  argued  to  belong  to  specifie  cultures  and  to  the  cotTesponding  languages 
(Cruse and Croft 2004,  p.  195). Thus,  some cross-linguistic similarities and differences in 
polysemy  can  presumably  be  attributed  to  similarities  and  differences  in  metaphor.  For 
example,  on  the  one  band,  Deignan  et  al.  (1997)  argue  that  the  conceptual  metaphor 
HUMAN RELATIONSHIPS ARE BUILDINGS is present both in English and in Polish, and 
that  is  it in manifested in  the  same  way  in  both  languages  in the polysemy of the  words 
CEMENT and CEMENTOW  Aé, both of which can be used not only concretely but also 
metaphorically in  expressions  such as  cement a relationship. On the other band, as  Csabi 
(2004, p.  250) points out, even when two languages do share the same conceptual metaphor, 
the  latter  will  not necessarily always  be manifested in the same  linguistic  patterns.  Thus, 
Deignan et al.  (1997, p.  354) posit that the metaphor IDEAS ARE FOOD is present in both 
English and in Polish but that it is not manifested in the same linguistic expressions in both: 
an incoherent idea is  characterized in Polish by  the adjective  NIEDOJRZALE  'not ripe', 
while in English it is characterized as HALF-BAKED. ~--~~~--~~~~~~-~~~-- ----~--~-- -----~ ·------------·- - --
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Crucially, there is  no  way to reliably predict which metaphoric extensions will be allowed 
from  one  language  to  the  next.  This  problem  can  be  illustrated  for  deictic  motion  verb 
polysemy with an example from Shen's (1996) analysis ofthe Chinese verb LAI 'come'. To 
account for the existence of the 'mental intention' sense shown in (50), Shen argues that this 
sense is  derived from the verb's prototypical spatial use (shown in  Figure  1.9  above) via a 
metaphoric shift from the  spatial domain to  the  mental domain,  with the  subject's referent 
(e.g. 'he') being viewed as moving towardthe future event (e.g.  'buy a gift'). Since the shift 
is  to the mental domain, the movement is  interpreted as  an intention, whence the notion of 
intended future occunence (p. 531-532). In contrast, Shen cites Langacker (1991) as claiming 
that in English, the existence of the future use of the verb GO (illustrated in (51)) is due to a 
metaphoric  shift from  the  spatial  domain  to  the  temporal  domain,  with  focus  thus  being 
placed on future  occwTence  rather than on intention.  According to  Shen,  the fact  that the 
future use is obtained via different metaphorical shifts in these two languages (i.e. shift to the 
mental domain in Chinese and to the temporal domain in English) explains why future GO is 
completely unacceptable with the future marker WILL (as in (52)), while LAI is  marginally 
acceptable  with  the  future  marker HUI,  as  in (53).  Crucially,  this  sort of account,  which 
attributes cross-linguistic differences in polysemy to differences in the particular metaphoric 
shifts  th~t are allowed in each language, offers little predictive power and thus constitutes a 
mere ad hoc description. 
(50)  Ta lai mai liwu 
he come buy gift 
'He's gonna [sic]  buy a/the gift.'(Shen, 1996, p. 528) 
(51)  He is going ta buy a gift. 
(52)  *J'Il be gonna hold the door. (Shen, 1996, p. 532) 
(53)  ??Wo  hui lai xi wan,  ni zuo beide ba. 
I will come wash dish y  ou do other PR  T 
'l'  11  wash the dishes, and y  ou take care of  other things.' 
(Shen, 1996, p. 529) 
Another example of the weaknesses of the Cognitive Semantic, metaphor-based approach in 
explaining cross-linguistic variation in the polysemy of deictic motion verbs cornes from Di 
Meola's  (1994)  examination  of differences  between  German,  English  and  Italian  deictic 44 
motion verbs  with respect to  a limited  set of senses.  Di  Meola points out that these  three 
languages  all  allow  extension of the  deictic  center  (nom1ally  the  physical  location of the 
speaker) to apply to an abstract part of the speaker, i.e. the intellect, as show in examples  (54) 
through (56).  In contrast, he  observes that while Getman KOMMEN  and English  COME 
cannot be  used  in extended uses  to  describe changes in the observer's emotions and body, 
Italian VENIRE can, as shown in (57) through (59) (p.  121-122). 
(54)  lhm kam eine Idee. 
(55)  An idea came to him. 
(56)  Gli venne un 'idea. 
(57)  Mi viene un desiderio irrefrenabile di mangiare cioccoloata. 
Lit. 'An irr-esistible urge to eat chocolate cornes tome'. 
(58)  Gli viene fame/sete/stanchezza/etc. 
Lit.  'Hunger/thirst/fatigue/etc. cmnes to him'. 
(59)  Gli à venuto mal di testa. 
'A headache came to him'. 
Di  Meola  claims  that  this  cross-linguistic  difference  in  polysemy  is  due  to  a  differing 
restriction  on  the  deictic  center:  in ·German  and  English  the  deictic  center  can  only  be 
extended to the mental domain, while in Italian it can apply to the whole body (and thus also 
to  the mind and emotions).  He further explains this difference in restriction by claiming that 
the  languages  in  question  use  different  folk  models  (p.  123).  Once  again,  this  type  of 
explanation is merely ad hoc and has no independent motivation
26
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Thus,  in  addition  to  the  problems  with  language-internai  explanatory  adequacy  identified 
above (sections 1.1.1  and  1.2.1), Cognitive Semantic analyses face another problem: they do 
26  Another example of a cross-linguistic comparison of deictic motion verbs is Viberg (1999, 2003) 
who examines the similarities and differences between Swedish KOMMA and GA and with respect to 
their cross-linguistic equivalents  from  languages  like  English. Like Di Meola (1994), however, this 
study does not provide a far-reaching, principled exp1anation for the sense divergences between these 
languages. 45 
not offer adequate means to  explain and predict between-language variation of polysemy. 
Relying  on  mechanisms  like  image  schema profiling  and  metaphor  to  account  for  sense 
relations,  they  do  not  allow  us  to  go  beyond  ad  hoc  descriptions  of cross-linguistic 
asymmetries  to  explain  why  the  members  of a  given  pair  of cross-linguistic  translation 
equivalents (in particular, deictic motion verbs) typically are not identical in their respective 
ranges of  possible se man  tic uses. 
1.3.2  Explaining cross-linguistic sense variation via monosemy: prelirninary evidence 
As shown above, from a language-interna! perspective, there are severa! reasons in favor of 
adopting the strong monosemist view, which postulates a highly abstract core meaning that 
combines  with extralinguistic knowledge to  generate specifie interpretations  in context.  In 
particular, I showed that Bouchard's (1995) monosemist approach provides one of the most 
powerful explanatory frameworks.  However, white Bouchard demonstrates the adequacy of 
his  them-y  to  explain  language-interna!  polysemy  patterns,  demonstrating  how  abstract 
monosemy  accounts  for  the  semantic  behaviour  of six  French  motion  verbs  (VENIR, 
ALLER, ARRIVER, PARTIR, ENTRER, and SORTIR), he does not attempt to  explain why 
the conesponding verbs in other languages do not have the same sense inventories
27
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In order to  fully test this approach, we must examine not only its language-interna! validity, 
but also its  ability to  account ,for variation between languages. To my knowledge, only one 
study has tested the cross-linguistic explanatory power of a strong monosemist approach by 
systematically comparing the sense inventories of a pair of  translation equivalents. In order to 
compare Bouchard's analysis of French with data from a language that is both typologically 
and  genealogically very different from French (and thus to test the universal validity of the 
monosernist approach), Zuercher (2010) examines the verb AVY 'come' from Malagasy (an 
27  This  author  does  offer  preliminary  evidence  of the  cross-linguistic  explanatory  power  of his 
monosemist approach, e.g.  in his comparison of English and French (  dealing with the interpretational 
properties  of manner-of-movement verbs and  with the  possibility or impossibility of certain  motion 
verbs to  be  used  transitively).  However,  he  does  not attempt to  account for  the full array of sense 
differences between a given pair of  translation equivalents. 46 
Austronesian  language  of the  Malayo-Polynesian  branch).  In  this  study,  I  identify  the 
different senses of AVY, propose a single semantic representation (shown in (61)), and show 
how slight differences between this  core meaning and that of VENIR (represented in (60)) 
explain the varions surface differences in these verbs' semantic behaviour. 
(60)  x 
(61)  x 
w --------------~~ 
Just like VENIR, A  VY's meaning is abstract and contains no concept of movement or space. 
Consequently, both verbs can be used not only in the spatial domain (to describe situations 
like  movement)  but also  in abstract  domains  like  time  and  origin.  However, they  are  not 
identical:  whereas  VENIR means  'X is  oriented toward being at the deictic  center', AVY 
means  'X is  oriented from  being at  the  anti-deictic  center'.  It should  be  noted  that  these 
schematic representations are simplifications of the relations expressed in the  tree structure 
used by Bouchard (1995), and that this formalism is  used here only for ease of presentation. 
Crucially,  unlike  the  image  schemas  used  in  Cognitive  Semantics,  this  representation 
expresses no spatial inf01mation at ate
8
. 
Thus, these two verbs differ only with respect to two aspects of their meaning: the nature of 
the constant and the role played by this constant within the representation. First, for VENIR 
the constant is  the deictic center o,  while in the case of AVY the constant is  the anti-deictic 
center w,  that is, any point other than the deictic center.  Second, for  VENIR, the  constant 
plays the role of  goal of the orientation, white in A  VY's meaning the constant corresponds to 
the origin of  the orientation. 
28  lt should also  be noted th at the analysis of Malagasy presented here is  mu ch less fine-grained than 
the present dissertation's analysis of  COME, GO, VENIR and ALLER (Chapters III through V), where 
I  propose  more  detailed  representations  accounting  for  a  much  wider  array  of senses  than  those 
considered here.  Moreover, unlike Zuercher (2010), which directly adopts  the  meaning proposed by 
Bouchard for VENIR, the present dissertation's analysis shows that modifications must be made to this 
representation in order to account for the full range ofVENIR's uses. 47 
A first  consequence of tllis difference in meaning is  that although both verbs can describe a 
movement in space, their spatial uses are not identical. For both verbs, a locative complement 
is  interpreted  as  giving  further  specification  to  the  reference  of the  constant.  But  the 
difference in role played by the constant in the two representations (end point for VENIR and 
origin for AVY) affects the interpretation of a directionally neutral locative complement: for 
VENIR, it is interpreted as  the destination of movement (62), and for AVY, it is  interpreted 
as the origin of  the movement (63i
9
. 
(62)  Jean est venu au bureau. 
(63)  Avy (t)any amin 'ny birao Jaona. 
come (PAST-)there PREP-DET office Jean 
'Jean cornes/came from the office.' (and not:  'Jean cornes/came to the office') 
A second consequence is  that while VENIR requires that the destination of motion be 'here' 
(normally the location of the speaker), in the case of AVY the destination can be anywhere-
'here' or 'there'. This is because VENIR's meaning indicates orientation toward o, the deictic 
center,  while  AVY's meaning specifies  no  destination  at  all. Moreover,  the  origin - the 
constant  w - is  extremely  general,  allowing  for  a  broad  range  of possible  trajectories. 
Consequently, (64) is vague: the destination can be either 'here' or sorne point located in the 
'not-here'
30
. 
29  An exception to  this generalization is  that in the future and imperative, the locative complement is 
interpreted  as  referring to  the goal of movement rather than to  the  source of movement.  1 argue  in 
Zuercher (2010) that this  is  due to  the interaction of AVY's meaning with the  Malagasy tense and 
aspect system. 
30  Note, however,  when  this  sentence  is  heard  out  of context,  the  most natural  interpretation for  a 
Malagasy speaker is that the destination is identical with the speaker's location. 1 show that this is due 
to an  inference based on the fact that A  VY's meaning specifies orientation from an origin that is  'not 
here'. (64)  Ho avy izy rahampitso. 
FUT come 3SG tomorrow 
'He will come tomonow.' 
48 
A  third  surface  difference  is  the  presence/absence  of a  preposition.  Because  VENIR's 
representation contains no element conesponding to the origin of the orientation, in order for 
VENIR to  take a complement expressing source of motion, a source-preposition (i.e. DE) is 
needed (65). This is  not the case for  AVY:  since the latter's complement links  to  a constant 
occupying the position of source of the orientation in AVY's semantics, a source complement 
need not be introduced by a source preposition (66).This structural difference holds not only 
for  the  spatial  domain,  but  across  the se  verbs'  different  senses,  including  the  recent past 
construction  in  (68).  This  same  underlying  difference  explains  an  additional  surface 
difference: AVY (unlike VENIR) can itself function as a FROM-preposition when it follows 
another verb in a serial construction, as shown in (69). 
(65)  Jean vient *(de) Montréal. 
(66)  Avy 0  any Montreal Jaona. 
come there Montreal John 
'J  olm comes/is co ming from Montreal.' 
(67)  Jean vient de manger. 
(68)  Avy 0  nisakafo Jaona. 
come P  AST -eat John 
'John has just eaten.' 
(69)  Tonga avy tany Fianarantsoa izy. 
arrive come PAST-there Fianarantsoa 3SG 
'He arrived from Fianarantsoa.' (lit. 'He arrived corning from Fianarantsoa.') 
Another  surface  surface  difference  involves  A  VY's  and  VENlR's  ability  to  express 
anteriority with respect to  the present, as  in (67) and (68) above. In VENlR's representation 
the  endpoint of the orientation is  the deictic center, whose temporal interpretation is  'now'; 
thus, when VENIR describes a relation of anteriority, it can do  so  only with respect to  the 
moment 'now'. In contrast, A  VY's representation places no constraint on the destination of 49 
the orientation, so it can express anteriority with respect to  a non-present event described in 
the main clause
31
. 
(70)  Nony avy n-ilalao izy dia n-ody. 
when come PAST-play 3SG CONJ PAST-go-home 
'Wh  en he bad played, he went home.' 
(71)  *Quand il vint/venait de jouer, il rentra/rentrait. 
Finally, while VENIR can express that an event has an impact on the speaker, AVY cannot, 
because A  VY's meaning does not intrinsically express  orientation toward a  deictic  center 
construable as the affected 'me'. 
(72)  Ne viens pas me dire que tu as faim! 
(73)  *Aza avy miteny amiko hoe noana ianao! 
NEG come PRES-tell PREP-1 SG that hungry 2SG 
lit. 'Don't come and tell me that you are hungry!' 
These findings  reveal a crucial advantage of a monosemous approach in explaining cross-
linguistic meaning variation: a set of numerous and seemingly disparate surface differences 
can be explained through a very slight difference in the underlying meaning representation. 
Because  these  representations  are  abstract  and  therefore  independent  of contextualized, 
situation-specifie details, even the slightest of variations in meaning at this level can give ri se 
to important differences at the surface level. 
The  results  of Zuercher  (20 1  0)  therefore  offer  preliminary  evidence  in  support  of the 
monosemist approach's potential to not only explain language-interna! polysemy patterns, but 
also to  explain differences between a given word's range of polysemy and that of its cross-
linguistic equivalent. However, this study ofMalagasy focuses on a relatively limited number 
of senses and does not in  volve fine-grained sense distinctions brought about, for example, by 
slight variations in the  nature of the referents of the verb's arguments, or variations in the 
speakerlhearer's  background  knowledge.  Consequently,  in  order  to  thoroughly  test  this 
31 Construction noted by Rajaona (1972, p. 315), from whom this Malagasy example was borrowed. 50 
monosemist approach's cross-linguistic explanatory power,  a  much more  exhaustive,  fine-
grained analysis of cross-linguistic sense similarities and differences in deictic motion verbs 
1s necessary. 
The goal of the present disse1tation is  thus to  carry out what is  to  my knowledge the first 
thorough,  far-reaching  test  of a  monosemist  approach's  ability  to  provide  a  principled 
account of the  variation of polysemy  between  languages. This  will  be  done  through  the 
comparative analysis of the  general English deictic motion verbs COME and GO and their 
French counterparts VENIR and ALLER. The research questions of the present disse1iation 
are the following: 
(74)  Question  1:  Are  English  and  French  deictic  motion  verbs  lexically 
monosemous? 
(75)  Question  2:  Why do  these verbs show the  cross-linguistic similarities that we 
observe in their uses? 
(76)  Question 3: Why do these verbs show differences that we observe in their uses? 
This comparative study will allow me not only to fwther test Bouchard's (1995) language-
internai analysis of the French verbs, but also  - crucially - to  show that abstract, unified 
semantic representations provide the key to  explaining why the deictic motion verbs of two 
given languages do not fully  share their sets of possible senses. Thus, I will show that the 
abstract monosemist view of word meaning pro  vides a more powerful, parsimonious account 
of cross-linguistic  asymmetries  of polysemy  than  spatio-centric  approaches  that  assume 
multiple lexicalized meanings. CHAPTERII 
CROSS-LINGUISTIC V ARIA  TION OF POL  YS EMY IN A NEO-SAUSSUREAN 
PERSPECTIVE 
Given this dissertation's main objeCtive of providing an explanation for  the  cross-linguistic 
variation of polysemy, a theory is  needed that provides the appropriate conceptual tools to 
explain cross-linguistic variation in  general.  As  I show in the present chapter, Bouchard's 
(2002, in  press) neo-Saussurean Sign Theory of Language provides the  needed theoretical 
foundations for  this undertaking and  will thus  serve as  the second major component of my 
theoretical  framework.  From this  them·y, I  adopt  the  fundamental  assumption  that  cross-
linguistic  variation  can  be  explained  based  on  properties  of the  Saussurean  sign  and  the 
logically anterior properties of the two systems (CI and SM) involved in language. That is, by 
looking at the substances from which language is  built, we can show why language varies, 
and why it varies the way it does. 
First,  in section  2.1 I  discuss  the  theory's  fundamental  assumptions,  focusing  on how  it 
proposes  to  explain  variation  across  languages.  Then,  in  section  2.2, I  show  the  logical 
consequences  of this  the01y  for  the problem of the variation of polysemy, examining this 
dissertation's  research  questions  in  light  of  the  theory  and  showing  how  my  hypotheses 
follow from its assumptions and principles. Finally, in section 2.3 I describe the methodology 
adopted to verify these hypotheses. 
2.1  Variation in a neo-Saussurean approach to language 
Bouchard's  (2002,  in  press)  neo-Saussurean  Sign  Theory  of Language  is  founded  on 
Saussure's conception of language as  a set of signs, i.e. binary associations between a form 
and a concept, or signifiant and signifié (Saussure, 1916). Bouchard applies the notion of sign 52 
not only to  words - which he  caUs  unit signs  (or U-signs) - but also  to  syntax, which  is 
composed of combinatorial signs (or C-signs) (in press, p.  123). Thus, on the one band the 
word  STAR consists  of a relation between a concept  (the  type  'star') and  a percept (the 
acoustic image /sta:r/), each of these purely linguistic elements being itself linked to a piece 
of extra-linguistic  material  (a  chunk  of extra-linguistic  cognition  linked  to  the  word's 
meaning and  sound waves linked to  the  word's form), as  illustrated in  Figure 2.1.  On the 
other band, a combinatorial sign like the  one in the phrase little star also consists of a link 
between  a  signifié  and  a  signifiant.  As  shown  in  Figure  2.2.,  the  signifié  consists  of a 
conceptual relation and the signifiant of this combinatorial sign consists of the formai mark 
of this  relation,  in this  case juxtaposition.  That  is,  in  little  star,  the  semantic relation of 
modification that holds between the words LITTLE and STAR is conveyed by the physica1 
juxtaposition  of these  two  words,  and  the  association  between  the se  two  relations  (one 
conceptual and one perceptual) constitutes a sign (in press, p.  121-122). 53 
chunk of  cognition 
Il  (signifié) 
[TYPE: STAR] 
/sta:r/ 
(signifiant) 
pa1iicular sound waves 
Figure 2.1  Illustration of  the U-sign STAR (adapted from Bouchard, in press, p.  103) 
chunk of cognition  chunk of  cognition 
===R(CI) == 
[Property LITTLE]  [TYPE: STAR] 
Il  Il 
/li tl/  /sta:r/ 
===R(SM) == 
sound waves  sound waves 
Figure 2.2  Illustration of the C-sign of modification in little star (adapted from Bouchard, in 
press, p.  121-122) 54 
As a set of associations between fonns and meanings, language interfaces with two systems: 
the  sensorimotor  system  (SM)  and  the  conceptual-intentional  system  (CI),  i.e.  general 
cognition.  Bouchard argues  that since signs are made up  of two  substances - percepts and 
concepts  - observations  from  the  sciences  which  study  these  two  systems  are  logically 
anterior  to  linguistics  (Bouchard,  2002, p. 2).  Cmcially,  he  argues  that we should  expect 
many  (if not  all)  properties  of language  to  derive  from  general  properties  of those  two 
systems,  and  that  linguists  should  seek explanations  for  linguistic  phenomena which  are 
extemally  motivated,  i.e.  founded  on properties  of the  two  interfaces,  before  postulating 
prope1iies unique to the faculty of language. This is expressed in his Substantive Hypothesis: 
"The most explanatory linguistic themy is  one that rninimizes the elements (ideally to  zero) 
that  do  not  have  an  extemal  motivation  in  the  prior  properties  of the  perceptual  and 
conceptual  substances  of language"  (Bouchard,  in  press,  p.  120).  The  absence  of such 
externat motivation, he claims, has been a major weakness contributing to the failure of many 
analyses proposed by theories such as generative grammar. The latter seeks to  explain many 
syntactic  phenomena  by  proposing  formai  elements  (e.g.  functional  categories, 
uninterpretable  features)  that  merely  reformulate  the  explananda  rather  than  seeking 
explanations in logically antcrior prope1iies (Bouchard, 2002, p.  27-33). 
Crucially for the present study, Bouchard's neo-Saussurean approach shows that by taking 
into account the properties of the Saussurean sign and properties of the two systems on which 
language is based, we can explain why languages vary in precisely the ways they do. Because 
the  signifiants  and  signifiés  of linguistic  signs  are  made  of radically  different  substances 
(percepts on the one hand and concepts on the other), the link between them has no logical 
motivation, i.e.  it is arbitrary in the Saussurean sense (Saussure 1916, p.  155-156; Bouchard, 
in press, p.  103-104). Moreover, the signifiants and signifiés themselves are arbitrary, in that 
the SM offers several different possible means to provide a fonn for a given concept, and the 
CI often offers  severa!  different ways  to  conceptualize the  same  reality.  Finally, there are 
severa! different possible ways to  relate a concept to a perceptual form.  Crucially, since the 
fonns, meanings and form-meaning mappings made possible by the SM and CI are equally 
optimal, different languages make different choices among these options, giving rise to  the 
variation observed across  languages  (Bouchard,  2002, p.  34-40).  However,  languages also 55 
vary within certain bounds:  the possibilities of cross-linguistic variation are channelled by 
properties of the two systems with which language interfaces, and this givcs ri se to reculTent 
cross-linguistic patterns and structural regularities (Bouchard, 2002, p. 36). 
Bouchard (2002) applies this  reasoning to  explain variation of syntactic phenomena across 
languages.  For  example,  he  points  out that  given  the  prope1iies  of the  CI-SM  interface, 
language  offers  several  different ways  to  mark Number,  all  of which are  equally  optimal 
(given  Saussurean arbitrariness).  This  arbitrariness  gives  rise  to  variation:  English  marks 
Number on the noun, while French marks iton the dete1Tl1Ïner.  This single difference in tum 
gives  rise  to  a multitude of syntactic differences.  For example,  since  both  languages  use 
Number as  a  means  to  nalTow  the  set of individuals  to  which  a  noun can refer  (i.e.  to 
"atomize" the noun's meaning), the Number-bearing element is typically required in the NP. 
Renee, omission of the  noun from  the NP is  acceptable in French, while omission of the 
determiner is acceptable in English. 
Bouchard  also  shows  that  this  difference  in  the  marking  of Number accounts  for  cross-
linguistic differences in adjectival modification. As  the author points out, both English and 
French establish the relation of ADJ-N modification through juxtaposition of the ADJ and N. 
Moreover, both are head-first languages,  so  the N should precede the ADJ within the NP. 
Rowever, the difference in Number-marking brings about a cross-linguistic difference in the 
relative order of adjective and noun. Since French expresses Number on the Det, a postposed 
ADJ is  free  to  apply directly to  the whole meaning of the N,  as  in  (77)  below;  when it is 
preposed, it  is  interpreted as  applying to  a subpart of the N's meaning,  as  in  (78),  where 
ANCIEN applies to  the  component specifying at what time  the N  property holds  true.  In 
other words, "the two  word orders that are logically possible under the linearity imposed by 
the oral modality of the  SM (N-ADJ and ADJ-N) are signifiants for two types of semantic 
relations between adjective and noun (modification of the who le network of meaning or of a 
subpart). English, on the other band,  specifies Number directly on N,  so  a postposed ADJ 
combines with N+Number and thus with a noun whose meaning is already atornized. In order 
for the ADJ to apply solely to the N's meaning, it must therefore be preposed (i.e. placed in 
the only other position allowed by linearity). Renee, unlike French, a preposed ADJ (as  in 56 
(79)) is ambiguous between an interpretation involving modification N's global meaning (80) 
vs. a subpart of the N's meaning (81). 
(77)  une église ancienne 
'an old church' 
(78)  une ancienne église 
'a former church' 
(79)  an old  friend 
(80)  Interpretation 1: 'a friend who is aged' 
(81)  Interpretation 2:  'a friend for a long time' 
In addition to demonstrating that the neo-Saussurean approach provides a powerful means of 
accounting  for  cross-linguistic  variation  based  on  logically  anterior  propetiies  of  the 
substances from which language is formed, this analysis of the compositional semantics of 
adjectival modification shows that the themy is well adapted to the study of polysemy. That 
is,  by showing that the polysemy of French adjectives results in a predictable way from the 
noun's and adjective's single lexical meaning and the semantic relation that links them (i.e. 
the signifié of the combinatorial sign), Bouchard's analysis stands as evidence of  this theory's 
ability to explain how a monosemous word interacts with its sentential environment to yield 
multiple, specifie interpretations. 
Thus,  in my analysis I adopt the neo-Saussurean Sign Theory of Language as  a conceptual 
framework to exp lain why polysemy varies, and why it varies in precisely the way it does. In 
keeping  with  this  them·y,  the  present  dissertation  adopts  the  assumption  that  given  the 
Saussurean arbitrariness  of the linguistic sign and its components, cross-linguistic variation 
follows  from  the  fact  that  individua1  languages  make different choices  among  the  equally 
optimal elements made available by the two logically anterior systems with which language 
interfaces. More specifically,  since the present study focuses on lexical semantic  content, I 
assume that causes for variation are  to  be  sought in the fact that the same extra-linguistic 
situation  (e.g.  motion)  can  be  expressed  via  several  different  conceptual  elements  made 
available by the CI, i.e. general cognition. 57 
2.2  Hypotheses 
The  theoretical  framework  of  the  present  dissetiation  consists  of  Bouchard's  (1995) 
monosemist  approach  to  word meaning  and  Bouchard's  (2002,  in  press)  Sign Themy of 
Language. In line with the fonner, this study will adopt the default view that words tend to 
have only a single meaning in the lexicon. In line with the latter, I will take the Saussurean 
sign as  a starting point for  inquiry into cross-linguistic variation (more specifically, lexical 
semantic variation). In the present section, I discuss this study's research questions in light of 
the theoretical assumptions laid out above, showing the hypotheses that follow from them. 
2.2.1  Question 1: Are English and French deictic motion verbs monosemous? 
We saw that there are severa! general reas ons to  adopt the default assumption that a multi-
sense word has only a single, highly abstract meaning in the lexicon. The most important of 
these are the following: 
•  Monosemy provides  a way  to  explain regular polysemy, i.e.  patterns of polysemy 
relations that occur from one word to the next and from one language to the next. 
•  Fuzzy boundaries between the various  senses of the  same word suggest that these 
senses are not lexicalized entities. 
•  The polysemist  view  leads  to  the  risk of uncontrolled  proliferation of postulated 
lexicalized meanings. 
•  Abstract  monosemy  eliminates  redundancy  between  lexical  mearung  and  world 
knowledge,  as  weil  as  between  the  various  senses  of the  same  word,  a  desirable 
outcome from the standpoint of  representational economy. 
In addition to these  arguments,  within a neo-Saussurean perspective there are  at  !east two 
major  reasons  to  expect  multifunctional  words  such  as  deictic  motion  verbs  to  be 
monosemous.  First,  the  association  between  the  signifiant  and  the  signifié  is  necessarily 
arbitary, and thus each sign presumably constitutes a greater burden for long-term associative 58 
memory than a motivated association. It follows that optimal language design would involve 
the smallest possible number of such arbitral)' associations
32
•  Thus,  the arbitrariness of the 
linguistic sign (following from the disparity between CI and SM) leads to the prediction that 
each word form will be  linked to  a single meaning, and that such meanings will tend to  be 
highly abstract, as in the strong monosemist view. 
Second,  abstract  monosemy  is  the  logical  extension  of a  fundamental  property  of the 
linguistic sign and its components: independence with respect to context. Unlike the units of 
animal communication, the human linguistic sign is not rooted in a specifie situation: it can 
change  referents  and  be  used  in  absentia.  According  to  Saussure,  while  a  word's 
pronunciation is  subject to  constant variation from one utterance to  another,  the underlying 
signifiant is a stable, abstract representation in the mind, an "acoustic image" rather than an 
actual string of sounds ( 1916, p. 98). Crucially, the same reasoning a  pp lies to the signifié: just 
as  a  stable,  abstract  signifiant  gives  rise  to  an  infinite  number  of different  acoustic 
manifestations, a  stable  signifié  can  give  rise  to  a  potentially  infinite  number  of surface 
manifestations, i.e.  senses, as  surrounding context varies. Moreover, just as  the signifiant is 
inaccessible to  direct observation, we can expect the signifié to also be inaccessible to  such 
observation. This concords with Ruh1's (1989, p.  132-135) claim that lexical meaning is not 
accessible to  consciousness, and that conscious reflection actually distorts lexical meaning. 
Bouchard's model  of the  linguistic  sign  insists  on this  invariant  character,  distinguishing 
between  the  lexical  meaning  proper  and  the  chunk  of conceptual  material  to  which  the 
signifié corresponds in a given contextualized use of the sign (see the illustration of the signs 
STAR and LITTLE in Figures 2.1  and 2.2 above). 
These  considerations  lead  to  the  following  hypothesis  m  response  to  my  first  research 
question. 
32  See also  Bouchard's (manuscript)  discussion  of mutual  exclusivity  and  the tendency toward the 
formation of  one-to-one mappings in the system of  signs. 59 
(82)  Hypothesis  1:  General English and French deictic  motion verbs (e.g. COME, 
GO, VENIR, ALLER) are monosemous; ali of the senses of each verb are the 
contextual product of  a single, abstract lexical semantic representation. 
2.2.2  Question 2: Why do these verbs show cross-linguistic sense similarities? 
This second question emerges from the observation that despite their multiple differences, 
polysemous translation equivalents nonetheless often share not one, but severa! senses. For 
example, English COME, French VENIR and Malagasy AVY can ali be used to express not 
on!  y motion, but also abstract origin: 
(83)  This ward co  mes from French. 
(84)  Ce mot vient de l'anglais. 
(85)  Avy amin 'ny teny frantsay izany teny izany. 
venir PRÉP-DÉT langue français ce mot ce 
'Ce mot vient du français.' 
As shown above, according to the Sign The01y of Language, cross-linguistic regularities and 
universals  result  from properties  of the  two  systems  with  which  language  interfaces.  As 
Bouchard points out, the signifiés of signs tend to  be  formed  around categories present in 
general cognition: 
We forma category on the  basis of various  sensory inputs.  Given the  ubiquity and  centrality of 
categories  in  our  cognitive  system,  it  is  not  surprising  that  signifiés  converge  on  them: these 
categories  already  organize our conceptual  space  and  determine  concentration  points  for  sorne 
signifiés which capture the categorical unifications (Bouchard, in press: 219). 
Thus, pre-linguistic concepts determine the  general contours of lexical semantics, making 
cetiain paris of conceptual space privileged candidates to be part of the signifiés of signs. It 
follows  that explanations for  cross-linguistic  regularities  in  the  semantic phenomenon of 
polysemy should be sought in universal properties of general cognition. 
Given this tendency of  signifiés to converge on recutTent conceptual categories, and given the 
assumption that the content of motion verbs' meanings is highly abstract and results from the 
combination of a  small  number of components  (see  Bouchard,  1995,  and  Hypothesis  1 
above), we can expect the cross-linguistic variation in the content of deictic motion verbs to 60 
be quite limited. This expectation is supported by the evidence about the Malagasy verb AVY 
presented above (section 1.3 .2): des pite the  important typological and genealogical distance 
separating Malagasy from French, both verbs were shown to be quite similar in the structure 
of their meaning. These observations lead to the following hypothesis. 
(86)  Hypothesis 2: Variation of the polysemy of deictic motion verbs is  channelled 
by  design  properties  of  general  cognition,  giving  rise  to  the  semantic 
commonalities observed in deictic motion verbs across languages such as English 
and French. 
2.2.3  Question 3: Why do these verbs show differences in their uses? 
In this subsection, I discuss three possible sources for the cross-linguistic variation of deictic 
motion verb polysemy:  1)  the interaction between Saussurean arbitrariness and properties of 
general  cognition;  2)  the  abstractness  of the  monosemous  signifié;  and  3)  cross-linguistic 
variation in grammar and lexicon. 
2.2.3.1  Arbitrariness of  the sign and properties of general cognition 
I hypothesize that some differences in the polysemy of English and French deictic motion 
verbs result from the fact that the CI offers more than one way to fonn an abstract meaning 
from which a movement interpretation can be derived, with different languages being free 
(due  to  Saussurean  arbitrariness)  to  make  different  choices  among  the  various  means 
provided by the CL 
This  hypothesis follows  from two  observations.  On the  one band, Saussurean arbitrariness 
applies  not only to  the  association between signifiant and  signifié, but also  to  the  signifié 
itself:  the  boundaries  of word meanings  are  neither universal  nor fully  pre-deterrnined by 
thought, so languages are free to vary in how they draw the limits of a given lexical meaning 
(Bouchard,  in  press,  p.  109).  On  the  other  hand,  under  the  assurnptions  of  the  strong 
monosernist approach, so-called "motion" verbs (  e.g. VENIR and  COME) are abstract and 
con  tain no concept of movement or spa  ce at all. Th  us, there may be more than one way to use 
the abstract primitives provided by general cognition to conceptualize or describe the same 
concrete,  real-world movement  situation.  This  idea receives  suppoti from the  preliminary 61 
evidence on Malagasy discussed above.  Despite the  differences  in their intrinsic semantic 
content (VENIR expresses orientation toward the deictic center, AVY expresses orientation 
from the anti-deictic center), both verbs can be used to  describe a situation of movement in 
space  toward  the  location  of the  speaker,  as  in Jean  vient and  Avy Jaona, both  roughly 
translatable as 'John is coming'. 
2.2.3.2  Abstractness 
1 hypothesize  that  a  second cause for the  variation of polysemy  lies  in abstractness: very 
slight differences in the abstract, monosemous meanings of a pair of translation equivalents 
can have remarkable surface effects. That is,  the  interaction of a word's abstract meaning 
with extra-linguistic information gives  rise to  a multitude  of disparate, seerningly random 
surface  differences  with  respect  to  its  cross-linguistic  counterpart,  making  these  two 
translation equivalents appear more radically different in meaning than they actually are. This 
hypothesis, like the preceding one, receives support from the results obtained for Malagasy 
AVY:  two  slight differences in the semantic representations of AVY and VENIR (nature of 
the constant, role played by the constant) suffice to  explain a whole set of surface semantic 
differences. 
2.2.3.3  Gratmnatical and lexical systems 
Finally, 1 hypothesize that another cause for the variation in the polysemy of deictic motion 
verbs  such  as  COME/GO  and VENIR/  ALLER lies in language-specifie properties su  ch  as 
gramrnar  and  the  network  of lexical  items  available  to  act  as  arguments.  In the  strong 
monosernist  view,  senses,  qua  contextualized  interpretations,  do  not  depend  solely  on 
underlying lexical meaning.  Rather, they are the product of the interaction of this meaning 
with  world  knowledge  and  contextual  infmmation.  Crucially,  context  includes  both 
discursive  context  and sentential  context,  and the  latter includes  both lexical  environrnent 
(e.g.  the  words  used  as  arguments  of the  verb  in  a  given  sentence)  and  grammatical 
environment (i.e.  the rules or combinatorial signs goveming the combination of words in a 
sentence).  Thus,  a  verb's  contextualized  sense  interpretation  is  partly  determined  by  the 62 
meanings of sunounding words  (especially arguments)  and by the  language's grammatical 
system (tense, aspect, etc.).  Since languages vary with respect to  these two factors  (i.e.  no 
two  languages  have  the  same  grammar and  set of lexical meanings),  these factors  can be 
expected to  bring  about differences  in the sense inventories  of two cross-linguistic verbal 
equivalents such as  COME and VENIR.  In  other words, certain sense differences between 
English and French deictic motion verbs can be expected to be either partially or completely 
attributable to differences in grammar or the lexicon. Given the arbitrariness of the linguistic 
signifié and the  language-specifie factors  of grammar and lexical environment that interact 
with this signifié to produce surface interpretations, the possibilities for variation in polysemy 
for  a given type of motion verb  are  presumably quite  large. Indeed,  in  this  perspective  it 
would be  an  extraordinary  coïncidence  if a  highly  polysemous  word  were  found  to  have 
exactly the same set of senses as its counterpmt in another language. 
The above considerations lead to the following hypothesis in response to  my  third research 
question. 
(87)  Hypothesis 3:  English deictic motion verbs differ in sense inventory from their 
. French counterparts for three reasons: 
o  General  human  cognition  offers  more  than  one  abstract  means  to 
conceptualize the same real-world movement situation.  Since these options 
are equally optimal,  the choice among them is  arbitrary, and therefore two 
languages such as French and English do not always choose the same option. 
o  The underlying meaning of a deictic motion verb is highly abstract, so even a 
slight difference in meaning can produce multiple surface differences. 
o  French and English differ with respect to  grammar and set of lexical items 
available to  serve as  arguments; these factors  give rise to  sense differences 
either alone or in interaction with the verb's underlying meaning. 63 
2.3  Methodology 
In the present section, I describe the methodology used to  verify the hypotheses laid out in 
the preceding section.  I first present the procedure used for  data collection (section 2.3.1), 
and then I briefly discuss how this data was analyzed (section 2.3.2). 
2.3.1  Data collection 
As announced above, the present dissertation aims to determine whether general English and 
French deictic motion verbs are monosemous as  well as  to  compare the semantics of these 
verbs  to  determine the  sources  for  their cross-linguistic  sense  similarities and  differences. 
More specifically, this study focuses on four motion verbs generally considered to be deictic: 
the  English  verbs  COME  and  GO  as  weil  as  their French  quasi-equivalents  VENIR and 
ALLER
33
. One reason for choosing these verbs is that they are among the most frequent and 
polysemous in these languages;  they therefore constitute ideal items  with which to  test the 
monosemist approach.  Although  VENIR and ALLER are  among the  items  in  Bouchard's 
(1995) case study illustrating his monosemist approach, I have included them in my own data 
collection  and  analysis  for  three  reasons.  First,  although  Bouchard's  analysis  provides 
compelling evidenc~ for the semantic representations he proposes for these items, his analysis 
does  not take  into  account as  broad a range of senses  as  I examine in  the  present study. 
Second, as  I show in Chapter III, the semantic representations proposed in Bouchard (1995) 
present severa! problems, and these can only be addressed through a more extensive analysis 
involving more fine-grained sense distinctions than those involved in his analysis. Finally, in 
order to  ensure a rigorous comparison of the translation equivalent pairs, it was necessary to 
adopt exactly the same data collection and analysis procedure for both languages. Renee, ail 
33 To my knowledge,  the only cross-linguistic comparative study focusing on this same set of verbs is 
Winston  (1988).  Crucially,  however, the  latter focuses solely  on  the verbs'  'motion'  uses  and  thus 
largely ignores these verbs' polysemy. 64 
steps of the data collection and analysis were canied out for both English and French in a 
parallel fashion. 
As  scholars like Ruhl  (1989) and Pustejovsky (1995) observe, in the analysis of a word's 
semantics,  ever  more  detailed  background  and  contextual  information  can  always  be 
introduced  or  modified  to  create  ever  finer-grained  sense  distinctions.  Consequently,  the 
number  of  possible  senses  for  a  given  word  is  potentially  infinite,  and  it  is  thus 
methodologically infeasible to  identify and examine al! of a given word's senses.  Thus,  in 
present study I aimed to identify a sufficiently large set to test my hypotheses very explicitly. 
In order to  obtain as  broad a pOlirait as possible for the semantic uses of each verb, my data 
collection involved the consultation of dictionaries, corpora and  speakers.  As  Ruhl (1989) 
points out, analyses ofword meaning (and in particular, polysemy) need to take into account 
as  large a sample of uses as  possible, and corpora can reveal valid senses that dictionaries 
neglect. The first stage of my data collection consisted of dictionary consultation. 1 consulted 
three dictionaries for each language. The dictionaries chosen for English were:  1)  Merriam-
Webster's  Third New  International  Dictionary  Unabridged,  2)  the  Oxford Dictionary of 
English, and 3) the Longman Dictionary of  Contemporary English. The dictionaries used for 
French  were:  1)  the  Grand Robert  de  la  langue française,  _ 2)  'the  Trésor  de  la  langue 
française,  and  3)  Lexis  :  le  dictionnaire  érudit  de  la  langue française.  These  particular 
dictionaries were  chosen for  the  following  reasons:  1)  each  is  widely used and  generally 
considered to be among the most reliable descriptions of  modern English and French; 2) each 
is synchronie in perspective (a crucial characteristic for the present study, whose perspective 
is a pmely synchronie study of the polysemy of  the verbs in question); 3) their definitions and 
sense  divisions  provide  a  highly  detailed treatment of the  words'  semantic  potential.  The 
latter  characteristic  is  of capital  importance,  since  my  aim  was  to  carry  out a  very  fine-
grained analysis in order to expose the somces of subtle semantic variations arising from one 
context to another. Ali information about the meaning and usage properties of the verbs was 
extracted from the dictionary entries and then used to construct a data base consisting of a 
prelirninary  list  of acceptable  senses  for  each  verb.  In  general,  in  deterrnining  sense 
boundaries, I maintained the sense division proposed by whichever dictionary made the finest 
sense distinction.  Senses  and  constructions  that were marked  as  archaic  or regional  were 65 
generally set aside.  This was  done in order to  avoid the inclusion in my analysis of senses 
that  are  subject  to  inter-speaker  variation  (due  to  regional  dialect,  sociolect,  technical 
terminology, archaic uses, etc.). 
In general,  multi-word verbal  expressions  that  were  either explicitly marked as  idiomatic 
expressions in the dictionaries or that I judged to be potential idiomatic expressions were also 
set aside and thus excluded from the analysis. Such expressions were numerous, for general, 
highly frequent motion verbs like COME and GO enter into a large  number of multi-word 
verbal expressions (  e.g.  What  is going on?,  They  have been going out for two  months, His 
idea didn 't go over very weil at the meeting,  Go for the gold, Paul doit s'en aller, Ça  va de 
soi, Il en va de même pour  ... , etc.). Expressions like these present a particular challenge for 
analysis: in order to be able to dete1mine the limits ofwhat th.e verb itself(GO, ALLER, etc.) 
contributes  to  the  semantics of the  whole expression, we need  to  have an idea of what is 
being contributed by the other elements (ON, OUT, OVER, etc.), and often these elements 
are  themselves  highly  polysemous.  Moreover,  the  fixed  character  of these  expressions 
strongly suggests  that  they  are  lexically  stored  and  thus  quite  possibly  semantically non-
compositional, making it methodologically undesirable to include them in an analysis seeking 
to  identify  the  productive,  core  lexicalized meaning of each  individual  motion.  For these 
reasons, such potentially non-compositional expressions were excluded from the subsequent 
steps of  my data collection (i.e. corpus and speaker consultation) as well as the analysis itself. 
The next stage of my data collection consisted of corpus consultation.  Using the  web  site 
Glossa Nee
4
,  I collected a total of 500 occurrences for each of the fom verbs from a set of 
newspapers published online
35
. The latter consisted of ten publications per language with the 
aim of pro  vi ding a mixtme of registers and themes. Th  us, alongside serious publications (  e.g. 
Le Monde,  New York Times), the corpus contained occurrences from tabloïds (e.g.  Voici,  The 
Sun). The newspapers used were the following: 
34 http://glossa.fltr.ucl.ac.be/ 
35  The occurrences  were collected from the articles published online during two periods: from March 
22 to 24, 2012, and then from April14 to 23, 2012. 66 
Table 2.1  Periodicals used for the corpus 
French  English 
Source  Country  Source  Country 
Le Monde  France  New York Times  us 
Libération  France  International Herald  us 
Tribune 
Nouvel Observatem  France  Newsweek  us 
La Tribune  France  Financial Times  UK 
Figaro  France  Washington Post  us 
Le Parisien  France  Las Vegas Sun  us 
La Presse  Canada  The Times  UK 
Dernière Heure  Belgium  Guardi an  UK 
La Meuse  Belgium  Sydney Moming  Australia 
Herald 
Voici  France  The Sun  UK 
Next, the corpus occurrences were placed in an Excel file, and in this file I used the inventory 
of combined dictionary senses from my data base to tag the  occurrences in the corpus. Ail 
dictionary senses that were used at least once to  tag  a corpus occurrence were retained as 
acceptable.  When sentences were not matched by  any  available  dictionary sense, I created 
new senses for them and set them aside to be verified. It should be noted that among the uses 
observed in the corpus, only a vety small number fell outside the sets of sénses provided by 
the dictionaries. 
The final  stage of my data collection consisted of speaker consultation and was carried out 
via informa! questionnaires. The goal of this consultation was to test:  1) dictionary senses of 
whose widespread acceptability I was uncertain; 2) the senses that bad been created based on 67 
untagged corpus occurrences; and 3) any sense that had not been attested (in a dictionary or 
corpus) for one language (e.g. French) but had been attested in the other (e.g.  English). The 
sentences  for  dictionary/corpus-attested  uses  were  either  taken  directly  from  the 
dictionary/corpus (sometimes in a modified form) or created. For each of the senses attested 
in  one  language but not the  other,  the  test sentence consisted of a direct translation of an 
acceptable sentence (  either created by myself or taken from a dictionmy or the corpus) in the 
other language. 
These  brief questionnaires  (one  per  language)  were  fi lied  out  in  Ex  cel  format  by  native 
English and French consultants (three per language), who were asked to provide acceptability 
judgements ("acceptable", "marginal", "unacceptable") for each example sentence (sorne of 
which were accompanied by an indication of  the sentence's intended meaning in parentheses, 
wherever I considered this necessary). In the case of senses coming from a dictionary or the 
corpus, those rejected by at !east two respondents were considered rare or marginal and were 
excluded from my  analysis. In the case of senses that were unattested in dictionaries or the 
corpus and had been "invented" via translation, each sentence that was approved by at !east 
two respondents was retained for analysis; ali sentences rejected by at !east two infonnants 
were excluded from my analysis, under the assumption that they reflected either erroneous 
use or highly marginal  (i.e. non universal)  uses  of the  verb.  A  sentence was  retained  and 
marked as marginal in my data base if: a) at !east two informants marked it as "marginal"; or 
b)  at  !east one informant marked it as  "marginal" and at !east one informant marked  it as 
"acceptable".  The results of the questionnaire were entered into my data base, with the full y 
accepted senses being retained for analysis. 
The above stages of data collection resulted in the definitive list of acceptable senses for each 
verb  given  in  Appendices  A  through  D
36
.  The  salient  cross-linguistic  similarities  and 
36 Note that during the analysis process, certain modifications and refinements were made to the sense 
lists  based  on  my  own intuition  as  well  as  comrnents  made  by  my  dissertation  advisor as  to  the 
(un)acceptability  of certain semantic  uses.  These modifications  are  integrated  both in  the  analysis 
(Chapters IV and V) and in the definitive sense lists presented in Appendices A through D. 68 
differences in the semantic uses of these verb pairs are shown in Appendices E (COME and 
VENIR)  and  F  (GO  and  ALLER).  These  senses  are  discussed  in  detail  in  the  analysis 
presented in Chapters IV and V. 
Before moving on, it should be pointed out that the sentences obtained from the dictionaries 
and  corpora play  a  limited  role  in  the  analysis  presented  in  Chapters  lV  and  V,  for  two 
reasons. First, des pite the variety of sources used in the corpus, the fact that only newspapers 
were used nonetheless placed a severe limit on the diversity of senses uses represented in the 
occunences, since jowualistic texts  tend to  center on recurrent themes and tend to  use the 
same basic style of writing.  As a result, examination of the corpus led to  the discovety of 
only a very small nwuber of uses that were not already described in the dictionaries. Thus, 
although the corpus allowed me to  validate the existence of certain dictionaty-attested uses, 
the  corpus  data did not lead to  a  significant contribution to  my analysis  in tenns of new 
senses
37
. 
Second, it should be noted that the main goal of the collection of sentences from dictionaries 
and the corpus was to  establish the definitive list of acceptable senses for each verb. Given 
that the  present dissertation is  a comparative study aiming to  show precisely how  specifie 
semantic uses are obtained from a single invariant meaning, it proved very important in my 
analysis  to  use  carefully  controlled  examples  clearly  showing  the  role  of the  co-textual 
factors contributing to a given semantic interpretation for a verb. Thus, although some of the 
dictionaty and  corpus  sentences  do  appea!·  (  either in original  fonn or modified to  fit  my 
purposes)  in  my  analysis  chapters,  the  majority  of the  example  sentences  given  in  these 
chapters have been created for the purpose of this dissertation. Crucially, however, each such 
"invented" sentence was created to  illustrate a general semantic use already established via 
the procedure described in the present section. 
37  In  a future study  aimed at discovering  additional semantic  uses,  it  would  be necessary to  use  a 
corpus that is bath larger and  composed of a grea ter variety of text types in arder to  ensure a grea ter 
diversity ofthemes and registers. 69 
2.3.2  Data analysis 
As  stated above, the present study aims to  1) identify the underlying meaning(s) of the four 
verbs  COME,  GO,  VENIR  and  ALLER;  2)  determine  the  causes  for  the  observed sense 
similarities;  and  3)  detennine  the  causes  (underlying  meaning,  context,  background 
knowledge, etc.) for the observed sense differences. 
To  do  this, I analyzed the senses retained in my data base, proposing one abstract semantic 
representation for  each verb.  This process involved  severa! successive modifications to  the 
representations, as  I tested the  ability of the  latter to couectly predict the  acceptability and 
unacceptability of senses  as  reflected by the  data obtained in the  above procedure.  In  line 
with the  neo-Saussurean framework  (Sign The01-y  of Language) adopted  in  this  study,  the 
semantic components used in these representations are grounded in properties of the Cl (i.e. 
general  cognition)  with  which  language  interfaces.  For  each  of the  non-shared  senses 
(English-only and French-only senses), I re-examined example sentences  (both tho se  from 
my data base and newly created sentences aimed at testing the  effects of small contextual 
variations)  in  order  to  determine  the  causes  (missing  component  in  the  semantic 
representation,  grammatical or lexical environment,  etc.) for  the  sense's unacceptability in 
one of  the two languages. 
Having presented the methodology used to identify both the sets of specifie senses of these 
verbs  and  the  intrinsic  lexical  semantic  content  of each,  I  turn  in  the  next chapter  to  a 
presentation of the latter. I th en go on in Chapters IV and V to show how the specifie senses 
of each verb are obtained in context from the verbs' monosemous representations. CHAPTERIII 
THE SEMANTIC CONTENT OF DEICTIC MOTION VERBS 
In this chapter, I present my analysis of the semantic content of the verbs COME and GO as 
well as their French counterpmis VENIR and ALLER. As mentioned above (section 1.2.2.2), 
the unified semantic representations proposed by Bouchard (1995) for French motion verbs 
serve as  a  starting point for  my analysis. However,  because cetiain aspects  of Bouchard's 
semantic  representations  pose  problems  involving  explanatory  adequacy  and  theoretical 
motivation, I propose cetiain modifications to  these representations. More generally, in line 
with the Sign Theory of Language (Bouchard, 2002, in press), which emphasizes the need to 
take  into  account  the  design  properties  of language  imposed  by  the  logically  anterior 
properties of the interfaces (in particular, the properties of the CI), I propose representations 
whose primitives are grounded in general cognition. As I show in Chapters IV and V,  these 
extemally  motivated  components  allow  us  to  account  both  for  the  similarities  and  the 
differences  in surface  behavior between the  English verbs  and  their French counterparts. 
Thus, in line with my Hypothesis 3 (see section 2.2), variation of polysemy is  channelled by 
properties of general cognition, giving rise to the semantic commonalities observed in motion 
verbs across English and French. 
I  ~how  in the present chapter that each of these four verbs (COME, VENIR, GO, ALLER) is 
made up of three main components:  1) orientation, 2) the deictic/anti-deictic center, and 3) a 
relation established between a  variable  and  the  deictic/anti  -deictic  center.  In sections  3.1 
through 3.3, I discuss each ofthese semantic components in tum, defining them and showing 
how they are motivated by properties of general cognition. Then, in section 3 .4, I conclude by 
identifying the semantic representation of each of the four verbs, showing that the latter are 
monosemous. 71 
3.1  Orientation 
In  Bouchard's  (1995)  case  study  of French  motion  verbs  (VENJR,  ALLER,  ARRIVER, 
PAR  TIR, ENTRER, SOR  TIR), the au  thor argues that each of the verbs has a single meaning 
structured  not  around  the  concrete  notion of movement,  but rather  the  abstract,  domain-
independent notion of 'orientation.3
8
.  As  shown above (section 1.2.2.2), because this notion 
of abstract  orientation  is  domain-independent,  it  can account  for  the  fact  that  verbs  like 
VENIR and ALLER describe not only spatial situations, but also abstract situations (such as 
futurity, anteriority, abstract origin, etc.). 
Bouchard argues that VENJR and ALLER have the semantic representations in Figures 3.1 
and 3.2  below,  respectively.  The  concept of orientation  is  not  explicitly  represented  as  a 
primitive in these representations. Rather, he claims that it derives from propetiies inherent in 
the semantic representation's tree structure. Each of these semantic representations has an X-
bar structure and thus consists of two relations, one embedded in the other. Bouchard argues 
that due to properties inherent in the tree structure, Figures 3.1  and 3.2 express that x J.  the 
highest argument, corresponding to  the grammatical subject in syntax,  is  'oriented' toward 
the lower relation.  In  addition, the variable x1 binds x2,  so  it is  co-referential with x2• Thus, 
these representations express that 'X is oriented toward X's being related to  o/ m'  (p.  60-68, 
p. 121, p. 150). 
38  This concept is not to  be confused with Jackendoffs primitive function ORIENT, which describes 
spatial orientation along a path and  is  claimed to  enter into the semantics of verbs like POINT in the 
sentences like The sign points across the river (Jackendoff, 2002, p. 362). 72 
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Figure 3.1  Semantic representation of  VENIR (Bouchard, 1995, p.  121) 
Figure 3.2  Semantic representation of  ALLER (Bouchard, 1995, p.  150) 
The idea that  the  semantic representations  of verbs  have  an  X-bar  structure  derives  from 
Bouchard's  (1995)  goal  of explaining  how  semantic  structure  interfaces  with  syntactic 
structure.  Howevet,  in  Sign  Theory  of  Syntax  (the  syntactic  component  of the  neo-
Saussurean  themy  of language,  Bouchard,  in  press),  syntactic  structure  is  argued  to  be 
composed solely of combinatorial signs, i.e. associations between a perceptual element (such 
as  linear  juxtaposition)  and  a  conceptual  element  (i.e.  a  semantic  dependency  relation 
between two elements in a sentence). In this view ofsyntax, elements like X-bar structure are 
mere  artefacts  of the  formàlism  used  in generative  grammar.  If X-bar  is  evacuated  from 
syntax, there  is  no  reason to  assume  that lexical meanings have such  a structure. In other 
words,  the  independent  motivation  offered  by  Bouchard  (1995)  for  the  concept  of 
'orientation' no longer holds. 73 
In a neo-Saussurean view, the prope1ties of language derive largely (perhaps entirely) from 
the substances of the systems with which language interfaces: the SM and the CI.  Thus, the 
primitives  from  which  lexical meanings  are  built are  provided by general cognition.  As  a 
result, elements of word meaning can be expected to reflect prope1ties belonging to cognitive 
systems outside language.  Bouchard (1995, p.  67-68) himself suggests that orientation is  a 
property  of general  cognition,  "an  organizing  concept"  that  the  human  mind  uses  to 
conceptualize the  input we receive  via our perceptual experience of the  world. Crucially, 
orientation is viewed as a concept that pre-exists percepts (i.e. it does not emerge from them). 
This view is  in opposition to  space-based approaches such as  Cognitive Semantics, for  the 
latter attributes  a  central  role  to  perceptual  experience of the  world  in  shaping  linguistic 
meaning (see  Lakoff,  1987,  and  Croft  and  Cruse,  2004,  among  others,  on  the  notion  of 
embodiment). 
I propose that the notion of orientation is  founded on the notion of magnitude.  Walsh and 
colleagues  (e.g.  Walsh,  2003;  Bueti  and  Walsh,  2009)  present  evidence  that  there  is  a 
common, domain-independent system of general magnitude in the brain that is  involved in 
processing across such diverse cognitive domains as  space, time, number, and action. These 
authors discuss a wide range of psychological and neurological evidence in support of their 
theoretical approach (A  The01-y  of Magnitude, ATOM), citing various behavioural findings 
that show interferences between domains such as space and time, or time and number, in both 
children and adults. For example, they point to findings tbat cbildren judge larger objects to 
be moving faster than smaller objects, as  well as  results showing that the time estimates of 
adults for the duration of  presentation of a digit were affected by the numerical magnitude of 
the digit.  In addition, these authors point to  neurological findings  showing that a common 
brain  system,  situated  in  the  parietal cortex,  is  active  during  the  processing of situations 
across these domains. 
We can  characterize  abstract  orientation  generally  as  a  tendency  of increasing potential 
towards being in  a given a state. The notion of increase is  founded on the general concept 74 
'mored
9
,  a concept which Walsh suggests is  at the  heart of the  general magnitude system 
operating  across  domains  (Walsh,  2003,  p.  484).  Decomposing  orientation  in  tenns  of 
magnitude ('more and more') and potential, I propose the following definition of the concept 
'orientation'. 
(88)  Definition of 'orientation' : 
'X is oriented toward astate S'= 'X bas an increasing potential to be in stateS' 
The  fact  that  orientation  derives  from  a  domain-independent  system  accounts  for  the 
observation that the verbs containing this primitive can be used to  describe relations in such 
diverse  domains  as  space  (Max  vient  chez  nous  demain;  Max  is  coming  to  our place 
tomorrow;  Cette route vient de Montréal;  This raad co mes from Montréal) and time (Louis 
vient de  manger;  L'année qui vient;  The  coming year).  Since orientation derives  from  an 
innate,  domain-independent cognitive system of abstract magnitude, it  is  a property that all 
humans  possess.  This  leads  to  the  prediction that this  same  semantic primitive  should  be 
found to play a role in numerous word meanings across languages. As I show in section 3.4, 
this primitive is at the heart of  not only the meanings of  French motion verbs like VENIR and 
ALLER, but also the meaning of their English counterparts COME and GO.  (Aiso see section 
1.3.2 above, where I provide evidence that the semantics of Malagasy AVY 'come' is based 
on this same primitive.) 
In  the  present study,  the  concept of orientation will be  fom1ally  represented  by  an  anow 
(though this anow is  not to  be interpreted as  expressing spatial properties), as  in  (88). This 
39  The  concept  'more'  is  a  recurrent  semantic  pnm1tlve  in  different  theoretical  approaches  to 
semantics.  See Mel'cuk (1989) and Wierzbicka (1989), as weil as Cognitive Linguistic studies such as 
Lakoff and Johnson (1980), where this concept plays a role in conceptual metaphors (e.g. MORE IS 
UP). Note that the earl y appearance of words like MORE in Ll acquisition supports the idea of status 
of  this concept as a primitive. 75 
representation expresses that X is oriented toward being in sorne state or relation (represented 
here by the marker S)
40
. 
(89)  'Orientation': 
x 
-------+  S(X) 
3.2  The deictic and anti-deictic centers 
In  addition  to  orientation,  the  verbs  COME,  GO,  VENIR  and  ALLER contain a  second 
semantic component: the deictic center (  o) and its negative counterpart, the an  ti -deictic center 
(w).  In the present section,  I first discuss  the traditional formulation of the  content of the 
deictic center  ('me-here-now'), showing why it is  inadequate for the description of deictic 
motion  verbs  (section  3.2.1).  Rejecting  this  f01mulation,  I  demonstrate  instead  that  the 
constant  contained  in  these  verbs  decomposes  into  two  basic  concepts:  'Subject  of 
Consciousness' and 'accessibility'. In sections 3.2.2 and 3.2.3, I examine these two primitive 
notions in tum and show how they are motivated by properties of general cognition. 
3 .2.1 Traditional f01mulation of the deictic center: 'me-here-now' 
The deictic center, also known as the origo and often symbolized as o, is traditionally defined 
as  a  constant  whose  content  is  'me-here-now'
41
•  Under  this  fonnulation,  this  constant 
contains three facets:  spatial  'here', temporal  'now'  and  the  abstract,  identificational facet 
'me'. In addition, Bouchard (1995) proposes the complementary notion of anti-deictic center, 
a constant syrnbolized as w and defined as 'NOT -me-here-now'. 
40 This symbolic representation of  the notion of orientation should not be confused with image-schema 
representations  such  as  those  of Langacker  (1987,  1991),  who  proposes  the  notion  of "abstract 
motion". 
41  Bastonnais  (2000)  points  out that this  widely  used  formulation  of the  deictic  center goes  back to 
texts such as Kerbrat-Orecchioni (1980), Berthoud, (1983) and Buhler (1990). 76 
Bouchard  (1995)  shows  that  this  multi-faceted fmmulation of the  deictic  and  anti-deictic 
centers helps account for the fact that polysemous deictic verbs such as VENIR and ALLER 
can be used across different domains like space, time, origin, etc. He argues that the facet that 
is  selected  depends  on  the  domain  in  which  the  verb  is  construed.  Thus,  if contextual 
informatiqn and background knowledge bring us  to  construe VENIR in the spatial domain, 
the  deictic center is  interpreted in its  'here' facet  (e.g.  in Max  vient de  Paris demain).  If 
instead VENIR is  interpreted in the temporal domain (  e.g.  in L'hiver vient vite cette année), 
the  deictic  center  it is  the  'now'  facet  that is  selected.  Finally,  when context and  extra-
linguistic infmmation favor an interpretation of VENIR in another, abstract domain (as in Ce 
mot vient du grec), it is the identificational 'me' facet that is selected. 
However, the 'me-here-now' formulation of this constant (and its negative counterpati) poses 
two  important problems. First,  a multi-faceted semantic component introduces complexity 
into the representation, with different uses resulting in pmi because of different subparts of 
the semantic representation being selected. In such an analysis, although the multiple uses of 
a  polysemous  deictic  word  are  not  placed  in  separate  entries,  these  multiple  uses  are 
nonetheless in a sense moved inside a single, complex entry. One crucial assertion of strong 
monosemist approaches  (  e.g.  Ruhl,  1989;  Bouchard,  1995)  is  that it  is  a  rnistake  to  build 
background knowledge into a word's lexical meaning. I argue that this same point holds for 
sub-lexical meaning components like the deictic center:  it is  a mistake to  build into  them 
pieces of knowledge that actually depend on background knowledge.  Such a solution goes 
against the  general principle of economy guiding the strong monosemist position,  since it 
dis  places the complexity of po  lys emy to the inside of the semantic representation rather than 
elirninating this complexity altogether (see my criticism ofPustejovsky's approach in section 
1.1.2).  Thus,  although  the  inferential  system  could plausibly  access  sublexical  elements, 
ultimately, a solution which posits internai complexity (where not ail  lexical or sublexical 
components are always  selected)  is  less  parsimonious  than a simple representation whose 
internai  components  are  more  general  and  in  which  ail  of the  components  are  always 
accessed when the word is used. 
A second problem arising from the characterization of the deictic center as  'me-here-now' is 
that  it incmTectly  predicts  that  words  containing this  constant (  e.g.  COME,  VENIR)  will 77 
pattern like the words conesponding to each of its facets, e.g.  English ME, HERE, and NOW 
or French MOI, ICI, and MAINTENANT
42
. 
For example, in the situations described by (90) and (91) below, the result of the movement 
event cannot be paraphrased as  'X is  here'. In  (92), the orientation is  not toward a temporal 
point  describable  as  'now',  but  toward  a  time  in  the  future  (  established  by  the  verb's 
morphology). Finally, in (93), the fortune is not oriented toward the speaker 'me', but rather 
toward a third person, Jean. 
(90)  Je vais au magasin.  Veux-tu venir? 
(91)  Je viendrai te voir demain. 
(92)  L'hiver viendra plus tôt l'année prochaine. 
(93)  La  fortune de Jean vient de sa tante. 
In  order  to  account  for  "extended"  cases  like  these
43
,  certain  scholars  have  proposed 
pragmatic  deviees  allowing  the  deictic  center  to  be  transfened  onto  non-prototypical 
referents.  Lyons  (1977,  p.  579)  calls  this  phenomenon  "deictic  projection".  Likewise, 
Bas tonnais (2000, 2001) claims that the deictic center can be transposed elsewhere than the 
speaker, towards another person or location that serves as  a temporary reference point. This, 
she  argues, gives  rise  to  the  simultaneous  presence, for  a single utterance,  of two  deictic 
centers:  a  (the  original  deictic  center associated  with  the  speaker)  and  ~ (the  transposed 
deictic center associated with someone other than the speaker, or sorne location other than the 
speaker's  location)  (2000,  p.  71-72).  For  example,  in  (90)  above,  the  deictic  center  is 
transposed onto the speaker's future location, while in (91), it is transposed onto the hearer's 
location. 
42 1 assume that the concepts 'me', 'here' and 'now'  must be taken to correspond to the meanings of 
the corresponding lexical units in English, French, etc. 
43  For a detailed discussion of the flexibility of deictic motion verbs,  see Fillmore (e.g. 1966,  1971, 
1975). 78 
Although this mechanism provides an account for non-prototypical uses of the deictic center 
defined  as  'me-here-now',  it  presents  at  least  two  disadvantages.  First,  the  proposed 
mechanism  leads  to  overgeneration.  As  Bastonnais  (2000,  p.  81)  herself  points  out, 
transposition of the deictic center to a third persan (  e.g. Je sais que Paul va à la montagne, et 
j'ai  décidé  de  venir),  while  logically  possible,  leads  to  highly  variable  acceptability 
judgements from one speaker to the next. Observations like this suggest that mechanisms like 
deictic  transposition  are  too  unconstrained  to  account  for  the  actual  limits  of the  deictic 
center's possible reference in usage. 
Second, from a theoretical standpoint, the deictic transposition hypothesis is unparsimonious 
because it requires the postulation, in addition to an internally complex 'me-here-now', of an 
auxiliary  pragmatic  mechanism  that  generates  new  deictic  centers.  A  truly  economical 
solution would be one in which the deictic center is internally simple and in which no special 
pragmatic  mechanism  is  required  to  account  for  its  non-prototypical  uses.  This  lexical 
semantic solution echoes Goddard (1997), who argues that the best solution is  to  make the 
semantic content of the verb's entry general enough to  cover not only first-person uses, but 
also all of  the verb's "extended" uses. 
Thus, 1 propose that the deictic  center o contained in the  semantics of COME/VENIR (as 
well as the anti-deictic center in GO/ALLER) does not decompose into specifie facets such as 
the lexical concepts 'me', 'here' and  'now'. Rather, it is composed of two abstract concepts 
that  are  both  rooted  directly  in  general  cognition:  'Subject  of  Consciousness'  and 
'accessibility'. Renee, 1 propose to define the deictic and anti-deictic centers as follows. 
(94)  Deictic center o : 'a point that is accessible to a Subject of Consciousness' 
(95)  Anti-deictic center ffi : 'a point other than the deictic center' 
Note that these definitions are being proposed only for deictic motion verbs. That is,  for the 
moment 1 am not making the  claim that this  same primitive  is  contained in  the  semantic 
representations  of other  deictic  words  (e.g.  demonstratives  such  as  THIS  and  THAT, 
locatives such as HERB and THERE, personal pronouns such as  ME, temporal expressions 
such as NOW and THEN, etc.). 
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Having  now  defined  the  deictic  center  in  terms  of  'Subject  of  Consciousness'  and 
'accessibility', I devote the next two  sections to  an  examination of these concepts, showing 
how they follow from properties of  general cognition. 
3.2.2 The concept 'Subject ofConsciousness' 
The  reason  why  the  deictic  center  o  contained  m  COMENENIR can  refer  to  a  point 
associated either with the speaker or with a person other than the speaker is that this constant 
is not intrinsically defined in terms of the speaker 'me'. Rather, it contains the more general 
concept 'Subj ect of Consciousness'. According to  Ruwet (1990), every sentence expresses a 
Content  of  Consciousness  (CC),  and  this  presupposes  a  corresponding  Subject  of 
Consciousness  (SC).  Crucially,  this  SC  is  neutra!  between  speaker  and  hearer:  it  is  not 
intrinsically defined in terms of either of these pa1iicipants of the utterance event. M01·eover, 
Ruwet shows  that in addition to  the  SC  and CC  conesponding to  the  sentence as  a whole 
(SCo  and CCo, respectively),  additional CCs  can be  embedded within a sentence. Each of 
these internai  CCs  corresponds  to  its  own SC,  and  the  latter  can be  either identical  to  or 
distinct  from  SC0.  Thus,  in  (96)  through  (98)  (Ruwet's  examples  12b-d,  p.  55),  verbs 
describing speech acts or mental attitudes introduce CCs, each one conesponding to  its own 
distinct  SC.  Consequently,  Bouchard  (1995)  defines  these  concepts  independently  of the 
notions 'speaker' and 'hearer' as follows:  "A Subject of Consciousness is an entity to which 
the  speaker attributes consciousness  (including himself and the person he  is  talking to).  A 
Content  of Consciousness  is  what  the  speaker  presents  as  being  pmi  of an  entity's 
consciousness" (p.299). 80 
(96)  PaulscJ  prétend que (Maxsc2 croit que (Dieu est mort)cC2 )cCJ  . 
(97)  llluisc1 semble que (la terre a tremblé)cc1. 
(98)  ÉmilesCJ souhaite que (Sophie l'aime unjour)ccJ. 
Ruwet (1990) shows that the notions SC and CC account for syntactic phenomena such as the 
distribution  and  reference  of the  French  locative  pronouns  EN  and  Y
44
,  proposing  the 
following constraint: "If EN or Y are in a clause expressing a content of consciousness CC;, 
EN and Y cannot be co-referential with the N'' that represents the Subject of Consciousness 
SC; of CC;" (p.  56). Thus, a sentence like (99) is unacceptable because EN is  part of the CC 
'que Sophie en est amoureuse', and  this  CC belongs to  the  SC  named by the noun phrase 
Émile. The sentence can only be made acceptable if EN is replaced by de lui, as in (100), for 
LUI is not subject to Ruwet's constraint. In contrast, in sentence (101) the NP ce livre with 
which EN is co-referential does not refer to  an entity capable of consciousness, and thus ce 
livre is  not an SC to wbich the CC expressed by the embedded clause belongs. As a result, 
the sentence is fully acceptable (p.  56-58). 
(99)  *Émile suppose que Sophie en est amoureuse. 
(1 00)  Émile suppose que Sophie est amoureuse de lui. 
(101)  Pour être bien compris,  ce  livre suppose qu'on  en  ait soigneusement étudié le 
plan. 
As  Bouchard  (1995)  points  out,  the  concepts  Subject  of Consciousness  and  Content  of 
Consciousness also play a crucial role in explaining certain properties of  Psych constructions. 
He  observes  that  verbs  such  as  French  FRAPPER and  English  STRIKE  are  capable  of 
expressing situations where one entity affects another either concretely or abstractly, as  in 
(102) and  (103) below, and their English equivalents  (104)  and  (105).  This,  he  argues, is 
44  He  also  shows  that  the  notions  'Subject of Consciousness'  and  'Content of Consciousness'  are 
responsible for  a similar constraint on the distribution and reference of insult expressions,  e.g.  *Paul 
pense qu 'on va renvoyer ce salaud vs. Le copain de Paul pense qu 'on va renvoyer ce salaud (Ruwei, 
1990, p. 67-71). 81 
because  the  verbs  in  question  do  not intrinsically  express  any  infonnation about  either  a 
spatial or psychological relation. Rather, they are monosemous and intrinsically express only 
an  abstract,  domain-independent  relation  of contact between  two  entities.  When  context 
indicates that the relation is  established in physical space between two concrete entities, the 
verb  is  construed  as  describing  physical  contact,  as  in  examples (102)  and  (104).  When, 
instead, the situation involves contact between a psychological entity (i.e. a "psy-chose") and 
"an entity capable of  hosting the emotion or feeling that the psy-chose refers to", the resulting 
interpretation is that the contact occurs not in physical space but rather in mental space, as  in 
examples (103) and (105) (p.  269-274). In the latter case, Marie/Mary is treated as  a concept 
and th us as part of the Content of Consciousness of  Paul. 
(1 02)  Marie frappe Paul avec un marteau. 
(1 03)  Marie frappe Paul par son intelligence. 
(104)  Mary strikes Paul with a hammer. 
(105)  Mary strikes Paul as intelligent. 
Crucially, the notion of Subject of Consciousness bas an impact on Psych constructions such 
as  this  one.  As  Bouchard (1995) points out, this notion allows us  to  account for  how they 
behave  with  respect  to  long-distance  anaphor  binding  relations  such  as  backward 
reflexivization  via  the  following  condition  on  long-distance  anaphor  binding:  "A  long 
distance  anaphor  can  be bound  by  a  Subject of Consciousness,  if the  Anaphor  is  in  the 
Content  of Consciousness  of that  Subject  of Consciousness".  Thus,  (106)  is  acceptable 
because  in this  sentence,  the  relation of contact is  established in mental  space,  with  'that 
book' being presented as  a concept that is part of the Content of Consciousness of Mary qua 
Subject of Consciousness (because, as the author points out, "Mary is crucially aware that the 
book is  about  herself').  In  contrast,  (107)  is  unacceptable  because  in  this  sentence,  the 
relation of contact is  established in  physical  space:  'that book'  is  presented as  a physical 
abject, not a concept in Mary's Content of Consciousness. For this reason, in (106) Mary is 
an acceptable antecedent of  herselj, but not in (107) (p. 299-300). 82 
(106)  That ,book about herselfstruck Mary as embarrassing. 
( 1  07)  *Thal book about herse If  struck Mary on the head. 
In  addition,  in his  analysis  of the  existential  constmction,  Bouchard  (1997)  establishes  a 
direct link between the  notion of deixis  and the  notion  'Subject of Consciousness'
45
.  The 
existential interpretation obtained for  the  constmction illustrated in  (1 08),  he  argues,  is  the 
compositional result of the elements present. In this constmction, an NP in predicate position 
(a man) is predicated of the subject, i.e. the locative pronoun THERE
46
. In this use, he argues, 
the predication is established in the mental domain, and the locative is constmed as referring 
to a point in this mental space, i.e. to a possible world Wn. Cmcially, this locative belongs to 
a two-member system in English, in which HERB represents the deictic center and THERE 
represents the anti-deictic center. Bouchard argues that since the anti-deictic element THERE 
expresses any point other than the deictic center, "it refers to a point in the speaker's mental 
space, in his Content of Consciousness, but other than the speaker, to any point other than the 
Subject of Consciousness himself' (p.  37, my translation). In other words, the deictic center 
is  conshued in mental space as  the Subject of Consciousness, and the anti-deictic center is 
construed as  this  SC's Content of Consciousness. The predication relation has  the  effect of 
attributing  the  properties  of  a  man  to  the  Subject  of  Consciousness'  Content  of 
Consciousness (in this  case,  the possible world Wn),  and the sentence therefore expresses 
membership  of 'a man'  in  the  possible  world  Wn,  yielding  the  meaning  we  observe  in 
existential sentences (p. 36-39). 
(108)  There is a man outside. 
Although  Bouchard  (1997)  clear1y  shows  a  conceptual  link  between  'Subject  of 
Consciousness' and the deictic center, I depart from his analysis on one important point:  as 
45 Ruwet (1990, p. 72) also suggests a possible link between the two phenomena. 
46 Bouchard's (1997) analysis also deals with the French existential construction (e.g. Il y a un homme 
dehors), which differs in that the non-deictic locative Y is used. 1 am setting aside this analysis in order 
to simplify the presentation of the relevant notions here. 83 
pointed out above, I reject the  'me-here-now' formulation of the deictic center. The Subject 
of Consciousness is  not  a contextually dependent construal (in the  mental domain) of the 
deictic center. Rather, the notion 'Subject ofConsciousness' is an intrinsic component of the 
deictic center.  That is,  rather than a multi-facetted constant defined in terms of space, time 
and person, the deictic center is an abstract constant centering on the way humans experience 
entities  and  events  in  the  world.  Since  this  element  follows  directly  from  the  way 
consciousness  interacts  with the expression of propositions, it is  grounded in  propetiies of 
general cognition and thus constitutes an externally motivated semantic primitive. 
The abstract character of the  'Subject of Consciousness'  component on  which the  deictic 
center is based allows us to account for the fact the deictic component in VENIR and COME 
can refer not only to the speaker, but also to the heat·er orto a third person. Given the central 
role of the speaker in the utterance act, it is the speaker who is most often selected to fil! the 
role of  the utterance's Subject ofConsciousness, as shown in (109) and (110), where the most 
natural interpretation is that the speaker is in Montreal at the utterance time. 
(1 09)  John is co ming to Montreal. 
( 11 0)  Jean vient à Montréal. 
Because the speaker is the most imp01iant member of  the utterance situation, and because his 
own location is the spatial point most accessible to him, the concept 'here' (i.e. the speaker's 
location)  is  the prototypical spatial  interpretation ascribed to  the  deictic center.  The same 
holds  for  the  values  'me'  and  'now'  traditionally attributed  to  the  deictic  center in other 
domains. Renee, traditional analyses of deictic verbs like COME and VENIR have rnistaken 
the deictic center's prototypical interpretation for its intrinsic content. 
Since the hearer is  also a participant in the utterance situation, he too can be selected as the 
SC. This happens most often when the speaker himself is ruled out as a candidate (based on 
sunounding linguistic context or based on background knowledge of the situation). Thus, in 
the  following,  since the subject of COMENENIR refers to  the  speaker, we infer that the 
destination is  the location of someone other than the speaker.  Given that the hearer is  the 
other  member  of the  utterance  situation  and  thus  a  potential  SC  for  the  sentence,  the 
destination location referred to is not the speaker's but the hearer's. 84 
( 111)  1 will come on Monday. 
(112)  Je viendrai lundi. 
Moreover, when context is sufficiently rich, even a third person can be selected as the SC. As 
Ruwet (1990)  and  Bouchard (1995)  show,  a verb  describing a psychological event brings 
with  it  its  own  SC.  This  is  true  of purely mental  verbs,  but also  verbs  of perception and 
communication verbs. Th us all tlnee of these classes of verbs set up SCs th at can be used to 
determine  the  reference  of the  deictic  material  COME  and  VENIR.'  In  the  following 
sentences, movement is not toward the speaker or hearer, but toward John/Jean, the referent 
of the grammatical subject of  the psychological/perception/speech verb. 
(113)  John thought someone was coming toward him. (MENTAL) 
(114)  Jean pensait que quelqu'un venait vers lui. (MENTAL) 
(115)  John saw someone coming toward him. (PERCEPTION) 
(116)  Jean voyait quelqu'un qui venait vers lui.  (PERCEPTION) 
(117)  John said that Mary had come to his house. (SPEECH) 
(118)  Jean disait que Marie était venue à sa maison. (SPEECH) 
In the context of  a narrative, a relevant Subject of Consciousness can be provided by a salient 
participant of the narrated situation
47
. In (119) and (120), John/Jean, by virtue of his role as a 
prominent pmiicipant in the  narrated situation,  acts  as  the SC  (whose thoughts/perceptions 
can  be  accessed  by  the  "omniscient"  narrator)  that  anchors  the  reference  of the  deictic 
material contained  in  COMENENIR. Likewise,  if the  speaker is  watching a  third  person 
47 See Fillmore (  e.g.  1975) on this type of use.  Antonopoulou and Nikiforidou (2002) mention that the 
term "subject of  consciousness" has been used in severa! existing studies on deixis to refer specifically 
to  cases  in  which  the  speaker adopts  the  perspective  of a  third-person  protagonist of a  narrative. 
Crucially however, unlike the present study, to my knowledge no existing analysis considers 'Subject 
of Conscious'  (as  defined  by  Ruwet  and  Bouchard)  to  be  an  invariable  component of a  speaker-
independent semantic representation accounting not only for a motion-toward-third-person-goal  use, 
but for the full range of  a deictic verb's uses. 85 
from across the street and wishes to describe the event from the perspective of  this participant 
(e.g.  in terms of the event's potential effects on the participant), he can utter sentences (121) 
and (122). 
( 119)  John stopped suddenly and looked around. A man was co ming (toward him). 
( 120)  Jeans 'arrêta et regarda autour de lui. Un homme venait (vers lui). 
(121)  Someone is coming toward  John. (He had better be careful.) 
(122)  Quelqu'un vient vers Jean. (Il devrait faire attention.) 
Renee, the  notion  'Subject of Consciousness'  makes  it  possible  to  go  beyond  traditional 
characterizations of the deictic center' s referential flexibility in terms of  rules th at in elude the 
notions 'speaker', 'hearer' or 'participant' (see Fillmore's,  1966, "suppositional rules"), and 
it  eliminates  the  need  for  a  multi-facetted  constant  (  e.g.  'me-here-now')  or  a  special 
pragmatic deviee like deictic projection/transposition. 
Before moving on, I would like to point out that like the present dissertation, several existing 
studies propose semantic descriptions of COME- and GO-verbs that are general and speaker-
independent.  Crucially,  however,  these  analyses  bear  disadvantages  with  respect  to  the 
present analysis. For example, Goddard (1997) defines COME as motion toward a place such 
that 'someone in this place could think: X is in the same place as  me'. Unlike the notion of 
Subject of Consciousness, Goddard's formulation does not allow us to predict with precision 
which  specifie  locations  (e.g.  hearer's  location,  location  of a  third  person  in  a  clause 
following a mental verb, location of  pro  minent character in a narrative, etc.) are acceptable as 
the destination of a motion event described by  a deictic verb like COME.  Sirnilarly, in his 
study of the motion verbs COME, GO, VENIR and ALLER, Winston (1988)  characterizes 
COME and VENIR as  describing  motion toward  the  "viewpoint". The author argues  that 
white the default choice is for the speaker to adopt his own viewpoint, he can also adopt the 
viewpoint of another person,  warranting  the  use  of COME/VENIR toward  a non-speaker 
goal.  However, the notion "viewpoint" is  vaguely defined, and as  the author himself points 
out,  he is  unable to  account for how this  concept is  grounded in human cognition (p.  34). 
Thus, while these analyses take the important step of unifying different 'motion' uses under a 86 
single, speaker-independent meaning, the concepts on which are they built lack the precision 
and independent motivation of  the notion 'Subject of  Consciousness'. 
3.2.3The concept 'accessibility' 
In  this  subsection I  examine  the  second concept contained in  the  meaning of the  deictic 
center, that of 'accessibility'. Like the notion 'Subject of Consciousness',  'accessibility' is 
not  intrinsically  spatial  but  rather  abstract  and  thus  domain-independent.  This  concept 
follows  from  notions of Subject of Consciousness and  Content of Consciousness:  when a 
person  (qua  Subject of Consciousness)  accesses  things  in  his  world  (both  concrete  and 
abstract entities and events), the person's consciousness establishes contact with these entities 
and events. I define accessibility as follows
48
: 
(123)  'Accessibility': An element X is accessible to  a given Subject of Consciousness 
(SC)  if there  is  a  potential  for  X  to  become  a  pm1  of the  SC's  Content  of 
Consciousness (i.e. for the SC to experience X). 
This potential contact can be established via the senses, or it can take place in a purely mental 
domain.  On the one hand,  when a  Subject of Consciousness perceives or interacts  with a 
concrete  entity  (e.g.  a  rock,  a  tree,  a  person)  or  an  event  (e.g.  a  st01m,  a  meeting,  a 
conversation)  in the  external world,  he is  conscious of this  entity,  and the  latter therefore 
becomes part of his Content of Consciousness. On the other band, an element such as an idea 
or a memory can become pm1 of the SC's CC directly, without the intervention of the senses, 
and thus without involving the domain of space. Crucially, whether we access an element via 
our perceptual  system  or do  so  directly  in mental  space,  this  access  ultimately  involves 
48 Note that this concept should not be confused with the  key concept of Accessibility Theory (Ariel, 
1990).  In the latter, the term refers  to the degree of ease with which the referent of a given NP can be 
activated in the addressee's memory. According to this theory, the speaker uses different means (such 
as the definite or indefini te pro no un) to mark the degree of  accessibility of  a given element. 87 
mental contact with the entities or events in question
49
. Thus,  'accessibility' is based on the 
idea  that  a  human's  conscious  interaction  with  his  enviromnent  always  has  a  mental 
dimension. 
Several authors  have shown that accessibility plays  a roie  in  lexical  meaning.  Vandeloise 
( 1991) demonstrates th at this concept is at the heart of the semantics of certain French spatial 
prepositions. For example, he shows  that prepositions PRÈS  DE and LOIN DE describe a 
relation  of accessibility  or  inaccessibility  (respectively)  between  the  prepositions'  two 
arguments (in Vandeloise's terms, the target and landmark,  i.e.  the figure and ground).  He 
argues that this  accessibility can take on different forms,  depending on the extra-linguistic 
factors involved in the situation being described. In sorne cases, it is physical contact that is 
involved  as  in  (124)  and  (125).  Here,  contrat)'  to  the  traditional  assumption  that  these 
prepositions encode an objective property like distance, what counts is  knowledge about the 
typical speed of the animals involved, this  speed deterrnining the  accessibility of the  lake 
with respect to the animals (p.  68): given our world knowledge about tm1les  and antilopes, 
the distance referred to in (124) is likely to be much smaller than that referred to in (125). 
(124)  La tortue est loin du lac. 
(125)  L 'antilope est loin du lac. 
But physical access is  not the only possible construal of the  general notion of accessibility 
encoded in the semantics of these prepositions:  this  relation can be  established visually or 
even aurally, as Vandeloise explains with the following examples. 
49  CfLangacker (1987), who proposes "a notion of 'interaction' or 'contact' that is abstract enough to 
embrace  spatial  coïncidence,  the  recitation of a  particular  letter  of the  alphabet,  or contact  in  the 
perceptual sense" (p. 179). 88 
Wh ile  physical  access  is  the  princip  le  factor  in  determining  the  norm [of distance],  access  to 
perception also plays a role.  A mountain may be near if we are admiring its beauty from a hotel 
window, yet far if we in tend to hike there. Here visu al access is opposed to  physical access. The 
wolves may seem near when we hear them howling in the woods, but luckily far enough away not 
to  threaten  our  lives.  In  this  example,  auditory access  and  physical access  are  in  opposition. 
Finally, a sailboat may be far to the naked eye, but near through binoculars. Two types of visu al 
access contrast here. Ali these different types of  access to the target change the value of the normal 
distance. (Vandeloise, 1991, p. 70, my emphasis) 
As  for the prepositions DEVANT and DERRJÈRE, they are claimed to  specifically involve 
perceptual accessibility. As Vandeloise shows, DEVANT expresses that the figure  (at !east 
partially) blocks the observer's perceptual access to the ground, while DERRJÈRE expresses 
that  the  ground  (at  least partially)  blocks  the  observer's  perceptual  access  to  the  figure
50
. 
Once again,  accessibility can take  on different forms,  depending on extra-linguistic factors 
involved in the situation. In (126), the detetmining factor warranting the use of DEVANT is 
the  fact  that  the  tent  (partially)  blocks  the  tree  from  the  view  (i.e.  visual  access)  of the 
speaker.  Conversely, in  (127),  DERRJÈRE  is  used  to  express  that  it  is  the  tent  which  is 
blocked from  the view of the speaker. Although visual perception is  the dominant channel, 
with sufficient context, other channels of perception can determine accessibility. Thus, when 
the sense of touch is  involved, the notion of movement can come into play:  if an object is 
blocking a  person from  reaching  out to  another object,  it  thereby  prevents  access  to  the 
person's sense of touch, warranting the utterance in (128). Fmthermore, in cettain contexts, 
access can even involve olfactory perception: even if the speaker can fully see two adjacent 
pots  of flowers,  (129)  is  an acceptable utterance, for  although  there  is  full  visual  access, 
accessibility to the sense of smell is being blocked (p.  123-131). 
50 Vandeloise considers that in addition to the meaning of  DEVANT/DERRIÈRE discussed here,  these 
prepositions have a second lexicalized meaning, which deals not with perceptual access but rather with 
the  intrinsic  front  and  back  of the  object serving  as  ground  and  illustrated  in  sentences  like  the 
following:  La  voiture rouge  est devant/derrière la  voiture  bleue,  where  the  location of one  car is 
determined  with respect to  the intrinsic  front/back of the  other rather  than by presence/absence of 
perceptual access. 89 
(126)  La tente est devant l'arbre. 
(127)  La tente est derrière l'arbre. 
(128)  La rivière est devant l'arbre. 
(129)  Je ne sens pas les violettes parce que les marguerites sont devant. 
Renee,  although  Vandeloise  does  not explicitly mention  the  link between his  analyses  of 
PRÈS DE/LOIN DE and of DEVANT/DERRIÈRE, both pairs cmcially involve the concept 
of accessibility.  The  main  difference  between  these  two  pairs  is  that  DEVANT  and 
DERRIÈRE have  a more  restricted meaning than PRÈS  DE and LOIN DE:  they are only 
about perception (not other kinds  of access,  such as  access  to  physical contact). Although 
Vandeloise restricts his discussion of PRÈS/LOIN DE and DEVANT/DERRIÈRE to  spatial 
uses of these prepositions (no ting a few abstract uses in passing), 1 will show in my analysis 
of COMENENIR and GO/ALLER that accessibility has  a much  wider range of (concrete 
and abstract) manifestations. 
Other au thors have noted (direct! y or indirect!  y) the role of access in certain semantic uses of 
deictic  motion  verbs
51
•  These  analyses  discuss  accessibility  via  the  concept of 'region of 
interactive  focus'  proposed  by  Lindner  (1981,  1982,  1983)
52
.  According  to  Lindner,  the 
region  of interactive focus  is  "the realm of shared experience,  existence, action,  function, 
conscious interaction and awareness" (Lindner, 1983, p.  171, as  cited by Di Meola, 1994, p. 
96). This constmct is characterized as internally complex, involving a diverse array of states: 
[lt]  is  a functional assembly which takes human interaction as  essential and  is  organized around 
the  way people canonically interact with things in the world around them - physically, socially, 
perceptually, cognitively, etc. Things (or people) located in this region can be in any of a cluster of 
states  represented  by  this  region:  in  use,  prepared,  active,  mobile,  agitated,  cognitively  or 
perceptually sa lient,  existing,  public, viable,  known,  and  so  on.  (Lindner,  1982,  p.  317-318,  as 
cited by Viberg, 2003, p. 91) 
51 In addition to the studies on deictic verbs discussed here, other existing research linking deixis with 
the notion of accessibility includes Burenhult (2003) and Jarbou (2010) on demonstratives. 
52  As  I was  unable  to  obtain Lindner's texts,  the passages cited here  were obtained from  Di Meola 
(1994), Radden (1996) and Viberg (2003). 90 
This concept is  linked to  the notion of accessibility, for an entity in the region of interactive 
focus  can be  seen  as  accessible:  "When a  trajector is  accessible  to  the  viewer  [  ...  ],  it  is 
available  to  the  public,  upholds  social  cornrnitments,  is  under  consideration,  desired, 
revealed, actual, viable, existing, known and visible[  ...  ]" (Lindner, 1983, p.  121, as cited by 
Di Meola, 1994, p. 97). 
Cognitive semanticists studying the polysemy of deictic motion verbs (Di  Meola,  1994, for 
German KOMMEN and GEHEN; Radden, 1996, for English COME and GO; Viberg, 2003, 
for  Swedish KOMMA and GA) have thus argued that "non-deictic" uses of these verbs are 
related to  the prototypical deictic motion uses via an extension from the actual deictic center 
to the region of interactive focus, as in the following dia gram. 
Source  Path  Goal 
----------> e  Deictic center 
e  Region of  interactive focus: 
PUBLIC ACCESS 
EXISTENCE 
PERCEPTUAL ACCESS etc. 
Figure 3.3  Sense extensions ofSwedish KOMMA 'come' (from Viberg, 2003, p. 91) 
Renee, as Radden (1996) points out, the  opposition between COME- and GO-verbs in their 
non-motion uses can be described in terms of entering and exiting the region of interactive 
foc us: 91 
The use of deictic motion verbs in describing non-deictic situations may be explained by Lindner's 
(1983) notion of a viewpoint-defined region of interactive focus. A trajector which enters a region 
of interactive  focus  is  accessible,  available to  the  public,  desired,  existing, known and  visible, 
while a trajector which leaves this region becomes imperceptible, inoperable, and defunct (Lindner 
1983: ch. II, 3.39, ch. III, 2.3.4). The viewpoint-defined region of interactive focus also motivates 
the use of  to come and togo [  ... ] (Radden, 1996, p.434, my emphasis). 
For example, Radden argues that the uses seen in examples like (130) and (131), involving 
visual accessibility, are motivated by this extension from the spatial deictic center as follows: 
"In sentence (16a) [my (130)], the stars become visually accessible and are seen as  'coming' 
into the viewer's region of interactive focus. In sentence (16b) [my (131)], the light becomes 
inaccessible and  is  seen as  leaving the viewer's region of interactive  focus"  (p.  434,  my 
emphasis). Similarly, Viberg (2003) accounts for the mental use of COME in examples like 
(132) as  an extension from the concrete deictic center to "cognitive access": "[  ... ] Origo bas 
been extended fmiher from the realm of physical experience into  something like our inner 
experience or consciousness." Crucially, he notes (with Lindner 1981,  1982) that "this kind 
of cognitive access can be conflated with cases of perceptual access into a single region of 
interactivefocus [  ... ]"(p. 90). 
(130)  The stars came out. 
( 131)  The lights went out. 
(132)  Those thoughts were coming again. 
These analyses are valuable in that they begin to  shed  light on the  role of accessibility in 
lexical  meaning,  in  particular,  providing  elues  about  the  relations  between  the  different 
(concrete  and  abstract)  senses  of deictic  motion  verbs.  However,  they  present  several 
significant problems. First, the notion of 'region of interactive focus'  as formulated above is 
too  vague and  intemally heterogeneous to  make useful predictions  about the  possible and 
impossible uses  of words  like  deictic motion  verbs.  Unlike  the  simple,  invariant,  abstract 
concept of accessibility  that I  am adopting,  the  region of interactive  focus  (a "functional 
assembly",  in  Lindner's  words)  is  intemally  complex.  This  complexity  is  not  only 
unparsimonious;  it  also  leads  to  inaccurate  predictions  if applied  to  deictic  verbs.  For 
example, if, as  claimed by Lindner and Radden above, there is a link between being desired 
and being accessible, it should be possible to say As 1 developed a love for boats, the/a yacht 92 
came ta me with the interpretation 'The/a yacht bccame desirable to me, i.e. I started to want 
to have a yacht'. This is clearly not the case, however, and a truly explanatory analysis must 
be able to predict the impossibility of such uses. 
Second,  the  above  analyses  rely  on  the  traditional  assumption  that  deictic  elements 
necessarily  center on  the  speaker-as-observer.  This assumption is  adopted in Vandeloise's 
analysis  of DEVANT  and  DERRIÈRE,  which  assumes  that  these  prepositions  express 
(in)accessibility  with  respect to  the  speaker as  observer.  Clearly,  however,  sentences  like 
(133)  and (134)  below  show  that accessibility can be  determined with respect to  a person 
other than the speaker. In (133), the situation involves accessibility to the hearer. That is,  in 
the second sentence, Marie does  not use the preposition DERRIÈRE  to  express that she  is 
visually inaccessible to  herself, but rather to  indicate that she is  inaccessible to  the hearer 
Jean. In (134), it is  possible that both the speaker and hearer of the utterance can see Marie 
but that Jean cannot;  hence,  the  sentence expresses Mary's inaccessibility with  respect to 
Jean, a third person. 
(133)  -Jean: Où te caches-tu? -Marie: Ici, derrière l'arbre! 
(134)  Jean ne voit pas Marie parce qu'elle est derrière l'arbre. 
Similarly,  Di  Meola's (1994)  analysis  of German KOMMEN and  GEHEN centers  on the 
prototypical use in which the deictic center is identified with the speaker. In order to explain 
the fact that deictic verbs used in idiomatic expressions can involve a more general observer 
than  merely  the  speaker,  Di  Meola  has  recourse  to  the  notion  of "origo  shift"  (see  the 
mechanism of deictic projection/transposition discussed in section 3.2.1 above)
53
: 
53  "So ist von einem kanonischen Betrachter auszugehen, der sich einen Ort "aussucht", an dem ihrn 
die  iiu~ere Welt zuganglich  ist.  Die Gegenstiinde sind  wahrnehrnbar (z.B.  sichtbar oder horbar);  sie 
sind dem Betrachter bekannt, er kann mit ihnen interagieren. 
Der kanonische Betrachter kann ais eine extreme Form der Origoverschiebung angesehen werden. Das 
Verb  kommen  bezeichnet  in  diesen  Fiillen  eine  abstrakte  Bewegung,  die  sich  dem  kanonischen 
Betrachter  nahert  (Eintritt  in  die  Region  des  interaktiven  Fokus),  das  Verb  gehen  hingegen  eine 
Bewegung, die sich entfernt (Austritt aus dem Fokus)." (Di Meola,  1996, p. 96-97) 93 
Thus we can take as a starting point a canonicat observer that "seeks out" a place from which the 
extemal world  is  accessible  to  him.  Objects are  perceptible (e.g.  visible or audible);  they are 
known to the observer, he can interact with them. 
The  canonical  observer can  be  viewed  as  an  extreme  form  of origo  shift.  The  verb  kommen 
describes in these  cases an abstract movement towards  the  cano  ni cal observer (  entry into  the 
region of interactive focus), white the verb gehen describes a rnovement away from the canonicat 
observer (leaving focus). (Di Meola, 1996, p. 96-97, my translation and emphasis) 
Such an analysis requires not only that we postulate metaphoric extensions :fi:om  movement 
to  abstract domains,  but also  a  vaguely defined notion of "canonicat observer" that  lacks 
independent motivation; according to Di Meola (1994,  p.  112),  this  observer "is identified 
with the region of perceptibility and cognitive accessibility" and is  derived from the deictic 
center's prototypical, egocentric meaning. Crucially, as I showed above (in section 3.2.2), the 
proper notion to  capture the referential flexibility of the deictic center is th at of 'Subject of 
Consciousness'. As  I will show in Chapters IV and V, context and background knowledge 
allow us to detennine which Subject of  Consciousness (or set of  subjects of consciousness) is 
the most appropriate for a given utterance containing one of these deictic verbs. The fact that 
in prototypical motion uses  accessibility is  determined with respect to  the  speaker simply 
follows from the fact that the speaker is the most salient participant in the utterance situation. 
In other words,  the  speaker  is  the  thing  that  is  most  accessible  to  himself.  This  is  why 
scholars have traditionally treated the deictic center via the characterization 'me-here-now'. 
A  final  problem raised  by  the  analyses  under discussion  is  that  they  adopt the  Cognitive 
Semantic  assumption  that  elements  such  as  deictic  verbs  are  lexically  polysemous
54
, 
proposing that spatial uses are central and that non-spatial uses are motivated by metaphorical 
extensions from space. As  a result, the notion of accessibility is  not taken to be an intrinsic 
property of an invariant, core meaning of deictic motion verbs, but rather merely a property 
of ce1iain  specifie, non-central  lexicalized senses  derivationally related  to  the  prototypical 
spatial use via the internally complex notion of  "region of interactive focus". 
54 See my discussion ofLakoffs (1987) approach to polysemy in the lexicon above (section 1.1.1). 94 
I depart radically from  these authors  on this point, showing instead that for deictic motion 
verbs like COME, GO, VENIR and ALLER, what is  semantically constant from one use to 
the next is  not the  idea of movement, but rather the notion of accessibility to  a Subject of 
Consciousness.  As  for  the idea of spatial proximity so  often attributed to  the semantics of 
these  verbs,  it  is  in  fact  merely  one  of the  many  contextually  derived  constmals  of 
accessibility: an object can be accessible to a Subject of Consciousness by being near to him 
in  space,  but  it  can  also  achieve  this  general  relation  by  being  accessible  to  perception, 
mentally accessible, or simply by existing. Renee, white certain Cognitive Semantic analyses 
of deictic verbs have rightly pointed out a link between accessibility and certain "extended" 
uses of these verbs, they fail to recognize the central role played by this notion: when deictic 
verbs  express  notions  like  'perceptible', 'known', 'publicly available', or  'existence', it  is 
because  each  of these  concepts  is  one  possible  marufestation  of the  more  general  notion 
'accessibility to a Subject ofConsciousness'. 
Cmcially, this approach to  the lexical meaning of deictic verbs bas a significant advantage 
over space-based, Cognitive Semantic analyses like those of Di Meola, Radden and Viberg: 
rather than positing complex networks of multiple lexical meanings involving metaphorical 
extensions from a central spatial meaning, I will show (in Chapters IV and V) that these verbs 
are monosemous, and that ali their numerous uses  can be  explained by defining the deictic 
center as  'a point that is  accessible to a Subject of Consciousness'. In  other words,  taking 
accessibility as a core component of these verbs' semantics, we can dispense with space and 
metaphor altogether in accounting for the broad range of contextual uses these verbs allow. 
3.3  Type of end relation 
As  shown  so  far,  COME  and  GO  share  severa!  semantic  propetiies  with  their  French 
counterparis  VENIR  and  ALLER.  First,  both  sets  of verbs  express  abstract  orientation 
predicated of X  (the  subject's referent).  Second,  for  both sets  of verbs,  this  orientation is 
towards a relation witb the deictic center (in the case of COMENENIR) or the anti-deictic 
center (in the case of GO/ALLER), and  the  deictic and  anti-deictic centers  ar·e  defined the 
same way  for both the English verbs and their French counterparts:  the  deictic center is  'a 95 
point that is accessible to  a Subject of Consciousness', and the anti-deictic center is  'a point 
other than the deictic center'. 
However, the  English and French verbs do  not have identical semantic representations, for 
they differ through a single component: the type of relation toward which X is  oriented.  In 
the present section I show that VENIR and ALLER express orientation toward a maximally 
general  relation  R,  while  COME  and  GO  express  orientation  toward  the  more  specifie 
relation of localization. 
3.3.1  The relation R 
VENIR and ALLER encode a maximally general relation between X and  the  deictic/anti-
deictic  center.  This underspecified relation, which I will  call R, is  described by  Bouchard 
(1995)  as  a general "combinatorial" or "associative function".  In other words,  VENIR and 
ALLER simply indicate that X is  oriented toward "relating" with o or ro  (p.  121)
55
. This can 
be represented as in (135) and (136). 
(135)  End-relation expressed by VENIR: R (X, o) 
(136)  End-relation expressed by ALLER: R (X, ro) 
Because the  relation established is  between two  points  (X and o/ro),  the R in these  verbs' 
meanings cannot be interpreted as predication, i.e. application of one the two elements as a 
propetiy  of the  other.  This  is  because  points  refer  to  entities,  and  one  entity  cannot  be 
predicated of another entity. This becomes apparent if we compare VENIR with DEVENIR, 
the latter of which presumably expresses orientation toward a property rather than a relation. 
Renee,  while the complement of VENIR or ALLER must be a relational element like a PP 
(as in (137)), DEVENIR takes as a complement an element expressing a property (such as an 
55  Bouchard (1995) proposes the  label COPULA for  this relation.  This label  is  problematic because 
copula traditionally refers  to  grammatical  class of elements  from  the  lexicon  (e.g. BE,  ÊTRE)  that 
serve to  link a subject to a predicative expression (an NP or an ADJ). In the present case, instead of a 
grammatical operator, we  have a semantic primitive that associates one point with another. Thus, for 
this primitive I reject the label COPULA and use R instead. 96 
NP  or  an  ADJ,  as  in  (138)).  For  the  same  reason,  DEVENIR  1s  incompatible  with  a 
complement that is a prepositional phrase. 
(137)  Jean est venu/allé à Montréal. 
(138)  Jean est devenu (un) professeur/ Jean est devenu célèbre. 
(139)  *Jean est venu/allé (un) professeur/Jean est venu/allé célèbre. 
(140)  *Jean est devenu à Montréal. 
3.3 .2  Localization 
While VENIR and ALLER express orientation toward general relatedness (R), COME and 
GO  express orientation toward the more specifie relation of localization  (L), which I  will 
represent formally as follows. 
(141)  End-relation expressed by COME: L (X, o) 
(142)  End-relation expressed by GO: L (X, w) 
This  concept  is  proposed by Vandeloise (1986,  1987,  1991)  in  his  analysis  of the French 
preposition À in its spatial use
56
.  The author characterizes localization as  a relation between 
two elements - the target (i.e. figure) and the landmark (i.e. ground)- whose main function is 
to  allow the hem·er to  locate the target by using the landmark as  a reference point. A crucial 
effect  of this  function  is  that localization "maximizes  the contras! between the  target (the 
object sought after)  and the landmark that is  the point of reference"  (Vandeloise, 1991, p. 
184, my emphasis). In other words, although all  spatial prepositions set up  an asymmetry 
between the figure (  expressed by the subj ect of the preposition) and the ground (  expressed by 
the object of the preposition), the localizing preposition À bas the effect of insisting on this 
asymmetry,  given  that  the  ground  is  treated  as  a  reference  point  allowing  the  hearer  to 
56  Note that Desclés et al.  (1998) also use a relation called localization as a semantic primitive in their 
analysis of motion verbs. Crucially, however, their notion does not have the prope1 ties laid  out here 
and therefore should not be confused with the primitive I am attributing to the meaning of COME and 
GO. 97 
determine the whereabouts of the figure. Thus, as he points out, "[f]or a landmark to localize 
a target ideally, both landmark and target must be ideal examples of their type" (Vandeloise, 
1991, p.  168). Moreover, as Ruwet (1969) points out, "the NP following à must itself have an 
intrinsic localizing value in sorne  sense;  this is  not necessarily the  case when we consider 
complements of the form dans NP, sur NP, etc." (p. 320, as  cited by Vandeloise,  1991, p. 
168). 
For example, white a significant asymmetry in size between figure and ground is not required 
by other spatial prepositions (as shown in (143)), the localization expressed by À does bring 
about this  requirement (as  shown in (144))  (p.  160).  Likewise, when À  is  used,  there  is  a 
marked tendency for asymmetry in mobility: the figure is mobile, and the ground is immobile 
(p.l61-162), resulting in the marginality of  examples like (145) and (146). 
(143)  La cuiller est près de la fourchette. 
(144)  *La cuiller est à la fourchette. 
(145)  ? Le chien est à l'arbre. 
(146)  ?  ? Le banc est à l'arbre. 
Vandeloise points out that the acceptability of ( 145) and (146) improves if the interpretation 
is that the doglbench is tied/chained to the tree. In other words, localization has the effect of 
anchoring the figure at the ground. When atypical abjects are used as  a ground, acceptability 
improves if this anchoring has a concrete reality (as in the examples here, where the figure is 
literally attached to the ground)
57
. 
A  third effect noted by Vandeloise (1991) is  that localization maximizes the "unknown vs. 
known"  contrast  between  figure  and  ground.  As  he  points  out,  an  element's  ability  to 
function as ground for the localizer À depends on "how precisely it is  localized in the shared 
knowledge of the speakers", resulting in a constraint on the specificity of the landmark: "à is 
57  As  I show  in  Chapters  IV  and V,  this  anchoring property  of localization  plays  a crucial role in 
accounting for the differences in semantic uses between COME/GO and VENIR/ALLER. --------- - ----------------
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acceptable in prop01iion to the specificity of the landmark's position". Thus, (147) and (148) 
are  acceptable because use of a proper noun typically presupposes that the  location of the 
referent is  known to  both speaker and hearer.  In contrast, since a definite atiicle does  not 
unambiguously pick out an individual, the acceptability of (149) depends on whether or not 
context or shared  background knowledge make  the  NP's referent  highly  identifiable.  And 
since an indefinite atiicle generally depicts the referent as  non-specifie (and thus not easily 
identifiable), (150) is unacceptable (p. 160-168). 
(147)  L'empereur est à Liège. 
(148)  L'empereur est au rocher de la Vierge Folle. 
(149)  (*)L'empereur est au rocher. 
(150)  *L'empereur est à un rocher. 
As Vandeloise points out, the concept of localization is  grounded in general cognition (1991, 
p.  184-185)  and  is  "fundamental  in  our  interaction  with  the  world"  (157),  for  in  daily 
existence,  humans  are  constantly  faced  with  the  need  to  locate  things  with  respect  to  a 
known/familiar reference point. However, we do not only locate things in space (e.g. looking 
for our keys in the morning), but also in abstract domains such as  time (  e.g.  anticipating a 
dinner  that  is  planned  for  later  in  the  day).  This  domain-independent  character  is  also 
reflected inside  language,  where  localizing elements such as  À  can be  used across  a wide 
variety ofsemantic domains, as shown in (151) through (154) (see Jackdendoff, 2002, p. 356-
360, for  a discussion of TO's use across domains)
58
.  In all of these examp1es,  À  serves to 
situate a figure with respect to a stable, familiar ground. Thus, although I adopt Vandeloise's 
basic  characterization  of localization,  I  depart  from  his  restriction  of this  concept  to  the 
58  Although I am assuming that the same general concept of localization is present across languages, 
operating as the core of  the semantics of  prepositions like French À and English AT, such lexical items 
may contain additional components that account for the cross-linguistic variation in their specifie uses 
(e.g.  French À's wider set of uses compared to those ofEnglish AT). Thus,  although elements like À 
and  AT can be  used  to  bring to  light certain properties of localization itself,  the latter should not be 
taken to be strictly equivalent to the semantics of  any given lexical unit. 99 
domain of space. Instead, I define localization more generally as the anchoring of an element 
X  with  respect  to  an  identifiable  point  Y.  Renee,  like  the  concepts  'orientation'  and 
'deictic/anti-deictic  center',  'localization'  is  abstract  and  domain-independent  (des pite  the 
spatial connotations that tenns like orientation and localization may can-y in eve1-yday use). 
(151)  TIME: Le concert est à 14/t. 
(152)  POSSESSION: Cette voiture est à Jacques. 
(153)  TEMPERATURE: Le four est à 400 degrés. 
(154)  DEGREE: À quel  point désire-t-il participer au colloque? 
The English and French verbs under examination in the present study thus differ with respect 
to  the  relation  they  contain:  VENIR and  ALLER contain  the  unspecified  relation  R  ('X 
relates to Y'), while COME and GO contain the localization relation L ('X is localized at Y'). 
As I show in Chapters N  and V, this difference in intrinsic semantic content provides the key 
to  understanding the numerous sense differences observed between French VENIR/ALLER 
and English COME/GO. 
This  cross-linguistic  asymmetry  111  verb  meanmg  JS  paralleled  by  an  asymmetry  in 
prepositional meaning:  the  general French prepositions À and DE cover a greater range of 
uses  than  their  English  counterparts  AT/TO  and  FROM/OF,  respectively,  and  it  is  thus 
reasonable to  assume that the fonner are more general  in meaning than the latter.  In other 
words, like the English verbs COME/GO, the English prepositions TO/FROM are richer in 
lexical meaning than their French counterpmis. 
Further  evidence  that  English  motion  verbs  tend  to  have  richer,  more  specifie  semantic 
content than their French counterparts cornes from Bouchard's (1995, p. 189-207) analysis of 
Manner-of-Movement Verbs (MMVs). The author notes that French MMVs combined with 
static prepositions yield only static readings (  e.g. La bouteille flotte sous le pont), while sorne 
English  MMVs,  when  combined  with  static  prepositions,  yield  dynamic  (i.e.  change  of 
location)  readings (e.g.  The bottle is floating under the bridge).  He argues that this follows 
from the way the  two  languages  encode orientation: French uses  abstract orientation as  a 
component only when the relation being expressed is too general to be expressed through 3D 100 
(i.e.  perceptually-based)  prope1iies.  English,  on the  other hand, makes  generalized use of 
abstract orientation as a component of motion verbs, preferring this over a perceptually-based 
orientation component. 
3.4  Identification of  the verbs' semantic representations 
Having defined the components that enter into the makeup of the verbs COME, VENIR, GO 
and ALLER, 1 can now identify the full semantic content of  each.  of these verbs. As shown in 
the semantic representations in Figures 3.4 through 3.7, each verb has only a single, abstract 
meaning  expressing  X's  orientation  toward  a  relation  with  a  constant.  For  VENIR  and 
COME, this constant is the deictic center o, and for GO and ALLER, the constant is the anti-
deictic  center  w.  Cross-linguistically,  these  verbs  differ  only  with  respect  to  a  single 
component: the type of relation established with the deictic/anti-deictic center. In the case of 
French VENIR and ALLER, the end relation is the maximally general R, white in the case of 
English COME and GO,  the  end relation is  localization (L).  Renee,  ALLER and VENIR 
express th at 'X is oriented toward being related to o/w', while COME and GO express that 'X 
is oriented toward being localized at o/w'. 
x 
--------.  R(X, o) 
Figure 3.4  Semantic representation of  VENIR 
x 
- - ------.  L(X, o) 
Figure 3.5  Semantic representation of COME x 
------ ... R(X, ffi) 
Figure 3.6  Semantic representation of  ALLER 
x 
------ ... L(X, ffi) 
Figure 3.7  Semantic representation of  GO 
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As I show in the next two chapters, this single difference between French and English verbs 
has  important consequences for  the uses they allow in  context.  In particular, semantic uses 
that rely on the notion of localization at an endpoint are obtained more easily for COME and 
GO  than for  VENIR and  ALLER.  In addition,  although  none  of these  verbs  intrinsically 
,  expresses a source relation for the orientation, the latter can be infeiTed based on the nature of 
the end-relation. Thus, COME and GO can also be used in situations requiring the notion of 
localization at a source point, white such uses are difficult to  obtain for VENIR and ALLER 
. when context or background knowledge do not provide this information. -------- - - ----- ---, 
CHAPTERIV 
THE SENSES OF COME AND VENIR 
The present chapter demonstrates how the specifie, contextualized interpretations of COME 
and VENIR are derived from  their respective monosemous meanings based on background 
and contextual knowledge. In particular, we will see that all of  the similarities and differences 
observed  between  these  verbs'  senses  follow  from  a  single  difference  in  their  invariant 
semantic representations (type of end-relation) as well as from differences in the English and 
French grammatical and lexical systems.  -
4.1  Motion 
In this  section, I discuss the most salient, prototypical set of senses of COME and VENIR: 
those traditionally treated as  describing motion toward the speaker or hearer.  As  shown in 
Chapter II,  many semanticists consider 'motion' as  the base sense of verbs like COME and 
VENIR. However, as  Bouchard (1995) shows, the notion of movement is in fact completely 
absent from the intrinsic meaning of these words. The situation of  movement that these verbs 
can be used to express is not a distinct meaning. Rather, it can be calculated directly from the 
abstract  core  meaning  of each  of these  verbs  identified  in  the  preceding  chapter  in 
combination  with  the  meaning of the  other  grammatical  and  lexical  elements  as  well  as 
elements of meaning detennined inferentially from our background and world knowledge. In 
short,  'motion' is  not  a meaning of these verbs,  but of the  sentences uttered in  particular 
contexts. 103 
4.1.1  Account of general properties 
We saw in the preceding chapter that the invariant semantic representations of COME and 
VENIR are the following: 
(155)  COME:  x 
-------+  L(X, o) 
( 156)  VENIR:  x 
_____  ___. R(X, o) 
A 'motion' use emerges when the subject refers to a concrete, mobile entity and when either 
lexical material in the sentence or background knowledge brings us  to  interpret the deictic 
center o concretely as a physicallocation. Sentences (157) and (158) are typical examples of 
this  'motion'  use.  Combining  the  elements  of  these  sentences  with  the  semantic 
representations of COME and VENIR, we obtain the compositional meanings illustrated in 
(159) and (160), respectively. 
(157)  John is coming to Montreal. 
(158)  Jean vient à Montréal. 
(159)  'John' 
--------.  L ('John', o) 
1 
'to'  'Monh·eal' 
(160)  'Jean' 
-------+- R ('Jean', o) 
1 
'à'  'Montreal' 
Let us first consider the English example. (1 return to the French sentence below.) Sentence 
(157) expresses that John is oriented toward being in a relation of loca1ization with o. The PP 
complement  is  interpreted  as  specifying  the  reference  of the  end-relation  in  the  verb's 104 
meaning
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. This follows from the assumption that a PP, a relational element, can only be co-
referential with another relational element. Renee, the PP cannot be interpreted as identifying 
o, sin  ce o is a point. Sin  ce the PP specifies the reference of  L, the argument of the preposition 
(the point Montreal) is  interpreted as  linking to o.  (Thus, my analysis differs in this respect 
from that of Bouchard (1995),  who  claims that the PP specifies  the  reference of o.)  The 
compositional  meaning  expressed  in  representation  (159)  can  be  roughly  paraphrased  as 
follows:  'John/Jean is  oriented toward being in a relation of localization with o, that is, with 
the point Montreal'
60
. 
World knowledge  about the  entities  being  referred  to  emiches  this  global  meaning.  The· 
prototypical referent of John is a human being, and the most likely referent of Montreal is  a 
city. The arguments present in the sentence are thus spatial entities, leading us  to  infer that 
the sentence describes a spatial situation. When construed in the spatial domain, the concept 
of localization yields  the  idea of being physically located at  a point in space (see section 
3.3.2), and we thus infer that o refers to a spatial point (an idea that is reinforced by o's being 
co-referential with Montreal). 
Because  the  notion  'orientation'  is  based  on magnitude,  and  because  the  meaning  'X is 
oriented toward a relation Y' decomposes as  'X bas an increasing potential to be in relation 
Y'  (  see  section  3.1 ),  the  sentence  John  is  coming  to  Montreal  can  be  paraphrased  as 
'John/Jean has an increasing potential to be at the point Montreal'. The most natural way for 
a human to have such a tendency is to be engaged in physical movement toward the location 
in question. At each successive point along the path Jean follows, he bas greater potential to 
bring about the  state  'Jean is  located at  Montreal'. The logical  end  state of any trend of 
increasing potential toward a relation Y is  the realization of that relation.  In spatial tenns, 
59  In  the  present study 1 use  the term  complement broadly to  refer to  any element that  identifies (i.e. 
links  to)  a subpart of a verb's lexical semantic structure.  When,  instead, a sentential element applies 
predicatively to (i.e. modifies) a subpart of  the verb's meaning, 1 consider this element an adjunct. 
60  1t  is  important to  point out  that the  paraphrases  used  in  the  present  analysis  have  no  theoretical 
import.  Rather, they are  used solely for expository purposes, allowing me to show how linguistic and 
extra-linguistic elements are used to obtain the global interpretation for a given utterance. 105 
once  John  is  physically  localized  at  the  point  'Montreal',  he  cannot  get  any  cl oser  to 
Monh·eal. 
The deictic center contained in COME and VENIR is defined as  'a point that is accessible to 
an SC'. Crucially, one spatial point to  which any given Subject of Consciousness has access 
is his own location. Thus, when the deictic center is construed spatially, it can be interpreted 
as  'the location of the  SC'. As  mentioned above  (section  3.2.2),  the  speaker is  the  most 
salient Subject of Consciousness, given his central role in the utterance situation. Moreover, 
since it is  the speaker who is primarily rcsponsible for assigning the status of SC to entities, 
he has a privileged, somewhat omniscient status. Consequently, he bas access not only to his 
own location, but also to the location of each entity to which he assigns the status of  SC. 
Thus,  in sentences  like  (157) above,  COME is  used to  indicate that the subject is  oriented 
toward  being  at  the physical location of the  speaker or other  SC. Since  the  prepositional 
phrase  to  Montreal  specifies  the  reference  of the  relation  L  ('John',  'location  of SC'), 
Montreal identifies the location of the SC. Finally, as Bouchard (1995, p. 127) points out, the 
most natural way for a mobile entity such as a human to be oriented toward being located at a 
point  in  space  is  for  this  entity  to  undergo  movement toward  that  location.  W e  therefore 
obtain the meaning:  'John is  moving toward the location of an SC (such as  the speaker), a 
location  specified  as  being  Montreal'.  Th  us,  for  sentences  like  (157),  the  most  natural 
interpretation is  a situation involving a concrete entity  (in this case,  a human)  undergoing 
movement in space. 
Since  VENIR  does  not  have  the  same  meanmg  as  COME,  it  does  not  make  the  same 
contribution to the overall meaning of the sentence in (158) as  COME does in (157). That is, 
VENIR does not contribute localization, since the end-relation expressed in its meaning is the 
maximally general R. However, in (158) the concept of localization is  nonetheless supplied 
by  the  preposition À, giving us  sufficient information to  construe  the  end-state  as  one of 
being physically  located  at the  location of an  SC.  Thus,  once again,  we obtain the  global 
meaning 'Jean is moving toward the location of  an SC'. 
Note, however, that a 'motion' reading can be obtained even in the absence of a destination 
complement, as in (161) and (162). (161)  John is co ming tonight. 
(162)  Jean vient ce soir. 
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Since the subject refers to  a mobile spatial entity capable of self-deterrnined, self-propelled 
motion, in the absence of a destination complement, the default assumption is  that the verb 
must be  interpreted  spatially:  the  deictic  center  refers  to  the  location  of an  SC,  and  the 
orientation  component  refers  to  a  motion  event.  This  is  because  according  to  our  world 
knowledge,  the  most  obvious  way  for  a  mobile  concrete  entity  like  a  human  to  be  in  a 
relation with a point in space is to be located there. Renee, although VENIR's meaning lacks 
the  specifie  notion of localization contained in  COME,  in a  sentence  like  (162)  there  is 
sufficient information for the idea of physical localization to be infened based on our world 
knowledge. As  a result, despite the difference in intrinsic semantic content, not only COME 
but also VENIR is able to express motion toward the location of a Subject of Consciousness, 
with or without the presence of a locative expression acting as a destination complement. 
In addition, world knowledge indicates that not only animate objects, but also various kinds 
of inanimate objects (  e.g.  vehicles,  clouds, rocks,  etc.) can undergo  motion through space. 
Consequently,  a  'motion'  reading  can be  obtained  even  when  the  subject of COME  and 
VENIR is a typically mobile inanimate entity, as in the following. 
(163)  There is a carla storm cloud coming (toward us). 
(164)  Il y a une voiture/un gros nuage qui vient (vers nous). 
4.1.2  Account of  deictic properties of  motion uses 
Traditional analyses of deictic verbs like COME and VENIR assume that in the motion use 
the end-point of the movement must be the location of the speaker, but this  is  an error. The 
deictic center contained in these two verbs' meanings is  'a point that is  accessible to  an SC', 
so in a 'motion' reading, the destination is the location of an SC. Given the speaker's special 
status  that follows from  the nature of language  (see section 3.2.2), it  is  true that the  most 
prominent SC  in any  utterance  situation is  the  speaker.  Thus,  without further  context,  we 
interpret the  verb as  indicating motion toward the speaker, as  in examples (157) and (158) 
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On the other hand, because entities other than the speaker can be assigned the status of SC, 
when contextual or background knowledge is  sufficient, a location other than the  speaker's 
location can be selected as the intended destination of the motion event expressed by COME 
and VENIR. This location can be that of the hearer (examples (165) and (166)), or a third 
person  in  the  case  where  COMENENIR  follows  a  mental  verb  ((167)  and  (168)),  a 
perception verb  ((169)  and  (170))  or a  communication verb  ((171)  and  (172)),  or  in  the 
context of a narrative, where the relevant Subject of Consciousness is provided by a salient 
participant ofthe narrated situation ((173) and (174)). (See section3.2.2 for my full account 
of  the way the SC is selected in each ofthese examples). 
(165)  J'tl come on Monday. 
( 166)  Je viendrai lundi. 
( 167)  John thought someone was co ming toward hi  m. 
(168)  Jean pensait que quelqu'un venait vers lui. 
(169)  John saw someone coming toward him. 
(170)  Jean voyait quelqu'un qui venait vers lui. 
(171)  John said that Mary had come to his house. 
(172)  Jean disait que Marie était venue à sa maison. 
(173)  John stopped suddenly and looked around. A man was coming toward him. 
(174)  Jeans 'arrêta et regarda autour de lui.  Un homme venait vers lui. 
Another traditional assumption about deictic motion verbs is that the goal of the movement 
must be the location of  the speaker (or other SC) himself. This, too,  i~ a~ enor, for the notion 
'a point that is accessible to an SC' can be construed in more than one way. On the one hand, 
it is  true that the speaker's (or other SC's) own location is  the most salient spatial point to 
which  he  has  access,  and  this  accounts  for  the  fact  that  in  prototypical  'motion'  uses  of 
COME and VENIR, the subject's referent ends up at the same point in space as  the SC. On 
the  other band, depending on contextual factors,  a point in space other than the SC's own 108 
location can be considered accessible to him, and in such situations, COME and VENIR can 
be used to describe a movement that does not end at the SC's location. 
To illustrate this, imagine a situation in which the hem·er is inside a bouse and the speaker is 
outside the bouse. Even though the movement does not necessarily result in the speaker and 
hearer  being  at  the  same  point  in  space,  sentence  (175)  is  perfectly  acceptable.  This  is 
because the element out of  indicates that the movement results in the person leaving a space 
functioning as  a container. Our world knowledge indicates that containers like bouses have 
sufficient properties to make a contained object inaccessible (in tenns of visibility, physical 
contact, etc.) to  a person who is  not also inside that container. Thus, a movement out of  a 
bouse or similar container typically results in the object becoming accessible. In the situation 
described  in (175),  the  hem·er  is  to  undergo  a  movement bringing him  into  a  relation of 
accessibility vis-à-vis the speaker, and thus the sentence is acceptable. 
(175)  Please come out of  the house. 
Now imagine a situation in which the hearer is standing either in a canoe that is on land or in 
a yard that is not surrounded by a fence. Imagine also that the hearer is within seeing-distance 
of the  speaker,  and that the  latter is  not in the  canoe/yard.  While  both  locations  count as 
containers (thus wananting the use of out ofto specify the destination of the motion), (177) 
would nonetheless be unacceptable in these contexts, while a sentence using a verb like GET, 
as in (176), is fully acceptable. 
(176)  Please get out of  the canoe/yard. 
(177)  ?  Please come out of  the canoe/yard. 
Given COME's semantics, (177) indicates a transition from inaccessibility to  accessibility, 
and this  enters  into  contradiction with our contextual/world knowledge:  due  to  the spatial 
characteristics of canoes and yards, containment within these spaces is unlikely to  make the 
hear·er  inaccessible  (e.g.  visually  inaccessible,  inaccessible  to  physical  contact, 
communication,  etc.)  to  the  speaker.  If,  however,  the  hearer  is  biding  undemeath  an 
overtumed canoe or inside a  yard surrounded by tall  hedges,  and the  speaker is  a  police 
officer  trying  to  arrest  him,  sentence  (177)  becomes  fully  acceptable.  This  is  because 109 
contextual factors are now such that the hearer's containment within these spaces renders him 
inaccessible  to  the  speaker,  making it now possible to  imagine  a  movement toward  non-
containment that would cause him to become accessible
61
. 
A  further  illustration of the  effects  of the  'accessibility'  component in  a  motion  context 
cornes from the  following  example. Imagine that the hearer is  standing in a shadow that is 
surrounded on all sides by a zone of light, and that the  speaker and hearer are facing each 
other.  Without further  context,  we  interpret (178)  as  meaning  that  the  speaker wants  the 
hearer to  move closer to  him (as illustrated in (179), wherc S stands for the location of the 
speaker, and the dots represent the starting and end points of the movement). But this is  not 
the only possible interpretation: the request would still be deemed to have been carried out if 
the hearer were to step sideways out of the light, remaining just as far from the speaker as he 
was before the movement (as illustrated in (180)). The detennining factor in this second case 
is not location or physical proximity, but rather access to  visual perception. 
(178)  1 can 't see you, please come into the light. 
(179)  Situation 1 
1 
'+'  • 
s 
61  Given that French is a verb-framing language that makes abundant use of the verb SORTIR (which 
encodes the notion of orientation toward non-containment: see Bouchard, 1995, p.  183-184), a French 
translation of(176) using VENIR is awkward: ??SVP, venez hors du canot/de la cour. 110 
( 180)  Situation 2 
G - >e 
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Likewise,  although the  default interpretation of (181)  is  that the  microphone is  physically 
close to the speaker, the sentence would still be acceptable in a situation where movement to 
the microphone brings the hearer no closer to the speaker (or even slightly fmiher from him), 
because the microphone is a point of  auditory accessibility for the speaker
62
. 
(181)  1 can't hear you. Please come to the microphone. 
To  fmiher illustrate how accessibility to the speaker (or other SC) can be achieved through 
situations other than an object's spatial co-occunence with the latter, consider example (182). 
Since the  most salient point that is  accessible to  an  SC  is  the  SC's own location,  without 
further context we interpret (182) as  indicating that an  SC  (such as the speaker) is standing 
next  to  the  telephone  pole  at  the  time  of the  event.  However,  the  sentence  is  still  fully 
acceptable if the SC is watching the action from a remote location via a camera mounted on 
the pole. This interpretation is made explicit in (183). In this case, the subject's referent ('the 
man') is  oriented toward being at a point that is  visually accessible to  the speaker, and the 
basic intrinsic requirement imposed by COME's semantics is thus met. 
62  See Di Meola (1994, p.  44-45) for a discussion  of how sight and hear·ing influence the reference of 
the deictic center in similar situations for German KOMMEN and GEHEN. 111 
( 182)  The man came toward the telephone pole. 
(183)  1  watched  the  television  monitor  in  disbelief as  the  man  came  toward  the 
telephone pole. 
Examples (178)  through  (183)  therefore demonstrate that when COME is  used to  express 
movement  through  space,  it  need  not  necessarily  express  movement  to  the  physical 
destination of the speaker (or other SC), as long as the destination is a point that is in one way 
or another highly  accessible  to  the  SC.  In our experience  of the  real  world,  increase  of 
physical proximity typically is an optimal way to increase access to  something, but it is  not 
the only way, as we have seen here. 
Finally, the notion of accessibility allows us to account for the behavior of 'home-base' uses 
often noted for COME's and VENIR's 'motion' use. As pointed out by Fillmore (e.g.  1975), 
deictic verbs can be used to describe movement toward a location that is strongly associated 
with the speaker (such as  his home or workplace), even when the speaker is  not present at 
that location at the time of  arrival, as in the following. 
(184)  John came to my house yesterday, but 1 was at work. 
( 185)  Jean est venu à ma maison hier, mais j'étais au travail. 
Our world knowledge tells us  that locations such as  a person's home, office, etc. are places 
where he spends a great deal of time. Thus, if an entity X moves to the home, etc. of an SC, 
there  is  a  good  chance  that X  will  become  accessible  to  this  SC.  This  accounts  for  the 
acceptability of sentences like (184)  and (185):  even though the subject's referent ('John') 
did not move to the location occupied by the speaker at the ti me of the event, he did move to 
a  location  which,  by  virtue  of the  speaker's  frequent  presence,  offers  the  potential  of 
establishing contact.  Moreover,  (184)  and (185)  presuppose that Jolm expected to  see the 112 
speaker at the bouse, i.e. that he expected to establish contact with him
63
. This is made clear 
by the unacceptability of(186) and (187), where the context indicates that John, havingjust 
seen  the  speaker  at  the  office,  could  not  have  been  expecting  to  see  him  at  the  bouse 
afterwards. 
(186)  *Yesterday,  John  visited me here at my office.  We  said goodbye,  and then  he 
came to my house. 
(187)  *Hier, Jean m'a rendu visite ici à mon bureau. Nous nous sommes salués, puis il 
est venu chez moi. 
Crucially,  in  this  situation  the  movement  was  not  aimed  at  establishing  a  relation  of 
accessibility between John and the  speaker, and  the result is  an effect of oddness. Thus,  in 
order for a location to function as  a "home base" referent of COME's and VENIR's deictic 
center, the location must not only be frequently occupied by the speaker (or other SC);  this 
frequent occupancy must be coupled with the  expectation that X's movement will bring it 
into  contact with  (i.e.  make  it accessible to)  the  SC.  Even  in  sentences  like  (188),  whose 
acceptability at  first  sight  appears  to  contradict this  generalization,  accessibility is  in fact 
involved. This sentence can be uttered acceptably even if the speaker is  not present  at the 
bouse at the time of utterance, despite the fact that John's intent was clearly not to  establish 
contact with the speaker. Crucially, in this situation the  result of John's presence - i.e.  the 
theft- is (perceptually) accessible to the speaker and hasan effect on him. Renee, the motion 
event results in the establishment of  a relation of accessibility, and the sentence is fine. 
(188)  Last night, since John knew 1 was away,  he came ta my house and stole my bike 
from the back yard. 
Before moving on to discuss the differences between the motion uses of COME and VENIR, 
I would like  to  point out a use that is  related to  motion and illustrated in (189)  and (190) 
63  In  the  present  discussion,  I  am  using  visibility  as  the  prototypical  case  of visual  accessibility. 
However, accessibility can be gained by other perceptual systems. Thus, (184) and (185) are perfectly 
acceptable when used by a blind person. For an alternative analysis of examples similar to  (184) and 
(185), see Winston (1988, p. 49). --------------
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below. Just as  a mobile entity such as a person can be localized at a point in space, in the 
domain of cyberspace a person can establish a localization relation with a website. COME 
and  VENIR can  therefore  be  used  to  describe  navigation  to  a  website  belonging  to  the 
speaker or other SC
64
. 
(189)  Come ta our web site for up-to-date information on the events. 
(190)  Venez sur notre site web pour des informations sur les événements. 
4.1.3  Account of differences in motion uses 
Despite the highly similar behavior that COME and VENIR display in their 'motion' uses, 
because  these  verbs  do  not  have  identical  semantic  representations  (i.e.  COME  contains 
localization as  an end state, while VENIR contains the maximally general relation R)  they 
nonetheless exhibit severa! differences. 
A  first  difference  concems  the  possibility of expressing  imminent anival,  a  concept  that 
requires  us  to  focus  on the  final  segment of a  motion  event.  Because  COME's meaning 
expresses  orientation  toward  a  relation  of  localization,  it  can  be  used  in  the  present 
progressive  to  focus  on X's act of establishing  a  relation of physical localization,  i.e.  of 
aniving at a point. This is  illustrated in (191 ), which can be uttered, for example, by a child 
responding to his mother who has just called to ber child to tell him that it is dinner time. 
(191)  I'm coming! 
VENIR, however,  contains only the underspecified relation  R.  On the  one hand,  we  have 
seen that due  to  the salience of space and movement in  human experience as  well as  our 
knowledge of how mobile entities  like humans  behave in the real  world,  the  end  state of 
VENIR's  orientation  can  be  inferentially  physical  localization  even  in  the  absence  of a 
locative destination complement (see example  (162)  above).  On the  other band,  since the 
64  One  informant judged this sentence to be odd.  A possible explanation is  that VENIR's lack of an 
intrinsic  notion  of localization  makes  it  less  appropriate  than  COME  to  describe  non-prototypical 
change-of-localization situations such as web navigation. 114 
verb itself does not con  tain localization in its semantics, it cannot be used to focus on this end 
state, and cannot therefore be used to focus on the arriva! portion of  the event. Thus, sentence 
(192), wbile not overwbelmingly unacceptable, is nonetheless odd. Physical localization can 
be  inferred  from  the  context,  but using  VENIR  to  focus  on arrivai  (rather  than  on  the 
movement as a whole) yields an effect of marginalit/
5
. 
(192)  ?Je viens! 
In contrast, ARRIVER, a verb which presumably does contain localization as an end state, is 
fully acceptable in this use
66
. 
(193)  J'arrive! 
A  second  difference  between  COME and  VENIR in  a  movement context concems  what 
Bouchard (1995) caUs the "continuance" effect, i.e. the implication of X's lasting presence at 
the destination after the movement event. Bouchard points out that ARRIVER tends to imply 
that X remains for a prolonged period at its destination ( 195), while VENIR tends to  imply 
that X moves on sh01ily after reaching its destination (194) (p.  171)
67
. In contrast, COME is 
equally compatible with both a  'continuance' and a 'temporary stay' reading, as  shown in 
(196) through (198). 
65  The use of the reflexive pronoun makes this sentence acceptable in Quebec French (Je m'en viens). 
However,  because  S'EN  VENIR is  potentially  a fixed  expression  (see  discussion  of methodology, 
section 2.3), and because the present study focuses on standard French, I will not attempt to explain 
this observation here. 
66 Note that the oddness of the VENIR example cannot be attributable to the absence of a progressive 
aspect in French, for if  it were, we should ob tain the same oddness for ARRIVER. 
67  Note that Bouchard's (1995) account for the continuance contrast between VENIR and ARRIVER 
differs from the analysis presented here. According to him,  this contrast is  attributable to the fact that 
VENIR  implies  internai  development  white  ARRIVER  does  not  (p.  168-171 ).  However,  this 
explanation is  inadequate: the  continuance  effect does  not concern  the  internai  development of the 
event itself, but rather a new movement event after the temporal boundary of the particular movement 
event being described. --------------------- - - --------
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(194)  André Breton est venu à Montréal en 1942. (='He visited Montreal in 1942') 
(195)  André  Breton  est  arrivé  à  Montréal  en  1942.  (='He  took  up  residency  m 
Montreal in 1942 ') 
(196)  André Breton came to Montreal in 1942. 
(197)  ='He visited Montreal in 1942' 
(198)  ='He took up residency in Montreal in 1942' 
COME's meaning contains localization as an end relation, which has the effect of anchoring 
X  at  the  deictic  center.  Assurning  that continuance  is  based  on  an anchoring  at  a  point, 
COME's localization component therefore suppotts a reading where there is a lasting stay at 
a point,  thus  accounting for  the  reading in  (198). Note,  however,  that  localization, while 
supp01ting  a continuance reading, is  nonetheless  fully  compatible  with  a  non-continuance 
reading.  Consequently,  COME's localization component does  not  act as  a constraint with 
respect to  continuance: it provides the notion of anchoring necessary to reach a continuance 
reading  (as  in  (198)),  but it  does  not favor  that reading  over one  of temporariness  (as  in 
(197)). 
On the other hand, VENIR's meaning includes a more general end state, one that does not 
involve  a  localization of X  at  a  point.  In  general,  our expectation  about  mobile  entities 
(  especially volitional mobile entities su ch as humans) is th at they can resume movement after 
stopping. Thus, the default assumption for a motion event is that the end state is  temporary. 
Since VENIR's meaning contains no component suggesting anchoring at a point, this  verb 
does not provide any information to  override our default assumption of continued mobility. 
As a result, in general VENIR tends to favor a 'temporary stay' reading. On the other hand, 
when  contextual  information  is  sufficiently  rich  to  construct  a  'continuance'  situation, 
VENIR allows this type of  reading, as in the following examples. 116 
(199)  André Breton est venu à Montréal en  1995.  Ça  lui a plu, et donc il a décidé de 
rester. 
(200)  Je suis venu pour rester. 
(201)  Viens habiter chez moi 1 
The 'continuance' contrast between COME and VENIR also explains why certain inanimate 
objects are unacceptable subjects of VENIR but acceptable with COME. In (202) and (203), 
the subject refers to an inanimate object involved in a motion situation. However, according 
to  our world knowledge, when an entity like a package is delivered it typically stays at the 
destination, so a delivety context favors a continuance reading.  Consequently, COME (like 
ARRIVER)  is  acceptable in  this  context because its  meaning  supports continuance,  while 
VENIR, whose meaning favors non-continuance as a default reading, is not acceptable in this 
use. 
(202)  A package came for you today. 
(203)  *Un colis est venu pour toi aujourd'hui. 
(204)  Un colis est arrivé pour toi aujourd'hui. 
An alternative explanation attributing this contrast to different animacy specifications in the 
lexical meanings of COME and VENIR is  contradicted by  the  fact  that in other contexts, 
there is no constraint on animacy for VENIR's subject: 
(205)  Ce colis vient de Paris. 
(206)  Ce colis vient d'arriver. 
(207)  Cette route vient de Québec. 
(208)  Son col venait à la hauteur de ses oreilles. (Grand Robert de la langue française) 
(209)  La brume  venait vers  eux,  spectrale,  à une vitesse folle.  (Peisson, cited in the 
Trésor de la langue française) 
A  final  surface  difference  resulting  from  the  asymmetry in the  semantics of COME and 
VENIR  concems  non-prototypical  destination  PPs.  When  the  destination  PP  of 
COME/VENIR refers to a concrete entity that is not a prototypicallocation, such as a human -- - --------------------------- -
117 
(an entity that typically cannot function as  a  localizer due to  our world knowledge), as  in 
(210)  and  (211),  we  interpret  the  destination  phrase  metonymically  as  refening  to  the 
location of  the persan (i.e. of the SC). This promotion of a person to the status of destination 
places  emphasis  on  the  end-relation  established  between the  subject and  the  SC  himself, 
suggesting that the movement is directed toward sorne kind of important interaction with the 
SC.  In  (210)  and  (211),  context  allows  us  to  infer  that  this  interaction  consists  of 
communication between the subject 'John' and the SC  'me'. But the corresponding French 
sentences (212) and (213) are odd
68
. This is because in the case of VENIR end-localization is 
provided solely by an element external to the verb, i.e. the preposition À.  Because COME's 
meaning expresses localization intrinsically and thus more directly, it can be used with non-
prototypical  complements  that  require  special  inferences  in  order  to  be  interpreted.  In 
contrast, because localization can be expressed only indirectly with VENIR, uses such as the 
one below, which require a non-prototypical construal of localization,  are more difficult to 
obtain
69
. 
(21 0)  John came to me about his problems. 
(211)  Wh en you need help, you can always come to me. 
(212)  *Jean est venu à moi à propos de ses problèmes. 
(213)  *Quand tu as besoin d'aide, tu peux toujours venir à moi. 
To  summarize,  in  the  present  section  I  have  shown  that  both  the  similarities  and  the 
differences  of  the  'motion'  uses  of  COME  and  VENIR  follow  directly  from  their 
monosemous  semantic  representations.  Moreover,  the  situational  notion  'motion'  derives 
68 We can, of  course, replace these with the acceptable sentences Jean est venu me voir à propos de ses 
problèmes  and  Quand tu  as  besoin  d'aide,  tu peux toujours  venir me voir,  but  in  such sentences, 
VENIR does not have a destination complement referring directly to a person. 
69  Note  that the  use  in  question  is  attested  for  VENIR in  very marked  contexts,  such as  when the 
intended SC is God: Je viens à vous, Seigneur, père auquel il  faut croire (Hugo, cited in the Trésor de 
la langue française).  In  such a context, the exceptional properties of the SC  and of the  end-relation 
established compensate for VENIR's "weak" expression of localization. 118 
from  the  intrinsically  encoded  idea of 'orientation toward a  point that  is  accessible  to  a 
Subj ect of Consciousness'. In  the  next section, I  tum to  a specifie subset of motion uses: 
those which involve movement followed by an action canied out at the physical destination. 
4.2  Motion + action 
In  this section I discuss  uses of COME and VENIR that express the combined notion of a 
motion event with an action situated at the destination of the movement. Although both verbs 
can be used to describe a motion event that is aimed at an action, they differ in how they can 
accomplish this.  These differences follow from the asymmetry in core meaning along with 
asymmetries in the grammatical systems of  English and French. 
In our experience of the world, willful human movement is  often directed at accomplishing 
an action at the destination location. That is, when we change locations,  it is often with the 
intention of doing something specifie at the place to which we are moving.  Given the natme 
of the semantics of COME and VENIR, when these verbs are used in a context supporting a 
motion reading, there are severa1 possible ways for them to  express a situation of movement 
aimed  at  and  immediately  followed  by  an  action.  One  possibility  is  to  adjoin  to 
COMENENIR  an  action-verb  infinitive  introduced  by  the  purpose-expressing  elements 
TO/POUR, as  in (214) and (215).  Another possibi1ity  is  use a coordinating conjunction to 
join COMENENIR with the action-verb, as in (216) through (219). 
(214)  John came ta talk ta me yesterday. 
(215)  Jean est venu pour me parler hier. 
(216)  Come and help us set the table. 
(217)  John came and helped us set the table. 
(218)  Viens et aide-nous à mettre la table. 
(219)  Jean est venu et nous a aidés à mettre la table. 
In general, VP  and  sententia1  coordination are  used to  present events  in the  order of the 
coordination, ofteri with a relation of causation (compare John  went into  the ho use and he 119 
saw  Mary  and  John  saw  Mary  and  he  went  into  the  house).  Thus,  we  interpret  the 
coordination in (216)  through (219) as  describing a relation of consecutiveness between the 
motion event and the action. And if the action takes place immediately after the motion event, 
the location of this action must logically be the end location of the motion event. Since in a 
'motion' use we construe the deictic center as  'the location of an SC (  e.g. the speaker)', for a 
sentence like (217) we ob  tain an interpretation paraphrasable as follows: 'John moved to the 
location  of the  speaker  (hear·er,  etc.),  and  immediately  afterward  at  that  location,  he 
performed  the  action of setting  the  table'.  Finally,  because  our default assumption  about 
· human  motion  is  that  it  is  willful  and  purpose-driven  (i.e.  when  people go  places,  it  is 
typically in  order to  accomplish  actions  at  their destinations),  our default  assumption for 
sentences  (216)  through  (219)  is  that  the  action  referred  to  by  the  second  verb  phrase 
constitutes  the  purpose  behind  the  motion  event.  Thus,  unlike  in  the  COME/VENIR  + 
TO/POUR + INF  use  in  (214)  and  (215),  the  notion  of pm·pose  is  inferred  rather  than 
explicitly expressed in (216) through (219). 
Despite  being  highly  similar,  the  meanings  obtained  for  the  two  constructions  are  not 
identical.  In  the  AND/ET -construction,  because  of  the  semantics  of  the  coordinating 
conjunction AND/ET, both events must be realized in order for the  sentence to be true.  On 
the other hand, in the TO/POUR + INF construction, because the action verb is introduced by 
an expression of purpose, realization of the  motion event does  not entail realization of the 
action.  This  is  shown  by  the  acceptability  of  (220)  and  (221),  compared  with  the 
unacceptability of the ET/AND construction in (222) and (223). 120 
(220)  John  came  to  talk to  me yesterday,  but 1 wasn 't  home,  so  he  lefl  me  a  note 
instead. 
(221)  Jean  est venu pour me parler hier,  mais je n'étais pas chez moi,  donc  il m'a 
laissé une note à la place. 
(222)  *John came and talked tome yesterday,  but 1 wasn 'thome, so he lefl me a note 
instead. 
(223)  *Jean est venu et m'a parlé hier,  mais je n'étais pas chez moi, donc il m'a laissé 
une note à la place. 
Because the notions of consecutiveness and purpose seen in these uses are not attributable to 
special semantic properties of COME and VENIR but rather to  the  semantic prope1iies  of 
TO/POUR on the one hand and those of AND/ET on the other (in combination with world 
knowledge about the actions involved), these means of expressing a 'motion with pm-pose' 
situation are available to  motion verbs in general both in English and French. However, due 
to  specifie properties of the  semantic representations of COME and VENIR, there are two 
additional ways to express 'motion+ action': the 'progedience' construction and the use of a 
present participle. In the following subsections, I discuss these two uses in turn. 
4.2.1  Progredience: COMENENIR + bare-INF 
It is  possible to  express  pm-poseful  motion  ending in an action  through  the progredience 
construction
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,  in  which  the  motion  verb  is  immediately followed  by an infinitive  whose 
action is intet-preted as  taking place at the location where the movement ends. For example, 
the sentence (224)  describes  a situation in which the  subject's referent  'Jean' undergoes a 
change of location, and at the end-point of this movement, he canies out the action of eating. 
This  use  is  obtained  compositionally  from  the  invariant  meaning  of VENIR:  the  latter 
contributes the idea that  'Jean' is  oriented towards a relation R with o, as  schematized in 
(225). 
70 This tenn was first proposed by Damourette and Pichon (1911-1950), and then adopted by Bouchard 
(1995). 121 
(224)  Jean vient déjeuner. 
(225)  'Jean' 
-------•R('Jean',o) 
As in the basic motion senses of  VENIR, knowledge about context and background brings us 
to  interpret o spatially as  the location of a Subject of Consciousness such as  the speaker or 
hem·er.  We thus obtain the interpretation 'Jean is oriented toward relating to  the spatial point 
"location of  the SC" '. As Bouchard (1995, p.132) points out, the infinitive DÉJEUNER do es 
not  identify  o, as  shown  by  the  fact  that  the  latter can be  explicitly  expressed  through  a 
locative expression even when the INF is presene
1
• 
(226)  Jean vient chez nous déjeuner. 
Instead, the INF is an adjunct providing information about the end state: it indicates how Jean 
relates  to  'here'  at  the  end  of the  orientation,  as  schematized  in  (227).  This  is  possible 
because of the maximally general nature ofVENIR's intrinsic end relation: VENIR indicates 
that the  orientation is  toward X ending up  in sorne  relation with  o,  but it does  not tell  us 
anything about the nature of this relation. Thus, an INF can be adjoined to VENIR to specify 
the nature of  R. 
(227)  'Jean' 
-------•-~_('Jean', 'here') 
'eat lu~ch' 
The most natural way for a concrete entity like a human to  relate to  a spatial point via  an 
action is to perf01·m the action while being located at that spatial point. Thus, we infer that at 
the end of the motion event, the subject's referent is  in a relation of spatiallocalization with 
71  Note, however, that I depart from Bouchard's (1995) analysis of progredience, since it is  based on 
the assumption that VENIR's meaning bas X-bar structure, an assumption which I reject on theoretical 
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the  location of the SC.  We bence obtain the interpretation:  'Jean is  oriented toward eating 
lunch at the location of the  SC'. The most natural way for  a human to  be  oriented toward 
establishing  a  relation  of localization  with  a  spatial  point  is  move  to  that  point,  so  the 
meaning constructed compositionally based on lexical  semantic content and extralinguistic 
knowledge from  sentence (226)  is  paraphrasable as:  'Jean moves to  the  SC's location (e.g. 
'here') and then performs the action of eating lunch at that location'. 
Thus,  when  we  adjoin  an  INF  to  VENIR,  this  INF  serves  to  describe  the  relation  R 
established at the end of the orientation between X and o, the latter being construed as a point 
in space. The fact that the INF is not linked to VENIR via a conjunction (such as  POUR or 
ET)  but  rather directly  applied  to  a  sub-part of VENIR's  semantic  structure  explains  the 
observation, made by Damourette and Pichon ( 1911-1950, #  1  055) and Bouchard (1995, p. 
130),  that  in  the  progredience  construction  the  motion  event  and  the  ensuing  action  are 
presented as being fused into a single complex event. This fusion is demonstrated by the fact 
that realization of the motion event entails realization of the second action.  If we affirm the 
former while negating the latter, this leads to unacceptability, as in the following examp1es. 
(228)  *Jean est venu déjeuner, mais finalement il n'a rien mangé. 
(229)  *Jean est allé à l'épicerie acheter du pain,  mais l'épicerie était fermée et il est 
donc rentré chez lui les mains vides. 
Furthe1more, Damourette and Pichon (1911-1950, #1055,  as  cited by  Bouchard,  1995,  p. 
130)  point out  that  the  progredience construction is  possible because the  INF  describes  a 
"verbal virtuality", a property necessary for this verb's meaning to "symphenomenalize" with 
the event denoted by VENIR. Bouchard (1995, p.  135) futiher argues that as  a result of the 
interaction of this verbal virtuality with the concrete,  spatially construed deictic center, the 
end-relation expressed by VENIR necessarily hasnon-effective reference. 
This  observation  that  the  progredience  construction  depends  crucially  on  non-effective 
reference of the end-relation has important consequences when we examine the English verb 
COME. Unlike VENIR, COME contains the specifie  end relation of localization.  When  a 
locative expression is used, it specifies the reference of this localization relation in COME'  s 
semantic structure.  Crucially, this  can be assumed to  force effective reference  of COME's 123 
localization component, blocking acceptability of the progredience construction, as  shown in 
(230) and (231 ).  On  the  other band, wh  en no  locative  expression is  used, the  localization 
relation  in  COME's  meaning  can  be  non-effective,  and  an  INF  expressing  a  "verbal 
vütuality" can thus  apply to  L,  leading to  an  acceptable progredience use as  in (232)  and 
(233). 
(230)  *Come here eat your dinner! 
(231)  *John wants to come to the restaurant eat brealifast. 
(232)  Come eat your dinner! 
(233)  John wants to come eat brealifast. 
In the case of VENIR, no  such conflict arises from  the presence of a locative complement 
because  VENIR  contains  no  intrinsic  localization  component.  Rather,  in  VENIR's 
progredience use, the notion of (spatial) localization is  inferred from context/background or, 
in the case of an explicit locative expression, it is provided by the latter. Thus, white the use 
of a locative expression blocks progredience for COME, it does not do so for VENIR. 
(234)  Viens ici manger ton souper! 
(235)  Jean veut venir au restaurant manger un gros déjeuner avec nous. 
Another  structural  peculiarity of English progredience follows  from  properties  of English 
grammar. In English, there are two possible forms  of the infinitive:  the TO-fonn (To  err is 
human; 1 want to  eat the cake)  and the  bare form  (1 can  eat the cake).  It is  reasonable to 
assume that TO, which is also typically used to introduce an NP, always takes  a point as an 
argument.  Thus, when TO  introduces a verb,  this  has  the  effect of causing the verb  to  be 
treated as a point. So wh en TO + INF is used as a complement of COME, the INF cannot be 
co-referential with the  end-relation as  a whole,  but rather only  with  the  point o
72
•  Renee, 
72  This  is  precisely  what  happens  in  the  'state-entering'  uses  involving  a  verbal complement  (see 
section 4.6),  which  have  the  structure  COME + TO  + INF. Bouchard  (1995, p.  132)  points  out  a 
similar structural contrast between the VENIR INF and VENIR À INF constructions in French. --------------------------------------------------------------------------------- -
124 
TO+INF is  incompatible with progredience, a construction that relies on an INF specifying 
the  nature of the end-relation in VENIR/COME's semantics. Only the  bare infinitive form 
can provide the "verbal virtuality" necessary for the progredience construction
73
• 
Thus, white (236) is an example of progredience, (237) is not. That is, example (236) has the 
entailment  properties  of progredience:  if the  motion  event  ('come')  takes  place,  then 
necessarily so does the event 'buy sorne bread'. In (237), the only possible reading for TO is 
a 'goal' reading (paraphrasable as  'in order to'), and unlike (236), this sentence is acceptable 
even if the motion event takes place but the second event does not. This possibility is made 
clear by the acceptability of  sentence (239) as compared with (238). 
(236)  John will come buy sorne bread. (progredience reading only) 
(237)  John will come to buy sorne bread.  (non-progredience reading only) 
(238)  *John  will come buy sorne bread,  but he 'Il  be disappointed when he gets here 
and realizes we 've already sold our fast loaf (progredience reading only) 
(239)  John will come to  buy sorne bread,  but he 'Il be disappointed when he gets here 
and realizes we 've already sold our fast loaf (non-progredience reading only) 
Note,  however,  that  the  English  bare  INF  form  is  neither  formally  nor  distributionally 
equivalent to French INF. The latter is formally complex (stem + infinitive suffix), while the 
former is formally simplex. French INF can be used in a variety of contexts:  it can function 
as  a no un (240) or appear as  the complement both of modal verbs (241) and various other 
verbs without a preceding element like English TO (242). 
73  In  addition,  it  is  possible that the  TO  blocks  the  INF  from  entering into  the  syntactically  local 
relation with GO that is  required in order for the INF to  directly specify the content of the end-state 
relation. (240)  Marcher est plus agréable que rouler en auto. 
(241)  Je dois/devrais/peux/pourrais/etc. travailler ce week-end. 
(242)  J'aime/J'entends/Je pense/Je souhaite/etc. visiter ce musée. 
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The English bare INF, on the other hand, is  more restricted:  it can only appear after modal 
verbs, as shawn in the following. 
(243)  *Walk is more pleasant than drive. (Walking is more pleasant than driving.) 
(244)  1 will/mustlshould/can/could!etc. work this weekend. 
(245)  *Ilike/intend/thinklwishletc. visit this museum. (Ilikeletc. to visit this museum.) 
Because the progredience construction is  based on the idea of a "fusion" between COME's 
meaning and that of the INF, the distributional restrictions of the English bare INF apply also 
to COME: the latter must either itself be an infinitive (249) or be preceded by a modal such 
as WILL, COULD, CAN, WOULD, etc.  (248). The other possibility is  for  COME to  be  in 
the imperative mood (250). This is  not surprising, if we posit that English bare INF and the 
English imperative - two formally identical elements which both involve irrealis - are two 
functional manifestations of  a single underlying grammatical element. 
(246)  *He cames eats with us.  (Present indicative) 
(247)  *He came eat with us.  (Past indicative) 
(248)  He will come eat with us.  (Future) 
(249)  He intends to/can/must/shouldletc. come eat with us. (Modal + INF) 
(250)  Come eat with us 1  (Imperative) 
Given the broader distributional properties of  French INF, the constraint observed for COME 
does not arise for VENIR's progredience: the latter does not require that the motion verb be 
in any patticular morphological form, and bence all of  the following sentences are acceptable. 126 
(251)  Il vient manger avec nous.  (present indicative) 
(252)  Il est venu manger avec nous. (Past indicative) 
(253)  Il viendra manger avec nous. (Future) 
(254)  Viens manger avec nous! (Imperative) 
(255)  Il entend/peut/doit/devrait/etc. venir manger avec nous. (Modal + INF) 
4.2.2  COME/VENIR+ V  -ing/en V  -ant 
In the present subsection I now turn to another possible way to use COME to express. 'motion 
+  action':  the  construction  COME  +  V  -ing  or  VENIR  +  EN  +  V -ant.  Due  to  intrinsic 
differences  between  the  English  and  French  present  patiiciple,  the  interpretational 
possibilities for this construction are more restricted for VENIR than for COME. I therefore 
discuss the two verbs separately, starting with COME. 
The present participle is a modifier, i.e. an element whose meaning is predicated of another 
element.  Thus,  adjoining  a present participle  to  a verb  results  in  the  participle's meaning 
applying predicatively to the main verb's meaning. One logical possibility is  that the present 
participle's meaning is  taken  to  modify the whole meaning of the  verb.  When the present 
participle  is  a  manner  of movement  verb  and  the  main  verb  is  COME,  predicating  the 
participle's meaning of COME's meaning as  a whole yields the  'manner of movement' use 
exemplified in (256) and schematized in (257). In this example, the meaning of tumbling- a 
manner of movement verb- applies  to  COME's meaning as a whole, and the motion event 
described by COME is thus depicted as having 'tumbling' as a manner. 
(256)  When the waiter bumped into the table,  the dishes came tumbling down. 
(257)  'dishes' 
-------•  L ('dishes', o) 
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Another  logical  possibility,  however,  is  that  the  present  participle  is  taken  to  modify  a 
component  of the  verb's  meaning.  This  is  what  distinguishes  sentences  (258)  and  (259) 
below, whose meanings are schematized in (260) and (261), respectively. In (258), elements . 
from  the  context favor  a reading in  which the meaning  'mnning' applies  to  the  whole act 
'came', yielding a 'manner of  movement' reading. In (259), on the other band, context fa vors 
a reading in which 'fishing' modifies not the global event expressed by COME's meaning as 
a whole (i.e. 'fishing' is  not the manner in which John came), but rather only a part of the 
verb's  meaning.  More  specifically,  the  participle  modifies  the  localization  relation  in 
COME's semantic  representation.  In  a movement context,  localization  is  constmed as  the 
state  of 'being at  the  SC's  location'. We thus  obtain  the  interpretation:  'John underwent 
movement to  the  same location as  the  SC, and at that location, he undertook the action of 
fishing'. 
(258)  When Ica/led John,  he came running to see what was the matter. 
(259)  John came fishing yesterday. 
(260)  'John' 
------+  L ('John', o) 
'mnning' 
(261)  'John' 
-------.  L ('John', o) 
'fishing' 
Because  the  end  relation in  COME's meaning  is  localization at  the  deictic  center o,  and 
because contextual information in the sentences above supports a spatial interpretation of o 
and the orientation, we obtain a motion reading, with the destination of the movement being 
the location of an SC such as  the speaker (262) or the hearer (263). Thus, we infer that the 128 
subject's referent joins  the  SC  in the  activity  refened to  by  the  V-ing.  In contrast,  when 
contextual information does not support the idea that the SC himself engages in the activity, 
we obtain a reading in which the subject's referent canies out the action alone, as in (264). 
(262)  John came jogging yesterday, and we had a great lime. 
(263)  Did John come jogging yesterday? 1 remember that you said you had been trying 
ta get him to exercise with you  ... 
(264)  John came askingfor help yesterday. 
We have seen that when the relation L is  specified via an explicit locative, L has  effective 
reference, and that in order for us to  obtain a 'verbal virtuality' interpretation of an adjunct 
verb allowing the two verbs' meanings to "fuse" into a single complex event, the localization 
relation in COME's meaning must be non-effective. That is,  L must not be specified via an 
explicit locative element in the sentence. When such a locative is present, as in (265), COME 
+ V-ing  cannot  receive  a  'motion  with  pw-pose'  reading,  but  rather  only  a  'manner of 
movement'  reading,  as  shown  below.  When  there  is  no  locative,  the  relation  L  can  be 
interpreted  as  having  non-effective  reference,  making  a  'motion  with  purpose'  reading 
possible. Unlike (265), sentence (268) is  thus ambiguous between a 'mam1er of movement' 
and 'motion with purpose' interpretation. 
(265)  He came to the park running. 
(266)  Possible intet-pretation:  'He came to  the park, and the manner of this movement 
was running' 
(267)  Impossible intet-pretation:  'He came to  the park, and when he reached the park, 
he started running' 
(268)  He came running. 
(269)  Possible inte1-pretation 1: 'The manner of  his coming was running' 
(270)  Possible intet-pretation 2:  'When he reached his destination, he started running' 
The semantic effect of this  COME + V -ing  'motion with pm-pose'  use is  sirnilar to  that of 
'progredience'.  On  the  one  band,  the  non-effective  reference  of L  allows  the  present 
participle verb to  be interpreted as a "verbal virtuality", forrning a complex event with the 
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main verb COME. Thus, as in progredience, the sentence describes an action in which the V-
ing action begins (vütually or actually) at the same time as  the motion event described by 
COME.  Renee,  just  as  we  saw  for  progredience,  it  is  impossible  to  affitm  the  main 
movement (provided by COME) while implying the negation of  the other action (provided by 
V-ing), as shown in (271). 
(271)  *John  came jogging yesterday,  but  when  we  got ta  the park and put on  our 
running shoes,  he  changed his mind and decided to  sit dawn  and read white I 
ran. 
Turning now to VENIR, recall that the end relation of the orientation in this verb's meaning 
is R, i.e.  general relatedness. At first glanee, we should expect it to be possible to use VENIR, 
like COME, with a present participle to obtain the 'motion with a pmpose' sense.  However, 
English and French bear a grammatical difference that prevents this. In French, the adverbial 
use of the present participle form V-ant (i.e. the French "gérondif') is generally restricted to 
the function of modifying a whole clause, as  in (272). When V-ant is  used to  modify only a 
verb and not a whole clause, it must be preceded by EN. 
(272)  Voyant qu'ellen 'avait pas besoin d'aide, j 'ai continué sur mon chemin. 
(273)  J'ai mangé en réfléchissant à mon analyse. 
Assuming (in conformity with the general monosemous approach to  lexical semantics) that 
this is the same EN that is used to express contaimnent in spatial sentences like (274), the use 
of EN with V-ant has the effect of forcing a contaimnent reading. A contaimnent relation can 
involve  the  containee  occupying  only  a part of the  container,  or altematively,  the whole 
container. This is reflected in the two interpretations possible for sentence (275), schematized 
in (276) and (278), respectively, and paraphrased in (277) and (279). 
(274)  J 'ai acheté des tomates en boîte. 
(275)  J 'ai mangé en marchant jusqu 'à l'école. (276)  'eat' 
'wa1k' 
(277)  'The act of eating lasted for part of  the duration of the act of  walking' 
(278)  'eat' 
'walk' 
(279)  'The act of eating lasted for the en  tire duration of  the act of walking' 
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Crucially, in either case the resulting relation is  one of simultaneity. In other words, EN's 
semantic 'containment' property forces a simultaneity reading on the EN + V -ant participle 
construction. As a result, COME's 'motion with purpose' use, which requires the possibility 
that  the  V-ing/V-ant  action  occur  at  the  destination  of  the  movement  expressed  by 
COME/VENIR,  is  not  possible  for  VENIR.  Thus,  while  the  English  sentence  (280)  is 
ambiguous between a 'manner of movement' reading and a 'motion with purpose' reading, 
its direct French translation (281) can have only a 'mann  er of movement' reading. Likewise, 
while (282) unambiguously calls for a 'motion with pm-pose'  reading, its French translation 
(283) is unacceptable. 
(280)  John came running. 
(281)  John est venu en courant. 
(282)  John came fishing. 
(283)  *John est venu en pêchant. 
In conclusion, in the present section I have shown that while both COME and VENIR can 
express 'motion with a pm-pose', they cannot al ways do soin the same way. On the one band, 
both verbs can be linked to  a second verb expressing an action using an explicit connector 
such as an element expressing pm-pose (TO/POUR) or a coordinating conjunction (AND/ET). 
On the other band, while both verbs can express  'motion with purpose' via a progredience 
construction, due to  the difference in semantics between these two verbs (i.e.  nature of the 
end relation), COME is subject to restrictions that do not appear for VENIR. Finally, due to a 
grammatical difference between French and English - i.e. propet1ies of the present participle 131 
form used to modify a verb - only COME can be  used with a present participle to  express 
'motion with a pm-pose'. 
4.3  Static spatial extension 
In  this  section 1 discuss  another type of spatial use of COME a!ld  VENIR:  static  spatial 
extension. This type of use emerges when orientation is interpreted spatially but the subject 
refers to an abject that is immobile and has considerable extent in space, as in sentences (284) 
and (285). 
(284)  Cette route vient de Montréal. 
(285)  This raad cames from Montreal. 
Combining the elements present in sentence (285) with the intrinsic semantics of COME, we 
obtain the meaning in (286). 
(286)  'this road' 
-------•  L ('this road', o) 
'Montreal' 
This meaning does not intrinsically express movement, nor even the more abstract concepts 
of change and time.  Thus, as  Bouchard (1995)  shows  for VENIR, the fact that we do  not 
obtain a dynamic spatial reading but rather a static spatial reading for this type of sentence is 
entirely attributable to  extralinguistic knowledge about the entities to  which the  arguments 
refer:  the most natural way for a road to be oriented towards relating to  a location is not to 
undergo movement, but rather to extend spatially to this location (p.  138-139)
74
.  Since ois 'a 
point that is  accessible to an SC', the end-point of the road's spatial extent is  the location of 
74  Hence, a notion like fictive motion (see Talmy, 2000) becomes complete!  y unnecessary under the 
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an  SC  (such  as  the  speaker).  Finally,  the phrase from  Montreal  specifies  that  the  source 
localization- i.e. the starting point-of  the road is Montreal, a city. 
In  (285)  above,  COME's intrinsically  encoded  end-relation  is  localization,  and  when  the 
verb's meaning is interpreted in the domain of space, we obtain the idea that the end-relation 
between 'this road' and o is  one of spatial localization, yielding the  notion of spatial end-
point. As  for VENIR, its  semantics contains no notion of localization.  However, given the 
centrality of spatial localization in human experience of the world, and given that the nature 
of the arguments present in the sentence favor construal in the domain of space, for sentence 
(284)  above  background  knowledge  leads  us  to  interpret the underspecified R  relation in 
VENIR's meaning as  spatiallocalization. Thus, the 'static spatial extension' sense exists not 
only for COME, whose meaning intrinsically contains the notion of localization at a point, 
but also  for  VENIR,  whose  meaning does  not.  Moreover,  as  shown in  (284),  no  explicit 
destination  complement  is  needed  to  obtain  this  reading,  since  the  deictic  center,  once 
interpreted spatially, is specifie enough to allow us to pick out the intended location. 
In sentences like (284) and (285) above, the FROM/DE- complement provides information 
about  the  origin  point  of the  immobile  spatial  entity  (e.g.  the  road).  If we  omit  this 
complement, as in (287) and (288), we are left with a sentence whose elements describe only 
the  end  point  toward  which  the  entity  is  oriented,  i.e.  the  SC's  (e.g.  the  speaker's  and 
hearer's) location. These sentences tell us only that the road extends up to the location of the 
speaker/hearer, and this amounts to saying that the speaker and hearer are standing by or on 
the road. Crucially, since this infotmation is already part of their knowledge, sentences (287) 
and (288) are completely uninformative, hence their unacceptability. 
(287)  *This road cames. 
(288)  *Cette route vient. 
The difference in intrinsic meaning between COME and VENIR bas consequences for these 
verbs'  ability  to  express  a  situation of static spatial extension.  In the  case of CC? ME,  the 
verb's semantic representation specifies that the end-relation is localization at an end point. 
This  in turn  implies  that  the  source of the  orientation  is  also  localization  at  a  point,  an 
inference represented by the gray portion of  the following schematization. 133 
(289)  x 
fel ~~Si~ --------.  L(X, o) 
Thus, in a sentence like (290) below, even though there is no source or destination expression 
(only a 'path contour' expression), we can still obtain an 'extension' reading.  The sentence 
tells us that the path is oriented toward localization at an endpoint o, construed spatially as an 
SC's location (e.g. the speaker's location 'here'). Because the verb encodes localization at an 
end-point, we infer that the origin of  the orientation is also a localization, i.e. a spatial starting 
point. The PP through the valley provides further information about the contour of the path 
itself.  The resulting  interpretation is:  'The path extends  between two  points,  one  implied 
point and the location here, along a path described as through the valley'. 
(290)  The path cames through the valley. (Webster's Third New Internationa[) 
VENIR's meaning,  on the  other hand,  contains  only  the  maximally general  R  as  an  end 
relation, allowing us only to infer an equally general source relation, as schematized in (291 ). 
Given the underspecified character of this relation,  the range of possible real-world source 
relations is too broad to allow us to infer a specifie source relation. Renee, there is nothing in 
VENIR's meaning to  support the inference of a source localization. Crucially, I assume in 
this  study that the notions  starting point and endpoint (both in the  spatial domain and  in 
abstract  domains)  rely  on  the  notion  of localization.  Since  VENIR's  meaning  does  not 
support the inference of a source localization, it cannot supply the notion of starting point 
needed to bring about a static extension reading. Consequently, VENIR is  not as  acceptable 
as  COME when the  complement merely describes  the  contour of the  path rather than the 
path's  starting  point,  as  shown  in  (292).  As  I  will  show  in  later  sections,  the  fact  that 
COME's meaning supports the inference of a source point while VENIR's meaning does not 
allows  us  to  account for  severa! other important surface asymmetries between COME and 
VENIR. 
(291)  x 
------ ... R(X, o) 134 
(292)  ?  ?  Le sentier vient à travers la vallée. 
The 'static spatial extension' use thus relies on the (explicit or implicit) idea of a localization 
at  a  source.  Localization,  in  tum,  requires  that  the  ground of the relation have  the  ideal 
properties of a ground (as pointed out by Vandeloise, 1991, p.  168), including the property of 
immobility when localization is construed in the domain of space. Concrete entities such as 
ci ti es are, by virtue of their immobility, ideal grounds. Highly mobile entities su ch as people, 
on the other band, are not. This explains why we cmmot obtain a 'static spatial extension' use 
for COME or VENIR when the source or destination PP refers to  a human, as  in  (293) and 
(294). 
(293)  *The roadlsidewalk/rug cames fromlto John. 
(294)  *La routelle trottoir/le tapis vient delà Jean. 
On the other band, since a point on one's body is (relatively) fixed with respect to  the body 
itself, such  a point can act as  a ground, provided that  there is  an element that defines the 
relevant search domain as  a person's body (see Vandeloise's,  1991,  160-173, discussion of 
search domain and localization with respect to a part of an object). In French, the inalienable 
construction  using  the  dative  persona!  pronoun  does  just that:  it  defines  a  person  as  the 
relevant  search  domain,  and  the  PP  or  NP complement following  it  is  taken as  applying 
within that field,  as  in (295) below.  Thus, when the dative inalienable construction is used 
with VENIR, as in (296), the result is the expression of 'static spatial extension' with respect 
to a point on the SC's body. The pronoun serves to identify the intended search domain as a 
person (ME, TE, LUI, etc.),  and the PP refers to a point within this domain, i.e. a body part 
interpreted as belonging to this person. Since the NP within the PP specifies the reference of 
the deictic center, 'a point that is accessible to an SC', the dative pronoun is taken to refer to 
the SC in question. The result is a situation in which a point on the body serves as a lirnit for 
a vertical  measure of entity X;  the  other extremity is  inferable from  world knowledge as 
being  the  sruface  on  which  X  is  standing.  English  has  no  comparable  dative  pronoun 
allowing an inalienable construction (as shown in (297)), so this specifie construction is not 
possible for COME (as shown in (298)). 135 
(295)  On lui a coupé la main. 
(296)  Jean me vient à l'épaule
75
. 
(297)  *They eut him the hand off 
(298)  *John cames me to the shoulder. 
In contrast, when there is  no element to  define the body as  the search domain, the use of a 
body  part  PP  to  express  'static  spatial  extension'  is  odd  in  French  (  example  (299)). 
Furthermore,  in  contexts  where  the  inalienable  constmction  is  impossible  because  the 
referent is not an inalienable part of  the SC's body, the effect is also one of oddness (example 
(300)).  As  for  COME, it can be used  in this  context with little  or no  awkwardness.  This 
difference in acceptability is attributable to the difference in COME's and VENIR's semantic 
richness:  since  COME's meaning supports  the  implication  of a  source  localization  white 
VENIR does  not,  and  since  'static  spatial extension'  relies  on the  idea of an  explicit  or 
implied source localization, VENIR is less acceptable than COME in marginal contexts such 
as this. 
(299)  *Jean vient à mon épaule. 
(300)  *Sa robe vient à ses chaussures. 
(301)  (?)Jean cames ta my shoulder. 
(302)  (?)Her dress cames ta her shoes. 
Finally, it should be noted that the slight awkwardness of (301) and (302) cao be alleviated in 
English by the use of a directional pmiicle describing the path of the extension.  Adding a 
path-expressing  particle  adds  spatial  infonnation  to  the  compositional  meaning  of the 
sentence, specifying the  nature of the orientation (e.g.  'up'  in  the  case of a  human being 
measured against another person's shoulder,  'down' in the case of a dress being measured 
75 For this sentence, two informants suggested that VENIR is unacceptable, and that ARRIVER should 
be used instead. Assuming that ARRIVER contains localization, this is not surprising, since the notion 
of endpoint is of  capital importance in the 'measure' context involved sentences like this one. 136 
against  the  location of a  person's  shoes).  This  additional  information makes  it  easier  to 
identify  the  intended  construal  of COME's orientation  (i.e.  static  spatial  extension),  thus 
compensa  ting  for  the  slight oddness  perceived by sorne  speakers  for  (30 1)  and  (302)  and 
brought about by the use of  a point on a person's body as the ground of COME's localization 
relation. Since French is  a satellite-framing language and thus tends expresses path directly 
on the verb rather than on satellites (Talmy, 2000), it possesses no direct equivalents of the 
particles UP and DOWN, and bence French offers no equivalent for (303) and (304). 
(303)  Jean cornes up to my shoulder. 
(304)  Her dress cornes down to her shoes. 
4.4  Actualization 
We have seen that the deictic center in COME's and  VENIR's meaning is  founded on the 
notion of 'accessibility'. In the  semantic uses discussed so  far,  contextual and background 
factors favor a situational meaning in which 'accessibility' is  achieved through X's being at 
the same physical location as the Subject of Consciousness. However, since this  notion of 
accessibility is  indcpendent of specifie  domains  like  space,  the  deictic  center can  receive 
other, non-spatial interpretations depending on context. 
I tum in this section to the uses of COME and VENIR that express 'actualization'. These uses 
emerge when the verb is not followed by a complement and when contextual and background 
knowledge supports a maximally general construal of the deictic center. This type of use is 
exemplified in (305) and (306). 137 
(305)  When the time cornes to leave, 1 am a/ways sad
76
. 
(306)  Quand vient le temps de partir, je suis toujours triste. 
The subject of these sentences refers to a temporal element, a point or period in time.  The 
compositional meaning of the sentences can thus be represented as  follows, where L stands 
for  the  'localization'  component  of COME's  meaning  and  R  stands  for  the  'general 
relatedness' component ofVENIR's meaning. 
(307)  'the time to leave' 
-- - ------ - .-.. LIR ('the time to leave', o) 
We thus obtain the general meaning:  'time period X is oriented toward being in a relation (L 
or R)  with o'. Crucially, the  sentences contain no  complement specifying the nature of the 
end-relation and of  o, so we assigna maximally general interpretation to o. The deictic center 
is  'a point  that  is  accessible  to  an  SC'.  Construing  o  maximally,  we  interpret  'an SC' 
generically as  meaning 'all SCs' or  'any SC'. Likewise, the  notion of 'accessibility', too, 
receives  a  maximally  general  interpretation.  The  most  general  way  for  an  element  to  be 
accessible to ail SCs is for it to be part of the real world, i.e. for it to exist. An element which 
is  part of the  real world fulfills  a minimal requirement for the  SC to  h~ve access to  it via 
experience.  Th  us,  the  deictic  center  is  interpreted  here  as  'existence',  the  state  of being 
potentially accessible to the experience of  al! SCs. 
The end-relation  is  thus  paraphrasable  as  follows:  'time period X  relates  (via L  or R)  to 
existence'.  For COME,  we  have  'X is  localized  in  existence',  i.e.  'localized  in the  real 
world'. To be  localized in the real world is  to exist. For VENIR, we have 'X relates (in an 
unspecified way) with existence'. Although this relation is unspecified, the only obvious way 
for X to  relate to  existence is for it to be in  existence, so we obtain the same end-relation as 
for  COME:  'X exists'. Thus,  in  its  'actualization'  uses,  VENIR expresses  that X  (a time 
period or an event) is oriented toward being in a relation with the deictic center construed as 
76  In this sentence the infinitive to  leave has undergone extraposition; it  is  a complement of time and 
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existence.  The  absence  of a  specifie  localization  relation  in VENIR's  meaning  does  not 
prevent this verb from functioning in the 'actualization' use, because this  use requires only 
that the  end  state be  one of 'existence', which is  compatible with but does  not require the 
notion of localization. 
Note  that  an  element's existence  is  always  situated  temporally.  That is,  a  given  element 
always exists at a specifie time. In the sentences above, the verb's morphology supplies the 
time of the event (E), so the orientation is situated at E.  In other words, at the time specified 
by the  verb's morphology,  the  subject's referent is  oriented toward being in  existence.  In 
sentences  (305)  and  (306),  COME  and  VENIR are  in  the  habituai  present  tense,  so  the 
situation is presented as occurring generally. 
In English, the progressive tenses present a situation not globally, but rather from the point of 
view  of its  internai  development.  Thus,  in  sentence  (308)  below,  due  to  the  present 
progressive, only the orientation, and not the end-relation that it leads to,  is  situated at the 
time 'now'. As a result, it is implied that the end-relation itself is situated at sorne other point 
intime than 'now'. 
(308)  Winter is coming. 
Given our conception of time as  being intrinsically oriented (from past to present to  future), 
the  time of the localization relation must be after 'now'. The result is  that the time period 
referred to by the subject is subsequent to the event time specified by the verb's morphology. 
The global interpretation obtained is represented in the following. 
(309)  'win  ter' 
--------~  I- !~  {'_~~~t~(.:  -'~~i~t~~1~~  )_-
't=
1
now' 
1 
1 
1 
'tl =  t + n =future' 
Consequently, in sentence (308) the orientation establishes a link between present and future, 
yielding the idea that the actualization is situated in the near future. 139 
Since French has no present progressive, use of VENIR to directly translate English sentence 
(308) results  in slight awkwardness,  as seen in (310)
77
•  Without suppmiing background or 
contextual  knowledge,  the  French present tense  typically  does  not  focus  on  the  internai 
development of the situation expressed by the verb. But if we add richer context suppmiing 
an  internai  development  reading,  as  in  (311)  and  (312),  it  is  the  process  itself that  is 
emphasized (rather than the endpoint), and VENIR can therefore acceptably be used with a 
'future actualization' reading. 
(31 0)  ?  L'hiver vient. 
(311)  L'hiver vient vite cette année. 
(312)  L'hiver qui vient  ... 
Crucially, the notion of futurity observed in the 'future actualization' use is  not due to  any 
intrinsic temporal content in the meaning of COME and VENIR. Rather, it results from the 
interaction  of the  notion  'orientation  toward  existence'  with  our  conception  of time  as 
intrinsically oriented from past to future. That is, it results from the interaction of the verb's 
morphology, the notion of orientation, and the deictic center taken in its maximally general 
interpretation 'existence'. 
When COME and VENIR are placed in the future  tense, the result is  once again a  future 
reading, but this time without the effect of imminence that accompanies the present tense use 
seen above. In this case, the event is  presented as being farther in the future.  Thus, in (313) 
and (314), the future tense of the verb situates the orientation as holding at sorne time in the 
future,  and  due  to  our  knowledge  of time's  intrinsic  orientation,  we  conclude  that  the 
existence of 'winter' is situated at sorne time subsequent to the time of the orientation itself, 
bence  in  the  more  distant  future,  as  schematized  in  (315).  Likewise,  when COME  and 
77 However, in Quebec French, the widely used form S'EN VENIR can be used in this context: L'hiver 
s'en vient.  Since the present thesis focuses only on standard French, 1 will not attempt an explanation 
for this observation. 140 
VENIR are placed in a (non-progressive) past tense, as in (316) and (317), the actualization is 
placed in the past. 
(313)  Winter will come earlier next year. 
(314)  L'hiver viendra plus tôt l'année prochaine. 
(315)  'winter' 
----------.  !-- !~  ç_~~~t~(_,  -'~::ci~t~~~~1. 
't ='future' 
(316)  Winter came early this year. 
(317)  L'hiver est venu tôt cette année
78
. 
1 
1 
1 
'tl = t + n =more distant future' 
Bouchard's (1995) account of this use of VENIR is  similar to mine. However, unlike in the 
present analysis, he ho1ds that the deictic center 'me-here-now' is  interpreted in its temporal 
facet  'now',  yielding  the  idea  'orientation  toward  now'.  In  such  an  interpretation,  it  is 
claimed, VENIR expresses that the event or time period named by the grammatical subject is 
oriented toward 'now', giving the effect of imminence of occurrence (p.  139-142). However, 
the  fact  that this  sense can be used  not only in  the  present,  but also  in  the  past or future 
tenses,  casts  doubt  on  the  idea  that  the  concept  'now'  is  truly  involved.  To  maintain 
Bouchard's  ana1ysis,  it  wou1d  be  necessary  to  have  recourse  to  the  notion  of deictic 
transposition.  In  sentences  like  (314)  and  (316),  the  temporally  construed  deictic  center 
would be transferred onto a reference time in the past (L'hiver est venu ... ) or the future (La 
crise  viendra  ... ).  But  as  1  showed  above  (section  3  .2.1 ),  su ch  a  mechanism  is  both 
unparsimonious and difficult to constrain. Crucially, under the analysis being presented here, 
no such mechanism is necessary. The orientation expressed intrinsically by COME/VENIR is 
78  An informant judged this  sentence  to  be  unacceptable.  This  is  perhaps  due  to  the  existence  of 
ARRIVER, which tends  to  be used  in  this type of context.  Crucially for the present discussion,  the 
past-tense of VENIR is  compatible with the  'actualization of a time period'  use,  as  demonstrated by 
sentences like Le moment est venu de partir. 141 
not  toward  'now',  but  rather  toward  'existence',  and  this  orientation  holds  at  a  time 
established by  the  verb  tense. What is  expressed  consistently  in  the  'actualization'  use  is 
therefore not that 'X is oriented away from being in the future toward being in the  present', 
but rather that 'X is oriented toward existence/actuality'. 
Since  an  event  always  corresponds  to  a  time  period  and  is  thus  an  inherently  temporal 
element, an event can also be used to obtain an 'actualization' reading. In sentences (318) and 
(319), X is an event (a cri sis), and the sentence tells us that the event is oriented toward being 
in existence. Thus, the sentences express 'actualization of an event'. 
(318)  The crisis came during what was already a difficult lime for the economy. 
(319)  La grande crise ...  est venue parce qu'un monde spéculatifs 'est mis en place  ... 
(Corpus) 
Note  that  while  the  actualization  expressed  in  these  sentences  is  close  to  the  notion  of 
'occmrence', there is an important difference between COME and VENIR, on the one band, 
and true occunence verbs (OCCUR, HAPPEN, ARRIVER, etc.) on the other. Unlike COME 
and VENIR, occunence verbs can reasonably be  assumed not to  contain the deictic center. 
Thus, while both occunence verbs and deictic orientation verbs are capable of expressing a 
situation in which X begins to exist, only COME and VENIR can express the orientation of 
an event toward being accessible to the experience of the set of all SCs. This contrast stands 
out  if we  compare  the  compositional  meanings  obtained  in  the  following  sentences. 
Sentences (320) and (322), which contain COME and VENIR, are accompanied by a nuance 
of subjectivity:  the  event being described is  presented as  somehow having relevance to  the 
speaker (or other SC). This is made clear by the oddness of sentences (325) and (327), where 
the subject refers to an event occuning at a time that is remote from the present, one that is in 
no way construable as being accessible to the experience of an SC. 142 
(320)  The crisis came in 1997/at a bad lime/as a result of  .. 
(321)  The crisis happened/occurred in 1997/at a bad time/ as a result of.. 
(322)  La grande crise ...  est venue parce qu 'un monde spéculatifs'  est mis en place  ... 
(Corpus) 
(323)  La grande crise est arrivée parce qu 'un monde spéculatifs 'est mis en place  ... 
(324)  The big bang happened/occurred over 13 billion years ago. 
(325)  *The big bang came over 13 billion years ago. 
(326)  Le big bang s'est  produit il  y a plus de 13 milliards d'années. 
(327)  *Le big bang est venu il y a plus de 13 milliards d'années. 
Not only events and time periods, but also entities can enter into existence. Thus, when the 
grammatical subject of COME and VENIR refers to an entity such as a person, this results in 
a situation in which a person begins to exist, as illustrated in (328) and (329). 
(328)  Those who came before us faced much harsher living conditions. 
(329)  Cette décision aura beaucoup d'impact sur ceux qui viendront après nous. 
In these sentences,  the  event is  placed in  a broad social or  historical context.  This  use  is 
obtained  in  the  same  way  as  the  'actualization  of an  event'  sense  above:  the  person's 
existence is treated as an event that occurs in a general historical or social context. Thus, this 
sense requires only the establishment of a general relation between the subject and the deictic 
center constmed as 'existence'. Since both verbs specify orientation toward an end state that 
is  a relation with the deictic center (localization for COME, underspecified relatedness for 
VENIR), both verbs provide sufficient information to obtain this reading. 
However,  when  a  person's  entering into  existence  is  not presented  abstractly against  the 
general backdrop of history (as  above) but rather concretely, as  in the context of birth, the 
situation is different. Based on our extra-linguistic knowledge, we view büih not simply as an 
abstract beginning of existence, but as  a concrete phenomenon, a passage from one physical 
state to  another.  Thus, a  'birth' reading, which hinges  on the notion of transition,  requires 
minimally an implied source for the orientation. But as we saw above, in order for the verb to 143 
ünply localization at a somce point, it must minimally contain localization at an end point. 
Since COME bas such a component but VENIR does not, only COME can be used to express 
'birth', as shown in the following. 
(330)  When the baby came, the family's routine changed. 
(331)  *Quand le bébé est venu,  la routine de la famille a changé. 
All of the types of subjects examined in this section (time periods, events and people) can be 
viewed as  entering into existence more or less  spontaneously. In contrast, according to  our 
world knowledge,  inanimate entities are not seen as  entering into existence  spontaneously. 
Rather, we  generally see  them as  being made  by someone or something.  Hence,  when an 
inanimate entity is used as  the subject of COME or VENIR, this does not generally result in 
an acceptable 'actualization' reading, as shown in the following. 
(332)  *This chair/this tree/this river/the first computer came  ... 
(333)  *Cette chaise/cet arbre/cette rivière/le premier ordinateur est venu(e) ... 
However, in  a richer context,  inanimate entities  such  as  artifacts,  projects,  etc.  do  lead to 
acceptable sentences for  COME, as  shown in (334)  and (335)  below. In (335), the manner 
modifier  how  is  applied  to  the  project's  orientation  toward  realization/actualization  (i.e. 
toward being in existence); thus, emphasis is placed onprogress rather than on the project's 
mere entering into existence, making the sentence interpretable. In (334), the modifier a long 
way  attributes  a  measme  to  X's orientation toward  its  present  state,  yielding  a  meaning 
paraphrasable as:  'the change undergone by computer technology and which has caused it to 
be in its  present state of experienceability is  of great extent', i.e.  computer technology has 
undergone a great deal of development leading up to its present state of existence. Crucially, 
however, the specifie uses seen in these sentences rely on the notion of transition from one 
stage  to  another,  which  in  turn relies  on the  notion of localization at a source.  And  since 
VENIR does  not contain end-localization and thus  does  not imply somce localization, it is 
not acceptable in 'progress' contexts such as these, as illustrated in (336) and (337). (334)  Computer technology has come a long way since the 1970s. (Longman) 
(335)  How is your project coming? 
(336)  *Comment ton projet vient-il? 
(337)  *Les ordinateurs sont venus très loin depuis les années 70. 
4.5  Individual experience 
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We saw above that when the subject of COME and VENIR refers to an abstract element and 
no complement is  present, the deictic center, 'a point that is accessible to  an SC', receives a 
maximally  general  interpretation  as  'accessibility  to  the  experience  of  all  ses''  i.e. 
'existence'.  X's  end  relation  with  o  (general  relatedness  for  VENIR  or  localization  for 
COME) is thus construed as  'being in existence'. But when COME and VENIR are followed 
by a complement PP, as  in (338) and (339) below, this complement restricts the reference of 
the deictic center. 
(338)  Goodfortune will come ta you ifyou are patient. 
(339)  La bonne fortune viendra à toi si tu es patient. 
Since the PP destination complement of COMENENIR al ways specifies the reference of the 
end-relation  between  X  and  the  deictic  center,  the  NP  complement  of the  preposition 
(you/toi) in these examples is  taken to  be co-referential with the deictic center o.  Since this 
NP refers to a person, the PP is  taken as  expressing that the end state of the orientation is a 
relation  with  a  specifie  person.  Renee,  the  deictic  center  cannot  receive  the  maximally 
general interpretation 'existence' (general accessibility to the experience of all SCs), and the 
end-relation cannot therefore be  interpreted as  the state of 'being in existence'. Rather,  the 
deictic  center  is  construed  as  accessibility  to  the  experience  of a  specifie  SC,  a  single 
individual. The compositional meaning obtained in sentence (338) is schematized in (340). (340)  'good f01tune' 
---------•  L ('good fortune', o) 
1 
1 
'you' 
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The NP you tells  us  that the deictic center refers  to  sorne  facet of the person you, and the 
subject  refers  to  a  phenomenon.  In the  case  of an  individual,  the  most  general  possible 
construal of 'a point that is accessible to a Subject of Consciousness' is as the experience of 
this  individual.  Consequently, the  sentence expresses that  'good fortune  is  orientcd toward 
being localized in the experience of the SC "you"', further construable as:  'good fotiune will 
occur and thereby become accessible to the experience of the SC 'you". 
In the case of example (339) illustrating VENIR, the underspecified end relation R (general 
relatedness) yields the idea that the end state is one in which 'good fortune relates to the SC's 
( 'your ')  experience'. The only obvious way to  interpret 'phenomenon X relates to  an SC's 
experience' is  'SC experiences phenomenon X'. We therefore obtain the same interpretation 
for  sentence  (339)  with  VENIR  as  for  (338)  with  COME:  'good  f01iune  will  occur  and 
thereby become accessible to the experience of the SC 'you' '. 
The 'individual experience' use being discussed here hinges on the idea that the deictic center 
refers to  the experience of a specifie individual. Although this idea can be provided directly 
via a PP complement, as in (338) and (339) above, it can also be obtained from other material 
in  the  discursive  context or from  background  knowledge, as  in  (341)  and  (342).  In these 
examples, instead of a complement, we find a modifier (at the cast of  many lives,  as a great 
relief) describing a consequence, an impact of the event X.  As shown in these examples, we 
can explicitly identify the individuals affected by this consequence, but if this inf01mation is 
omitted, the notion of an affected individual or set of individuals can be inferred from  the 
notion of consequence. And this notion of affected individual - whether expressed or implied 146 
- is taken as identifying the SC in COME's meaning. Thus, we have sufficient information to 
generate an 'individual experience' situation
79
• 
(341)  The  diplomatie crisis came at the cast of  many lives (at the cast of  the lives of 
many innocent civilians). 
(342)  The decision came as a great relief  (for everyone). 
Given the highly general nature of the subject in the examples above (  e.g. 'good fortune'), we 
interpret  accessibility  simply  as  'the  SC's  experience'.  But  certain  phenomena  have 
properties such that they can become accessible to a person's experience only via one of the 
specifie  perceptual  channels  (sight,  hem·ing,  etc.).  Thus,  if world  knowledge  about  the 
subject's referent strongly suggests experience via a single perceptual channel, we  interpret 
the verb's 'accessibility' component as perceptibility
80
. 
(343)  The building came into sight. (sight) 
(344)  La citadelle vint en vue.  (sight) 
(345)  The sounds of  birds came to him through the window.(sound) 
(346)  Le chant des oiseaux venait jusqu 'à lui.  (sound) 
(347)  The smell oflilacs came to himfrom around the corner.  (smell) 
(348)  Les odeurs de la campagne venaient jusqu 'à lui. (smell) 
As  examples (343) through (348)  illustrate, this use is  possible for  sight,  sound and  smell. 
However, as examples (349) through (352) below show, the senses of touch and taste are less 
acceptable.  This  is  because  the  orientation  expressed  by  COME  and  VENIR  implies  a 
transition,  a passage with  internai  development.  While  stimuli  received  via  the  senses  of 
79  At present I am unable to account for the awkwardness of  the French translations ofthese sentences: 
?  La crise diplomatique est  venue au prix/coût des  vies  de civils innocents;  ?  La décision est  venue 
comme un grand soulagement pour tout le monde. 
8°  Cf  Di Meola (1994, p. 97-100) and Viberg (2003, p. 88), who discuss 'access to perception' uses but 
consider  them  derived  from  space  and  motion  (e.g.  via  the  metaphor  VISUAL  FIELD  IS  A 
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sight, heat·ing and smell fit these criteria (i.e. we receive visual, auditory and olfactory stimuli 
from objects at a distance and the transmission of these stimuli thus happens over time and 
space), those received via touch and taste do not: they require direct physical contact and thus 
are viewed as  having no  intemal development, no  passage toward a destination.  However, 
these  uses  can  be  made  acceptable  if a  source  phrase  is  supplied,  supporting  a  reading 
involving transmission over time and space and thus internai development, as shown in (353) 
through (356). 
(349)  *An uncomfortablefeeling came from the chair.  (touch) 
(350)  *Une sensation inconfortable venait de la chaise. (touch) 
(351)  *A tas te of  ginger came (ta him) from the cookies he was eating.  (tas te) 
(352)  *Un goût du gingembre (lui)  venait des biscuits qu'il mangeait. (taste) 
(353)  He  could fee!  an  intense  heat thal  was  coming from  the  bakery  downstairs. 
(touch) 
(354)  Il sentait une chaleur intense qui venait de la boulangerie en bas. (touch) 
(355)  The taste of  ginger in my pancakes cames from the ginger beer 1 use.  (taste)
81 
(356)  Le goût  du  gingembre  dans  mes  crêpes  vient  de  la  bière  de  gingembre  que 
j'utilise. (tas te) 
Since events such as  phone calls take place over a distance and are experienced through a 
sense, they too can be expressed via COME or VENIR. 
(357)  The cali came tao late: John had already left. 
(358)  L'appel est venu trop tard: Jean était déjà parti. 
Humans  can have perceptual experience of phenomena situated outside  the  self,  as  in the 
preceding examples, but they can also experience phenomena occurring within the self, such 
81 Note that (355) and  (356) fall  on the border between a 'taste' reading and  an  'origin' reading (see 
section 4.9). 148 
as  a physical ailment. Thus, when X refers to  a physical ailment, as  in (359)  and (360) we 
once a  gain construe the deictic center as  'accessibility to the perceptual experience of SC', 
yielding a sentence meaning 'SC experiences physical ailment X'. 
(359)  Il lui est venu un gros mal de tête. 
(360)  !!lui est venu une angine. 
VENIR's orientation component, which implies internai development, leads  to  a constraint 
on  the  'physical  ailment'  use:  physical  condition  X's  graduai  passage  into  a  state  of 
perceptibility entails that X must not be a sudden ailment, as  shown in  (361)  , and that the 
development itself must be perceptible, as shown by the marginality of (362)
82
. 
(361)  *Il lui est venu une crise cardiaque. 
(362)  ?  Il lui est venu une tumeur. 
Since the  phenomena in  question  are  internai  to  the  individual  but  not  controlled  by  the 
individual nor by any identifiable entity, the subject must be impersonal IL, as shown by the 
unacceptability of (363) through (365).This follows from an observation made by Bouchard 
(1995,  p.  250)  and  by Labelle (1989, p. 30,  as  cited by Bouchard), who point out that  in 
general the impersonal construction can have the effect of "denying responsibility" for the 
event described by the verb.  The physical ailment cannot be conceived of as  responsible for 
its own coming into being, so the use of  the impersonal is necessary. 
82  This insight is  due in  part to  Anita Thomas (persona! communication). Note that example (362) is 
judged as fully acceptable in Bouchard (1995, p.  171). However, at !east one of my informants rejected 
this sentence. As for the requirement of internai development for VENIR, see Bouchard (1995, p. 168-
170) for an alternative analysis. (363)  *Une tumeur lui est venue. 
(364)  *Une angine m'est venue. 
(365)  *Un gros mal de tête m'est venu. 
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Because VENIR contains no  end localization and thus does not imply a source localization 
distinct from the SC, it can be used to describe such physical conditions originating inside the 
self, accounting for the acceptability of (359) and (360) above. In contrast, because COME's 
meaning specifies that the end state of the orientation is a relation of localization between X 
and the deictic center,  COME implies that the origin of  the orientation is a localization at 
sorne point that is distinct from the end-point. This notion of implied source, illustrated in the 
following, leads to the requirement that X have a sta1ting point outside the SC. Consequently, 
COME ca1mot describe the development of a physical ailment (a development taking place 
exclusively within the SC), as shown in (367) through (370). 
(366)  x 
L(X, o) 
(367)  *A  big headache came to him. 
(368)  *(A case of) tonsillitis came to him. 
(369)  *A heart attack came to him. 
(370)  *A tumor came to him. 
Note that  the  contrast between these unacceptable  English  sentences  and  their  acceptable 
French  counterparts  is  not  attributable  to  the  presence  or  absence  of the  impersonal 
construction.  Impersonal  THERE,  while  quite  compatible  with  other  uses  of COME 
(examples (371) through (373)), does not improve the acceptability of the 'physical ailrnent' 
use (examples (374) through (376)). 150 
(3 71)  The re co mes a lime in every man's !ife when he feels the need to  rejlect on his 
past accomplishments. 
(372)  There came a day when Paul was tired of  his job. 
(373)  There came a man seeking help. 
(374)  *There came (to him) a big headache. 
(375)  *There came (to him) (a case of) tonsillitis. 
(376)  *There came (to him) a tumor. 
In addition, it might be suggested that the contrast between VENIR and COME conceming 
the 'physica1 ai1ment' is due to the existence in French of the dative clitic, which can be used 
to  express inalienable entities (such as body parts), as  in (377). However, this is clearly not 
the source of the contrast, for white cetiain physical ailments (  example (379)) can be treated 
as inalienable, others cannat (examples (380) and (381)). 
(377)  Jean lui a serré la main. 
(378)  *John shook him the hand. 
(379)  Le médecin lui a enlevé la tumeur. 
(380)  *Ce médicament m'a guéri l'angine. 
(381)  *Cette aspirine m'a soulagé le mal de tête. 
When contextual infotmation brings us  to  interpret the SC not as  a persan as  a whole, but 
rather as  a part of a persan, it becomes possible to  use not only VENIR but also COME to 
describe an intemal phenomenon. For example, in (382) and (383), the physical symptom X 
consists of tears, a concrete entity that can undergo movement. The PP complement refers to 
a pati of a person's body. Crucially, this pmi of the body is an organ responsible for (visual) 
perception, and thus a channel of perceptual experience (access). Thus, the deictic center is 
restricted in this  case to  the eyes,  so  we construe the rest of the body as  lying outside the 151 
deictic center
83
.  Since we conceive of tears as  originating somewhere inside  the body and 
moving to our eyes, where they become visible (or perceptible via tactile sensation) and thus 
accessible to the person himself or to an external observer, the extra-linguistic situation does 
not enter into contradiction with COME's implication that X  originates outside the deictic 
center. 
(382)  Les larmes lui viennent aux yeux. 
(383)  Tears came to his eyes. 
Although  the  phenomena  discussed  so  far  are  experienced  via  perceptual  channels, 
phenomena situated in the mental domain (mental entities such as thoughts, ideas, memories) 
are  experienced  directly  via  consciousness.  Moreover,  the  mind  can  be  subdivided  into 
different parts.  In particular, we can distinguish between mental entities  that are  currently 
accessible to our consciousness/awareness and those which are not.  Thus, while the notion 
'Subject ofConsciousness' can be taken generally to refer to a conscious person (as a whole), 
it can  also  be  construed  narrowly  as  refening  only  to  a  person's  consciousness  itself. 
Accordingly, not only VENIR, but also COME, can be used to describe an event in which a 
mental  entity X  enters  into  a  person's consciousness.  In examples  (384)  and  (385),  X  is 
oriented toward being accessible to an SC identified by a PP complement or a dative clitic. 
Since X is  a mental entity, we infer that the accessibility is  established via a purely mental 
channel: X ends up being mental/y accessible to  the SC construed narrowly as  the person's 
conscwusness.  In  other  words,  we  obtain  as  a  global  meaning:  'SC  experiences  mental 
content X'. 
83  Cf Di  Meola's (1994, p.  112-123)  analysis  that claims  that  in  German and  English,  ce11ain  uses 
result from the deictic center being extended to apply exclusive!  y to the mind (rather than the emotions 
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(384)  Il m'est venu une idée géniale. 1 Cette idée m'est venue hier. 
(385)  An idea came tome. 1 This idea came tome yesterday. 
(386)  J'avais de la  difficulté à trouver la réponse, mais après beaucoup de réflexion, 
elle m'est enfin venue. 
(387)  I a lot of  difficulty finding the answer,  but after much thought,  it final/y came to 
me. 
One might object that  the  line  of argument advanced  here  should  also  apply  to  physical 
ailments which can originate outside the self (e.g.  tonsillitis, headache, etc.).  But there is a 
crucial difference with respect to mental entities: when an idea is transmitted from outside the 
self, we conceive of it as being the same idea both at source and destination. When an illness 
is  transmitted,  the  coming into  being of the particular  case  of illness  is  conceived  of as 
happening within the individual (regardless of whether the actual cause of the ailment lies 
outside the SC). 
A  final  example of an  'individual  experience'  use  of COMENENIR involving  an event 
intemal to  the self is the sexual sense (i.e.  'orgasm') attributable to sentences like (388) and 
(389) with the proper supporting situational context. Lamarche (1998) offers the  following 
characterization of this  use: "Dans cet emploi, la situation à  laquelle renvoie l'expression 
n'implique  pas  plus  d'une  entité,  [  ... ]  mais  seulement  celle  à  laquelle  renvoie  le  sujet. 
Intuitivement,  l'événement  décrit  n'implique  que  cette  entité,  le  point  culminant  de  cet 
événement étant identifié par un état spécifique du sujet"  (p. 66).  In terms  of the present 
analysis, in this semantic use the person's consciousness itself is  subdivided, and the verb is 
used to describe orientation of one part of this consciousness - the sensation itself- towards 
being accessible to the Subject of Consciousness construed nanowly as  the experiencer of 
this sensation. 
(388)  Helshe came. 
(389)  Il/elle est venu(e). 153 
4.6  State-entering 
In the present section I tum to  a discussion of uses of COME and VENIR that describe an 
entity entering into a  new state.  I first describe the properties of this  type of use  that are 
common to  the  se  two  verbs  (section  4.6.1 ),  and  th en  I  discuss  the  differences  observed 
between them (section 4.6.2). 
4.6.1  Account of  shared properties 
Recall what COME and VENIR have the following monosemous representations. 
(390)  COME:  x 
------+  L(X, o) 
(391)  VENIR:  x 
-------+  R(X, o) 
Thus, they have in common the idea that 'X is oriented toward being in a relation with o'. As 
seen above (see section 4.1 ), wh  en the subject of COME or VENIR re  fers to a con  crete entity 
and the complement refers to a physical location, both the orientation and the deictic center 
are construed spatially, and the result is a  'motion' reading. When the complement is  a PP 
that, instead of referring to  a location, refers to an abstract state, we still obtain a dynamic 
reading, i.e.  one in which the orientation component is construed as 'change'. However, in 
this case the complement indicates that the deictic center is not to be construed spatially, but 
rather abstractly. Thus, the end-relation in COME's and VENIR's meaning is interpreted not 
as a physicallocalization, but rather as 'being in state S'. The following are typical examples 
of  this type of  use. 154 
(392)  John came to the conclusion that Mary had been lying. 
(393)  Jean en est venu à la conclusion que Marie lui avait menti. 
(394)  The two political parties came to an agreement. 
(395)  Les deux partis politiqùes en sont venus à une entente. 
Consider the example (392) above.  Taking into consideration the  verb's invariant semantic 
content as well as the elements present in the sentence, we obtain the meaning schematized in 
(396), paraphrasable as 'John was oriented toward a being localized at the deictic center', this 
point being further identified as the mental state 'the conclusion that...'. 
(396)  'John' 
--------..  L ('John', o) 
1 
'conclusion that...' 
Recall that the deictic center contained in these representations is  defined as  'a point that is 
accessible  to  a  Subject  of Consciousness ', and  that  accessibility  is  an  abstract,  domain-
independent notion that can be construed in a number of ways depending on situational and 
contextual factors. In the case of  the 'motion' uses, given the nature of the elements involved, 
the  deictic  center is  construed  spatially:  the  subject's  referent  ends  up  being at  the  same 
physicallocation as the SC. But in the examples above, the deictic center cannat be construed 
spatially,  since  the  complement  indicates  that  the  end  state  is  an  abstract  one. Thus,  the 
deictic  center is  interpreted  instead  as  'an  abstract state that is  accessible to  the  SC'. The 
Subject of Consciousness need not necessarily be the speaker: it can be virtually any animate 
entity  capable  of consciousness  and  made  available  by  sorne  element  of the  sentence, 
surrounding discourse, background knowledge,  etc.  (see section 3.2.2). In examples  (392) 
through (395), since context does not favor any SC in particular, the interpretation is that the 
intended SC is any discourse pmiicipant (i.e. speaker and/or hearer). 
The  most  general  way  for  an  abstract  state  of affairs  to  be  accessible  to  the  discourse 
participants is  for  it to  be  mental/y accessible to  them.  Thus, sentences  like  (392)  through 
(395)  describe the subject's entering into  this mentally accessible state.  Moreover, a given 155 
state S cannot be said to exist until sorne entity is in that state: when an entity X enters into S, 
it  actualizes  S.  So  in  'state-entering'  sentences,  X's entering  into  S  causes  S  to  become 
mentally accessible to  the discourse participants, i.e.  to  enter into their focus of  attention
84
• 
Describing  state  S  as  becorning  the  focus  of attention  in  turn  implies  that  S  has  sorne 
significance in the context of the discomse
85
. 
In addition, the  'state-entering'  use  involves an end-state that is  localization. In the case of 
COME, this is att:ributable to  COME's intrinsic semantic content, and in the case of VENIR, 
it is  attributable to  the presence of À introducing the complement. As Vandeloise (1991, p. 
160-168) points out, localization has the effect of emphasizing the asymmetry between figme 
and  ground.  Crucially,  he  also  observes  that one  of the  main properties  of the  ground  is 
stability,  and  that conversely,  a figure  must normally be  an element that is not ·fixed  and 
stable but rather one that can be situated with respect to a stable entity (p.  21-24, p.  161-162). 
This  exp  lains  the  contrast  illustrated  in  examples  (397)  through  (  400),  where  the  nouns 
CONCLUSION  and  IDEA,  while  semantically  quite  similar,  nonetheless  yield  opposite 
results when used as  either the subject or the complement of COME. Since conclusions tend 
to be states of mind which we maintain over a certain amount of ti me once we have reached 
them,  CONCLUSION denotes  a  stable  entity  and  is  thus  an  ideal  ground.  This  stability 
makes it perfectly acceptable as  the ground in the  'state-entering' use in (397) but odd in as 
the  figme  in  (398)  (an  example  of the  'individual  experience'  use,  see  section  4.5). 
Conversely, the noun IDEA, which does not strongly imply stability, is  fine as  the figure in 
the  'individual  experience'  use  (399)  but  awkward  as  the  ground  in  the  'state-entering' 
sentence (  400). 
84  I owe  this  notion of entry  into  focus  of attention to  Di Meola (1994,  2003),  Radden (1996)  and 
Viberg (2003). Note, however, that their analyses consider senses involving this notion to be derived 
from 'motion' via the intemally complex concept 'zone of interactive focus' (see 3.2.2). 
85  Note,  however,  that  the  verb's  deictic  content can  be  construed  differently  when  the  PP  itself 
expresses  a  particular  type  of  accessibility.  This  is  the  case  in  expressions  like  come  into 
being/existence (where the complement forces construal of the deictic center as  'existence') and come 
to  consciousness  (in  which  transition  from  unconsciousness  to  consciousness  results  a  person's 
becoming accessible to the SC via the potential for interaction, communication, etc.). 156 
(397)  1 came to the conclusion thal  ... 
(398)  ?  1 came to the idea thal  ... 
(399)  An idea came to me. 
(  400)  ?  A conclusion came to me  ... 
The specifie natme of the end-state is determined by the natme of the element refened to by 
the PP complement. Thus, while examples (392) and (393) above describe a person's ending 
up possessing a ce1iain mental content (i.e.  'conclusion that... '), in  (  401) and (  402) the  PP 
refers to  a tapie of discussion, so we obtain a 'shift of attention' reading. Once again, given 
the deictic center's construal as  'astate that is significant to discomse', these sentences have 
the effect of placing focus on the state described by the PP and thus of depicting the latter as 
significant for subsequent discomse. 
(  401)  To  come to  the  main  tapie of our discussion,  1 would now like  to  address  the 
tuition hike. 
(  402)  Vous feriez mieux d'en venir tout de suite au sujet qui vous amène ici. 
In the examples discussed so far, the complement consists of  a localizing preposition- TO or 
À  - introducing  a  state  NP.  But since  TO  and  À  can  also  take  an  infinitive  verb  as  a 
complement, and since a verb can describe a state, COME and VENIR can also be used to 
express 'state-entering' with a TO/À-INF complement, as in the following. 
(403)  He had come torea/ize thal she could not be trusted. 
(404)  J'en suis venu maintenant à regarder le monde comme un spectacle et à en rire. 
(Flaube1i, cited in the Grand Robert de la langue française) 
(  405)  If  we now come to consider the disadvantages of  this po  licy  ... 
(  406)  Nous en venons maintenant à considérer les désavantages de cette politique  ... 
Moreover,  although  the  examples  discussed  above  contain  animate  subjects,  the  'state-
entering' use is  by no  means restricted to  such subjects,  as  (407) and (408) show.  This is 
because vüiually any entity can undergo a change to a new state. 157 
(  407)  This neighborhood has come to resemble a city dump. 
(  408)  Ce quartier en est venu à ressembler à un dépotoir. 
( 
Having  shown  in  this  subsection  that  COME  and  VENIR,  which  have  similar  semantic 
content, both behave similarly in their 'state-entering' uses, I tum in the following subsection 
to a discussion of the differences they manifest for this type of  semantic use. 
4.6.2  Account of  differences 
COME and VENIR differ in the type of en,d-relation they express: VENIR's end-relation is 
the maximally general relation R,  while COME'S end-relation is  the more specifie relation 
'localization' (=L).  As  pointed out above, this does  not prevent VENIR from being able to 
express 'state-entering', since the preposition À provides the notion of localization required 
to  obtain this  reading. However, the absence of localization in VENIR's semantic content 
does have an impact on the specifie properties of 'state-entering' in French. 
To  illustrate  this,  consider  the  following  examples  repeated  from  above.  If we  omit  the 
element EN from the French sentence to  obtain a sentence that is  structurally equivalent to 
the English example, the result is  unacceptability, as  shown in (411). The same observation 
holds for ail of  the 'state-entering' examples of  VENIR given so far. 
(  409)  John came to the conclusion that Mmy had been lying. 
(  41 0)  Jean en est venu à la conclusion que Marie lui avait menti. 
(  411)  ?  Jean est venu à la conclusion que Marie lui avait menti. 
This obligatory presence of EN is  due to  the absence of localization in VENIR's semantics. 
As shown elsewhere, because COME's meaning contains an end-relation that is  localization 
at a point, it implies that the initial relation was also localization at a point. COME's meaning 
thus supp011s  the idea of a transition from one state to  another. Because VENIR's meaning 
does  not indicate that the end-relation is  one of localization,  this  verb's meaning does  not 
support the inference of a source localization. Furthennore, as pointed out by Talmy (2000), 
in  satellite-frarning  languages  like  French,  the  verb  is  responsible  for  canying  crucial 
information about path (in my tenns, infonnation about mientation). I therefore assume that 158 
in satellite-framing languages, inferences  about elements such as source of orientation can 
only  be  made  based  on  the  semantics  of the verb  itself.  Renee,  despite  the  presence the 
destination localizer À in sentences like (  411 ), no sow·ce localization can be infened. 
Cmcially, if we assume that the notion of being in a state observed in this type of semantic 
use is derivcd from the general notion of localization, then it follows that VENIR's meaning 
lacks the necessary content to suppmt the inference of an initial state. Thus, in order for us to 
obtain a change-of-state situation, the  notion of source localization must be  supplied by  a 
lexical element other than the verb. The pronoun EN bas the propetiy ofbeing able to refer to 
a general, unnamed but discursively available state of affairs. Thus, this  maximally general 
localizing element (which conesponds roughly to DE + LE) is used to fulfill this function in 
sentences 1ike (  41 0) above. 
Although  the  source of the  orientation (and hence  the  notion of initial  state)  is  obtained 
differently for the two verbs (via inference from the end-relation in  the case of COME and 
via the explicit element EN in the case of VENIR), in both cases the precise nature of this 
source remains unspecified. Given that in the 'state-entering' use the end-state is portrayed as 
mentally  accessible  to  the  SC, we  infer that the  beginning  state  is  mentally  inaccessible. 
Cmcially, since cause is associated with beginning state (i.e.  the agent that brought about the 
change acted on the entity at the time of the initial state  ), the cause behind the event is treated 
as inaccessible as weiL That is, the original impetus of the change is depicted as  inaccessible 
to  the  Subject  of Consciousness.  This  further  leads  to  the  assumption  that  the  subject's 
referent was not fully  in control of the process, that it was not the sole cause or even the 
primary cause of  the change. As a result, the process is presented as at least patti  y determined 
by an urmamed set of externat circumstances
86
.  This implied external influence is present in 
the 'state-entering' examples discussed above. For example, in (392) and (393), it is implied 
86 See Di Meola (2003, p. 55-56) on how external influence can be inferred in a movement context: "if 
we focus on the GOAL, the fact of reaching it must be relevant (non-obvious);  therefore an external 
force  must  have  influenced  the  movement  (hindering  the  trajector,  pushing  himlher  towards  an 
unforeseen GOAL, transporting him/her towards the GOAL)". 159 
that John/Jean's ending up  with the  belief in question is  the result of a series of unnamed 
experiences. This implication of an external influence is  subtler but nonetheless present in 
(  401) and (  402);  in  these  sentence the  implied external circumstances  take  the forrn  of an 
obstacle - an abundance of tapies to  discuss - potentially hindering arrivai at the  tapie in 
question. This effect is  lost if we replace COME with a different verb (  e.g.  To  address the 
main tapie of  our discussion, ...  ). 
Because the notion of source is  provided differently for  the two  verbs, they do  not behave 
identically in terms of the kinds of transitions they can describe. In the case of VENIR, we 
can reasonably assume  that  expressing source on the  separate  lexical  element EN has  the 
effect ofjoregrounding this source and thus emphasizing the idea of contingency on a set of 
external  circumstances  that  channel  X's  development  toward  the  end  state.  As  a  result, 
VENIR  is  more  restricted  than  COME  in  the  types  of changes  it  can  describe:  it  is 
incompatible with situations where external factors play a minimal role or no role at all in 
detetmining the change. This observation accounts for the absence of two sub-uses of 'state-
entering' for VENIR: 'total amount' and 'location-reaching'. I will now discuss each of these 
sub-uses in turn. 
COME can be used to  express a 'total amount' sense, that is, a situation involving the result 
of an arithrnetic operation, as  in (412).  As  mentioned above, 'state-entering' uses involve a 
state that is  reached after a preceding development, and  this  state is  depicted as  becoming 
mentally accessible to  the  Subject of Consciousness. As  in the  other  'state-entering'  uses, 
sentence (412) expresses that the subject's referent is oriented toward a relation identified by 
a  prepositional  phrase.  More  specifically,  the  subject your bill  is  oriented  toward  being 
anchored  at  an  end state that is  identified by  the  PP  to  25  dollars  as  an amount.  This  1s 
schematized in (413). 
(412) 
(413) 
Your bill cames to 25 dollars. 
'your bill' 
--------.  L('your bill', '25 dollars') 160 
Given our knowledge of the entities involved - a bill on the one hand and an amount on the 
other- and our knowledge of how such entities can relate to each other in the real world, we 
infer  that  the  change  of state  referred  to  by  the  orientation  is  an  arithmetic  operation. 
Moreover, because the end-relation of the orientation is  one of localization, which  supplies . 
the notion of end-state when orientation is construed as a process, the amount is construed as 
the result of this calculation. We thus obtain the  interpretation:  'Y  our bill is  oriented via an 
arithmetic operation (  e.g.  addition) toward the end result of the amount 25  dollars'. Th at is, 
'the total of  y  our bill is 25 dollars'. 
As  stated above, because VENIR does not contain localization as  an intrinsic end-relation, 
this verb does not suppmt the implication of source localization required to  obtain the notion 
of an initial state. Renee, sentence (  414) below is unacceptable. Moreover, as  seen above, if 
we  include EN  in  order to  express  this missing notion of source localization,  this  has  the 
effect  of emphasizing  the  influence  of extemal  factors  on  the  outcome  of the  process. 
However, world knowledge tells us that the result of a given mathematical calculation is not 
contingent on factors  extemal to  the calculation itself.  That is, the fact that a restaurant bill 
for an item of 12 dollars and an item of 13  dollars cornes to a total of 25  dollars is inevitable 
and is  in no  way contingent on circumstances such as  the volition of the person performing 
the  calculation. Thus,  the  'total amount'  use  is  equally unacceptable when EN is  used,  as 
shown in (  415). In the case of COME, this problem does not arise:  source localization is not 
supplied by a separate lexical element but rather inferred from  the verb's intrinsic content. 
This notion of external influence is thus defeasible in the case of COME, so the 'amount' use 
is acceptable for this verb. 
(414)  *Le compte de taxes vient à 100 dollars. 
(415)  *Le compte de taxes en vient à 100 dollars. 
The preceding discussion also allows us  to  account for  another difference between COME 
and VENIR with respect to  'state-entering': only COME can be used to  express 'location-
reaching'  as  in  (416). In the  'motion' uses  described  in section 4.1, the  deictic  center is 
interpreted as  'the location of an SC', and the  orientation is  thus  interpreted as  a  motion 
toward  this  SC's  location.  However, in  (416)  the  indefinite  article  presents  the  bridge  as 161 
discursively new/unknown,  so  it cannot be the  SC's (e.g.  speaker's/hearer's/protagonist's) 
location. Thus, a prototypical 'motion' construal is ruled out. 
(416)  After walkingfor hours, the weary hikers came to a bridge. 
Crucially, being physically located at a point in space is  a type of state,  and  this  state can 
become mentally accessible to the SC by entering his attention. Thus, since the deictic center 
in (416) cannot be construed concretely, it is interpreted abstractly as 'mental accessibility' as 
in  the  state-entering  uses:  the  sentence  describes  the  hikers  entering  a  state  ('being at  a 
bridge')  that  becomes  mentally  accessible  to  the  SC  (in  this  case,  one  of the  discourse 
participants)  by  entering his  attention. This  focusing  of attention depicts  the  new state  as 
having significance  for  the discourse.  Thus,  the  'location-reaching'  use  often appears  in a 
story context, and the location reached by the subject's referent ends up having sorne kind of 
significance for later events, serving as the setting for upcoming action
87
. 
As  in  the  other  'state-entering'  uses,  the  implied  source  localization  (based  on  COME's 
intrinsic end-localization component) has the effect of suggesting that the state-entering event 
was  influenced by  factors  external  to  the  entity  undergoing the  change,  i.e.  the  subject's 
referent.  As  pointed out by Di Meola (2003), in the context of a movement through space, 
influence of  external factors over a motion event can take the form of circumstances directing 
a person toward a location (as in the case of accidentai, unintentional arrivai at a location) or 
the  form  of obstacles  impeding  the  reaching  of a  desired  destination.  The  former  case 
('accidentai anival') is exemplified by (416) above, in which the indefinite pronoun suggests 
that the location is  new and unknown to the characters of the narrative, and the latter case 
('arrivai despite  obstacles') is  illustrated in (417),  in  which  the  definite article depicts  the 
bridge  as  a  discursively available,  known  location, and  bence  as  the  characters'  intended 
destination. In this case, since X ends up at an intended destination while being influenced by 
external circumstances, the most natural inference is  tbat these circumstances hindered X's 
87 For an alternative account of this semantic use (which they cali 'salient location'), see Antonopoulou 
and Nikiforidou's (2002) discussion ofGreek ERXOME 'come'. 162 
arrival. Note that the definite a11icle  in the  bridge makes the sentence also compatible with 
COME's  prototypica1  'motion'  reading  (see  section  4.1),  so  the  sentence  is  ambiguous 
without fm1her context. 
(  417)  A  ft  er hours of  walking, the weary hikers final!  y came to the bridge. 
Since  VENIR's  intrinsic  meaning  does  not  supp011  the  implication  of an  initial  state 
necessary to  bring about a 'state-entering' reading, the 'location-reaching' use is  impossible 
for this verb, as shown by the unacceptability of (418). Moreover, the addition of  EN not only 
provides source localization but also foregrounds the role played by externat circwnstances in 
bringing about the state-entering event. While this is compatible with abstract processes like 
decision-making  (Il  en  est  venu  à  la  conclusion/décision  ... ),  world  knowledge  about 
locomotion indicates that the latter is  determined in large part by the subject's volition. That 
is, in (416), even though the hikers' arrivai is accidentai or unexpected, the hikers are still the 
principle  cause  of their  own  movement  to  that  location. Thus,  the  emphasis  on  externat 
causal factors  brought about by the  inclusion of EN in  the  sentence is  incompatible  with 
'location-reaching', resulting in the unacceptability observed in (419). 
(  418)  *Après des heures de marche, les randonneurs sont venus à un pont. 
(  419)  *Après des heures de marche, les randonneurs en sont venus à un pont. 
A final difference in the behavior of COME and VENIR with respect to 'state-entering' uses 
involves the expression of a hypothetical event. As  noted above, situations of abstract state-
entering can be  expressed by VENIR as  long  as  the  element EN  is  present to  supply  the 
necessary notion of source, and as  long as  the situation being described is  compatible with 
the  semantic  effects  (i.e.  foregrounding  of externat  influence)  that  EN  brings  with  it. 
However, there is one specifie 'state-entering' use - the 'hypothetical event' use illustrated in 
(420) and (421) - which al!ows the omission of  EN. 163 
(  420)  Si Jean  en venait à perdre son emploi,  la famille  n'aurait aucune source de 
revenu. 
(421)  Si Jean venait à perdre son emploi,  la famille n'aurait aucune source de revenu. 
In these examples, SI (together with the imperfect tense in the SI-clause and the conditional 
in the main ç;lause) indicates that the situation is a hypothetical one. Predictably, inclusion of 
EN in (  420) expresses source and th us depicts the event as having a known cause. In contrast, 
omission of EN,  as  in  (  421 ),  depicts  the  event  as  having  no  known  cause,  i.e.  as  being 
fortuitous.  Crucially,  this  absence  of a  known  cause,  while  unacceptable  elsewhere,  is 
compatible with the semantics of a SI + imparfait + conditional counterfactual sentence, for 
the irrealis presents the event 'Jean loses his job' as  belonging not to  the real world but to  a 
possible world, bence attenuating the requirement of a known cause. 
Conversely, since COME's meaning implies an identifiable source behind the event, there is 
a slight clash with the notion of fotiuitousness  suggested by the hypothetical construction. 
Thus, a 'hypothetical event' use is  slightly awkward in sentences like in (  422). However, in 
sentences like (423), the presence of the phrase by chance presents chance itself (i.e. absence 
of cause) as  a known cause, and the conflict with the  'known cause' implication following 
from COME's semantics is resolved. 
(  422)  ?  If  John came ta !ose his job, the family would have no source of  inca me. 
(423)  If  by chance we come ta meet our friends during our trip, we can tell them the 
news. 
In summary, both COME and VENIR can be used to express 'state-entering' when followed 
by a PP complement referring to an element construable as  a state. When this happens, the 
deictic center is  interpreted abstractly as  'an element that is  mentally accessible to  the SCs 
involved  in the  discourse',  and  this  suggests  that the  end-state  of the  change bas  special 
significance for ensuing events in the discourse. Because COME implies a source and thus a 
cause, COME's 'state-entering' uses weakly imply that the event is  influenced by external 
factors.  In contrast, because VENIR's meaning does  not imply a source and thus does not 
imply  a  cause,  when it  is  not  used to  describe a  fortuitous  event  (in  a  SI  + imparfait + 
conditional sentence)  it must be  accompanied by EN.  In the  latter case,  because  cause is 164 
expressed by an explicit lexical element rather than implied, the notion of extemal cause is 
foregrounded, making VENIR incompatible with changes detetmined primarily by the entity 
undergoing the change itself. 
4.7  COME + ADJ 
We saw in the preceding section that when COME is combined with a PP describing astate, 
the result is  a sentence expressing the entering of a state. Since adjectives, like PPs, express 
states and properties, an adjective can be used with COME to express the entering of a state, 
as in the following. 
(424)  Your dreams will come true. 
(  425)  The figures in the painting came a/ive. 
(  426)  The screw on the refrigerator came loose. 
(427)  The shoes came untied. 
(428)  The piece came unglued. 
In  these  sentences,  the  verb  expresses  that  the  subject  is  oriented  toward  being  in  a 
localization relation with the point o.  The adjective expresses a property or state (  e.g.  'true', 
'alive',  'loose',  'w1tied',  etc.).  Unlike  adverbs,  adjectives  cannot  be  applied  to  a  verb's 
meaning as a modifier, so when an adjective is adjoined to  the verb COME, we interpret it 
not as  qualifying the COME-event, but rather as  identifying the content of sorne subpart of 
this verb's meaning. At first glanee, it appears possible that the adjective's meaning identifies 
(i.e.  links to) the deictic center o, specifying its content as in the following representation. 
(429)  'dreams' 
--------•  L ('dreams', o) 
1 
1 
'true' 
This  1s  in fact  impossible,  however,  because  o  is  a  point,  and  adjectives,  qua  elements 
expressing  properties  and  relations,  are  inherently  non-punctual.  Rather,  as  an  element 165 
intrinsically expressing a property or state (rather than a punctual element like an entity), an 
ADJ  can  only  be  taken  as  specifying  the  content  of a  predicative  element of COME's 
meaning. Thus, just like a PP complement, an ADJ complement
88  of COME is  interpreted as 
identifying the content of the end relation L, as  in the representation (430) below. Thus, in 
sentences (424) through (428) above, the ADJ is interpreted as  indicating how X is anchored 
at o at the end of the orientation. Thus, for examples (424) and (425), we obtain the following 
respective compositional meanings: 'Rer dreams were oriented toward having the property of 
being true'; 'The screw was oriented toward having the properiy of being loose'. Since the 
ADJ expresses a property or state, the sentence describes a change of state. 
(430)  'dreams' 
-------•  L ('dreams', o) 
-~---- - -- - ----
1 
'hue' 
Renee, in these sentences, the ADJ tells us how X is anchored at o at the end of the change. 
More  specifically,  since  the  deictic  center  is  'a point  that  is  accessible  to  a  Subject of 
Consciousness', the above sentences describe a change toward being anchored at sorne point 
that is accessible to an SC. The specifie way in which this accessibility is accomplished - and 
hence the specifie way we construe the deictic center - is filled in by our world knowledge 
about the state involved. For example, in (  424) above, the sentence states that dreams end up 
anchored at o by having the property of being true (with the implication that the initial state 
was one of mere potentiality). Things that become true are considered to be part of existence, 
and as we saw above, existence is  one way of being accessible to  SCs in general. Renee, in 
(  424)  the  deictic  center  is  construed  as  'existence'.  Similarly,  in  (  425)  the  ADJ ALIVE 
indicates that the subject's referent ('the figures in the painting') ends up being anchored at o 
88 Although the ADJ in this construction is not "selected" by the verb, I consider it a complement on a 
par with a PP insofar as it identifies (i.e. links to) a subpart of  the verb's meaning. 166 
via  the  property  of being  alive,  a  property  that  once  agam  favors  interpretation  of the 
transition as one from astate of  potentiality (or fictiveness) to astate of  existence
89
. 
But accessibility can be achieved in more than one way.  Aside from accessibility to  one's 
experience (established, e.g, via existence), another general way for a person to  have access 
to something is  to exercise a celiain control over it. In the domain of space, one way to  have 
potential control over an object to be able to manipulate it, to cause it to move. Consequently, 
a concrete pa1i of  an object can become accessible via mobility/detachment:  by leaving astate 
of fixedness  and  thus  becoming detached and  mobile,  an object enters a state of potential 
manipulability by  a person. This is  what we find  in  examples  (424)  through  (428)  above: 
adjectives  of disunion like LOOSE,  UNTIED or UNGLUED describe  a  state  of concrete 
mobility whose establishment brings an object not into existence but rather into the realm of 
potential manipulability by people in general. In such cases, the accessibility expressed by the 
deictic center is interpreted as mobility. 
As  seen in  the  preceding  section,  the possibility of deriving  a  situation  of 'transition'  or 
'change of state' from COME's intrinsic meaning hinges on the notion of anchoring at an 
end-point, the latter being provided by COME's localization component. As we saw above, 
since  À  expresses  localization,  VENIR can be used to  express  change of state  when it  is 
followed  by a  (no un  or verb)  complement  introduced  by  À,  as  in  (  431)  below.  But an 
adjective  cmmot  be  the  complement of a  preposition  (as  shown  in  (  432)). Consequently, 
when an adjective is  combined with VENIR as  in (433)  through (436), since no  element is 
present to  express the  needed notion of localization, we cannot obtain a  'change of state' 
reading, and the sentence is unacceptable
90
. 
89  Note that this  use  does indeed  involve the  notion  'existence'  and  not  the  idea of X's ending up 
corresponding to  the  SC's desires, as  is  evidenced  by  the acceptability of Mary's nightmares came 
!rue. 
90  In  informai  Quebec French  it  is  possible (at  !east for  some  speakers)  to  use  VENIR + ADJ  to 
describe a sud den change of state in a person: Je suis venu tout mal quand elle m'a posé cette question 
délicate.  However, given the  limits of the present  study,  which deals  only with Standard French,  l 
exclude this regional use from my analysis. (  431)  Jean en est venu à la conclusion que  .  ..là croire que  ... 
(432)  *Ses rêves sont venus à vrai(s). 
(433)  *Ses rêves sont venus vrais. 
(  434)  *Les figures dans le tableau venaient/sont venues vivantes. 
(  435)  *Les chaussures sont venues détachées. 
(  436)  *La corde est venue desserrée. 
4.8  Order 
167 
In this section I discuss how COME and VENIR are used to describe the notion of 'order' or 
'sequence'.  When  the  orientation  in  the  meaning  of COME  and  VENIR  is  interpreted 
statically  rather  than  dynamically  and  in  the  mental  domain,  these  ~erbs can  express  an 
ordering of elements, as in (437) and (438). Given the elements present in the sentence and 
the intrinsic semantics of COME and VENIR, the semantic representations obtained for these 
sentences are shown in (439) and (440), respectively. 
(437)  P cames before Qin the alphabet. 
(  438)  P vient avant Q  dans 1  'alphabet. 
(439)  'P' 
------•L('P',o) 
'before Q' 
(440)  'P' 
------.R('P',o) 
'avant Q' 
In these  examples,  the  generic  present tense  of COMENENIR indicates  that  the  overall 
relation  expressed  by  the  verb  holds  at  ali  times.  Renee,  just  as  in  the  'static  spatial 
- --------168 
extension'  use,  we obtain the  idea that COMEIVENIR's orientation is  a stable, atempora1 
property, not a dynamic event. Because the tense is generic, and because the reference of the 
deictic  center  is  not  specified  by  any  explicit  lexical  element,  the  deictic  center  is  also 
interpreted generically as  refening to  an element that is  accessible to  SCs  in  general.  The 
arguments present in the  sentence (the letters P and Q) refer to  abstract elements. We thus 
conclude  that  the  orientation  itself is  to  be  interpreted  abstractly. Moreover,  the  element 
BEF  ORE  supplies  the  notion of a  relation of 'arder', a  type of oriented relation  between 
points;  we  thus  construe  COMEIVENIR's  orientation  as  'order'.  Finally,  the  arguments 
involved  in  the  sentence refer  to  mental  entities,  so  the  end  relation of the  orientation is 
construed as mental accessibility to SCs in general. Thus, the global compositional meaning 
obtained for the sentences can be paraplU'ased as  follows:  'When any given SC thinks about 
(i.e.  mentally accesses)  elements of type  X and Y,  the  SC  views  these  elements as  being 
ordered su ch that X is before Y'. 
Note that the difference in meaning between COME and VENIR - i.e.  the natme of the end-
relation - has no  impact on the verbs' ability to  express this sense, for all that is  required to 
obtain this reading is that the end state be construable as mental accessibility to  a generic SC. 
In the  case  of COME,  the  end  relation  is  localization  with  the  deictic  center,  and  thus 
localization  in  the  SC's  consciousness.  An  absh·act  element's  being  localized  in  our 
consciousness  is  equivalent to  this  element being part of our consciousness.  On the  other 
hand, when VENIR is  used, the end relation is  the more general 'X relates to  o'. The only 
logical,  salient  way  to  interpret  the  idea  that  'abstract  element  X  relates  to  the  SC's 
consciousness' is  once again that X is part of the SC's consciousness. Thus, both verbs have 
the  necessary  content  to  lead  us  to  an  'order'  interpretation  based  on  contextual  and 
background knowledge. 
One  specifie  notion  involving  order  is  the  hierarchical  relation  of priority.  COME  and 
VENIR can therefore be used to  express a situation ofpriority, as  in (441) through (444). In 
(441)  and  (442),  the  notion  of priority  is  mentioned  explicitly.  In  (443)  and  (444), it  is 
obtained  via  our  knowledge  of  the  entities  involved  in  the  situation.  The  word 
BEF  ORE/  A  V  ANT  once  agam  establishes  a  relation  of arder  between  the  arguments 
education  and national defense,  which are  treated here  as  concepts.  Our world  knowledge 169 
indicates that concepts such as  these typically constitute important issues  in the context of 
politics. From this  extra-linguistic  notion of impotiance and  from  the  ordered  list  effect 
obtained  via  COME's and  VENIR's  semantics,  we  infer  that  the  list  involved  here  is  a 
hierarchy of priorities. The preposition BEFORE/ AVANT indicates the relative order of the 
two elements within this hierarchy. Finally, we interpret the sentence based on a convention 
involving  hierarchies:  in  a  list  intended  to  indicate  the  importance  of elements,  the  most 
important element is listed first, and so on (rather than the opposite order, which is  logically 
possible but not allowed by convention). Thus,  for  example, in (441)  COME's orientation 
and BEFORE's semantics indicate that 'freedom' is the first element in the list, and thus has 
greater impotiance than elements lower on the list such as  'material comfort'. 
(  441)  Freedom cames weil before material comfort in my priorities. 
(  442)  La liberté vient bien avant le confort matériel dans mes priorités. 
(443)  (For me,) education cames before national defense. 
(444)  (Pour moi,) l'éducation vient avant la défense nationale. 
Another type of situation involving a hierarchical relation is that of a contest. Thus, COME 
and VENIR can also be used with a 'rank in a contest' sense, as in (445) and (446). In  this 
case, contextual information supplied by elements like among sixty contestants, in  the race, 
candidat,  and  votes  informs  us  of the nature of the  hierarchy:  rather  than a  hierarchy of 
priorities  (as  in  the  examples  above),  it  is  a  hierarchy  of positions  resulting  from  a 
competition such as a spo11s  event (  445) or an election (  446). Once again, by convention, in a 
list of contestants the first position is occupied by the person who obtains the highest score or 
who  remains last after all  other are elirninated.  Renee, (  445) expresses th at the referent of 
SHE  is  second  on  the  ordered  list  and  thus  bas  the  second  best performance  among the 
contestants. 170 
(  445)  She came in second place among sixty contestants. 
(  446)  A la fin du premier tour,  notre candidat préféré venait en 5e position avec 12% 
des votes.  (Corpus) 
A related use  is  the  'classification' sense illustrated in (447) below. This use is  possible for 
COME (perhaps only in a slightly formai register) but not possible for VENIR. As  with the 
'arder'  uses discussed above,  this reading is  based on the notion of 'mental accessibility'. 
However, here the context does not suggest 'arder'. Rather, the complement within the tenns 
of  the treaty specifies the nature of the end relation as contaimnent. Thus, we ob tain that 'the 
conflict', treated here as  a concept, is oriented toward a containment relation with a treaty. 
Since  a  treaty  is  an  abstract element,  a  mental  entity,  COME's orientation  component  is 
construed  abstractly,  and  the  end  relation  in  COME's  meaning  is  construed  as  mental 
accessibility to a generic SC. The sentence can thus be paraphrased as follows:  'This conflict 
has  the  property of being oriented  toward being contained in the  tenns of the  treaty, this 
treaty being mentally accessible to (in this case, known to) a generic SC'. 
(447)  This conjlict cames within the terms of  the treaty. 
(448)  *Ce conflit vient dans/à l'intérieur/en dedans des termes du traité. 
Crucially, this 'classification' sense presupposes a prior grounding at an origin point. That is, 
an entity which originates outside the classification is placed inside the classification, making 
it accessible to the SC, whose perspective is associated with the containing entity itself. Since 
the semantic content of VENIR does not imply a source localization, this use is  not possible 
for VENIR, as shown in (448). 
4.9  Origin 
In this section I discuss another type of  abstract use of COME and VENIR: the expression of 
'origin' exemplified by (449) and (450). 171 
(  449)  This word co mes from Gree  k. 
(  450)  Ce mot vient du grec. 
Given the invariant semantic content of COME, taking into account the elements present in 
(  449), we ob tain the semantic representation given in (  451 ).  As for (  450), the representation 
obtained is the same, except that the end relation is R rather than L. 
(451)  'this word' 
-------•  L ('this word', o) 
1 
1 
'Greek' 
As with the 'order' uses exarnined above (section 4.8), the generic present tense leads us to 
interpret these sentences as  expressing permanent, atemporal properties rather than events. 
Thus, 'this word' has the property of being pennanently oriented toward a relation with the 
deictic center. W e have seen that wh  en context does not suggest a specifie construal of the 
deictic  center,  it can receive the maximally general  construal  'existence',  since  'being in 
existence' is the maximally general way to be accessible to all SCs. Based on this construal, 
in (449) the grammatical subject's referent is oriented toward being in existence. My analysis 
of 'origin' thus differs somewhat from that of Bouchard (1995), who argues that for VENIR, 
"[t]he moment of utterance [  ... ] is anchored in the self of the speaker crucially viewed as  a 
self in a set of  all selves" (p.  13 7), and for whom the 'origin' use of VENIR therefore results 
from the idea of a permanent orientation of the  subject's referent toward 'me'  taken as  the 
representative  of  the  set  of  all  selves.  If  we  replace  the  traditional  'me-here-now' 
characterization of the deictic center with the notion of'  accessibility to an SC', this allows us 
to  account for the highly general nature of the deixis in the 'origin' use without needing to 
postulate a mechanism whereby the speaker is extended represent the set of all selves. Given 
the highly general nature of  the notion 'Subject of Consciousness' (a notion not anchored in a 
specifie  utterance  participant like  the  speaker),  the  idea of 'orientation  toward  existence' 
follows  in  a  straightforward  manner  from  the  general  meaning  'orientation  toward 
accessibility to any SC'. 172 
Since the semantic content of COME and VENIR con  tain a specification of the destination of 
the orientation but not of its  source,  they require a phrase introduced by FROM or DE in 
order to express origin (Bouchard, 1995, p. 122). This contribution of the DE/FROM-phrase 
to the overall meaning of the sentence is  illustrated in (  451) above. For sentences (  449) and 
(  450), we  thus  ob tain  the following  interpretation:  'this word has  a permanent orientation 
toward existence, and the source of  this orientation is the Greek language'. 
The type of 'origin' being expressed varies depending on the nature of the subject and the 
nature  of the  element  referred  to  by  the  DE/FROM-complement.  The  examples  above 
illustrate the 'etymology/derivation' use, which applies when the subject refers to a linguistic 
unit such as a word. When the subject is a human being, there are two basic possibilities, for 
we conceive of  humans as possessing two main types of origins. These two possibilities yield 
the 'family descent' and 'geographical origin' senses illustrated in the following. 
(  452)  John co  mes from a good  family. 
(453)  Jean vient d'une bonnefamille. 
(  454)  This man co mes from Ital  y. 
(  455)  Cet homme vient d'Italie. 
In (  452) and (  453), the FROM/DE-phrase identifies  the source as  being a family,  and this 
leads  us  to  construe COME'sNENIR's abstract orientation as  a  relation of genealogy.  In 
(454)  and  (455),  the  FROM/DE-phrase indieates  that the  somce of the  orientation  is  the 
geographie entity 'Ital  y'. In other words, this man has the permanent prope1iy of having Ital  y 
as  his  origin
91
.  Given  our  extra-linguistic  knowledge  about  the  way  in  which  humans 
typically establish  a  relation  of origin with  geographical  entities  like  countries  (  either by 
being born in the country or by residing there for a long period oftime), we obtain: 'This man 
was born (or bas resided for a long time) in Ital  y'. In other words, 'This man is Italian'. 
91 Note that in  a narrative, the English simple past and  the French imparfait, which are the past-tense 
counterparts of the generic present, are also acceptable with this use:  John came from a good family; 
Jean venait d'une bonnefamille.  ' 173 
Inanimate entities can also be ascribed the property of geographie origin in our conception of 
the  world, and  this accounts  for  the  examples  in  (456)  and  (457).  Finally, since the most 
natural  way  to  interpret  'origin'  in  the  case  of an  abstract  element is  in  tenns of cause, 
orientation takes the form of 'abstract origin/causation' in (  458) through (  465). 
(  456)  This wine cames from Ital  y. 
(  457)  Ce vin vient d'Italie. 
(458)  This idea cames from Plata. 
(  459)  Cette idée vient  de Platon. 
(  460)  His sadness cames from the circumstances. 
(  461)  Sa tristesse vient des circonstances. 
(  462)  Ki  nd deeds come from a kind he  art. (Webster 's Third New International) 
(463)  Les grandes pensées viennent du cœur.  (Vauvenargues) 
(464)  Many mistakes come from carelessness. 
(  465)  Beau  coup d'erreurs viennent de la négligence. 
4.10 Possession 
One way for a person to have access to  an entity is to exercise a certain control over it, and 
one pmiicular form of control is  the relation of possession. Thus, one way for  an entity to 
establish a relation of accessibility with the SC is to enter into the possession of  the latter
92
. In 
the sentences (466) and (467), the subject of COME or VENIR refers to an inanimate entity 
(a sum of mo ney  in (  466), a piece of real es  tate in (  467)  ), and there is a complement (a TO-
phrase in (  466) and dative ME in (  467)) describing a relation to  a person. Combining these 
92  Cf Di Meola's (1994,  p.  101-103)  discussion of the  'possession/control'  uses  of KOMMEN and 
GEHEN, which he considers to be meanings derivationally linked to  the prototypical motion uses via 
the concept 'region of interactive foc us'. 174 
elements with the semantic representation of COME, we obtain the compositional meaning 
schematized in (468). 
(  466)  Severa! thousand dollars came to him from his uncle. 
(467)  J'ai  même dû  vendre,  l'an  dernier,  un  domaine  de  cent soixante  hectares,  la 
Michouille,  qui me venait de ma grand-mère maternelle.  (Romains, cited in the 
Trésor de la langue française) 
(468)  'money/land' 
--------+  L~R  ('money/land', o) 
'his uncle/ma grand-mère  'to/à'  'him/me' 
Thus, the sentences express that an inanimate entity (money, land) is oriented toward being in 
'  a  relation  (localization,  general  relatedness)  with  the  deictic  center,  this  relation  being 
specified as  involving a persan. According to  world knowledge, entities such as  money and 
land  are  typically  in  a  relation  of possession  with  people,  and  possession  is  a  type  of 
accessibility. The orientation toward this relation therefore is interpreted as indicating that the 
entity enters into a relation of possession with the persan (i.e. begins to  belong to  the latter). 
Finally, the FROM/DE-phrase supplies the notion of source, thereby indicating the identity of 
the previous possessor of  the entity. In the present sentences, contextual information indicates 
that the  transfer of possession occurs within a family,  and based on our world knowledge 
about how possessions  are  transferred  within a  family,  we  obtain  a  specifie  'inheritance' 
reading. 
When the verb is in a generic tense, the orientation is taken to refer to a stable property rather 
than  to  a  transfer.  Thus,  in  (469)  and  (470),  in  which  a  FROM/DE-phrase  once  again 
indicates the identity of the source persan, we obtain a reading that is  sirnilar to  the 'origin' 
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(  469)  Most of  his mo  ney co mes from investments. 
(  4  70)  La plupart de son argent vient de ses investissements. 
People can establish a relation of possession not only with concrete entities,  but also with 
abstract elements such as  qualities and abilities.  Thus,  COME and  VENIR can be used  to 
describe the beginning of the possession of an abstract quality, as in (471) and  (472), or an 
ability,  as  in  (473)  and  (474). Note  that  in  the  latter  two  examples,  the  tense  is  generic, 
yi el  ding the same effect as for (  469) and (  4  70) above: the orientation is construed as a stable, 
atemporal property rather than as an event of acquisition. The sentences thus express that at 
all  times  (or at  !east habitually), the  talents  of writing,  painting,  humor, etc.  are  oriented 
toward being possessed by the person: she has permanent access to  these talents
93
.  Because 
these  sentences  involve  an  abstract  subject  and  a  destination  complement  refeiTing  to  a 
person, the sense is quite close to the 'individual experience' uses of COME and VENIR (see 
section 4.5). The difference here is that the subject denotes a quality or ability rather than an 
event, and the end relation is thus one of possession rather than one of experience. Note that 
in the case of both types of uses, the absence of a source expression poses no  problem for 
VENIR's abi1ity  to  express  these  senses.  This  is  because  when the  subject is  an abstract 
element such as an event, a quality or an ability, no transfer is involved, so these uses do not 
require the notion of source localization on which transition readings depend
94
. 
93  Note once again that the English simple past and  the  French imparfait, which can function as past 
tense equivalents of the generic present in a narrative setting, are acceptable in this use:  Writing came 
naturally to her; L'écriture lui venait naturellement. 
94  When,  instead  of a  general  talent,  the situation involves  an ability to  accomplish  sorne punctual 
action on a specifie occasion, COME appears acceptable, while VENIR is awkward: ft cornes hard  for 
me to  accept your views vs.  ??Il/Cela me vient difficilement d'accepter vos  opinions. At present 1 am 
not able to explain this difference. 176 
(471)  The spirit oftrue humility cames to those who seek it diligently.(Webster's Third 
New International) 
(472)  La vraie humilité vient à ceux qui la cherchent activement. 
(473)  Writing/ painting/humor cornes naturally to her. 
(  4  7  4)  L'écriture/La peinture/L'humour lui vient naturellement. 
Finally,  when  COME is  used  in  the  progressive as  in (  475)  and  (  476), it  can  describe  a 
situation of 'owing'. Once again, background knowledge about the entities involved (money, 
credit, etc.) supports a construal of  the end state as one of  possession. The present progressive 
serves to  situate not an entire event, but rather a part of the event, at the time of utterance. 
Renee, in these sentences it situa  tes part of the orientation at 'now', such that the end relation 
has not yet been rea1ized at the time of  utterance. We th us infer that the event of acquisition is 
situated in the future.  Other elements of the context (  e.g. 1 have  ...  , you will get  ... ) lead us  to 
the notion that the relation of possession is  one that is  meant to happen. From this we infer 
that  the  entity  in question is  owed to  the  person.  Because this  sense  involves  transfer of 
possession, it relies on the verb's ability to imply source localization. This, as we have seen, 
is not possible for VENIR given this verb's intrinsic content, and as a result, VENIR cannot 
be used to express a situation of 'owing'
95
. 
95  However, replacing VENIR with REVENIR makes these  uses fully acceptable:  Je ne réclame que 
l'argent qui me revient;  Tu auras tout le crédit qui te revient. This is presumably because the semantic 
content  of REVENIR,  in  particular  the  aspectual  content  of the  prefix  RE-,  compensates  for  the 
missing notion 'source'. 177 
(  4  7  5)  1 have another dollar co ming ta me. 
(476)  Y  ou will get ail the credit that is coming ta you. 
(477)  *J'ai un autre dollar qui me vient. 
(  4  78)  *Tu auras tout le crédit qui te vient. 
4.11 Existence with a property 
In this section I look at uses involving the notion of 'existence with a property'. These uses 
emerge when 1) the subject (X) refers to an entity, 2) the verb is in a generic tense, and 3) the 
verb  is  followed  by  a  modifier describing a  property of X.  General  examples of this  use 
appear in the following sentences. 
(479)  Cats come in many shapes and sizes. (Longman) 
(480)  They don't come any tougher than my brother. 
(  481)  My brother is as tough as they come. 
In these sentences, due to  the use of the  generic present and  the  absence of a complement 
specifying the  reference of the  deictic  center,  the  Subject of eonsciousness is  interpreted 
generically as  'all Ses', and the deictic center itself receives a maximally general constmal as 
'accessibility to  the experience of all Ses', i.e.  'existence'. Th  us, these sentences describe a 
situation in which X  is  oriented toward existing and bence toward being accessible  to  the 
potential experience of any  SC.  The compositional meaning obtained for  sentence (479)  is 
represented schematically as  follows, where the meaning of the modifying phrase in many 
shapes and sizes a  pp  lies to the meaning 'cats'. 
(482)  'cats' 
-------•  L ('cats', 'experience ofall Ses') 
---~---
1 
'in many shapes and sizes' 
The generic present brings us  to interpret the orientation as  describing a  lasting, atemporal 
property  (see  Bouchard,  1995,  p.  137).  Thus,  for  (479)  we  obtain:  'cats  in  general  are 178 
accessible to the experience of any Subject of Consciousness with the property of varying in 
shape and size'. In other words, 'cats exist in different shapes and sizes'. 
Note, however, that due to  extra-linguistic knowledge, example (479) is ambiguous between 
this  general 'existence with  a property'  reading arid  an  'availability for  pmchase'  reading. 
The latter interpretation is  due to  our world knowledge about animais  like  cats,  which, as 
pets; can be pmchased. The following examples  illustra~e this particular reading more clearly, 
for in these cases the subject refers to a more prototypical pmchasable entity. 
(  483)  This sofa co mes in four different co lors. 
(  484)  This computer cames with a monitor. 
According to  our knowledge of the way hwnans and products interact, a salient way for a 
product  to  be  accessible  to  a  person  is  via potential possession.  Thus,  based  on  extra-
linguistic knowledge of the  entities  involved,  we  infer that the relation towards which the 
subject's referent is  oriented is one of availability for purchase (i.e. accessibility in the fmm 
of potential possession). The generic construal of the Subject of Consciousness as  'all SCs' 
yields the idea that the artifact in question is available to any Subject of  Consciousness, in this 
case, any person who might want to buy it. 
A  related  sense  is  the  'beginning  of availability  for  purchase'  use  exemplified  m  the 
following. 
(  485)  The new iPod is coming ta storesltoMontreal/to Canada this spring. 
(  486)  The mo vie is co ming to theaters/to Montreal/ta Canada this jal!. 
The difference here is that the verb is not in a generic tense, but rather in a progressive tense. 
Thus, the verb's meaning cannot be construed as describing a permanent, atemporal property 
but rather an imminent event.  In these sentences, the present progressive indicates that the 
orientation holds at the time of  speech and that the orientation conesponds to a process that is 
underway, yielding the idea of  imminence. Here, the deictic center's reference is specified by 
a TO-phrase describing a physical location (either a general location such as  Montreal or 
Canada, or an institution such as stores or theaters). Given the natme of the subject (a product 
or creation), we once again infer that the orientation toward accessibility to SCs in general is 179 
to be interpreted as  'availability for purchase, viewing, etc.', and the locative complement is 
taken  as  indicating the  physical  location allowing  this  availability  (i.e.  where  people  can 
purchase or vicw the product). This reading is reinforced when the PP refers explicitly to  a 
commercial institution that sells/makes  products of the  type  refened to  by  the  subject.  In 
sum, for sentences (485) and (486) we arrive at the following compositional meaning:  'The 
new  iPod/movie  will  soon  be  available  for  purchase/viewing  111 
stores/theaters/Montreal/Canada'. 
The uses discussed so  far  in the present section involve cases where the subject of COME 
refers  to  a  concrete entity  or an abstract product.  We  saw  above  that  when  the  tense  of 
COME is  interpreted generically,  the orientation is  taken  to  be pennanent and  atemporal, 
yielding a situation in which X  is  available to  be  experienced by SCs  in general,  and  the 
modifying expression is  taken to  describe a prope1iy that X generally possesses. When the 
modifier is  a WITH-phrase, as in example (484) above, the atemporal prope1iy expressed is 
one of accompaniment by  another entity.  Likewise, when the  subject refers  to  an abstract 
element, as in the following, and the verb is followed by a WITH-complement, the result is a 
situation in which one abstract element (the subject's referent X) is  accompanied by another 
(the complement ofWITH). 
(  487)  Neither nominee  will accept the  spending limits  that  come with public funds. 
(  adapted from Corpus) 
(488)  He enjoys the respect that cames with being an executive. 
Once again, given that no complement specifies the reference of the deictic center, the latter 
receives  the  maximally  general  construal  'accessibility  to  the  experience  of ali  SCs',  i.e. 
'existence'.  As  a  result,  these  examples  express  the  following  meaning:  'The 
respect/spending  lirnits  are  oriented  at  ali  times  toward  existence,  and  this  existence  is 
accompanied  by  being  an  executive/by  public  funds'.  The  combination  of the  notion 
'accompaniment' with the idea of an orientation that holds true at ali moments yields the idea 
of entai/ment.  That is,  'being an executive  entails  (receiving)  respect',  and  'public  funds 
entai! spending limits'. 180 
The 'existence with a property' uses of  COME are founded on notion of  an implied source: in 
order for us to be able to meaningfully interpret the idea of an entity's permanent orientation 
toward existence, we must be able to infer that it is orientedfrom sorne source. For example, 
in order for a product to be available for pm·chase, it must be provided by someone. COME's 
meaning,  which  contains  the  notion  of localization  as  an  end  state,  implies  a  somce 
localization, enabling this verb to express different 'existence with a property' situations. On 
the other band, we have seen that since VENIR's meaning expresses orientation only toward 
the underspecified relation R,  it  lacks the necessary content to  support such an inference. 
Whereas events and time periods can be easily conceived of as passing from potentiality to 
actuality (see the 'actualization' uses discussed in section 4.4), it is more difficult to conceive 
of an entity as undergoing such a transition to actuality unless the entity in question has sorne 
identifiable source. That is, according to our experience of the world, an entity cannot simply 
"materialize" out of nothing. Renee, this verb cannat be used to translate the above examples 
in which COME expresses 'existence with a property', as shown in (489) through (494). Note 
that the  partial  acceptability of the  'abstract accompaniment'  use  illustrated  in  (  493)  and 
(494) is  due to  the fact that the arguments involved, while not events, are abstract elements 
and can thus be more easily assimilated to events. Nonetheless, since in this use the tense is 
generic (anchoring the orientation at ail times), the sentence describes a general truth rather 
than a punctual event. Renee, an event reading is ruled out, barring full acceptability. 
(  489)  *Les chats viennent en diverses formes et tailles. 
(490)  *Ce sofa vient en quatre couleurs différentes. 
(  491)  *Cet ordinateur vient avec un moniteur. 
(492)  *Le  nouveau  iPod  vient  aux/dans  les  magasins/à  Montréal/au  Canada  ce 
printemps. 
(  493)  ?  Il aime le respect qui vient avec le fait d'être un PDG. 
(  494)  ?  Aucun des  candidats n'acceptera les  limites  de  dépense  qui viennent avec un 
système de subventions publiques. 
Before closing my discussion of the  'existence with a  property'  senses, it is  interesting to 
point  out  a  difference  between  Quebec  French  and  Standard  French:  in  the  fo1mer,  the 181 
'availability for purchase' sense illustrated in (490) and (491) above is perfectly acceptable 
(and  indeed quite frequently  used). Although the  question of regional variation goes  well 
beyond the limits of the present study, it is worthwhile to suggest the beginning of a solution 
for this pattern. It may be  that certain uses of VENIR in Quebec French are influenced by 
English via contact. In particular, the  'availability for purchase'  use,  which belongs to  the 
domain of commercial  transactions  and  consumerism,  is  presumably quite frequent  in the 
input received  by  Quebec French speakers.  Advertisements,  product descriptions,  etc.  are 
frequently translated from English, and numerous anglicisms therefore make their way into 
the translations. This high frequency of use may have the  effcct of oveniding the oddness 
brought about by VENIR's lack of implied source localization, perhaps  even leading to  a 
separately lexicalized meaning for this use in Quebec French. 
4.12 Recent past 
In this section I tum to  the 'recent past' use of VENIR illustrated in (495). In this sentence, 
the complement of  VENIR is a DE-phrase with an INF as the complement of DE. As seen in 
previous uses  (  e.g.  motion, spatial extension, origin, etc.),  a DE-complement of VENIR is 
always  interpreted  as  telling us  about  the  source  relation of the  orientation,  not  the  end-
relation.  We  have  seen  that  when  VENIR  is  followed  by  a  destination  complement 
introduced by À, the latter preposition identifies (i.e. links to) R in the representation, and À's 
complement links to the point o. Likewise, when VENIR is followed by a source complement 
introduced by DE, the latter element identifies the source relation (an infened R),  and DE's 
complement links to  R's argument, i.e.  an inferred  co  (since the source of an orientation is 
expected to  be distinct from  its  destination).  Thus,  for  an  'origin'  sentence like  (496),  we 
ob tain the representation in (  497), and for sentence (  495), we ob tain the meaning schematized 
in (498). 182 
(495)  Jean vient de manger. 
(  496)  Jean vient de Montréal. 
(  497)  'Jean' 
R ('Jean', o) 
'de'  'Montréal' 
(498)  'Jean' 
R ('Jean', o) 
1  1 
1  1 
'de'  'manger' 
The  complement  of DE  in  (495)  is  an  infinitive  verb  describing  an  action,  an  element 
anchored in time.  We thus  most naturally constme the  components of VENIR's semantics 
temporally:  ro  and o are points in timc, and VENIR's orientation is the orientation intrinsic to 
time itselfl
6
. Moreover, DE + MANGER tells us that the source of  the orientation is a relation 
between 'Jean' and  'manger': it  indicates that at  time  ro,  'Jean' is  the  agent of the  action 
'manger'. The deictic center ois 'a point that is accessible to the Subject of Consciousness', 
and the point in time that is  most directly accessible to the SC  (such as the speaker and/or 
hem·er) at the utterance time is the utterance time itself; bence, the deictic center is constmed 
temporally  as  'now'.  And  given  the  orientation  we  attribute  to  time  itself (from  past  to 
present to  future), we infer th at 'manger' is  anterior to  'now', so  the action is situated in the 
past. 
Finally, since VENIR is in the present tense and the whole orientation is predicated of 'John', 
the sentence describes a property of Jean that holds at the utterance time.  This results in the 
following  compositional meaning: 'At the  time of speech,  Jean has  the  property of being 
oriented from his past action of eating toward his present state (i.e. not eating)'. As Bouchard 
96 See Bouchard's (1995, p. 139-144) simi1ar analysis of this semantic use. 
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(1995, p.  143-144) points out, this orientation creates an effect of relevance, accounting for 
the "recentness" traditionally attributed to  this construction. That is, in (495) above, the link 
of orientation between Jean's past action of eating and the moment of utterance portrays this 
action as  being relevant or close to  the present.  When VENIR's tense places  the moment of 
reference in the past rather than the present, as in (499), ois once again construed as  'a point 
intime that is accessible to SC at reference time', but this time the accessibility holds in the 
past. The deictic center is thus construed as  a point in the past, and the relation of anteriority 
holds with respect to this  reference time, yielding a relation of anteriority between two past 
moments. 
(  499)  Jean venait de manger. 
The element DE involved  in this  construction is  highly abstract,  as  evidenced by  the  vast 
ana  y of uses it bas in French. The corresponding English prepositions FROM and OF have a 
narrower range of uses, and th us  presumably a less general semantic content than DE
97
. We 
can also assume that it is this highly generalmeaning that allows DE to take not only a noun 
phrase, but also  an INF  as  an argumenë
8
.  In contrast, FROM is  the element that typically 
introduces a source  in  combination with COME (as  in  (500)). Presumably due to  its  more 
restrictive semantics, FROM can only take a gerund as a verbal complement (as in (503)) and 
never  accepts  an  INF  as  a  complement,  as  shown  in  (501)  and  (502).  Crucially,  the 
unacceptability of (504) indicates that the gerund's semantics is  incompatible with a recent 
past situation. This is most likely because the INF is an inealis form while the gerund is not. 
Renee, due to the absence in English of a highly general source-preposition like the French 
97  Note however,  that an  analysis of DE's semantic content goes  far  beyond the  boundaries of this 
study. 
98  Another use  in which DE introduces an  INF  is  its  complementizer role:  e.g. Jean  a fini de  lire le 
livre;  Jean  oublie  toujours  d'apporter  ses  clés.  That  DE  functions  as  a  complementizer  in  such 
sentences is shown by the fact that the infinitival complements alternate with NPs rather than with PPs: 
Jean  a fini sa soupe  vs.  *Jean  a fini de  sa soupe;  Jean  oublie  toujours  ses  clés  vs.  *Jean  oublie 
toujours ses clés. 184 
DE that is  capable of taking an  INF  as  a complement,  COME cannot be used  to  form the 
'recent past' construction that we observe for VENIR. 
(500)  John cames from Montreal. 
(501)  *John 's headache cames from (ta)  think about polysemy. 
(502)  *John comes/is comingfrom (to) eat. 
(503)  John 's headache co mes from thinking about polysemy. 
(504)  *John comes/is comingfrom eating. 
The above analysis predicts that in order to  have a 'recent past' use, a language must have 
sorne  maximally  general  means  of linking  a  verbal  complement  to  the  source  of the 
orientation  in  the  COME-verb's  semantic  representation. This  prediction  is bome out by 
evidence from Malagasy, whose equivalent to COME is AVY. As I show in Zuercher (2010), 
because  AVY's meaning encodes the notion of source directly, a source preposition is  not 
required in order to link a complement to the source pali of A  VY's semantic representation, 
as shown in (505). Indeed, Malagasy bas no prepositional equivalent to DE or FROM; rather, 
due  to  A  VY's  semantics,  it  is  AVY  itself that  fulfills  the  role  of DE-preposition  when 
combined with other motion verbs, as in (506). Crucially for the present discussion, for this 
reason AVY can also take a verb directly as a source complement. In sum, since Malagasy 
possesses a highly general equivalent to French DE - namely, the COME-verb AVY itself -
Malagasy exhibits the 'recent pas t', as shown in (507)
99
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99 The fact  that the  A  VY's complement  is  not an  INF  (a  form  that does not exist in Malagasy)  but 
rather a past-tense  active  verb  requires  explanation, but this  goes  beyond  the  limits of the  present 
study. The  answer  most  likely  lies  in the  fact  that  Malagasy's  tense  and  aspect system  is  radically 
different from those oflndo-European languages. (505)  Avy Fianarantsoa Rakoto. 
come Fianarantsoa Rakoto 
'Rakoto comes from Fianarantsoa.' 
(506)  Tonga avy Fianarantsoa Rakoto. 
arrive come Fianarantsoa Rakoto 
'Rakoto anived from Fianarantsoa.' 
(507)  Avy nisakafo Rakoto. 
come P  AST  -eat Rakoto 
'Rakoto has just eaten.' 
4.13 COME/VENIR+ VERB: impact on the SC 
185 
We saw earlier (section 4.2) that when vr;NIR is combined with an adjunct verb expressing 
an  action,  this  can yield  a  'motion +  action'  situation in which  the  subject's  referent  (a 
concrete, mobile entity) undergoes a movement tlu·ough space and perfonns an action either 
during or at the end of the movement. However, because VENIR is not inherently spatial, the 
VENIR + bare-INF construction can also yield an abstract reading when context favors such 
a  reading.  Consider  example  (508)  below,  whose  components  yield  the  meaning 
representation in (509). 
(508)  On viendra sans doute dire que j'exagère. 
(509)  'on' 
---------.  R ('on', o) 
..,-
\ 
'dire que  .. .' 
In this sentence, the INF adjunct describing the relation R denotes a speech act.  On the one 
hand, since speech acts have a physical reality, the sentence can be receive a progredience 
reading; under this reading, the sentence describes a movement undergone by a person, and 
the  speech  action expressed  by  dire  que...  takes  place  at  the  destination  location of this 
movement. But another way to establish a relation with 'a point that is accessible to the SC' 
via an action like 'saying' is for this action to be part of the SC's experience and thus to have 
an impact on the SC. In this case, we interpret o not as 'the SC's location', but rather as  'the 186 
SC's experience' (see section 4.5). In addition, the orientation component itself suggests that 
the  action  does  not  mere1y  occur;  it  enters  into  the  SC's  realm  of experience.  This 
presupposes  that  the  source  of the  action's  orientation  is  a  point  other  than  the  SC's 
experience, which has  the effect of potiraying the action as  unexpected, surprising, or even 
fotiuitous  in  the  eyes  of the  SC.  This  effect  of surprise/fotiuitousness  is  even  more 
pronounced when supported by background/world knowledge, as in the case of(510). 
(510)  Ne viens pas me dire que Jean est malade! 
While the progredience use is restricted to  animate subjects (as Bouchard, 1995, p. 130-131) 
because  only  animate  entities  can  undergo  self-movement  toward  a  location  with  the 
intention of performing an action there, virtually any kind of element (an entity, an event, a 
quality, etc.) can enter an SC's experience unexpectedly and have an impact on him.  Thus, 
sentences  like  (511)  and  (512)  below are fully  acceptable.  Note also  that construal of the 
notion  'relation to  o'  as  'being in the  SC's  experience'  and  thus  as  'impact on  the  SC' 
presupposes  nothing  about the  negative  or positive  character  of the  impact.  Thus,  while 
sentences like (510) and (511) express or imply a negative impact on the speaker, (512) is not 
clearly negative or positive, and the impact in (513) is clearly positive. As for (514), although 
VENIR  serves  to  express  that  the  light's  'tempering of the  reflection'  would  have  sorne 
psychological effect on the observer by entering into his experience, the precise nature of this 
effect could only be gathered from background of contextual knowledge.  In other words, in 
all  of these  examples  the  nature  of the  impact  itself is  obtained  from  extralinguistic 
knowledge  (e.g.  hearing  about  a  sick friend  typically  affects  a  person  negatively,  while 
finding evidence in support of  one's point typically brings about satisfaction). 
(511)  Des pensées insupportables venaient m'assaillir. 
(512)  Rien n'est jamais venu contredire les résultats de cette expérience. 
(513)  Son histoire vient appuyer le point que je défendais tout à l'heure. 
(514)  Une lumière que nul reflet ne vient tempérer.  (Gautier, cited in the Grand Robert 
de la langue française) 
According to Bouchard (1995, p. 145-147),  the notion of impact on the speaker seen in this 
use  is  derived  by  construing  the  deictic  center  as  'me'.  However,  I  consider  that  my 187 
characterization of the .deictic center in tenns of accessibility provides a stronger explanation 
for how 'impact' is obtained in this construction: X does not relate directly to the speaker, but 
rather to 'a point that is accessible to the SC', and the most natural way for an abstract action 
to  become  accessible  to  a  person  is  for  it  to  enter  into  his  experience  and  impact  him. 
Moreover, since the deictic center is defined in terms of the Subject of Consciousness rather 
than the narrower notion 'me', we correctly predict that the 'impact' use can express impact 
on people other than the speaker, as in the following examples. 
(515)  Peut-être qu'un événement imprévu viendra changer ta vie. 
(516)  Jean avait peur que la pluie vienne gâcher ses plans. 
We have seen that like VENIR, COME can be used to  express a 'motion+ action' situation 
with  the  progredience  construction,  as  in  (517).  This  is  possible  because  in  a  context 
supporting  a  concrete  construal  of COME's  localization  component,  the  INF  adjunct  is 
interpreted  as  describing  this  localization:  in  (517),  the  INF  adjunct  indicates  that  the 
localization  at  the  end  of the  orientation  is  achieved  via  the  action  'eat', so  there  is  an 
orientation toward Jolm's eating while localized at the point o. Given that eating is a concrete 
action, the most natural way for this to occur is if  John is physically located at o. 
(517)  John will come eat at our house today. 
Cmcially, as  discussed earlier (section 3.3.2), localization is  compatible with situations in 
which the  figure  is  anchored  at  a  stable  ground.  This  property is  respected  in  a concrete 
construal of COME, in which localization is construed as being physically present at a place. 
We have  also  seen that  COME's localization is  compatible with  a construal  as  'the SC's 
experience', which accounts for the 'actualization' and 'individual experience' uses in (518) 
and  (519),  respectively. In these uses, the  subject's referent enters the  SC's experience by 
entering into existence, and 'being in existence' is compatible with localization's portrayal of 
a figure being anchored at a stable ground. However, in the 'impact on the SC' use observed 
for VENIR, the end-relation is not achieved by X's entering into existence. Rather, X merely 
enters the SC's experience via an action.  Crucially,  actions are ephemeral, so  'b.eing in the 
SC's experience via an action' is  not fully compatible with localization's portrayal of X as 
anchored at a stable ground. Consequently, while COME can be used to  express 'motion+ 188 
action',  it  cannot be  used  to  express  'impact on the  SC'  as  in (520)  through  (523).  This 
observation  holds  hue regardless  of wh ether  COME  is  combined  directly  with  an  INF, 
combined with a vcrb via AND (as in (520) tlu-ough (522)) or appears in the COME+ V-ing 
constmction (as in (523)) 
100
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(518)  The crisis came during what was already a dijjicult timefor the economy. 
(  519)  Good  fortune will come ta you if  you are patient. 
(520)  *Someone will most likely come (and) say thal 1 am exaggerating. 
(521)  *Don 't come (and) tell me thal John is ill! 
(522)  *Nothing has ever come and contradicted the results of  this experiment. 
(523)  *Don 't come te/ling me that John is ill! 
In the present chapter I have shown that although COME and VENIR possess a wide range of 
semantic uses,  these  senses  are all  manifestations of a single  lexical meaning.  Both verbs 
express 'orientation toward a relation with the deictic center, a point that is  accessible to a 
Subject of Consciousness'; hence, the semantic behavior of these verbs shows a considerable 
degree of cross-linguistic similarity.  However, 1 have also shown that a single difference in 
intrinsic meaning (i.e.  the nature of the  end-relation),  in combination with cross-linguistic 
asymmetries in grammar and lexicon, gives rise to an important number of differences in the 
specifie semantic uses that are possible for these verbs. In the following chapter, 1 show that 
this same generalization applies to the verbs GO and ALLER. 
100  Note  that  some  of these  English  sentences  were  judged  to  be  marginally  acceptable  by  my 
informants,  but 1 suspect  that  this  is  based  on  a  metaphorical,  movement-based  reading,  not  on  a 
genuine, abstract 'impact' reading. CHAPTER V 
THE SENSES OF GO AND ALLER 
In this  chapter 1 discuss  the  verbs  GO and ALLER, showing how their semantic uses  are 
obtained in context.  Like COME and VENIR,  all of the  senses  of GO  and ALLER result 
from a single, abstract meaning in combination with background and contextual knowledge. 
In addition,  as  was  the  case for  COME and VENIR,  the  numerous  sense similarities  and 
differences  observed  for  GO  and  ALLER  follow  from  minor  differences  in  their  core 
meanings as weil as from grammatical differences between English and French. 
5.1  Motion 
Like COME and VENIR, GO and ALLER can be used to express motion when the subject is 
a  concrete,  mobile  entity,  especially  one  capable of locomotion.  This  happens  when  the 
orientation toward a relation with the constant - in this  case,  the anti-deictic center w - is 
interpreted as  orientation toward a spatiallocalization at a point other than o, i.e.  movement 
toward a point in space other than 'here'. ln wbat follows, 1 first discuss the properties of the 
'motion' senses that are common to both GO and ALLER, and I then provide an account of 
the differences in 'motion' uses observed for these two verbs. 
As  Bouchard (1995,  p.  150) points  out,  VENIR and ALLER differ through only a  single 
element, the nature of the constant they contain: while VENIR contains the deictic center o, 
ALLER contains the anti-deictic center w.  As 1 showed above (section 3.4), English COME 
and GO are distinguished from one another in precisely the same way. In addition, English 
verbs  show  the  same  difference  in  semantic  content  with  respect  to  the ir  French  quasi-
equivalents:  while VENIR and  ALLER express  orientation toward  the maximally general 
relation R,  COME and GO contain the more specifie end-relation L,  localization. Thus, the 190 
semantic  representations  for  the  monosemous  meaning  of GO  and  ALLER identified  in 
Chapter III are the following: 
(524)  GO:  x 
------+  L(X, w) 
(525)  ALLER:  x 
------ +  R(X, w) 
Although GO  and ALLER do  not intrinsically encode the notion of movement, a  'motion' 
use emerges in sentences like (526) and (527). 
(526)  John is going ta Paris this summer. 
(527)  Jean va à Paris cet été. 
In  examples  (526)  and  (527),  the  locative  PP  complement  is  interpreted  as  providing 
information about the reference of the end-relation encoded in the verb's semantics (R in the 
case of  VENIR, Lin the case of  GO). Thus, Paris, the complement of the preposition TO/À is 
taken to be co-referential with w. The combina  ti on of  the elements of these sentences with the 
invariant semantic representations of GO and ALLER yields the meanings illustrated in (528) 
and (529), respectively. This meaning can be paraphrased as  follows:  'John/Jean is  oriented 
toward being in a relation (localization or general relatedness, respectively) with the point w, 
that is, with the city Paris'. 
(528)  'Jolm' 
----------+- L ('John', w) 
1  1 
'to'  'Paris' 
(529)  'Jean' 
----------+- R ('Jean', w) 
1  1 
1  1 
'à'  'Paris' 
Given  our world  knowledge  about  the  entities  being  referred to  by the  arguments  - i.e. 
John/Jean most likely refers to a human being, a spatial entity, and Paris most likely refers to 191 
a city, another spatial entity- we infer that the sentence describes a spatial situation and that 
the  verb's  semantics  must  therefore  be  interpreted  in  the  domain  of space.  This  fact, 
combined with the fact that ffi  is co-referential with Paris, indicates that ffi  refers  to a spatial 
point. 
The  semantic  content  of GO  expresses  that  the  end-relation  of the  orientation  is  one  of 
localization:  L('John',  'Paris').  Combined with  the  infened  notion  of space, this  abstract 
localization  is  interpreted  as  a  state  of being  physically  located  at  a  point.  Since  world 
knowledge tells us that the most natural way for a concrete, mobile entity (e.g. a human) to 
be oriented toward being located at a spatial point is to undergo movement, the pragmatically 
euriched meaning we obtain for the sentence is: 'John undergoes movement to the location ffi, 
i.e. Paris'. 
Unlike  GO, ALLER's semantics  does  not contain the  notion of localization. However, in 
sentence (527) above, this notion is nonetheless provided by an element externat to  the verb, 
the  preposition  À.  This  preposition  does  not  intrinsically  express  directionality  and  can 
therefore be assumed not to contain the notion of destination. But since the À-PP complement 
of  VENIR links with the end-relation of  the orientation in VENIR's representation, this PP is 
interpreted  as  describing the  end-state  resulting from  the  motion  event:  it  thus  refers  to  a 
destination.  Consequently,  despite  the  absence  of localization  in  ALLER's  meaning,  the 
compositional, contextually enriched meaning of sentence (527)  is essentially equivalent to 
that obtained for its English translation (526): 'Jean undergoes movement to  the  location ffi , 
i.e. Paris'. 
Finally, the deictic  properties  of the  constant  ffi  provide  information about the destination 
Paris. Recall that ffi  is defined as  'any point other than the deictic center o', and that the latter 
is defined as  'a point that is accessible to  an SC'. Since the most obvions spatial point to 
which  a  given  SC  has  access  is  his  own  location,  a  spatial  constmal  of ffi  yields  the 
interpretation 'a point other than the SC's own location'. Renee, in sentences (526) and (527) 
above, Paris,  by virtue of being co-referential with  ffi,  is identified as being a location other 
than that of  the SC. On the one band, since the most salient default SC for a given utterance is 
the speaker (see Ruwet, 1991, p. 55), in order for these sentences to be uttered acceptably, the - --- - --- ----------------------- -
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speaker must not be located in Paris at the utterance time. On the other hand, GO and ALLER 
contain no  infonnation about the  source of the orientation. Thus,  sentences like  (526)  and 
(527) are neutral with respect to  the deictic properties of the point of departurc:  while they 
can describe an event in which John/Jean is  leaving the  speaker's location,  they can also 
equally well describe an  event in  which John/Jean's departure point is  some location other 
than that of the speaker
101
• These two logically possible movement situations for GO/  ALLER 
are  illustrated  schematically  in  (530)  and  (531),  where  S  represents  the  location  of the 
speaker at utterance time. 
(530)  Interpretation 1: 
Se ------- - 3> e  Paris 
(531)  Interpretation 2: 
e-- ------ 3> e  Paris 
•  s 
Since in a motion construal GO  and ALLER describe movement toward a place other than 
the SC's location (more specifically, some place other than 'here' when the SC is the speaker 
himself), these verbs are incompatible with the locative complements HERE and ICI, which 
intrinsically encode the idea 'speaker's location at the utterance time': 
101  As  I  show  throughout this  chapter,  because the  anti-deictic  center in  GO/ALLER's meaning is 
defined very generally as 'any/sorne point other than the deictic center', these two verbs have a broader 
range of uses than their deictic counterparts COMENENIR. 193 
(532)  *Go here! 
(533)  *Va ici! 
(534)  *John went here yesterday. 
(535)  *Jean est allé ici hier. 
The  'motion'  reading  obtained  for  sentences  like  (526)  and  (527)  is  due  in  part  to  the 
presence of the notion of localization, which is  provided by GO's semantics in (526) and by 
À's semantics in (527). When there is no complement expressing localization but sorne other 
element of the sentence provides information strongly supporting a motion situation, we can 
still obtain a 'motion' use for GO and ALLER. For example, in (536) and (537), although no 
complement specifies the destination of the movement, there is  a complement specifying a 
spatial path (dawn the stairs,  dans toutes les directions). Based on this notion of spatial path 
combined with  the  notion of orientation provided by  GO/ALLER's intrinsic  meaning, we 
infer that the subject's referent is  moving along the path. Moreover, in our experience of the 
world,  paths are finite  and thus  have an endpoint. When an object moves  along a path,  it 
eventually  ends  up  being physically  located  at  that  endpoint.  We therefore  infer an  end-
relation of (spatial) localization from the elements present in the sentence and from our world 
knowledge. Note that as in (526) and (527) above, the movement must be toward some point 
other than o, even though in (536) and (537) ois not explicitly identified by a complement. 
(536)  He held the rail as he went down the stairs. (Webster's Third New International) 
(537)  Les gens allaient dans toutes les directions. 
In  sentences  (538)  through  (541),  there  is  no  complement  at  all,  but  there  is  a  modifier 
expressing a property of movement:  speed  in  (538)  and  (539),  and  distance  in  (540)  and 
(541). Thus, here too the elements present in the sentence provide sufficient infonnation to 194 
allow us  to  atTive  at a  'motion' reading without the presence of a destination complement 
expressing localization
102
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(538)  This car goes fast. 
(539)  Cette voiture va vite. 
(540)  John wentfar before stopping. 
(541)  Jean est allé loin avant des 'arrêter. 
Despite surface sirnilarities  in  the  motion uses of GO  and  ALLER,  the  difference  in their 
intrinsic  semantic  content - i.e. the  natme of the  end relation (L  vs.  R)  - causes  severa! 
differences in the behavior of these verbs in a motion context. As pointed out by Lamarche 
(1998), the possibility of  using a verb to des cri  be a given situation depends crucially both on 
the  intrinsic  semantic  content  of the  verb  itself and on  the  information provided  by  the 
elements  present in surrounding context.  This, he  claims, accounts  for  the contrast in use 
observed between ALLER and semantically richer verbs like MONTER and DESCENDRE, 
the latter of which rely less heavily on the presence of sentential context to describe specifie 
movement situations: 
Alors  que  les verbes qui  ont une  constante n'ont pas besoin d'un  complément syntaxique pour 
identifier une situation, aller requiert la présence d'un complément pour identifier une  situation 
correspondante. En revanche, l'absence d'une constante dans aller en  fait un verbe qui permet de 
référer à des  situations plus générales que les  verbes qui ont une constante.  (Lamarche,  1998, p. 
51-52) 
102  However, when the distance expression is  a measure NP rather than an adverb, a 'motion'  use  is 
acceptable in English but not in French.  Compare:  ft took us over an  hour to  go  ten  kilometres  vs. 
*Cela  nous  a pris plus d'une  heure pour aller dix  kilometres.  This  may  be due  to  the absence of 
localization in ALLER's meaning:  presumably, a distance-NP, which expresses merely a  magnitude 
but does not contain the idea of end point or movement, can only function as a modifier when the verb 
itself contains end-localization OR when the verb contains other material (like manner of movement, 
as  with  COURIR)  allowing movement to  be inferred.  In  contrast,  a  distance  adverb  like  LOIN  is 
acceptable  because  it  expresses  the  idea of two  spatial  points  separated  by a  distance  and  bence 
suggests a starting point and an end  point. 195 
In other words,  when a verb's lexical semantic content is  highly general (as in the case of 
ALLER) and information provided by extemal elements (as well as background knowledge) 
does  not till  in  the  necessary  details, certain semantic uses  are  impossible for  the  verb  in 
question. We saw in Chapter IV that because COME's semantic content is more specifie than 
that of VENIR, certain uses observed for the former are unacceptable for the latter. Likewise, 
as I will show throughout the present chapter, the fact that ALLER's meaning is more general 
than that of GO allows us  to account for a wide range of differences in the possible uses of 
these two verbs. 
For example, because GO con  tains the idea of localization at an end point, a 'motion' reading 
can  be  obtained  for  this  verb  even  if the  sentence  contains  neither  a  complement  nor a 
modifier,  as  in  example  (542)  below.  In  contrast,  due  to  ALLER's  lack  of intrinsic 
localization  at  an  end-point,  when there  is  neither a  locative  complement  nor  a  modifier 
describing a property of movement, information provided by the sentence is  insufficient to 
lead to  a reading involving dynamic orientation toward localization at a spatial point. Thus, 
use of ALLER without such a complement or modifier is unacceptable, as shown in (543). In 
order for this sentence to be made acceptable, we minimally require some element expressing 
localization.  As  shown in (544), this can be accomplished by adding the maximally general 
locative Y. This follows naturally from Y's semantic content: Y expresses localization, for it 
is semantically equivalent to À + LE. 
(542)  Are you going ta the concert?- Y  es, J'rn going. 
(543)  Vas-tu au concert?- *Oui, je vais. 
(544)  Vas-tu au concert?- Oui, j'y vais. 
As pointed out by Lamarche (1998) and as  shown in (545) through (547), ALLER contrasts 
with  VENIR  on  this  point, for  the  latter can appear acceptably without a  complement or 
modifier in the 'motion' use. The reason for this difference is that the deictic center is much 
narrower  in  its  potential  reference  than  the  anti-deictic  center.  In  a  context  supporting a 
motion reading, VENIR makes it much easier than ALLER to pick out the proper referent for 
the end-point of the  movement among all of the potential possibilities: the end-point is  'a 
point that is accessible to the SC', and in any given spatial situation, the number of  points that 196 
can be  considered spatially accessible to  the SC are quite limited in number.  In contrast to 
this,  the  spatial  points  qualifying  as  potential  referents  for  w (i.e.  ali  points  that  are  not 
spatially accessible to  the SC)  are virtually infinite in number.  Renee, we  can arrive at the 
intended interpretation of R('Jean', o)  as  localization of Jean at a spatial point more easily_ 
than  we  can  for  R('Jean',  w),  making  it possible  to  obtain  the  motion  sense  without  an 
explicitly mentioned destination for VENIR but not for ALLER. 
(545)  Est-ce Fred vient au concert?- Oui,  il vient. 
(  546)  Viens! 
(547)  *Va! (Vas-y!) 
Note  that  this  difference  between English  and  French is  indeed  due  to  the  difference  in 
semantic content between GO and ALLER, and not to a rule conceming ellipsis. Thus, while 
sorne  may claim that in (542) above the destination expression has  undergone ellipsis, the 
acceptability of (548) shows clearly that the absence of a destination complement is possible 
without  a  previously  mentioned  destination,  and  thus  without  ellipsis.  Once  again,  this 
sentence's  direct  French  translation  (549)  is  unacceptable  because  of the  absence  of an 
element providing localization
103
. 
103  Note  that  Lamarche  (1998,  p.  194-200)  argues  against  a  lexical  solution  to  this  problem, 
hypothesizing instead that GO  and ALLER have identical semantic content. This author suggests that 
the contrast in the omissibility of the complement is due to grammar, in particular, to an asymmetry in 
the  verbal morphology of French and English.  However,  he  does  not  indicate which morphological 
properties are responsible and how the alleged cross-linguistic difference in ellipsis might follow from 
them. Moreover, while he points to contrasts in the pairs BE/ÊTRE and STA  Y/RESTER to support his 
hypothesis, I can think of very few other English/French pairs that exhibit this kind of contrast. If the 
source of this cross-linguistic asymmetry were indeed grammatical, we would expect the contrast to be 
manifested  systematically  across  a  wide  variety  of verbs.  Hence,  a  grammatical  solution  for  this 
difference between English and French appears dubious. 197 
(548)  Keep your hands inside the car while it is going! 
(549)  *Garde tes mains à l'intérieur de la voiture pendant qu'elle va! 
In (542) above, the destination of motion is  provided by discourse.  When GO  is  used in a 
motion context without a complement, and when there  is  no  obvious destination available 
from discourse or background knowledge, weinfer that there is sorne potentially identifiable 
destination location due to GO's intrinsic localization component. The omission of an explicit 
element identifying this destination, together with the fact that it is not readily available from 
discourse, has the effect of backgrounding the destination in the situation being presented. 
This backgrounding of the destination is  reinforced in (548)  by the  use of the  progressive 
aspect, which focuses  on a  subpart of the  event and bence takes  focus  off of the  event's 
temporal boundaries. 
When background knowledge indicates that some movement is to take place (for example, in 
the context of a race) but has not yet occurred at reference time, as  in (550) and (551), theo 
the  notion  of a  motion  event  is  presupposed.  This  background  knowledge  brings  us  to 
interpret the omission of the  destination in the  sentence as  placing emphasis  on transition 
from astate ofnon-movement to astate ofmovement. Consequently, we obtain a 'beginning 
of movement'  reading. As  shown in (552)  and  (553),  because ALLER lacks  the  intrinsic 
notion of localization at an end point, the verb does not have the necessary content to supply 
the idea of an unmentioned but identifiable spatial destination, so the French counterpatis of 
these  sentences  are  unacceptable.  Predictably,  when  the  general  element  Y  expressing 
localization is  added to  fulfill  this  function, this  semantic use becomes  possible (example 
(554)). (550)  On your mark, get set, go! 
(551)  Go when the light turns green. 
(552)  *À  vos marques, prêts, allez!  (Instead: A  vos marques, prêts, partez!) 
(553)  *Va quand le feu est vert.  (Instead: Pars quand le feu est vert.) 
(554)  Vas-y : le feu est vert 1 
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Altematively, the absence of an explicit destination can lead to a 'departure' reading. In (555) 
below, the absence of a destination plu·ase once again has  the effect of backgrounding the 
notion of  destination. However, since this sentence would typically be uttered in a situation in 
which the hearer knows the speaker's location at utterance time, the source location is known 
information. In addition, elements of the discursive context (in the present case, the sentence 
ft is late and the modal must) attribute urgency to the motion event. This urgency, combined 
with the focus  on the  point of depa1iure  resulting from the  backgrounding of destination, 
yields a reading in which GO describes departure from whatever location X occupies at the 
reference time. Once again, ALLER can also express this 'departure' interpretation, but only 
provided that the general locative Y is used. 
(555)  ft is late. 1 really must go. 
(556)  *Il est tard. Je dois vraiment *();) aller. 
(557)  Il faut vraiment que j'  *(y) aille. 
Before closing this discussion of the 'motion' use of GO and ALLER, I would like to point 
out several related  uses.  In the  sentences  examined  so  far  in the present section,  the  end 
localization (intrinsically expressed by GO and provided via À  in the case of ALLER)  is 
interpreted as  X's being physically  located at a point in space.  This  physical construal of 
localization is due to  the way mobile objects like people establish localization relations with 
large,  immobile entities such as cities.  In sentences  like  (558), world knowledge rules  out 
such a reading. However, a human's eyes can be used metonymically to refer to vision as in 199 
(559). Moreover, vision involves a point of focus that we can locate in space, and whenever 
we move our eyes, this point also moves. Therefore, GO in (558) is most naturally interpreted 
as expressing 'shift of gaze' 
104
. 
(558)  My eyes went to the far side of  the room,  where 1 had heard a sudden noise. 
(559)  Keep your eyes on that suspiciousfellow. 
Another non-movement sense that shares characteristics with a prototypical motion reading 
involves Internet navigation. As shown for COME and VENIR, when the destination phrase 
refers to  a website, knowledge about this entity rules out a relation of physical localization, 
and instead, we interpret the sentence as describing vüiual navigation resulting in localization 
at a  website.  On the  other hand,  unlike  web  navigation,  which  occurs  purely in a  virtual 
space, the reading of a printed document is more anchored in physical space. Thus, in order 
to  express orientation toward consultation of a printed text, we require greater support from 
the components in the sentence. Because GO  expresses end-localization more directly than 
ALLER (the latter getting localization only via À), a 'document consultation' use is easier to 
obtain for GO than for ALLER, as  shown in (562) and (563). 
(560)  He went to the store 's website to check the priee of  the product. 
(561)  Allez au/sur le site web pour obtenir les informations dont vous avez besoin. 
(562)  One must go to the original documents for an account of  the colony's early years. 
(Webster 's Third New International) 
(563)  *Nous devons aller aux documents originaux pour trouver les réponses. 
Another  use  involving  a  person's  establishment of a  localization  relation  comparable  to 
spatial  localization  is  'appearance  on a  television/radio  show',  illustrated  in  (564).  Once 
again,  given that this exh·a-linguistic reality is  a less prototypical localization situation, we 
104 Although I am at present unable to full y account for the impossibility of this use for ALLER  (*Mes 
yeux sont allés  à/vers  l'autre côté de  la pièce,  où j'avais entendu un  bruit soudain), the explanation 
quite likely lies in  the fact that ALLER's more general semantic content makes  it more difficult to 
arr~ve at a non-prototypical movement situation such as this one. 200 
require grea ter supp01t from the semantics of the sentence to describe the situation, so GO is 
appropriate, white ALLER is less natural (565). 
(564)  The politician went on the popular television show and declared that he would 
runfor re-election. 
(565)  ?Le politicien est allé à l'émission populaire pour annoncer qu 'il allait se porter 
candidat à la réélection. 
Finally, when the subject of GO  or ALLER refers to a message of sorne kind (an entity that 
inherently oriented from sender to receiver), the orientation is interpreted as 'transmission of 
a message'. This is  because  the most natural way for a message (a mental, communicative 
content)  to  establish  a  localization  relation  with  a  person  is  to  enter  into  the  person's 
possession  and  to  become  the  potential  mental  content of that  person.  Moreover,  in  our 
experience of the world, transmission of a message typically involves transmission between 
two  distinct  physical  locations  (that  of the  sender  and  that  of the  receiver),  bence  the 
resemblance between this  semantic use and  the  prototypical  'motion'  use discussed  in  the 
present section. 
(566)  The email went to everyone in the company. 
(567)  Le courrieZ  est allé à tout le monde au département. 
5.2  Motion + action 
In this section, I discuss uses  of GO and ALLER involving the expression of a motion event 
together with an action. Since the properties of the 'motion + action' uses of GO/ALLER are 
in  large  patt  identical  to  those  of the  'motion  +  action'  uses  of VENIR/COME,  in  the 
following subsections I discuss  cettain aspects  only briefly. There  are three basic, logically 
possible relations between a motion event and an action canied out by  the same agent:  1) 
manner of movement (i.e. the action term specifies  the  manner in which the  movement is 
canied out);  2)  simultaneity  (i.e. the motion event and the action are distinct but coïncide 
temporally);  and 3)  consecutiveness (i.e.  one happens after the other). Moreover, when the 
relation is  one of consecutiveness and it is  the  motion  event that precedes the action,  we 
generally  infer  that  the  action  constitutes  the  very purpose of  the  motion  event.  As  seen 201 
above (section 4.2), this is due to world knowledge about human motion: people generally go 
to places in arder to do specifie things at those places. In English, this notion of pm-pose can 
be expressed explicitly via TO, as in (568) and (569), or it can be inferred when GO and the 
action verb  are  merely linked by the coordinating conjunction AND,  as  in (570)  through 
(571). 
(568)  John went to talk to Paul yesterday. 
(569)  John went to buy sorne bread. 
(570)  Go and help them set the table. 
(571)  John went and helped them set the table. 
Because ALLER does not contain localization, there must be a destination complement in 
arder for  these  uses  to  be  acceptable.  This  is  shawn in  the  following:  the direct  French 
translations of (568) through (571)  involving a  POUR-purpose-adjunct or ET-coordination 
are unacceptable, but the addition of  a locative complement makes them acceptable. 
(572)  *Hier Jean est allé pour parler avec Paul. 
(573)  Hier Jean est allé au bureau de Paul  pour lui parler. 
(574)  *Jean est allé pour acheter du pain. 
(575)  Jean est allé à l'épicerie pour acheter du pain. 
(576)  *Va et aide-les à mettre la table. 
(577)  Va dans la cuisine et aide-les à mettre la table. 
(578)  *Jean est allé et les a aidés à mettre la table. 
(579)  Jean est allé dans la cuisine et les a aidés à mettre la table. 
Note that the construction GO/ALLER+ TO/POUR can receive a different reading, one that 
is acceptable for both verbs (at least in the infonnal register). When the INF itself denotes an 
action involving  movement and  contextual information indicates that  this  intended action 
ends up not occurring,  as  in (580) and (581), we obtain a situation in which an orientation 
toward  a  movement  action begins  but  is  not fully  realized.  Thus, rather than interpreting 202 
GO/ALLER as  describing  a  change  of location ending  at  a  destination,  we  interpret X's 
interrupted orientation as X's merely beginning the action or unde1iaking steps that normally 
lead up  to  this action. Indeed, these sentences are acceptable even if the  subject does  not 
change location at all but only canies out anticipat01y movements such as reaching for a door 
handle.  Crucially, the reason that this 'umealized motion' use is possible for ALLER is that 
the notion of destination is not provided by the main verb, but rather by the lNF that directly 
applies to the end-relation in ALLER's semantic structure. 
(580)  She goes to get out of  the car, but then she changes her mind. 
(581)  Elle va pour sortir de l'auto, puis elle change d'idée. 
In addition to  general means available for constructing a 'motion + action'  situation (means 
which are not attributable to  the semantics of these verbs in pa1ticular and which are thus 
available  to  motion  verbs  in  general),  specifie  properties  of  the  invariant  semantic 
representations of GO and ALLER lead to additional ways to express 'motion + action': 1) 
through a destination complement PP; 2)  through progredience; and 3) through the use of a 
present pmiiciple. In the following subsections, 1 examine these different constructions one 
by  one,  showing  how  the  specifie  type  of  reading  obtained  in  each  case  emerges 
compositionally  from  the  combined  information  provided  by  the  verb's  arguments,  by 
grammar and by background knowledge. 
5.2.1  GO/ALLER + destination PP 
If the PP complement of GO or ALLER refers to  a location that is sh·ongly associated in our 
world knowledge with a specifie activity
105
,  this leads to the inference that the motion event 
bas as  its  goal and  effective outcome the accomplishment of an activity at the destination 
105  See Vandeloise (1991, p. 173-184), who discusses this type ofmetonymy with complements ofthe 
localization preposition À. 203 
location, as in (582) and (583)
106
, whose meanings are represented schematically in (584) and 
(585), respectively. In other words, given world knowledge about the salient link between the 
location and the activity carried out at that location, sentences like these can be interpreted 
metonymically as describing 'motion followed by an activity'. 
(582)  Mary  goes  to  school/church/the  theater/the  cinema/the  doctor 's  office/the  hair 
salon/the store every week. 
(583)  Marie  va  à  l'école/à  l'église/au  théâtre/au  cinéma/chez  le  médecin/chez  le 
coiffeur/à l'épicerie chaque semaine. 
(584)  'Mary' 
(585) 
------+  L ('Mary', w) 
'Marie' 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
'school, church, the thea  ter, etc.' 
--------.  R ('Marie', w) 
'l'école, l'église, le théâtre, etc.' 
When the destination PP complement of ALLER refers not to a spatial location, but rather to 
a resource (such as food or infmmation) as  in (586) and (587), we infer that the end relation 
is  one  where  the  subject  ends  up  at a  certain  location  where  he  obtains  the  resource  in 
question
107
•  The absence of this use  in English, shown by the  unacceptability of (588) and 
106  Note that in sorne cases in English (e.g. goes to  school,  to  church), the metonymie construal of a 
location  as  the  activity  accomplished  at  this  location  is  further  reinforced  by  the  absence  of a 
determiner, a syntactic context that forces a non-count (i.e. mass) construal of the no un, a reading that 
is more compatible with an activity than a location. 
107 The examples aller à 1  'esturgeon, aux asperges, aux provisions, au bois, à 1  'eau,  aux nouvelles,  aux 
informations given by the  Grand Robert de  la langue française are further illustrations of this  same 
use. 204 
(589) , is presumably due either to semantic differences between À and TO orto differences 
between semantic properties of  the French and English determiner system. 
(586)  Nous allons aux fraises ce week-end. 
(587)  Jean  et  Marie  ne  connaissent  pas  bien  cette  ville,  donc  ils  sont  allés  aux 
renseignements. 
(588)  *We are going ta (the) strawberries this weekend. 
(589)  *John and Mary don 't know this city very well, sa they went to (the)  information. 
On the other band, sin  ce English GO allows omission of the destination complement (due to 
its  intrinsic  localization  component),  it  can  be  combined  with  a  FOR-phrase  expressing 
purpose in arder to express a similar situation, as in (590) and (591). ALLER, which does not 
allow omission of the destination complement in a motion situation, cannot appear in this use 
(shown in (592) and (593)). 
(590)  We are goingfor strawberries this weekend. 
(591)  John and Mary don't know this city weil, so they have gonefor information. 
(592)  *Nous allons pour des fraises ce week-end. 
(593)  *Jean et Marie sont allés pour des renseignements. 
However, due to  the difference in the elements that enter into the composition, this English 
construction (GO  +  FOR +  NP)  is  not  completely  equivalent  to  the  French  construction 
(ALLER+ AUX + N).  In the case of the French construction, since the NP referring to the 
resource  is  part of the  destination phrase  introduced  by  the  localizer À,  it  is  interpreted 
metonyrnically as  the location at which the resource in  question is to be acquired. Moreover, 
the fact that the resource  is  expressed as  a destination depicts the  activity of obtaining the 
resource as a goal in itself: in sentence (586) above, it is the act of picking strawberries (and 
not merely the strawberries themselves) that constitutes the goal of the movement. In contrast 
to  this,  in  the  English  construction  GO  +  FOR +  NP  does  not  depict  the  resource  as  a 
destination; instead, this construction receives an 'errand' reading in which the main goal is 
simply to  obtain the resource. That is, since no  localization relation is  established with the 
expression referring to this resource, there is nothing to support the inference that the activity 205 
constitutes a goal in itself (  e.g. strawberry-picking as a leisure activity rather than strawberry-
buying as a ch  ore). 
When the destination TOI  À-phrase refers to a person and elements of the context suggest an 
activity involving that person, we interpret the destination phrase metonymically as referring 
to  the person's location, and the activity (i.e. the interaction) is  infeued to  take place at that 
location. This  is  the case for sentences such as  (594)  and (595), where the elements ta  tell 
hi  m  ...  and pour lui dire  ...  indicate a communication act, a type of interaction prototypically 
involving face-to-face interaction and thus  spatial localization at the same point.  However, 
since  ALLER's  meaning  contains  no  localization  component,  this  verb  requires  richer 
context than GO in order to  obtain this reading. Thus, when no explicit mention is made of 
the type of interaction to  take place, the use is acceptable for GO, but marginal for ALLER, 
as shown in (596) and (597). This is true even when an element of  context indirectly suggests 
the type of  interaction to take place: (598) is fine, while (599) is not
108
. 
108  Note  that  in  English, when no  lexical element specifies the  type of interaction, we infer that the 
latter is  communication, the most frequent type of face-to-face interpersonal interaction according to 
our world  knowledge.  Note also  that French does  exhibit certain expressions of the type ALLER + 
AUX + N  in  which  the N  refers  to  a persan (  e.g.  aller  aux femmes,  aux danseuses  [Québ.}).  The 
interpretation obtained for this construction is  on a par with the 'resource' use seen above (e.g. aller 
aux fraises):  the  referent  of N  is  depicted  as  a  "resource",  and  the  activity  at  the  end-location  is 
inferred from context and/or world knowledge. 206 
(594)  I will go to the prince to tell him what I have heard. 
(595)  Et  je vais de ce pas au Prince pour lui dire ... (Molière, cited in the Grand Robert 
de la langue française) 
(596)  I will go to the prince immediate/y. 
(597)  *J 'irai au prince ùnmédiatement. 
(598)  If  you need advice, you should go to John. 
(599)  *Si tu as besoin de conseils,  tu devrais aller à Jean. 
Finally, when the PP complement of GO and ALLER refers not to an entity but to an action, 
as in (600) and (601), the sentence expresses that the subject's referent establishes a relation 
of localization  with  an  action.  Given  our  knowledge  that  hurnan  movement  is  typically 
oriented toward the accomplishrnent of actions, and given that many actions require a prior 
movement before they can begin (e.g. one must typically travet a ce1tain distance in order to 
engage  in  war),  for  sentences  like  (600)  through  (602)  we  infer  that  X  undergoes  a 
movement, that the action referred to  by the destination PP is the goal of the movement, and 
that the action occurs at the destination location of this movement. Note that in the case of  go 
to  war, if the subject refers  to  a country instead of a person, a 'motion + action' reading is 
ruled out by world knowledge: unlike people, countries cannot undergo change of location. 
Thus, instead, for a sentence like  Germany went to  war with Russia,  we obtain an  abstract 
'change of state' use in which the NP war is interpreted as  a state. As 1 show in section 5.5, 
such  a  use  is  possible  for  GO  + TO + NP, but not for  ALLER + À  + NP,  whence  the 
unacceptability of*  L 'Allemagne est allée à la guerre avec la Russie. 
(600)  John does not want to go to war. 
(  601)  Jean ne veut pas aller à la guerre. 
(602)  Jean va au combat/à la chasse. 
Finally,  while certain activities  (e.g. guerre, chasse) typically require that the traveling take 
place before the movement event, other nouns (e.g. walk, cruise,pèlerinage) denote activities 
that are motion events themselves.  When GO/ALLER's PP complement contains the latter 
type of noun,  we therefore infer that the motion event and the activity are part of a single 207 
event: the noun is taken as describing the nature of the movement itself. In this case, the basic 
destination locative preposition (TO/  À) is  no  longer used, since the PP does not refer to  the 
destination of the movement
109
. 
(603)  Let 's go for a walk. 
(604)  My parents are going on a cruise. 
(605)  Aller en pèlerinage, en ambassade,  en conquête 
5.2.2  Progredience: GO/ALLER+ bare INF 
As  with COME and VENIR (see section 4.2.1), when GO  and ALLER are followed by an 
infinitive adjunct, the latter is taken to provide information about the end relation encoded in 
the main verb's semantics (Land R, respectively). For example, in sentences (606) and (607), 
the INF déjeuner describes the relation R contained in ALLER's meaning, as schematized in 
(608),  and  this  yields  a  situation  paraphrasable  as:  'Jean  is/will  be  oriented  toward 
establishing sorne relation with w via the action eat brealifast'. 
(606)  Jean va déjeuner. 
(607)  Jean ira déjeuner. 
(608)  'Jean' 
-------.R('Jean',w) 
'eat lunch' 
The precise type of  relation established between Jean, a mobile, concrete entity, and the point 
w is inferred from background and world knowledge.  Since w is not intrinsically spatial, but 
rather merely  'a point other th an  the (  abstract) deictic center', sentence  (  606)  allows  more 
109 The cross-linguistic difference in choice of  preposition (FOR/ON vs. EN, the latter ofwhich takes a 
determinerless  complement)  is  most  likely  attributable  to  semantic  properties  of the  prepositions 
themselves. The explanation for this difference therefore goes beyond the scope of the present study. 208 
than one construal. For example, if w is  interpreted as  being a point in time, we obtain the 
'future'  use discussed in  section 5.9  below. If it is  taken to  be a spatial point, we obtain a 
situation in  which Jean establishes a relation with a location  via the action 'eat breakfast'. 
Sentence  (607),  in  which  ALLER  is  in  the  future  tense,  rules  out  a  'future'  reading  of 
ALLER (due  to  the  redundancy  that  such  a reading  would  involve),  so  the  most  natural 
interpretation  is  one  where  w is  a  point in  space.  And  given  our knowledge  of the  way 
mobile, concrete entities behave in the real world, the most natural way for such an entity to 
relate to a spatial point via an action is to perform that action at the spatial point in question. 
Thus,  for  (607)  we  obtain  the  'progredience'  reading,  in  which  the  subject's  referent 
undergoes movement and then canies out the action denoted by the INF at the destination of 
this movement. 
Note that this  progredience reading,  which involves  a movement situation, is  obtained for 
sentences  like  (606)  and  (607)  despite  the  fact  that  they  contain  no  element  expressing 
localization at an end-point. This is  because the action expressed by the INF, together with 
the fact  that the subject refers  to  a volitional and  self-propelled  entity, provides  sufficient 
information to  nanow down  the  set  of possible referents  for  w:  there  are  only  a  limited 
number of imaginable ways  for  such  an  entity  to  establish  a relation with  a point via an 
action,  and spatial localization at such a point is  one of these.  In  contrast, as  seen earlier, 
when ALLER is followed by no  complement (such as  the destination complement in  (609)) 
or adjunct (such  as  the  INF  in  the  progredience construction or  vite  in  (610))  favoring  a 
motion interpretation, the set of possibilities is tao broad, and the sentence is unacceptable, as 
in (611). 
(609)  Jean va au marché. 
(610)  Jean va vite. 
(611)  *Jean va. 
As  for  English  GO,  when it  is  followed by an INF  as  in  (612), this  INF  applies  to  GO's 
lexically  encoded  end  relation  (localization),  and  we  once  again  obtain  a  progredience 
reading.  However,  because the  formation  of the  complex  event  involved  in progredience 
hinges  on the INF's expressing a "verbal virtuality" (Damourette and  Pichon,  1911-1950, 209 
#1055, as  cited by Bouchard, 1995, p. 130) and thus on non-effective reference of the end-
relation (Bouchard, 1995, p. 135), progredience becomes impossible when GO has a locative 
complement, for the latter specifies L and thus forces effective reference of this end relation 
(example (613))
110
• In contrast, the presence of a locative complement in the case of ALLER 
does  not force  effective reference  of a localization component, since  ALLER contains  no 
such component. Thus,  the acceptability of progredience is not affected by the presence of a 
locative, as shown in (614). 
(612)  John will go eat breakfast. 
(613)  *John will go to the restaurant eat breakfast. 
(614)  Jean ira au restaurant manger un gros déjeuner. 
Since in the progredience conshuction the INF describing a "verbal vütuality" directly bears 
on a subpart of GO/ALLER's meaning, realization of the motion event entails realization of 
the INF action. Th  us, we cannot affirm the f01mer wh ile implying the negation of the latter. 
(615)  *Jean ira dîner avec ses amis, mais il ne mangera rien. 
(616)  *John will go dine with his friends, but he won 't eat anything. 
Finally, because progredience is  based on the fusion of the two events into a single complex 
event,  and  because  it  is  the  bare  INF  form  that  appears  in  the  English  progredience 
construction (see section 4.2.1 ),  the distributional restrictions of the  latter also  apply to  the 
main verb GO.  As a result, a progredience use is possible only when GO is itself in the bare 
infinitive  fonn preceded  by  a  modal  (617)  or  future  marker  (617),  or  when  it  is  in  the 
imperative  (619/
11
•  In  all  other contexts  (e.g.  (620)  and  (621)),  progredience  for  GOis 
11 0  The  sentence John  will go  eat at  the  restaurant  is,  of course,  fine,  because  the  locative  PP  is 
syntactically dependent on the INF rather than on GO. 
111  Recall that 1 am assuming that the English bare INF and imperative - which are formally identical 
and which both express irrealis - are two functional manifestations of  a single underlying grammatical 
element. 210 
impossible. In contrast, since French INF has much broader distributional propetiies, no such 
constraint appears on the progredience use of  ALLER (as shown in (622) through (624)). 
(617)  John intends to/can/must/shouldletc. go buy some bread. (Modal+ INF) 
(618)  John will go buy some bread. (Future) 
(  619)  Go buy some bread! (Imperative) 
(620)  *John goes buy(s) some bread. (Present indicative) 
(621)  *John went buy(bought) some bread. (Past indicative) 
(622)  Jean va/est allé/ira acheter du pain. (Presentlpastlfuture indicative) 
(623)  Va acheter du pain! (Imperative) 
(624)  Il entend/peut/doit/devrait/etc. aller acheter du pain. (Modal+ INF) 
Before moving on, it should be noted that since the 'motion with pm-pose' reading hinges on 
our assumption that human motion is  directed toward the realization of actions, it cannot be 
obtained if the subject is  an inanimate entity, i.e.  an element which is incapable of intention 
and  whose  movements  through  space  cannot  be  considered  to  be  directed  at  the 
accomplishment of a goal.  Thus,  while the  basic motion sentence  (625)  is  acceptable,  the 
progredience sentence (626) is not (cf. Bouchard, 1995, p.  130-135, for an alternative account 
of  the animacy constraint on progredience). 
(  625)  1 don 't want the ball to go over the fence. 
(626)  *1 don 't want the ball togo hit the neighbor on the head. 
5.2.3  GO/ALLER+ V-ing/en V-ant 
1 now turn to  another possible way to use GO  to  express a 'motion + action'  situation:  the 
construction GO + V  -ing.  The asymmetly noted for COME and VENIR also a  pp lies to GO 
and ALLER: due to  differences inherent in the English and French present participles, when 
used as  modifiers  of a  verb,  the  ALLER +  EN +  V -ant construction has  more restricted 211 
interpretational possibilities than its English counterpart. I therefore discuss the two verbs in 
turn, starting with GO. 
Because a present participle flll1ctions  as  a modifier, when it is  adjoined to the verb GO  it 
applies predicatively  to  GO's meaning.  Crucially, a modifier can apply either to  the whole 
meaning  of its  argument  or  to  a  subpa1i  of the  latter.  When  background  and  contextual 
knowledge favors  ari  interpretation where  V-ing  applies  to  the whole meaning of GO,  we 
obtain a 'mmmer-of-movement' reading, as in (627), whose meaning is schematized in (628). 
When, instead, context brings us to interpret the V-ing as  applying to only a subpart of GO's 
meaning- namely, to  the end-relation L  (X, w)  - we obtain a reading in  which  the  V-ing 
ascribes  a  property  to  X's localization at  w.  Thus,  in  sentence  (629),  whose  meaning  is 
represented in (630), the resulting compositional meaning is:  'John underwent movement to a 
location other than the SC's location, and at that location, he undertook the action of fishing'. 
Furthennore,  given  our  default  assumption  that  volitional  human  movement  is  aimed  at 
carrying out an action at the destination location, we infer that the action 'fishing' constitutes 
the purpose of the  motion event being expressed.  Thus, rather than a  'manner of motion' 
reading, sentence (629) receives a 'motion with pmpose' reading. 
(627)  When the waiter tripped, the plates wentjlying. 
(628)  'the plates' 
--------+  L ('plates', w) 
---------------------------------
(629)  John went fishing yesterday. 
(630)  'John' 
1 
1 
1 
'flying' 
--------+  L ('John', w) 
'fishmg' ~-------------------------------------------------------------------------~------
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As  shown  for  COME,  when  context  and/or  background  support  both  interpretational 
possibilities, the sentence is ambiguous, as in (631) and (632). The first reading is obtained if 
we interpret the  V-ing as  modifying GO's semantics as  a whole, while the second reading 
results from interpreting V-ing as modifying only the end-relation L. 
(631)  John  went  running  (when  he  heard  the  explosion  nearby).  ('manner  of 
movement') 
(632)  John  went running (at  the park in  arder to  get some  exercise).  ('motion with 
purpose') 
The  'motion with pw-pose'  use  exhibits  severa!  constraints,  all  of which  follow  from  the 
interaction between the V-ing modifier and GO's L component. First, since the motion event 
and the action event form a complex event, it is  impossible to affirm one while implying the 
negation of  the other. 
(633)  *John went jogging yesterday,  but due to  the rain,  he ended up not running at 
al!. 
In addition, as shown above (section 4.2.1 ), wh en the localization relation L is specified via 
an explicit locative complement, L has effective reference, which prevents the "fusion" of the 
two verbs' meanings into a single complex event, a condition required to obtain the 'motion 
with purpose' reading. Thus, while (634) is ambiguous between a 'manner ofmovement' and 
a 'motion with purpose' reading, the addition of a locative complement of GO in (635) makes 
the sentence incompatible with a 'motion with pw-pose'  reading. This fwther explains why 
(636) is  odd:  according to  our world knowledge, 'fishing' is  not construable as a manner of 
movement. When the locative is dependent on the  V-ing rather than on GO, as in (637), the 
sentence is fully acceptable, for in this case the complement provides  information about the 
action 'fishing' rather than directly specifying the reference of GO's semantic component L. 
The fact that we intet-pret this locative as specifyir:g the destination of the movement itself is 
the  result of inference:  if 'fishing'  takes  place  at  the  location  'at the  lake', and  'fishing' 
modifies  the  end-relation L expressed in  GO's meaning,  we  infer that the  location 'at the 
lake' is  identical to the destination of the movement event. Crucially, this knowledge is not 
the  result  of a  direct  structural  relation  between  the  complement  at the  lake  and  GO's 
component L, so no element in the sentence forces effective reference of  L. 213 
(634)  John  went running.  (Ambiguous: The action 'running' is  the manner of John's 
movement vs. the action 'running occurs at the destination of  John's movement.) 
(635)  John went to the park running.  ('manner of movement' only) 
(636)  ?  ?  John went to the lake fishing. 
(  63 7)  John went fishing at the lake. 
Furthermore,  since  the  'motion with purpose'  reading  results  from  V-ing  modifying GO's 
end-relation L,  V-ing  can constitute  an acceptable answer to  a where-question,  a question 
which normal! y ca lis for an answer consisting of a location. 
(638)  -A: Where did Mary go? 
-B: Shopping/jogging/etc. 
Although the 'motion with pm-pose'  reading results from  V-ing modifying L rather than the 
entire semantic content of GO, this modifier nonetheless applies to  a subpart of the motion 
event. Thus, the present participle must itself describe an action that involves some kind of 
internai change of location, as  in (639). If the participle is  a verb that expresses no internai 
movement, it  is  incongruous as  a modifier of a subpart of the motion event, so the verbs in 
(640)  are  unacceptable.  In  example  (641),  the  patiiciple  verb  drinking,  although  not 
intrinsically  encoding  change  of location,  is  nonetheless  compatible  with  a  change-of-
location construal (i.e. John visited more than one bar), so the sentence is acceptable. 
(639)  John  went  running/swimming/jishing/shopping/hunting/apple-picking/dancing/ 
bowling/ice-skating. 
(640)  *John went playing chess/standing at the corner/reading a book. 
(  641)  John went drinking fast night. 
In contrast,  the progredience construction is  compatible both with movement actions  (642) 
and  non-movement  actions  (643).  This  is  because  unlike  the  present  participle,  which 
expresses a process and th us necessarily a  pp  lies to part of  the GO-event itself, the INF carries 
no aspectual propetiies. Renee, unlike the present participle, the INF adjunct can describe the 
end-state resulting from the movement event. 214 
(642)  John  will  go  run  (at  the  park)lswim  (at  the  pool)!.fish  (at  the  lake)/shop 
(downtown). 
(643)  John will go play chess/stand at the corner/read a book/drink at his favorite bar. 
Tmning  now  to  ALLER,  we  fi nd  two  differences  with  respect  to  the  GO  +  V  -ing 
construction.  First,  whereas  GO  contains  localization  and  therefore  requires  no  locative 
complement,  ALLER  contains  no  localization  and  therefore  requires  the  presence  of a 
locative complement in order to explicitly identify the destination of the orientation and th us 
bring about the necessary conditions for a motion construal. Thus, while (644) is acceptable, 
its direct translation in (645) is not. The same observation holds for (646) and (647). 
(644)  John went running. 
(645)  *Jean est allé en courant. 
(646)  The plates wentflying. 
(647)  *Les assiettes sont allées en volant. 
A second difference follows from a grammatical asymmetry between English and French. As 
we saw in examples (273) and (275) (section 4.2.2), when the French present participle (the 
"gérondif') is used to modify a verb rather than a whole clause, it is preceded by EN. Since 
the  latter expresses containment, a relation that is  temporally equivalent to  simultaneity, the 
construction EN + V  -ant necessarily expresses a situation in which the  main verb event is 
contained within the  temporal boundaries of the  event expressed by the  pmiiciple verb.  In 
other words, given the semantic properties of the French "gérondif' conshuction, while EN 
V-ant  can  be  interpreted  as  applying  to  the  whole  of ALLER's  meaning,  it  cannot  be 
interpreted as applying on! y to a subpart of  the event described by ALLER. Hence, ALLER + 
EN + V-ant can be used with a 'manner of movement' reading, as in (648), but not with a 
'motion with pmpose' reading, as in (649). 
(648)  Jean est allé à l'école en courant. 
(649)  *Jean est allé au lac en pêchant. 
To conclude, in the present section I have shown that while both GO and ALLER can express 
'motion + action',  they  differ in  the  way they accomplish  this  and in  the  constraints that 215 
apply. On the one band, both verbs can be linked to a second verb expressing an action using 
an explicit connector such as  an element expressing pm-pose  (TO/POUR) or a coordinating 
conjunction  (AND/ET).  On  the  other  band,  while  both  vcrbs  can  express  'motion  with 
pm-pose' via a progredience construction, due to  the difference in semantics between these 
two  verbs (i.e. nature of the  end relation)  GO  is  subject to  restrictions that do  not apply to 
ALLER.  Finally,  these verbs  show two main differences with respect to  the  expression of 
'motion + action' using a present participle. First, white GO requires no locative complement 
(and  indeed  is  incompatible  with  such a  complement in the  'motion with  pm-pose'  use), 
ALLER requires such a complement due  to  the absence of a localization component in  its 
own semantic structure.  Second,  because  the  element EN in the  French present participle 
construction imposes  a temporal  containment relation on the  sentence  (in which the  main 
verb event is  contained with the bounds of the participle verb event), ALLER, like GO, can 
express  'manner of movement',  white  only  GO  can  be  used  with  a present participle  to 
express 'motion with a pm-pose'. 
5.3  Static spatial extension 
When the  referent  of GO/ALLER's subject is  a  mobile  concrete  entity,  the  most natural 
reading is a motion situation. However, when the subject's referent is a concrete entity that is 
immobile and possesses considerable extent/length in space, the most natural construal of the 
orientation is a static one rather than a dynarnic one. The compositionalmeaning obtained for 
sentences (650) and (651) is schematized in (652) and (653), respectively. 
(650)  Cette route va à Montréal. 
(  651)  This raad goes ta Montreal. 
(652)  'this road' 
-------•  L ('this road', m) 
'Montreal' 216 
(653)  'this road' 
---- - ---.  R ('this road', ffi) 
'Montreal' 
In these sentences, the  locative PP TO/À-Montreal specifies the  end relation component in 
GO/ALLER's meaning. The noun Montreal is  taken to  specify the reference of the constant 
ffi, leading us  to construe the latter as  a location in spacc. Moreover, since ffi is 'a point other 
than the deictic center', and since the spatially construed deictic center re fers  to  the location 
occupied by a Subject of Consciousness, Montreal is identified as being a location other than 
the  location  of the ·  SC.  Finally,  given  world  knowledge  about  the  properties  of roads  -
namely,  the fact that they are immobile and possess considerable spatial extent - the most 
natural interpretation for  these sentences is: 'This road extends through space to  the city of 
Montreal, a location that is distinct from the location of an SC (  e.g. the speaker or hearer)'. 
Just as  ALLER's lack of a localization component prevents it from  expressing movement 
without an explicit complement or modifier to  supply the notion of localization or another 
property of movement (as  shown in  (654)),  we  find  the  same  impossibility for  the  static 
spatial extension use when ALLER is followed by no complement (655). 
(654)  *Je vois une voiture qui va. 
(655)  *Cette route va. 
In addition,  under the  assumption  that the  phenomenon of static  spatial  extension  is  less 
salient in human experience than movement, we can expect the 'static spatial extent' use to 
require  greater support from  contextual or  background knowledge  in  order to  be  obtained 
than is  the case for  a 'motion' reading.  Thus, as  we  saw for  COME, GO  cam1ot receive  a 
static spatial extension reading when there is  no  destination complement, while the absence 
of  such a complement does not prevent us from aiTiving at a motion reading. 217 
(656)  *This raad cames/goes. 
(657)  That caris coming/going. 
Unlike VENIR and COME, verbs for which the presence of a source-phrase suffi ces to obtain 
the  spatial extension use,  the  inclusion of such  a complement alone  does  not allow us  to 
obtain  this  sense  for  GO  and  ALLER,  as  shown in  (658)  and  (659). This  is  due  to  the 
difference in the nature of the constant contained in these verbs with respect to  COME and 
VENIR. The deictic center, 'a point that is accessible to a Subject of Consciousness', is mu ch 
narrower in its set of potential referents than is its complement w, defined as  'any point other 
than the deictic center'. 
(658)  *This raad goes from Montreal. 
(659)  *Cette route va de Montréal. 
On the  other band,  a phrase  supplying the  notion of path (a salient property of immobile 
entities which have considerable extent in space, such as roads) compensates for the absence 
of a destination PP for  GO, as  shown in (660). In contrast with this,  since ALLER contains 
no  end-localization component and thus does  ~ot imply a starting point (a notion needed to 
obtain a static spatial extension reading, as shown in section 4.3), even the inclusion of a path 
phrase is insufficient to  produce a fully acceptable 'spatial extension' sentence, as  shown in 
(661). 
(  660)  The raad goes through the forest. 
(661)  ??La route va à travers la forêt. 
When the subject refers to an entity that possesses considerable extent along more than one 
dimension (i.e.  X is  not just long but also wide), this makes it more difficult to construe the 
entity's extent in space in  terms  of orientation along a  single axis.  As  a result,  the  'static 
spatial extension'  reading is  more  difficult to  obtain for  this  kind of subject,  as  shown in 
examples (662)  and (664).  This difficulty can be overcome, however, if a lirnit  expression 218 
such as ALL THE WA  Y or JUSQUE is added, for the notion of 'limit' provides extra support 
for the notion of end-point that is central to the 'static spatial extension' use (examples (663) 
and (665))
112
• 
(  662)  ?  His land goes to the river. 
(663)  His land goes ail the way to the river. 
(664)  *Son terrain va à la rivière. 
(665)  Son terrain vajusqu'à la rivière. 
When the subject of GO refers not to an entity with spatial extent, but rather to  an  ape1iure 
such  as  a  door,  we  obtain  a  reading of 'spatial  access'  rather  'spatial  extension'. For a 
sentence like (666), world knowledge of the subject's referent tells us  that one of its salient 
properties is to provide physical access to  a space, and the most natural way for an aperture 
such as  a door to  be oriented toward a localization relation with a space is  to  be physically 
contiguous to  it.  The complement to the cellar/balcony identifies this space, and the constant 
w further indicates that it is a location other than the location of  the Subject of  Consciousness. 
We infer from this deictic information that the location in question is  inaccessible to  the SC 
at  the  time  of speech.  Putting  this  information  together,  we  obtain  an  overall  meaning 
paraphrasable as:  'This door, by being contiguous with the cellarlbalcony, can provide the SC 
with access to that space'. Note, however, that this use relies to a greater degree on inference 
than  the  more  direct  'spatial  extension'  use  illustrated  above:  we  can  derive  'spatial 
extension'  more  directly  from  the  notion  of abstract  orientation  than  we  can  'providing 
spatial access'. Consequent!  y the verb ALLER, which do es not imply source localization and 
thus requires richer context in order to describe a static spatial situation, cannot be used to 
express 'spatial access', as shown in (667). 
11 2 For a slightly different analysis ofthese facts, cf  Lamarche (1998, p. 62). (666)  That door goes to the cellarlbalcony. 
(667)  *Cette porte va au/sur le balcon/sous-sol. 
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Sin  ce the 'static spatial extension' use of GO and ALLER relies on the static character of the 
entities involved in the situation, this reading cannot be obtained when the complement PP 
refers to  a mobile entity such as a human (examples (668) and (669)). In addition, whereas 
the  French inalienable  dative  constmction makes  it possible  to  define  the  relevant  search 
domain as the body and th us to use a pa1i of the body as the end  point of  the static orientation, 
this  use  is  impossible for  ALLER. This  contrast is  illustrated in  (670)  (a sentence that is 
acceptable for at least sorne speakers) and (671). Even the addition of an explicit lexical item 
indicating measure, which guarantees acceptability for VENIR, does not help with ALLER 
(  examples  (672)  and  (673)).  This  is  because  ALLER  contains  the  anti-deictic  center  w, 
defined as  'a point other than the deictic center'. Since the deictic center is  'a point that is 
accessible to the SC', use of ALLER in this context depicts the end-point of the static spatial 
extension as inaccessible to the SC. In the context of this use, the dative pronoun, by defining 
the search domain for the referent of the end-point PP, identifies the person in question as the 
relevant  SC,  and  we  thus  obtain  a  contradictory  situation:  X's extension is  defined  with 
respect to  the  SC's body but also  depicted as  inaccessible  to  this  SC.  In other words,  the 
situation is depicted simultaneously from the SC's perspective and from a perspective other 
than the SC's, and this contradiction results in the unacceptability seen in (673). 220 
(  668)  *The roadlsidewalklrug goes from/ta John. 
(669)  *La routelle trottoir/le tapis va delà Jean. 
(670)  (?)Jean me vient à l'épaule. 
(671)  *Jean lui va à l'épaule. 
(672)  Son  col  venait  à  la  hauteur  de  ses  oreilles.  (Grand  Robert  de  la  langue 
française) 
(673)  *Son col allait à la hauteur de ses oreilles. 
5.4  Abstract extent 
1 now tum to  the  'abstract extent' class of senses.  As pointed out earlier (see section 3.1), 
magnitude is a domain-independent concept (Walsh, 2003; Bueti and Walsh, 2009), and the 
orientation  component  in  the  semantics  of GO  and  ALLER  is  based  on  this  notion  of 
magnitude (via the concept 'more and more'). This leads to the correct prediction that verbs 
like  GO/  ALLER can  be  used  to  describe  extent  not  only  in  space,  but  also  in  abstract 
domains. When the subject of GO or ALLER is an entity that possesses quantifiable extent in 
sorne abstract domain, we obtain a sense expressing abstract extent rather than spatial extent. 
For  example,  in  (674)  and  (675),  the  subject  salaries/salaires  refers  to  an  abstract, 
quantifiable entity,  and the PP complements identify the source point and end-point of the 
orientation  as  being  specifie  amounts  of money.  Combining  these  arguments  with  the 
semantic representations of GO and ALLER, we obtain the meanings schematized in (676) 
and (677), respectively. (674)  The salaries of  executives go from 100,000 to 200,000 dollars. 
(675)  Les salaires des cadres vont de 100,000 à 200,000 dollars. 
(676)  'salary' 
(677) 
______  ,.... L ('salaty', w) 
'100,000 dollars'  '200,000 dollars' 
'salary' 
--------.  R ('salary', w) 
'100,000 dollars' 
1 
1 
'200,000 dollars' 
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These sentences express that the entity 'salary' hasan orientation between two points, both of 
which  are  arnounts  of money.  According  to  our  extra-linguistic  conceptualization  of 
magnitude,  amounts are naturally  oriented from lesser to greater, a fact  that is  compatible 
with the orientation expressed in these sentences (where the end point is of greater magnitude 
than the source point).  Given that the tense is  the simple present (expressing a state rather 
than an event), this orientation is interpreted as static extension between two points along the 
axis of  monetary amount. We th  us interpret these sentences as characterizing the range within 
which  the  value  of the  subject's  referent  ('salaries')  varies:  the  source  phrase from/de 
100,000 dollars and the end-point phrase toi à 200,000 dollars express the lower and upper 
boundaries of a range in the domain of monetary amounts, and this range is predicated of the 
subject salaries.  The sentence thus expresses that 'the salaries of executives vary within a 
range whose bottom and top limits are 100,000 and 200,000 dollars, respectively'. 
The nature of the entities involved determines the precise abstract domain within which we 
construe the orientation expressed by GO and ALLER. For example, when the arguments are 
temporal,  the  orientation between two points  is  interpreted along the axis of time and we 
ob tain the 'temporal extent' reading illustrated in (678) and (679). Likewise, if  the arguments 222 
are  elements  lying  along  a  scale  of intensity,  such  as  symptoms,  we  obtain  a  'range of 
intensity' reading as in (680) and (681). 
(678)  The period goingfrom 1939 ta 1945  ... 
(679)  La période allant de 1939 à 1945  ... 
(  680)  Symptoms (can) go from ve1y mild  fe  ver ta severe pain. 
(681)  Les  symptômes  peuvent  aller/vont  d'une  très  légère  fièvre  à  des  douleurs 
intenses. 
The notion of a range along some axis of magnitude depends crucially on the idea of a lower 
and  an upper  lirnit, two  delirniting points on this  axis  which serve  to  define the  range.  In 
examples  (674)  to  (681)  above,  the  notions  of both  source  and  end-point  are  explicitly 
provided by PP complements. But when only a TO/À-phrase (examples (682)  to  (687)) or 
only a FROM/DE source-phrase (examples (688) to (693)) is present, the information present 
in the sentence is insufficient to obtain such a reading. 223 
(  682)  *The salaries of  executives go from 100,000 dollars. 
(683)  *Les salaires des cadres vont de 100,000 dollars. 
(684)  *The period  goingfrom 1939 
(685)  *La période allant de 1939 
(686)  *Symptoms (can) go from very mildfever. 
(687)  *Les symptômes peuvent aller/vont d'une très légère fièvre. 
(688)  *The salaries of  executives to 200,000 dollars. 
(689)  *Les salaires des cadres vont à 200,000 dollars. 
(690)  *The period going to 1945 
(  691)  *La période allant à 194  5 
(692)  *Symptoms (can) go to severe pain. 
(693)  *Les symptômes peuvent aller/vont à des douleurs intenses. 
In  such  cases,  additional  contextual  material  is  required  in  order  to  obtain  a  situation of 
abstract extent. This can be done by including a term explicitly providing the notion of extent 
(e.g.  FARTHER, PLUS  LOIN)  or  the related  notion  'limit' (e.g.  UP  TO,  JUSQU'À, AU 
DELÀ DE), as in the following. This additional information compensates for the absence of a 
phrase identifying the  lower bound of the range by placing emphasis on  the other value's 
status as upper limit of  the range. 224 
(694)  The priee of  gas can go up to fhree dollars here. 
(695)  Le prix de l 'essence peut aller jusqu'à trois dollars ici. 
(696)  Our records do  not go farther than the early nineteenth centwy. 
(697)  Nos documents ne vont pas plus loin que le début du XIX siècle. 
(698)  The diff erences between them go further than is  commonly believed.  (Webster's 
Third Intemational) 
(699)  Les diff érences entre eux vont plus loin que ce que l 'on suppose habituellement. 
(700)  La folie de celui-ci (. .  .) va parfois jusqu'à vouloir être battu ... (Molière, cited in 
the Grand Robert de la langue française) 
(701)  Dans  ces  temps-là,  un  roi  ne  quittait  jamais  sa  demeure;  ses  excursions 
n'allaient pas au delà d'une partie de chasse  ... (De Las Cases, cited in the Trésor 
de la langue française) 
French possesses  the  construction  DANS  LES  (shown  in (702))  expressing  the  notion of 
approximate value or amount, a mcaning resulting from the combination of the  'container' 
relation expressed by DANS  with the notion of 'range' expressed by the plural determiner 
LES: the  expression indicates that a given value on a scale lies  within  a given range.  The 
notion 'approximate amount' comes from placing the magnitude within a range rather than 
situa  ting it at a point. Predictably, since this expression contributes the notion of range, it can 
be  combined  with  ALLER  to  obtain  an  'abstract  extent'  reading  without  the  elements 
nonnally necessary to obtain a range situation, as evidenced by the acceptability of (703). On 
the other band, English has no direct eq1,1ivalent to this construction (as shown in (704)), and 
it is  thus  impossible to  construct a sentence with GO  (705)  equivalent to  ALLER's use in 
(703). 225 
(702)  L'arbre mesure dans les trois mètres. 
(703)  Que gagne votre fille avec ses leçons? (..)Justement elle [la mère] était en train 
d'examiner  leurs  petits  comptes.  Cette  année,  ça  irait dans  les  quatre  mille 
francs. (Daudet, cited in the Trésor de la langue française) 
(704)  *The tree measures in the three metres. 
(705)  *This year, her !essons will go in the jour thousands francs. 
In all of the uses discussed so  far in the present section, the orientation in the  semantics of 
GO  and  ALLER  is  taken  to  refer  to  the  entity's  orientation  along  a  relevant  abstract 
dimension, and the source and destination complements refer to  limits along this dimension, 
yielding the notion of 'extent'. However, the latter notion is not attributable to the semantics 
of the  verbs  themselves,  but  rather  to  knowledge  about  the  entities  involved.  When  the 
subject's  abstract  referent  has  no  quantifiable  extent  but  instead  merely  constitutes  an 
oriented relation between two abstract points, GO/  ALLER's orientation can be used to refer 
to  this  relation,  as  in (706)  and (707)  (schematized together in (708)),  where  a somce and 
destination phrase specify the beginning and end-points of  the relation. 
(706)  What is the logicallink that goes from intelligence to morality? 
(707)  Quel est le lien logique qui va de l'intelligence à la moralité? 
(708)  'logicallink' 
--------.L/R ('logicallink', w) 
'intelligence' 
1 
1 
'morality' 
Likewise,  any  ordered  series  - by  virtue  of being  ordered  - necessarily  possesses  an 
orientation. Renee, in (709) and (710), the FROM/DE- and TO/À-phrases are  taken to  refer 
to thefirst and  fast  elements of the series, respectively. In (711) and (712) we infer from our 
knowledge  of how  deals  work  in  the  real  world  th at  GO/  ALLER  des cri be  the  oriented 
relation that holds between the people involved in the deal.  In particular, the  modifier on/y 
one  way/dans  un  sens  seulement  provides  information  about  how  the  orientation  of the 
favors:  only one party involved provides favors for the other (i.e. the deal is oriented in only 226 
one direction). Finally, even thoughts are relational and can be viewed as  oriented, namely, 
from the thinker to  the abject of thought. This accounts for the use illustrated in (713) and 
(714)
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(709)  This logical series goes from the simples! of  machines to the most complex. 
(71 0)  Cette suite logique va des plus simples des machines aux plus sophistiquées. 
(711)  He quickly realized th at in this deal, the favars went only one way. 
(712)  Il s'est vite rendu compte que dans cette entente,  les faveurs allaient dans un sens 
seulement. 
(713)  Our thoughts go ta the inhabitants of  that jlooded village. 
(714)  Nos pensées vont aux habitants de ce village inondé. 
5.5  Change-of-state 
In this section 1 discuss uses of GO and ALLER which express 'change of state', exemp1ified 
in (715) and (716). In these sentences, the subject refers to an entity and the source and end-
point phrases each refer to a state or property. The combination of these semantic elements 
yields the meaning schematized in (717) for sentence (715). 
(715)  The skj was goingfrom blue ta gray as the clouds appeared. 
(716)  Le ciel allait du bleu au gris à mesure que les nuages arrivaient. 
113  The English sentence is  preferable with the particle OUT following the  verb.  This is  most likely 
because  English, which makes heavy use of directional particles, prefers here to  explicitly  mark the 
contrast between  the  thoughts'  containment within  the  mind  and  the  fact  that the  objects  of these 
thoughts exist outside the mind. 227 
(717)  'the sky' 
--------.  L ('the sky', CD) 
'blue'  '~ay' 
We infer from GO's intrinsic end-relation that the source relation is also one of localization. 
As pointed out in section 4.6, when the figure of the localization relation is an entity and the 
ground is  a state or propetiy, this relation is  interpreted as  ascribing the state or property to 
the entity in question. Use of a dynamic tense (here, the past progressive) favors a dynamic 
reading  of the  verb's  meaning.  The  sentence  thus  expresses  that  'the  sky  was  oriented 
dynamically from being blue to being gray'. Consequently, for sentences of  this type we most 
naturally interpret the orientation as a change of  state: the subject undergoes a transition from 
having one propetiy to having another property. 
In the case of the French sentence (716) above, the content of the sentence differs from its 
English counterpati via ALLER's meaning: the latter expresses general relatedness (R) rather 
than  localization.  However,  end-localization  is  supplied  by  the  preposition  À  in  the 
destination phrase, and the DE-phrase expresses a source point. Thus, (716) yields the same 
interpretation as its English counter-part: 'the sky changed from blue to gray'. 
Since relations can also be subsumed under the class of states, we can also obtain a 'change 
of state' reading when the source and destination PPs refer to  relations with abstract entities, 
as in the following sentences. Here, world knowledge of how music works allows us to fill in 
the details of the situation being refened to:  melodies are made up of a temporal succession 
of torres,  so  if a melody undergoes a transition from a relation to  one tone to  a relation to 
another and does so at a certain speed, the most natural way to  interpret this is that the torres 
make up the melody in question and that they follow one another in time when the melody is 
played. -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------
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(718)  The melody goes from one tone to another with surprising rapidity. 
(719)  La mélodie va d'un ton à l'autre avec une rapidité surprenante. 
Change of state necessarily involves  at  !east two distinct states:  an initial state and an end 
state.  In the examples above, the sentence contains explicit mention of both of these via a 
source phrase and a destination phrase. However, when GO and ALLER are not followed by 
a FROM/DE-phrase, the initial state must be inferred. Since the end-state involves w, 'a point 
other than o', an abstract transition to  localization at w is  interpreted as  transition to  sorne 
state that is  distinct from the deictic center. The end state must therefore be something that 
contrasts in  a salient way with the deictic center, i.e.  with states that are accessible to the 
Subject  of Consciousness.  One  obvious  way  for  a  given  state  to  be  accessible  to  the 
experience of Subjects of Consciousness in general is for it to  constitute the normal state of 
affairs 
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: that which is normal occurs mu ch more frequent! y than that which is abnormal, and 
the former is  thus much more accessible to our experience. For this reason, many end states 
that are compatible with COMENENIR are incompatible with GO/ALLER because they do 
not contrast saliently with the n01mal state of affairs, as shown in the following. 
11 4 Clark (1974, as  cited by Gandour, 1978; p. 381)  appears to  be the  first to  have proposed the idea 
that the deictic  center can be interpreted as  an entity's "normal state". Di Meola (1994, p.  106-1 12) 
also discusses the role of  the concept of normalcy in certain abstract uses of GO and German GEHEN. 229 
(720)  John camel*went to the conclusion that Mary had been lying. 
(721)  Jean en est venu/*allé à la conclusion que Marie lui avait menti. 
(722)  The two political parties came/*went to an agreement. 
(723)  Les deux partis politiques en sont venus/*allés à une entente. 
(724)  To  come/??go  to  the main tapie of  our discussion,  1 would now like to  address 
the tuition hike. 
(725)  Vous feriez mieux d'en venir!*  aller tout de suite au sujet qui vous amène ici. 
However, when the  PP complement does refer to  a state which contrasts strongly with the 
normal  state  of affairs,  English  GO  becomes  acceptable,  as  in  sentences  (726)  through 
(732/ 
15
• This requirement of non-normalcy is  made clear by the contrast between (726) and 
(733), the latter of which contains near-synonyms that lack the stark contrast with normalcy 
observed in the former. 
11 5  The  fact  that  the  preposition  selected  here  is  IN(TO)  rather  than  simply  TO  is  most  likely 
attributable to the fact that states are often treated as containers:  John is in/*at a trance,  The country is 
in!*  at a recession, etc. (726)  John went into a rage/a depression/ecstasy. 
(727)  The driver !ost control and the car went into a spin. 
(728)  The building went to ruin. 
(729)  The company went into bankruptcy. 
(730)  The country went into a rece,ssion. 
(731)  John went to sleep. 
(732)  John went into a trance. 
(733)  *John went into anger/sadness/happiness. 
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Since ALLER, like GO, describes orientation toward a relation with CD,  one rnight expect it to 
be able to  used  in the  same way to  express transition to  an abnormal state.  However,  as  a 
verb-framing language, French shows a  strong tendency to  encode information about path 
and destination on the verb rather than on a preposition or particle (Talmy, 2000). Thus, to 
express the situations corresponding to the sentences above, French would most naturally use 
verbs such as  ENTRER and TOMBER, as shown in (734) through (740). Nonetheless, some 
of these  changes  of state  can  be  described  with  ALLER,  though  less  naturally  or  less 
frequently than with the verbs shown here. For example, one can say se laisser aller dans un 
sommeil profond,  aller à la  ruine,  aller à  la faillite.  This is  evidence that ALLER is  not 
semantically  incompatible  with  changes  of state,  and  that  the  real  cause  for  its  general 
unacceptability in the construction ALLER + ST A  TE-PP shown in the examples below lies 
in the language's preference for expression of events like containment-entering directly on 
the verb itself. 231 
(734)  Jean est entrél*allé dans une rage  ... 
(735)  Jean est entré/tombé/a sombré/*est allé dans une dépression. 
(736)  Jean est tombél*allé en extase. 
(737)  Jean est entré/*allé dans un sommeil profond/dans une transe. 
(738)  L 'édifice est tombé/*allé en ruine. 
(739)  L'entreprise a fait faillite/est tombée/a sombré!?  est allée en faillite. 
(740)  Le pays est entré/*allé dans une récession. 
In the following sentences, the progressive tense (along with locative expressions indicating a 
tendency rather than the reaching of a lirnit) brings us to constme GO's orientation not as an 
effective transition from one state to  another (and thus an actualization of the end state), but 
rather as a potential to be in the end state: the latter is depicted as non-effective. Crucially, in 
such a context emphasis is not placed on the establishment of a relation with a state that is 
inaccessible to  the SC.  As  a result,  the constraint requiring that the complement PP of GO 
describe astate that contrasts strongly with the normal state of affairs disappears in sentences 
like these. For this same reason, ALLER is also acceptable in this use. 
(741)  Many  industries  have  been forced to  eut jobs and it looks  like  the  electronics 
industry is going the same way/in the same direction. (Longman) 
(742)  Beaucoup d'industries ont dû coupé des emplois,  et l'industrie de l'électronique 
semble aller dans le même sens/dans la même direction. 
(743)  The government says it wants ta  avoid a crisis,  but that is  exact/y  where we are 
going. 
(744)  Le gouvernement dit vouloir éviter une nouvelle crise, mais c'est bien vers là que 
nous allons. 
(745)  She offered wondered where she was going in !ife. 
(746)  Elle se demandait souvent où elle allait dans la vie. 
In addition, a tendency can be associated with change of magnitude along an axis. As verbs 
expressing orientation (a notion derived from  the general concept of magnitude),  GO  and 232 
ALLER  can  express  such  a  change  in  magnitude,  provided  that  the  axis  itself can  be 
determined  based on  context,  and provided  that an  element of the  sentence  expresses  the 
direction of the change (increase or decrease). However, given the contrasting properties of 
satellite-framing languages  and  verb-framing  languages,  GO  and  ALLER are  not  used  to 
express change of magnitude in the same way.  Verb-framing languages favor expression of 
directional  information  on  the  verb  itself.  Thus,  if ALLER  is  combined  with  a  present 
participle verb specifying the direction of  change in magnitude, as in (747) through (749), we 
obtain a sentence expressing a gradual tendency of increase/decrease along the axis specified 
by the meaning of the V-ant and/or by context. 
(747)  Le prix du carburant allait en croissant
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(748)  L'activité du volcan va en diminuant. 
(749)  La situation allait ens 'empirant. 
As  shown elsewhere,  ALLER generally resists  being used without a complement since  its 
semantic representation provides so  little infonnation about the end-state. But in the present 
case,  the  sentence  contains  sufficient infonnation  to  identify  the  end-state:  based  on  the 
change of magnitude expressed by the present participle and our knowledge of the subject's 
referent (an abstract quality  or state associated with a scale of intensity), we  infer that the 
end-point of the  orientation  is  a  value  on  the  contextually  provided  scale  of magnitude. 
Consequently, we do  not need a PP or other locative identifying the  end-relation with w in 
ALLER's semantic representation. 
In contrast to  French,  satellite-framing languages  such  as  English  favor  the  expression of 
directional information outside the verb, notably on prepositions and particles. Thus, using a 
verb to express directionality in combination with GO yields an effect of oddness, shown in 
(750) through (752). Instead, the notion of change of magnitude is  most naturally expressed 
11 6 Note that inclusion of EN before the verb depends on register: omission of EN corresponds to  the 
formaVliterary register (according to the Trésor de la langue française). 233 
in English by  combining a directional particle such as  UP  or DOWN with GO,  as  in  (753) 
and (754). 
(750)  *The priee of  fuel was going/went increasing/growing. 
(7 51)  *The vol  cano 's leve! of  activity was going/went diminishirig/decreasing. 
(752)  *The situation was going/went worsening. 
(753)  The priee of  fuel was going up. 
(754)  The volcano 's leve! of  activity was going dawn. 
This difference between verb-framing and satellite-framing languages also accounts for the 
contrast illustrated in (755) and (756) below. In (755), a destination PP explicitly identifies 
the numerical limit of a change along the dimension of priee. Since scales such as  priee are 
inherently oriented from small to  large amounts, and since world knowledge about auctions 
indicates that one  bid is  always greater in amount than the previous bid,  we infer that the 
change consists of increase, and the destination TO-PP is identified as the upper end-point of 
this increase.  On the other band, since French favors expression of directional notions such 
increase/decrease on the verb itself, the mere use of ALLER+ À-PP as in (756) is inadequate 
to  obtain a 'change of magnitude' reading. This situation can be  expressed, however, if the 
notion of upper limit is explicitly supplied (JUSQU'À) or if ALLER is  replaced by the verb 
MONTER (757), which always expresses 'increase' when applied to magnitudes. 
(755)  The  bidding went (up/all the  way)  to  $50 before the chair was sold.(Webster's 
Third New International) 
(756)  Les enchères sont allées *à/ jusqu'à 50 dollars avant que la chaise soit vendue. 
(757)  Les enchères sont montées à 50 dollars avant que la chaise soit vendue. 
Most of the  'change of state'  uses  discussed  so  far  involve  specification of the  end-state 
through  a  prepositional  phrase.  However,  since  adjectives,  like  PPs,  express  states  and 
properties, an adjective can be used with GO to express change of state, as in (758) through 
(761). 234 
(758)  John went crazy. 
(759)  John went red in the face when he heard the news. 
(760)  John/that state has gone Republican. 
(761)  The plane went invisible on the radar screen. 
These sentences differ from the GO + PP uses illustrated above in how they express change 
of state, due to  the way adjectives differ from prepositional phrases. In  sentences like (758) 
through (761), the verb  expresses that this  subject (John, that state,  the plane) is  oriented 
toward being in a localization relation with the point co.  The adjective expresses a propetty or 
state ('crazy', 'red', 'Republican', 'invisible'). Adjectives cannot be a  pp lied as modifier to a 
verb's whole meaning, so when an adjective is adjoined to the verb GO,  the only possibility 
is that it applies to sorne subpa1t of this verb's meaning. One might posit that the adjective's 
meaning  links  directly  to  co,  specifying  the  content  of the  anti-deictic  center,  as  in  the 
following representation. 
(762)  'John' 
------+-L ('John', co) 
1 
1 
'crazy' 
However, as seen earlier (section 4.7), this is not possible:  the anti-deictic center co  is a point, 
and adjectives (which express properties and relations) are non-punctual and cannot therefore 
be co-referential with a point. In addition, when a noun specifies the reference of co,  it  must 
be introduced by a preposition that links to  the end-relation L  and  thereby  establishes  the 
noun's co-reference with co  as in sentence (763), represented in (764). The same applies to an 
adjective  used  as  a  noun,  as  in  (765).  Consequently,  in order  for  an  ADJ  to  specify  the 
reference of co,  it would need to  be introduced by a preposition. But as  we see in (766) and 
(767), the GO + ADJ sentences become unacceptable ifwe adda preposition. 235 
(763)  Jean went ta sleep. 
(764)  'John' 
------+  L ('John', w) 
1  1 
'to'  'sleep' 
(765)  The sky was goingfrom blue ta grey. .. 
(766)  *John went ta crazylto red in the face/ta Republican. 
(767)  *The plane went ta invisible. 
Thus, in sentences (758) through (761) above, the adjective does not specify the reference of 
the anti-deictic center w.  Instead, it identifies the content of a predicative element of GO's 
meaning:  the end relation L,  as  shown in the representation (768). Thus, in sentences (758) 
through (761) above,  the ADJ indicates in what way X is  anchored at  w at the  end of the 
change. These sentences thus express a change of state that results in  the  entity having the 
property denoted by the ADJ. They can therefore by paraphrased as follows:  'John is oriented 
toward having the property ofbeing crazy/red/Republican/etc.'. 
(768)  'John' 
--------+  L ('John', w) 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
'crazy' 
The element w itself bas the intrinsic meaning 'a point other thau the deictic center', and the 
deictic center in tum means 'a point that is  accessible to  a Subject of Consciousness'. The 
end-state of the  change described in  these  sentences  is  therefore  somehow distinct from  a 
state that is accessible to an SC.  The specifie way in which the end state establishes contrast 
with the unmentioned deictic center is  determined by our world knowledge of the property 
itself. For example, in (758) the ADJ CRAZY describes a state that contrasts saliently with 236 
nOimalc/ 
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.  Recall  that  'the  normal  state  of affairs'  is,  by  virtue  of the  frequency  and 
likelihood of occunence of the n01mal,  accessible to  Subjects of Consciousness in general: 
an SC is much more likely to experience something if it conesponds to the nonnal state of 
affairs  than if it is  exceptional or abnormal.  Renee,  the  unmentioned deictic  center in this 
example  is  interpreted  as  'nonnalcy',  and  the  anti-deictic  center  in  GO's  meaning  is 
construed  accordingly  as  'non-normalcy'.  The  same  interpretation  of w  is  obtained  for 
sentences (759) and (760). In (759), redness of the face  is  exceptional, and this exceptional 
quality  is  responsible  for  a  fw-ther  inference  supp01ied  by  world  knowledge:  John  is 
manifesting an intense emotion such as  anger or nervousness.  In (760),  association of the 
ADJ Republican with w leads  to  the  inference that  the  entity's normal/default condition is 
that of being  non-Republican.  Likewise,  in  (769)  through  (773)  below, world  knowledge 
allows us  to  identify the initial, default state or property as  lack of technology (769), being 
restricted to a single counhy or region (770), being off the air (771 ), being pati of a musical 
group (772), and being drinkable (773). 
(769)  Our university decided togo high-tech this year. 
(770)  The company is going global. 
(771)  (In the context of  a radio show) Everyone quiet on the set,  we 're about togo live! 
(772)  The singer has finally decided togo solo. 
(773)  The milk in the fridge has gone sour. 
As the following sentences show, other construals of  the anti-deictic center are possible based 
on the ADJ's semantics. In  (774),  the adjective EXTINCT brings us  to  interpret w as  non-
existence (in opposition to an implied deictic center construed as 'existence', see section 4.4). 
In (775), the adjective INVISIBLE specifies that the plane's change to inaccessibility takes 
the form of visual inaccessibility. 
11 7  Di  Meola (1994, p. 106-111) discusses the  ro1e of normalcy in  this use of German GEHEN  and 
English GO, but as elsewhere, he considers it me'taphorically derived from motion. 237 
(774)  This species is going extinct. 
(775)  The plane went invisible. 
When the  situation described  by the  sentence involves  change to  a  state that is  somehow 
incompatible with the content of ffi, the result is at best marginal acceptability. For example, 
despite the fact that both sentences involve the same property ('red'), (776) is  fine but (777) 
is strange. This is  due to extra-linguistic knowledge of the entities involved: for a human to 
be red in the face is  an exceptional quality (and thus one that is  compatible with ffi),  white a 
traffic light's turning redis perfectly unexceptional. Likewise, while the sentence John went 
mad is  fine  when the  ADJ  is  interpreted  as  meaning  'crazy', it  is  odd when the  ADJ  is 
interpreted as  meaning 'angry', as shown by the marginality of the paraphrase in (778). Once 
again, this is because madness contrasts strongly with the normal state of affairs and thus is 
compatible  with  ffi's  'non-nonnalcy'  construal,  white  anger  is  viewed  as  a  banal 
psychological  state,  making  it  conflict with  the  non-normalcy  implied by  the  anti-deictic 
center. 
(776)  John went red in the face. 
(777)  ?The traffic light went red 
(778)  ?  ?  John went angry when we told him the news. 
Recall that the possibility of deriving a  situation of 'transition'  or 'change of state'  from 
GO's meaning hinges on the notion of  anchoring at an end-point, the latter being provided by 
GO's localization component. Since the French verb ALLER lacks this component, it cannot 
be used to describe change of state without the preposition À (which expresses localization) 
or a directional element expressing tendency towards a state.  Thus, when we use ALLER 
with an ADJ as in the English examples exarnined above, the result is unacceptability, for no 
element in the sentence provides the notion of  end-point localization from which to derive the 
notion of  end-state. 238 
(779)  *Jean est allé fou. 
(780)  *Jean est allé républicain. 
(781)  *L 'avion est allé invisible. 
(782)  *Le chanteur a décidé d'aller solo. 
(783)  *La compagnie est allée globale. 
5.6  Possession 
We saw in the preceding section that when the subject of GO and ALLER refers to an entity 
and the PP destination complement refers to an abstract element such as a state or property, 
the  end  relation with  w is  interpreted  as  a  state,  and  we  thus  obtain  a  'change of state' 
reading.  When the PP complement refers instead to  a person, as  in (784)  and (785), world 
knowledge of the entities involved leads to  a different interpretation of the end-relation and 
thus  of  the  situation  as  a  whole.  The  compositional  meaning  of  these  sentences  is 
schematized in (786). 
(784)  The relieffunds went to the people who needed it the most. 
(785)  Les fonds de secours sont allés à ceux qui en avaient le plus grand besoin. 
(786)  'funds' 
--------.  LIR ('funds', w) 
1 
1 
1 
'people' 
As  shown in (786), these sentences express an orientation of 'funds' toward a localization 
relation (  expressed intrinsically by GO in (784) and provided by À in (785)) with 'people'. 
Here,  the  subject refers  to  an  amount of money,  an  entity which, according to  our world 
knowledge, has the salient property of  commonly undergoing transfer of  possession from one 
person to another.  The complement is a PP refening to a person or group of  people. Based on 
our knowledge of how money and people interact in the real world, the most natural way to 
interpret the end relation is as one of  possession. Consequently, the orientation component in 239 
GO/ALLER's meaning is interpreted as transfer of  possession, and the sentence thus receives 
a reading describing the acquisition of an entity (in the present case, money) by a person. 
In the  domain of space,  a person, qua mobile  entity,  is  inappropriate  as  the  ground of a 
localization relation, as shown in (787). In contrast, in an abstract domain like possession, an 
expression referring  to  a person  is  perfectly  suitable  as  a  ground,  since  in  this  domain  a 
person satisfies the criterion of stability (788). 
(787)  Où est le livre? -*A Jean. 
(788)  A  qui appartient ce livre? -A Jean
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In  a  sentence  favoring  a  'transfer  of possession'  reading,  our  background  and  world 
knowledge supplies the details about the type of transfer involved. Thus, in (784) and (785) 
above,  elements of context (relief  funds/fonds de  secours as  well as  need/en avoir besoin) 
lead us  to  infer that the transfer is  one of giving.  In  contrast, in sentences (789) and (790) 
elements of context (  e.g. ta the eldest son/au fils ainé) indicate that the trans fer of possession 
involves members of a family.  Since the transfer of possession of money or objects within a 
farnily  most typically takes  the form of inheritance, the most natural  interpretation of these 
sentences  is  that person refened  to  by the  complement acquires  the  subject's  referent  by 
inheriting it.  Note that  even when the  source of the  transfer is  not mentioned, there  is  an 
implied  initial  state  (based  solely  on  world  knowledge):  the  object  was  initially  in  the 
possession of another member of the same farnily. However, inheritance does not necessarily 
take place within a family. This is  reflected in (791)  and (792), where sentential/discursive 
material indicates that the destination of the trans fer is someone outside the initial possessor' s 
family (e.g. the creditors, les pauvres). 
11 8 Although the English stative localizer AT, unlike À, does not have a possession use (*This book is 
at John), we do observe TO in contexts of  trans fer of possession: 1 gave/bequethed/lent/sold the book 
to John.  Indeed, TO can express transfer of possession without an accompanying verb, as on the label 
of a gift (To  Mary).  Thus, the absence of a possession use for AT  is not counter-evidence against the 
idea that a person is a sui table ground for localization in an abstract domain like possession. 240 
(789)  The farm went to the eldest son.  (Webster Third New International) 
(790)  L'héritage ira au fils ainé. 
(791)  Nearly  al!  the  estate  went  to  the  creditors of the deceased.  (Webster's  Third 
International) 
(792)  La tante, fidèle à l'idée fzxe de toute sa vie,  laissait son million à leur premier né, 
avec la jouissance de la rente aux parents jusqu'à leur mort. Si le jeune ménage 
n'avait  pas  d'héritier  avant  trois  ans,  cette  fortune  irait  aux  pauvres. 
(Maupassant, cited in the Trésor de la langue française) 
Because  in  these  'transfer  of  possession'  uses  the  possessed  entity  itself  plays  the 
grammatical ro1e  of subject (a function associated with the semantic role of agent and thus 
with the  notion of control)  and the receiver takes  the  form of a destination PP, the  latter 
participant  is  depicted  as  playing  a  passive  role  in the  event.  Accordingly,  when  world 
knowledge indicates that the transfer is of a type typically governed by the volition of the 
receiver, GO and ALLER are inappropriate to express transfer of  possession. 
(793)  *The  diamonds  went  to  the  thief  (Intended  meaning:  'The  thief  stole  the 
diamonds. ') 
(794)  *Les diamants sont allés au voleur. 
(795)  *A  loaf of bread went to John  at the grocery store. (Intended meaning: 'Jolm 
bought a loaf of  bread at the grocery store.') 
(796)  *Un pain est allé à Jean à l'épicerie. 
Thus, given the intrinsic semantic content of GO and ALLER, in order for these verbs to be 
appropriate  to  describe  transfer  of possession,  the  transfer  situation  must  be  largely 
independent  of the  receiver's  will  or  control.  As  illustrated  above,  situations  such  as 
'giving/donation'  and  'inheritance'  satisfy this  requirement.  Another transfer of possession 
situation  that  is  compatible  with  this  idea  is  one  involving  a  reward  in  a  competition, 
exemplified by sentences (797) through (800), in which the subject refers to a reward (e.g. a 
prize,  a job, an honor of sorne  sort)  and in which background/world knowledge about this 
reward indicates that it is attributed via a competition. In these sentences, although obtaining 
the entity in question involves willful effot1 on the part of the receiver, cmcially the outcome 
of the  contest is  primarily determined by the wills of other individuals.  Similarly, in (801) 241 
and  (802),  which  describe an  election situation,  background knowledge  about the  subject 
('vote') tells  us  that the  receiver (at  !east  in the  context of fair elections)  is  not the  agent 
determining the orientation of  the vote's attribution. 
(797)  The  top  prize  went  to  a  twenty-four-year-old sculptor.  (Oxford Dictionary  of 
English) 
(798)  Le grand  prix est allé à un film indépendant cette année. 
(799)  The job went ta Mr.  Martin. 
(800)  Le poste est allé à M  Martin. 
(80 1)  My vote will go ta the socialist candidate. 
(802)  Mon vote ira au candidat socialiste. 
As  shown  in  (795)  and  (796)  above,  since  selling  and  buying  are  typically  viewed  as 
involving the receiver's willful control to a large degree, they are also typically incompatible 
with  the  semantics  of GO  and  ALLER.  However,  when  context  and  world  knowledge 
provide  information  that  brings  us  to  construe  the  selling/buying  event  as  involving 
competition, the sentence is  acceptable.  This is illustrated in (803) and (804), which involve 
an  auction  setting  in  which  buyers  are  competing  for  the  same  item.  In  this  context, 
competition limits each individual buyer's power to determine the outcome of the situation. 
(803)  Thejewels will go ta the highest bidder. (Longman) 
(804)  Les bijoux iront à la personne qui fait l'offre la plus élevée. 
Finally, although omission of the destination complement referring to the receiver deprives us 
of the necessmy  information to  arrive at a  'transfer  of possession'  use  ((805)  and  (806)), 
sufficient inf01mation can be provided by an element of context other than a destination PP, 
leading to  an acceptable  'transfer of possession' reading of GO  in  (807)  and (809). In this 
case, the FOR-complement specifies an amount of money, thus indicating that the transfer is 
a commercial transaction;  since all  commercial transactions result in change of possession, 
we infer that the end-localization relation - L('the bouse', co)- refers to  possession of 'the 
bouse' by sorne new owner. But since ALLER does not contain end localization, there is  no 242 
intrinsic component from which to  derive the notion of new possessor, and hence sentences 
(808) and (810) semantically incomplete. 
(805)  *The house went.  (Intended meaning: 'The house was sold to someone. ') 
(806)  *La maison est allée. 
(807)  A house like this would go for 250,000 dollars. (Longman) 
(808)  *Cette maison irait pour 250,000 dollars. 
(809)  Many  items at the auction went for less  than their true value.  (Webster's Third 
New International) 
(81 0)  *La plupart de la marchandise est allée vite. 
5.7  Resource/contribution 
In  the  present  section  I  discuss  GO's  uses  which  deal  with  the  notions  'resource'  and 
'contribution',  showing  that  they  are  not  possible  for  ALLER  due  to  its  difference  in 
semantics with respect toGO. In the previous section, we saw that a 'transfer of possession' 
reading  emerges  when  the  subject  refers  to  an  inanimate,  possessable  entity  and  when  a 
destination PP identifies the end localization relation as  involving a person. If,  instead, the 
destination PP  refers  to  an  inanimate entity,  as  in  (811)  and  (812), we  obtain a  different 
situation. 
(811)  70% of  al! antibiotics go into animal feed.  (Corpus) 
(812)  The budget doesn 't say what would replace ...  the copper-nickel alloy that goes 
into the nickel.  (Corpus) 
Here, world  knowledge about the entities involved indicates that the end-relation cannot be 
one of  possession: the inanimate entity referred toby the PP complement ('animal feed', 'the 
nickel  (i.e.  a  coin')  cannot  be  said  to  possess  the  referent  of the  subject  ('antibiotics', 
'copper-nickel  alloy'), for  possession involves  only  humans.  Moreover,  th,e  preposition in 
these sentences IN (of INTO) expresses a containment relation. In both sentences the subject 
refers to a substance and the INTO complement-PP refers to a concrete entity. This results in 243 
the  following  compositional meaning:  'Substance X  is  oriented  toward being contained in 
con  crete. entity w', as illustrated in (813). 
(813)  'substance' 
- ------•  L ('substance', w) 
1  1 
1  1 
1  1 
1 
'containment'  'concrete entity' 
In our experience of the world, artifacts such as  these come into being through a process of 
combination of different materials and substances, resulting in the substances/materials being 
part of the  atiifact.  This  leads  us  to  interpret  the  highly  general  'containment'  relation 
expressed by  IN  as  a  'pati-whole' relation.  That  'containment'  can be  constmed as  'part-
whole' independently of the use under discussion is  shown in examples such  as  (814) and 
(815). 
(814)  Do you know how much salt is in thatfoodyou are eating? 
(815)  This food contains genetically modified vegetables. 
Moreover, world knowledge tells us  that by being an ingredientlcomponent of an artifact, a 
substance/material contributes to  the existence of that artifact.  However, despite this notion 
of a formative process leading up to the atiifact's existence and to the part-whole relation, the 
generic present tense in the sentence indicates that the orientation holds at all points in time. 
Consequently, we constme the sentence as describing a stable property rather than a process. 
This  results  in  the  following  situational  meaning:  'substance  X  (antibiotics,  alloy)  is  an 
ingredient/component of  artifact w (animal feed, nickel)'. 
Like GO's semantic content, the notion of containment is abstract and domain-independent, 
as  evidenced by the numerous non-spatial uses of containment words such as  those in (816) 
through (820). Th us, wh  en the arguments of GO are abstract elements such as actions, we can 
use it to express the establishment of an abstract containment relation, as  in (821) and (822). 
Once  again,  the  relations  expressed  in  the  sentence, in  combination  with  extra-Jinguistic 
knowledge of the arguments,  suggest a process resulting in a containment relation between 
two elements (the subject X and the constant w).  Likewise, we infer from world knowledge 244 
that  when an  action  (e.g.  effort)  is  part of another action  (e.g.  the  production of a  play, 
making an  operation successful),  the former  contributes  to  the  existence/realization of the 
latter. Note that in (822), the tense is not generic, so GO's orientation is construed here as an 
event rather thanas a stable property. 
(816)  Infive minutes, class is over. 
(817)  1 didn 't mean it in that sense. 
(818)  We are entering a new era. 
(819)  She ente  red a state of  hypnosis. 
(820)  That book contains many ideas dating back to Plata. 
(821)  Mu ch effort goes into the production of  plays such as this one. 
(822)  Considerable  effort  went  into  making  the  operation  successful.  (Oxford 
Dictionary of  English) 
The realization of an abstract element such as an event can be viewed as the partial result not 
only of actions, but also of the availability of resources.  Thus, when the PP complement of 
GO refers to an action but the subject refers to an entity, we infer that the latter is a resource 
that contributes to  the realization of that action. This is  the case in  (823)  through (825), in 
which the subject refers to an amount ofmoney. Given our extra-linguistic knowledge ofhow 
mo ney contributes to the realization of  various actions, there is sufficient information to bring 
about an interpretation in which the money acts as a conh·ibuting factor in bringing about the 
action described by the complement PP. Note that unlike the concrete 'ingredient/component' 
use  shown  above  (examples  (811)  and (812)),  which  relies  on  the  notion of containment 
expressed  by  IN,  abstract  situations  such  as  those  illustrated  in  (823)  and  (825)  can  be 
expressed via a  variety of prepositions.  This  is  due  to  the nature of the  entities  involved: 
while  artifacts  come  into  being  via  the  establishment  of a  part-whole  relation with  their 245 
components/ingredients, the abstract relation between events/actions and their causal factors 
can be conceptualized in more than one manner
119
. 
(823)  A large part of  the money went into/toward cleaning up the disaster area. 
(824)  A quarter of  the budget goes toward/for military purposes. 
(825)  Haljher salary goes towardlon the rent. (Longman) 
In our experience of the world, actions and resources  that are put forth  to  bring about the 
accomplishment of a goal can vary in the extent to  which they contribute to  accomplishing 
the  goal.  Accordingly,  when  context  supports  a  construal  of  GO  as  describing  the 
contribution of a cause or resource to the existence/realization of the PP's referent, we can 
use a modifier of GO to specify the extent to which the cause or resource contributes to this 
realization. This is  shown in (826) through (828), where GO  is  modified by expressions of 
extent (a long way,jar)
120
. 
(826)  The  sale  will go  a  long  way  towards  easing  the  huge  debt  burden.  (Oxford 
Dictionary of  English) 
(827)  Critics are wondering how  jar these measures will go toward meeting the needs 
ofthose touched by the disaster. 
(828)  A little bit of  this cleaner goes a long way. 
As  (828) shows, when such a modifier is  present, the complement expressing the resulting 
action/state can be ornitted, for the information provided by the subject and the modifier are 
sufficient to  arrive  at a  situation of contribution  toward  a  goal.  Combining  the  subject's 
119  An account  both  of the  factors  determining  choice of preposition  and  of semantic  differences 
brought about by this choice would require an analysis of the meaning of the prepositions themselves. 
As  announced  in section 2.3,  given that  these elements are themselves highly polysemous, such an 
analysis goes beyond the scope of  the present study. 
120  I assume, in line with the general monosemous approach being pursued here, that these modifiers 
are  not intrinsically spatial elements.  Evidence  in  support of this  assumption comes  from  the  wide 
array of  abstract uses of  these supposed "distance" expressions: e.g. So far,  we haven 't made too many 
mistakes; John  is far from being the best candidate; As far as 1 can tell  ... ; She is far too easy on her 
students. 246 
semantics with the semantics of the verb, we ob  tain a situation in which an mtifact is oriented 
toward a localization relation with w. X refers to a product whose function is  to  dean. The 
end-relation of the orientation is therefore most naturally interpreted as being one in which X 
contributes to  the action 'successful cleaning'. We infer that the extent modifier a long way 
describes the degree to which the cleaner contributes to bringing about this event, leading to 
the compositional meaning 'a small dose of the cleaner contributes greatly to  the realization 
of  the event of  cleaning sorne object'. 
In each of the  'resource/contribution'  uses  discussed  above,  the verb  GO,  which contains 
localization as an end-relation, provides the necessary infonnation from which to  derive the 
notion of  a process with an end-point, i.e. an outcome. In addition, this localization relation is 
further specified via prepositions such as  IN and TOW  ARD that interact with elements of 
context and background knowledge  to  bring about the  notion of causality.  Since  the  verb 
ALLER does not contain localization, it does not provide the notion of end  point necessary to 
derive  the  idea of outcome of a  process.  Although  this  notion of end-localization can be 
provided by using the preposition À, use of  this preposition precludes the use of an additional 
preposition expressing a notion construable as causality. Renee, whether ALLER is used with 
À  or a  containment preposition like  DANS,  it does  not allow us  to  obtain an  acceptable 
sentence expressing a 'resource/contribution' situation, as the following sentences show. 247 
(829)  *La  plupart  des  gens  ignore  les  substances  toxiques  qui  vont  aux/dans  les 
produits ménagers. 
(830)  *Un effort considérable est allé à/dans/sur ce projet. 
(831)  *La moitié de son salaire va au/dans/vers le loyer12I. 
(832)  *La vente ira loin à/dans/vers une réduction de la dette. 
5.8  Ceasing/ending 
In the  present section I turn to  uses  in  which  GO  expresses  'ceasing/ending'.  As  we saw 
above (section 5.5), a 'change-of-state' reading cornes about when the subject of GO/ALLER 
refers to an entity and there is a PP complement describing astate. The complement is  taken 
to  specify  the  reference  of the  end-state  'localization  at  the  anti-deictic  center',  thus 
identifyiJ?g the state resulting from the change. 
However, when the subject refers to an entity and the verb is not followed by a complement 
specifying  the  natme  of the  end  state,  the  latter  must  be  infened from  context  or from 
worldlbackground knowledge. This is the case in (833) through (835). 
(833)  Before John goes, we should ask him ta have a look at our computer. 
(834)  1 heard about the job of!er John received. If  he goes,  who  will take his place in 
the company? 
(835)  John wants his ashes ta be scattered at sea when he goes. 
In each of these sentences, the subject refers to  a human, so  each sentence expresses that a 
human is oriented toward a localization relation with w. The constant w is 'a point other than 
o', and ois intrinsically 'a point that is accessible to SC'. So in sentences like these where no 
complement identifies the end-state, we infer that the end state of the change is sorne kind of 
state that makes X inaccessible to the SC. This is schematized in the following. 
121 With À, this sentence appears to be acceptable for certain speakers of Québec French, perhaps due 
to the influence ofEnglish. (836)  'John' 
------•  L ('John', w) 
1 
1 
1 
'a point inaccessible to SC' 
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According to our world knowledge and given the highly general, domain independent nature 
of the notion 'accessibility', there are multiple ways for a human to become inaccessible to a 
given SC. In  (833),  as  seen in my discussion in  section 5.1,  when context favors  a spatial 
constmal of o and thus also of w (as  'SC's location' and 'a point other than SC's location', 
respectively),  the  result  is  a  'motion'  reading.  Since  there  is  no  complement  specifying 
destination of movement, the most natural spatial reading is  one of departure from the SC's 
location. However, in (834) and (835), context favors an abstract construal of w, so a motion 
reading is mled out. In (834), contextual material (in particular, the clause who will take his 
place in the company) provides information about the type of end-relation resulting from the 
change: the change involves an interpersonal relation, i.e. involvement in an organization (the 
company).  Thus,  the  initial  state  'localization at  o' takes  the  fonn of employment at  the 
company,  and the  end-state  is  one of non-employment at the  company.  Since the  infened 
source  point is  the  deictic  center (as  shown in  (836)  above),  we infer that  the  Subject of 
Consciousness (in this  case the  speaker and/or hearer)  is  most likely a fellow employee of 
John. Thus, the sentence expresses that John is oriented toward no longer being employed at 
a company for which the SC also works. 
In  (835), context once again supports an abstract constmal of w.  However, in  this case, the 
information available suppotis a drastically different situation. As pointed out above (section 
4.4), the most general way for a given entity to be accessible to all SCs is for it to exist. Thus, 
when context is  appropriate, o can be constmed as  'existence', leading us  to  constme w as 
'non-existence'. In such cases, GO describes X's orientation toward non-existence, yielding a 
'ceasing to  exist' reading. Furthermore, world knowledge tells us  that the  broad notions of 
existence and non-existence, when applied to humans, are most naturally interpreted as  life 
and dea th,  respective! y.  Thus,  sentence (835) most naturally receives the  reading: ' ... when 
John dies ...  '. 249 
When the  subject refers  to  an element other than  a human,  this  also  affects  the  way  we 
construe  X's  orientation  toward  inaccessibility.  For example,  in  (837)  the  subject  is  an 
abstract,  inanimate  entity.  Our  default  assumption  about  any  entity  refened  to  in  the 
discourse  is  that  it  exists,  so  we  interpret  'localization at  w'  as  'non-existence',  and  the 
sentence  thus  receives  the  interpretation  'these jobs  are  oriented  toward  a  state  of non-
existence'. Given our world knowledge about jobs, we infer that the jobs in question are to be 
eliminated.  The  same  reasoning  applies  to  (838).  In  this  case,  the  modal  HAVE  (TO) 
expresses the  necessity or desire for the 'ceasing' to  occur. That is,  the speaker expresses a 
wish to see the policies cease to exist, and the sentence thus describes a situation of rejection 
or abandonment. 
(83 7)  These jobs are due togo next year. 
(838)  These antiquated policies have togo. 
When  the  subject  refers  to  a  concrete  entity  which  according  to  world  knowledge  is 
commonly  possessed  by  humans,  as  in  (839)  and  (840),  we  most  naturally  interpret  the 
implied initial relation of accessibility to  the SC as  one of possession by the SC. Thus,  the 
sentence is  taken to  describe the ending of a relation of possession, i.e.  the action of getting 
rid of the entity in question. The difference between these sentences and (838) above results 
from our world knowledge about the  entities involved:  the  most obvious way for us  to  rid 
ourselves of an unwanted policy is for it to  cease to  exist, while the most natural way for a 
person to rid himself of a couch or a dog is for him to  end a relation of possession with the 
couch!dog  (which  obviously  can but does  not  necessarily  involve  the  entity's  ceasing  to 
exist). 
(839)  This couch has togo. (We have had itfor thirty years now.) 
(840)  That dog has togo. (He has been chewing up al! of  our furniture.) 
White GO  can  be  used to  express  'ceasing of possession'  when context indicates  that the 
possessor is  the instigator of this  change (as  in the  preceding examples), the result is  only 
marginally  acceptable  when the  instigator is  someone  other than the  possessor,  as  in  the 
'theft' situation expressed by (841). The slight oddness of this sentence comes from the fact 250 
that in this case transition to a relation of non-possession occurs via motion, and the use of  an 
inanimate subject with GO  in a motion context is  only acceptable when the  entity can be 
depicted as providing its own movement
122
. 
(841)  ?When he returned,  his equipment had gone.  (Adapted from Oxford Dictionary 
ofEnglish) 
According to world knowledge of artifacts, possession is not the only way for these objects to 
cease to be accessible to  a Subject of Consciousness. An artifact to which we attribute sorne 
salient functionality  can cease to  be  accessible by  ceasing to function.  Thus,  in (842)  and 
(843),  complementless  GO  with  an  artifact  as  a  subject  receives  a  'breaking/damage' 
interpretation: the sentences express that the light bulb and washing machine (whose default 
state is  to  be  functional)  are oriented toward non-functionality (  ro ), i.e.  they  are ceasing to 
function.  Note  that  sentence  (843)  is  ambiguous  between  two  opposite  readings:  the 
'breaking'  (i.e.  orientation  toward  non-functionality)  reading  described  here  and  an 
interpretation in which the washing machine is canying out its normal function.  This second 
interpretation, which results from construing GO's orientation temporally, will be explained 
in section 5.9. 
(842)  The light bulb is starting togo. 
(843)  My washing machine is going. 
Just  as  atiifacts  achieve  accessibility to  humans  when  they  fulfill  their  intended  function, 
humans' own cognitive and perceptual faculties are accessible (and indeed act as channels of 
access  themselves)  when  they  are  functional.  Thus,  when  the  subject  of GO  is  an NP 
refening  to  such  a  faculty,  as  in  (844)  and  (845),  the  faculty's  orientation  toward 
inaccessibility to the SC is most naturally interpreted as the SC's loss of this faculty. That is, 
122 Note that although the sentence becomes full y acceptable when had is  replaced with was, this does 
not constitute counter-evidence to the cunent analysis, since adjectival GONE can be assumed to  be 
lexically distinct from the verb GO. c---------- ---------------------------------~ -----------
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these sentences describe a situation of gradual impainnent, meaning roughly:  'My faculty of 
hearing/memory is starting to disappear'. 
(844)  My hearing is starting togo. 
(845)  My memory is starting togo. 
According  to  our  world  knowledge,  while  the  proper  functioning  of faculties  such  as  a 
human's senses  is  itself seen as  the default situation (and thus an appropriate referent of o 
when the latter is construed as  'normalcy'), sensory events themselves - especially negative 
sensations such as pain-are typically viewed as temporary and exceptional. Consequently, if 
the subject X refers to a sensation such as a headache or a ringing in one's ear, the sentence is 
only  marginally acceptable:  when hearing disappears  (as  in (844)  above), there  is  loss of 
something that is normally present, whereas wh  en a transi tory auditory phenomenon (  e.g.  the 
ringing in my ear) disappears, it is odd to portray this transition as 'orientation from a normal 
to an exceptional state of  affairs'. 
(846)  ?  H as y our head  ache go  ne y et? 
(847)  ?The ringing in my ear has  finally go  ne. 
Note that the notion of transition from normalcy to an abnormal state is merely an inference 
resulting from the absence of an element in the sentence explicitly specifying the nature of 
the end state.  When we  add  a particle like  A  WAY, which I  assume expresses  'ending of 
localization at sorne point', this particle specifies the nature of the end state.  Since A  WA  Y's 
meaning  is  neutral  with  respect  to  the  deixis  of the  starting  point  (i.e.  it  can  describe 
orientation from  any point,  not just o),  the  sentences become fully  acceptable as  in (848) 
because they are no longer construed as  describing the ending of a normal state, but rather 
merely the transition from one state to another. 
(848)  My headache/The ringing in my ear went away. 
AU  of the  'ceasing/ending'  uses  described  in  this  section  result  from  the  fact  that  GO 
expresses orientation toward a localization at w.  When no complement is  present to  specify 
the nature of this end localization at w, we interpret it as  a state of inaccessibility to the SC 
(the nature of this  state being detennined by contextual information and world knowledge 252 
about the entities involved). ALLER, on the other band, does not contain localization as  an 
end relation (  construable  as  an  end  state),  so  it cannot express  change of state  without a 
complement  specifying  the  nature  of the  end-state. As  a  result,  ALLER cannot  be  used 
without a complement to express 'ceasing/ending', as the following examples show. 
(849)  J'ai entendu parler de l'offre d'emploi que Jean a reçue.* S'il va,  qui prendra sa 
place au sein de l'entreprise.? (intended meaning : 'ending of employement') 
(850)  *Jean  veut que ses  cendres soient répandues  à la  mer quand il ira. (intended 
meaning: 'death') 
(851)  *Ces emplois sont censés aller l'année prochaine. (' ceasing to exist - inanimate 
entity') 
(852)  *Ces  politiques  désuètes  doivent  aller.  (intended  meanmg: 
'rejectionlabandonment, ending of  possession') 
(853)  *Ce  divan/ce  chien  doit  aller.  (intended  meaning :  'rejectionlabandonment, 
ending of possession') 
(854)  *L'ampoule  dans  la  salle  de  bain  commence  à  aller.  (intended  meanmg: 
'breaking, ceasing offunctionality') 
(855)  *Mon oui'e commence à aller. (intended meaning: 'loss offaculty') 
Note,  however,  that  the  expression  S'EN  ALLER  can  indeed  be  used  to  express 
'ceasing/ending',  as  shown  by  examples  such  as  (856)  through  (860).  As  this  complex 
expression  is  at  least  potentially  an  idiomatic  expression,  it  bas  been  excluded  from  the 
present dissetiation's analysis (see section 2.3). However,  one possible explanation for  the 
existence of  this use for S'EN ALLER is that the presence of  EN (much like English A  WA  Y) 
provides the notion of source localization, and that the latter, in combination with ALLER's 
deictic content, yields the notion of 'ceasing localization at o', i.e.  'ceasing to be in astate of 
accessibility'. 253 
(856)  Si Jeans 'en  va,  qui prendra sa place au sein del  'entreprise? 
(857)  Avant des 'en aller, Jean a exprimé ses derniers vœux. 
(858)  Sa volonté s'en va peu à peu. (Grand Robert de la langue française) 
(859)  Les  tâches  d'encre  s'en  vont  avec  ce  produit.  (Grand  Robert  de  la  langue 
française) 
(860)  Du jour qui s'en allait,  à peine s'il restait un  incertain reflet  ...  (Ramuz, cited in 
the Trésor de la langue française) 
5.9  Temporal uses 
In the majority of the semantic uses examined so far, the subject of GO/ALLER refers to an 
entity, and world knowledge about the nature of this entity and  about the  complements or 
modifiers (if any are present) determines how we construe the orientation expressed by  the 
verb.  If,  instead, the subject refers to  a time period as  in (861) and (862), world knowledge 
once again detennines how we interpret the orientation expressed by the verb. 
(861)  Summer is goingfast. 
(862)  L'été va vite. 
Since the subject of GO/ALLER refers to a time period, the verb's orientation and the anti-
deictic center  ffi  are interpreted in the  temporal  domain. Because the  anti-deictic center is 
defined  as  'a point  other  than  the  deictic  center',  and  because  the  deictic  center can  be 
construed temporally as  'now', the anti-deictic center is  interpreted temporally as  'any point 
that is  not now'. We view time itself as  being intrinsically oriented from past to  present to 
future (due to properties of general cognition; see Bouchard, 1995, p.  141), and since all time 
periods are "slices" of time, they are also intrinsically oriented, as illustrated in the following. 
(863)  Time 
Intervals of  time 
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Thus,  in a temporal construal, the  orientation in GO/ALLER's meaning is  taken to  refer to 
the  intrinsic orientation  of time  itself or of an  interval  of time.  Given the  orientation we 
attribute to time, if  ro  is th.e end-point of the temporal orientation, it must be subsequent to the 
reference time and thus in the future (Bouchard, 1995, p.  155). For an English sentence like 
(861)  above,  we  obtain  the  compositional  meaning  illustrated  in  (864),  which  can  be 
paraphrased as:  'The time period summer is undergoing an orientation toward localization at 
its own intrinsic temporal end point'. 
(864)  'surnmer' 
-------•L ('summer', ro) 
1 
1 
1 
'future endpoint' 
In the case of the French sentence (862) above, we obtain a similar compositional meaning, 
paraphrasable as:  'the period summer is  temporally oriented  toward relating to  a temporal 
point ro'.  Although no localization is expressed here, the fact that we construe the orientation 
and the constant ro  temporally radically reduces the possible interpretations of the relation R. 
That is,  given our knowledge of time's orientation and  our knowledge  that  time  intervals 
have boundaries, the only obvious way for a time period to be oriented toward a future point 
ro  is  for  ro  to  be the  endpoint of this petiod
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.  Th us,  despite the  absence of a localization 
component in the sentence, we nonetheless infer that  ro  refers  to  the  endpoint of the time 
period,  leading  us  to  the  same  global  meaning  as  with  GO:  'summer  is  oriented  toward 
rea ching its own temporal end point'. 
In  both  sentences,  the  modifier  quickly/vite  specifies  the  speed  of this  orientation.  The 
speaker is  thus expressing the impression that the time period's natural tendency to  reach its 
123  lt could be argued that representation (864) also allows an alternative interpretation: if  ffi is a future 
point other than the summer's own endpoint, we could obtain:  'the summer is oriented to being wholly 
in  the future', i.e.  'the summer will take place in the future'. Crucially, however, this interpretation is 
ruled out by our extralinguistic knowledge:  a time period like summer cannot be  oriented away from 
the present such that it becomes localized in the future. 255 
temporal endpoint is  being accomplished with considerable speed.  While world knowledge 
indicates that time passes at a constant speed, use of a speed modifier portrays the speaker's 
subjective experience of  the passage oftime, an experience that allows for the speed oftime's 
passing to  vary. If the sentence were to  contain no  such modifier, as  in (865)  and (866), it 
would simply state that a given time period X is  oriented toward its own intrinsic endpoint. 
Since time periods are all intrinsically oriented toward their own endpoints, these sentences 
are completely uninformative and thus unacceptable. 
(865)  *The day is going. 
(866)  *La journée va. 
Since an event is by definition an element that occurs in time and thus corresponds to a time 
interval, all events inherit the property of having an intrinsic temporal orientation. Renee, if 
the  subject  is  an  event  expression  as  in  (867)  and  (868),  we  constme  GO/  ALLER  as 
describing this event's orientation toward its own temporal endpoint.  Once again, without a 
modifier, the sentence merely restates the obvious fact that these events are oriented toward 
their own endpoints, yielding the unacceptability observed in (869) and (870). 
(867)  The events are going so fast thot 1 am not able to keep up to date. 
(868)  Les événements vont si vite que je n'arrive pas à me tenir au courant. 
(869)  *The events are going. 
(870)  *Les événements vont. 
Note that the  preceding examples contain no PPs specifying source and destination.  When 
such complements are included, they are interpreted as  explicitly identifying the source and 
endpoint of the orientation, i.e. the temporal beginning point and end point of the time period. 
Sentences (871) and (872) yield a meaning that can be schematized as in (873). 
(871)  The enrollment period goes from the ]5th to the 30 of  August. 
(872)  La période des inscriptions va du 15 août au 30 août. 256 
(873)  'emoll. period' 
----------+  LIR ('emoll. per.', co) 
1 
'15 Aug.'  '30 Aug.' 
By explicitly anchoring the time period at both a starting point and an endpoint, we obtain a 
reading  expressing  'measure  of a  time  period'.  This  is  parallel  to  the  'spatial  measure' 
reading obtained when the  arguments are concrete, immobile entities (This raad goes from 
Quebec to Montreal; Cette route va de Québec à Montréal). In contrast with (867) and (868) 
above, this anchoring at precise temporal points has  the effect of presenting the time period 
objectively, independently of the speaker's impressions. Predictably, combining botha speed 
modifier and source/destination PPs describing a beginning point and an endpoint results in a 
conflict  between a  subjective  and  an  objective presentation of the  time  period's passing, 
bence  the  unacceptability  of sentences  such  as  (874)  and  (875).  However,  the  sentences 
become acceptable if we are contrasting the impression of speed during that period with the 
speed of  another period, as in (876) and (877)
124
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(874)  * The enrollment period went quickly from the 15th to the 30 of  August. 
(875)  *La période des inscriptions est allée vite du 15 août au 30 août. 
(876)  The  enrollment period went quickly from  the 15th  to  the 30 of  August but then 
dragged on for a month. 
(877)  La période des  inscriptions est allée vite du  15 août au 30 août puis a avancé 
très lentement pendant un mois. 
So far, we have looked at cases where the time expression plays the role of subject, yielding a 
sentence  expressing  that  the  time  period  or  event  is  oriented  toward  its  own  temporal 
endpoint, with  additional  sentential  elements  such  as  modifiers  or  source/destination  PPs 
providing information about this orientation. If, on the other hand, the event expression is not 
124 Observation made by Denis Bouchard (persona! communication). 257 
the  subject  but  rather  a  complement  or  adjunct,  the  compositional  meaning  obtained  is 
different. This is  the case in (878) and (879) below, where GO and ALLER are followed by 
an infinitive verb describing an action. Since these elements are temporal, the orientation and 
anti-deictic  center are  once again  interpreted temporally. However,  in this  case  given  the 
structural position of the  event  expression,  the  latter  provides  inf01mation  about  the  end 
relation of the orientation:  it describes the end-state situated at  the  temporal point w.  The 
result  is  a  situation  in  which  the  subject's  referent  X  is  oriented  temporally  toward 
accomplishing the action described by the infinitive verb, yielding the idea that the action is 
located in the future. In this use, the subject can be virtually anything (a person, an inanimate 
entity,  an  abstract  element,  an  event,  a  quality,  etc.),  since  virtually  any  element can be 
conceived of as being oriented toward participation in a future event. As Bouchard (1995, p. 
153-154)  points  out,  the  orientation  componenf,  by  expressing  a  link  between  present 
(established by the present tense of is going, va) and future (w  identified by the infinitives to 
write/écrire), yields  an  effect of relevance  to  the  present, bence  the  notion of 'nearness' 
traditionally associated with this use. 
(878)  John is going to write a book. 
(879)  Jean va écrire un livre. 
Because GO and ALLER differ in terms of the end-relation they intrinsically express, they 
also  differ in  the precise way  in which they can be combined with an action infinitive to 
express 'future'. In sentence (878) the infinitive is introduced by the localizer TO. (I assume, 
in  line  with  the  general  monosemous  approach,  that  prepositional  TO  and  infinitive-
introducing TO are one and the same lexical element.) The TO-phrase is taken to identify the 
content of the relation L,  so TO's argument, the INF itself, is  taken to identify L's argument 
w. We thus obtain the semantic structure illustrated in (880). 258 
(880)  'John' 
- ------------.  L ('John', w) 
'future' 
'write a book' 
The sentence thus  ascribes  to  Jolm  the property of being oriented toward engaging in the 
!NF-action 'write a book', and the present progressive situates this property at the moment of 
speech. Renee, the speaker is ex pressing a prediction about the occunence of a future action. 
Predictably, if  we use the past progressive as in (881 ), the property holds at a reference time t 
in the past, with the action taking place at a time t' subsequent to  t.  (Since the reference time 
is distinct from the present, t' can be prior to, identical with, or subsequent to  'now'.) At this 
past reference time from which the Subj ect of Consciousness views the situation, the action is 
presented  as  potential  and  indeed  probable,  given  that  John  bas  an  orientation  (i.e.  an 
increasing potential) toward writing a book. But the fact that the  orientation held true at  t 
does not entai! that it held true at all times subsequent to  t,  and bence an additional clause 
affinning non-occurrence of the event as in (882) does not produce a contradiction. 
(881)  John was going to write a book. 
(882)  John was going to write a book, but he gave up the idea due to a lack of  time. 
If, instead, we use the future progressive as  in (883), the result is an unacceptable sentence. 
This sentence states that the orientation holding true at future time t and that ex tends from t to 
a temporal point w that is further in the future. As a result, the orientation does not hold true 
at utterance time. The simultaneous use of GO and WILL gives rise to  a conflict: on the one 
hand, GO expresses a tendency toward a future action and bence makes a prediction, and on 
the  other  band,  the  future  marker  WILL fully  isolates  this  prediction  in  the  future  and 
presents it crucially as  non-effective in the present. The event's present potential to  occur is 
therefore both affirmed  (via GO's orientation)  and  denied  (due to  this  orientation's being 259 
non-effective),  and  this  conflict  in  perspective  results  in  the  unacceptability  exhibited  in 
(883). 
(883)  *John will be going ta write a book. 
Note that the construal of  GO's orientation as a temporary (i.e. temporally bounded) propetiy 
relies on the use of the progressive aspect. If we use a non-progressive fonn, the orientation 
is either construed as punctual (as with the simple past in (884)) or as non-temporary (as with 
the simple present in (885)), and consequently no  'futme' reading can be  obtained for GO. 
Likewise, if GO is  in a morphologically unmarked form, such as when it follows a modal, it 
lacks  the  possibility  of anchoring  the  orientation  at  the  time  of speech  or  the  time  of 
reference, leading once again to an unacceptable use (as shown in (886)). 
(884)  *John went ta write a book. 
(885)  *John goes ta write a book. 
(886)  *John willlwould/can/could/etc. go ta write a book. 
Recall that tbere are two basic ways in wbich an INF can be combined with a preceding verb 
in English: either by being introduced by TO, or in its bare form.  As we saw in the discussion 
of GO's progredience use (see section 5.2.2), in wbicb a bare INF following GOis taken to 
specify the content of GO's end relation L,  this GO + BARE-INF construction is  limiteti to 
cases in which GO itself bears no morphological mark.  Thus, when GO is in the progressive 
fonn, it cannot be combined directly with a bare INF.  And since GO's future reading relies 
on the use of the  progressive fonn,  GO  + BARE-INF  cannot be used  to  obtain a  'future' 
reading, as shown in (887). 
(887)  *John is going write a book. 
In contrast,  as  Bouchard  (1995,  p.  154)  points  out,  ALLER's  'futme'  use  is  structmally 
equivalent to  the 'progredience' sense.  As  we saw in my discussion of progredience, unlike 
English GO, French ALLER is not subject to any constraints on its morphological form when 
it combines directly with an INF. This is why ALLER can be directly combined with an INF 
to obtain a 'future' reading as in (888), whose semantic structure is given in (889). (888)  Jean va écrire un livre. 
(889)  'Jean' 
----------+  R ('Jean', ro) 
1  1 
1  1 
1  1 
1  1 
1 
1 
1 
'écrire un livre'  'futur' 
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As  seen in the discussion of progredience, because the INF is  directly adjoined to  ALLER 
rather than introduced by a relational element, it cannot be taken as  co-referential with the 
point w. Instead, in this construction it applies directly toR itself, thus telling us how 'Jean' 
relates to the temporal point ro:  Jean relates to this  future point by carrying out the  action 
'write a  book'.  We thus  obtain a  meaning paraphrasable as:  'Jean is  oriented toward the 
future action ofwriting a book'. 
Note that this construction contains no element expressing localization and thus no  element 
expressing  the  notion  of temporal  endpoint.  If,  instead  of directly  combining  INF  with 
ALLER,  we  were  to  use  the  localizer  À  to  join the  two  verbs  as  in  (890)  below,  this 
localizing preposition would specify the content of R. Furthermore, INF, the argument of À, 
would be taken as  co ~referential with R's argument, the point w. However, as seen above (see 
section 5  .5), a situation of transition toward localization at a new point requires the notion of 
source localization. Crucially, while GO's meaning supports an implied source localization, 
ALLER's meaning does  not.  Renee, while GO + TO + INF  is  acceptable with  a  'future' 
reading,  ALLER + À + INF  is  not,  as shown in  (890).  Note that the addition of EN (an 
element expressing source localization, c.f. my discussion of EN VENIR À INF, section 4.6) 
does not improve acceptability. This is because EN appears to be semantically inadequate to 
express  a  temporal  source  localization,  as  evidenced  by  the  fact  that  (891)  cannot  be 
paraphrased as (892). (890)  *Jean va à écrire un livre. 
(891)  La période des inscriptions va du 15 août au 30 août. 
(892)  *La période des inscriptions en va au 30 août. 
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To conclude, in the present section we have looked at GO/ALLER's temporal uses, i.e. those 
in which one of the arguments in the sentence refers to  a temporal element such as a time 
period or an event. We have seen that there are two general possibilities, depending on the 
grammatical role occupied by the time expression. If the time period/event NP plays the role 
of grammatical subject of GO/  ALLER, the orientation component in these verbs' meaning is 
construed as referring to the intrinsic orientation oftime itself (from past to present to future), 
and we ob tain an use ex  pressing the passing of time. If the temporal element is a complement 
or adjunct of GO/ALLER, we  obtain a  situation of 'X's orientation toward perfonning a 
future action'. The precise structure via which this is achieved in each language is influenced 
by the verb's intrinsic semantics and by the language's grammatical properties. GO expresses 
'future'  when the INF is  introduced by TO, making INF co-referential with the co  and thus 
expressing localization at a future time associated with an action. ALLER, on the other band, 
expresses 'future' when an INF is directly adjoined toit, such that the INF applies directly to 
R,  telling  us  how  X  relates  to  co  at the  end  of the  orientation.  Despite  these  structural 
differences, both verbs allow the expression of an action located in the future. 
Furthennore,  the  present  section  bas  demonstrated  that  like  GO's  and  ALLER's  other 
semantic uses, their temporal uses are derived in context from an invariant, abstract meaning. 
Thus, contrary to what is affinned in Cognitive Semantic analyses ofthese verbs, it is entirely 
unnecessary to posit separate meanings linked to the prototypical 'motion' use via conceptual 
metaphors such as TIME PASSING IS MOTION (see Radden, 1996). Both the 'motion' use 
and  the  temporal  uses  of these  verbs  are  obtained  because  GO  and  ALLER  express 
orientation,  i.e.  'increasing  potential',  with  contextual  factors  determining  what  kind  of 
orientation  is  involved.  The  sentence John  is  going  ta  Montreal expresses  that  Jolm  bas 
increasing potential  to  be  in Montreal, while the  sentence John  is  going  ta  write  a  book 
expresses that he bas increasing potential to write a book. In the former case the relation takes 
the  f01m  of motion, while in the  latter it takes  the fonn of futurity,  and it  is  context and 262 
background knowledge  that  are  responsible for  this  distinction.  Crucially,  the  adoption of 
multiple  lexicalized  meanings  linked  via  numerous  conceptual  metaphors  in  a  complex 
network (as in a Cognitive Semantic analysis) makes this type of  parsimonious generalization 
impossible. 
5.10  Evaluation 
In this section I discuss how GO and ALLER express evaluation. As  shown above (section 
5.9), when the subject of GO refers to an event and there is a modifier expressing a temporal 
property  such  as  speed  as  in  (893),  we  construe  the  orientation  and  the  endpoint  w 
temporally: the sentence is taken to describe the event's orientation toward reaching its own 
temporal end point.  In sentence· (894),  the  subject once again refers  to  an event,  yielding a 
temporal construal of the orientation. However, in this case, rather than providing temporal 
infmmation the modifier expresses evaluation. 
(893)  The events are going so fast that 1 am not able to keep up to date . 
. (894)  The exam/dinner party/construction of  the bridge went well/is going weil. 
Evaluative modifiers  can be  assumed to  express  degree of conespondence between a real 
element A and a conesponding ideal A'. Thus, evaluative terms  like WELL and POORL  Y 
can be given the approximate description in (895) and (896), respectively. 
(895)  Positive evaluators:  'actual A ~  ideal A' ' 
(896)  Negative evaluators:  'actual A f. ideal A' ' 
As  a  result, in  (897)  below  the  adverbs  WELL  and POORL  Y  express  that  the  particular 
instantiation  of  the  action  A  named  by  the  verb  (painting,  swimming,  dancing) 
corresponds/does  not conespond to  an implied ideal version A' of this action. The sentence 
therefore expresses that 'Jane's painting/swimming/dancing corresponds/does not correspond 
to the ideal for painting/swimming/dancing'. 263 
(897)  Jane paints/swims/dances well/poorly. 
Hence, in (894) above the  modifier WELL applies to  GO's meaning and indicates that the 
event's actual orientation conesponds toits ideal orientation. The use of this modifier brings 
us to look for sorne element in GO's meaning that can be compared to an ideal. Crucially, the 
relation L(X, w  ), which is construed temporally as anchoring at a temporal end point, can be 
metonymically interpreted as  the state of affairs that holds at that endpoint, i.e. the outcome 
of the  event.  Applying  the  semantics  of the  positive  eval~ative element  WELL  to  this 
component,  we  obtain  the  idea  that  the  event's  actual  outcome  corresponds  (to  a  certain 
degree) to  its  ideal outcome, as  schematized in the following.  In  other words,  the  sentence 
expresses that 'event X (the exam/dinner/party/etc.) is oriented towards the attainment of its 
ideal outcome'. 
(898)  'event' 
-------•L ('event', w) 
1 
1 
1 
'actual outcome';:::; 'ideal outcome' 
Based on this same reasoning, when the subject of GO + EVALUATIVE-MODIFIER refers 
to a time period, the latter is construed metonyrnically as an event or succession of  events, i.e. 
as an interval with interna! change. Thus, in (899) through (901) below, the subjects the day 
and the weekend refer to  the  events that happened during the  temporal interval in question. 
Once  again, use  of an  evaluative  modifier  yields  the  idea  of a  comparison  between  the 
event's actual outcome and its  ideal outcome. Even when the precise nature of the event is 
not specified,  as  in (90 1  ), we  still  infer that the  referent is  sorne  kind  of event/process  or 
series of  events. 
(899)  The day is going pretty well. 
(900)  How did the weekend  go? 
(90 1)  'Hi Jane. How's it going?' - 'Fine,  thanks.' 
Due  to  its  difference  in intrinsic  meaning, the  verb  ALLER  achieves an  'evaluative'  use 
differently than GO.  Because ALLER's end-relation is  the maximally general R rather than 264 
localization at a point, ALLER's semantic content is  too  general to  provide the notion of a 
temporal endpoint in a sentence like (902). Renee,  CD  cannat be construed as an outcome of 
the  event.  As  a  result  the  evaluative  modifier BIEN's meaning of 'correspondence  to  an 
ideal' cannat be taken as qualifying the outcome of the event as it does in (899) through (90 1) 
above. 
(902)  L'examen/la fête/la construction du pont va bien. 
If, however, the evaluative modifier is taken instead as applying directly to R itself, we obtain 
a meaningful interpretation. Since Ris maximally general, it can be construed as any relation 
between  two  elements,  provided  that  there  is  information  fi·om  context  or  background 
knowledge  to  support  this  construal.  In  the  present  case,  we  have  a  modifier  that  itself 
expresses a relation between two elements: an actual element A and the corresponding ideal 
A '. So  if the  modifier applies to  R,  we obtain that R itself is  a relation of correspondence 
between X and its ideal, as represented in (903). 
(903)  'event' 
-------•R ('event', CD) 
1 
1 
1 
'conespondence to ideal' 
This notion of 'ideal'is suppmied by the semantic properties of the anti-deictic center, whose 
meaning  is  'any point other than the  deictic  center'. Recall  that  the  deictic  center can  be 
construed as  'the real world' (for example, see section 4.4). When this is  the case, the anti-
deictic center is  most naturally interpreted as  'the set of non-real, i.e.  potential, worlds' (see 
Bouchard,  1997).  In  the  context  of an  evaluation,  the  notion  'potential  world'  can  be 
interpreted specifically as  'the desirable potential state of affairs', i.e 'the ideal'. Thus, for 
sentence (902) above, we obtain:  'event X (the exam/party/construction/etc.) is engaged in a 
tendency toward corresponding to an ideal'. 
Since not only events  but entities can be characterized as  resembling or not resembling an 
ideal, ALLER can also be used to express evaluation with a subject referring to an entity, as 
in the following examples. 265 
(904)  Jean va bien. 
(905)  Les affaires vont bien. 
(906)  L'économie va bien. 
In  each  of these  sentences,  the  elements  present yield  the  compositional  meaning  'X is 
oriented toward corresponding to the ideal X' '. Note that this bas consequences for the kind 
of propetiies that can be targeted by the evaluation.  Since X is  being compared to  an ideal 
version  of itself (X'),  sentence  (904)  expresses  that  the  'real  Jean'  is  oriented  toward 
c01responding to (i.e. resembling) the 'ideal Jean'. This restricts the interpretation to aspects 
of Jean himself: without special context, Jean va bien normally means that he is healthy or 
th at he is  in a psychological state of well-being. However, as pointed out by Denis Bouchard 
(persona! communication), when the  context involves a salient action of which Jean is  the 
agent, Jean can be used metonyrnically to refer to this action. Thus, for example, an observer 
of a chess toumament (or other contest)  can say Jean  va  bien  with the  intended meaning 
'Jean is doing weil so far'. This is  because in the context of the tournament, the most salient 
aspect of John is not a general property such as health or psychological well-being, but rather 
his status in the game (i.e. whether he is winning or losing). 
In contrast to  ALLER, GO contains the specifie end-relation of localization, and the latter is 
not construable as correspondence to an ideal. That is, saying that 'X is localized at w' cannot 
be interpreted as 'X is similar to  üJ'. Th  us, wh  en GO is used with an evaluative modifier, the 
latter  cannot be  taken  as  specifying  the  content of the  end-relation L.  Instead,  as  shown 
above, the modifier applies to the end-point üJ  construed as an outcome of an event. Because 
GO's 'evaluation' use is  based on the temporal construal of GO's components, we can only 
obtain this sense when the subject is a temporal element, i.e. a time period or an event. When 
the  subject  refers  to  sorne  other  type  of element  such  as  an  entity,  the  result  1s  an 
unacceptable sentence, yielding the following contrasts between ALLER and GO. 266 
(907)  Jean va bien. vs.  *John is going weil.  (person) 
(908)  Ce couteau va mal. vs.  *This knife goes/is going bad/y. (inanimate entity) 
(909)  L'économie va bien. vs.  *The economy is going weil.  (abstract entity) 
Another difference concerns the possibility of omission of the modifier.  ALLER's evaluative 
use is  not based on orientation toward an outcome but rather on correspondence to  an ideal. 
As shown above, the notion of  ideal itself is obtained by construing OJ  as a possible world and 
hence  an  'ideal'  when  contextual  elements  such  as  an  evaluative  modifier  suppmi  this 
interpretation. But when the subject of ALLER is the highly general pronoun ÇA, an element 
capable of referring to  'the situation in general'  and thus to  'things as  they exist in  the real 
world', we ob tain a sentence expressing that the real world is oriented toward conesponding 
to  m.  The  'possible  world'  construal  of the  latter  is  thus  strongly  favored  by  semantic 
properties of ÇA, so no evaluation modifier is needed to obtain an evaluation interpretation, 
as  shown in sentences like  (910)  and (911).  In contrast to  this,  GO's evaluative use results 
from the verb's meaning being construed temporally, with and  OJ  (construed as  a temporal 
endpoint) receiving the interpretation 'outcome', such that no element of the verb's meaning 
provides the notion of 'ideal'. Since the latter is  supplied solely by the evaluative modifier, 
omission of  this modifier is impossible, as shown in (912)
125
. 
(910)  Ça va. 
(911)  Ça ne va pas en ce moment. 
(912)  *ft is going/Things are going. 
Since ALLER's component OJ  is construed as 'ideal' (i.e. that which is inaccessible to the SC 
in the  real  world),  when a  dative  clitic pronoun is  used,  the latter specifies  the person to 
125  An apparent exception is  the use of  the subject ANYTHING, as in: At these parties, anything goes. 
However, this is most likely a fixed expression, as shown by the impossibility of  changing the tense or 
aspect: *At that party, anything went. *At this party, anything is going.  Moreover, anything goes does 
not express evaluation, but rather permission. ------- -----
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whom  this  ideal  belongs,  i·.e.  the  SC  whose  conscwusness  determines  the  ideal.  Renee, 
sentence (913) expresses 'acceptability to a person'. 
(913)  Je peux te/vous rencontrer à 1  Oh demain. Est-ce que ça te/vous va?- Oui, ça me 
va. 
Since English has no direct equivalent to the French dative clitic, a direct translation of these 
sentences is  unacceptable, as  shown in (914). Moreover, since in GO's 'evaluative' use the 
anti-deictic center is interpreted temporally rather than as an ideal, a destination complement 
refening to a person cannot specify the reference of w, accounting for the impossibility of the 
'acceptability to a person' use for GO, as in (915). 
(914)  *! can meet you at 10 tomorrow. Does thal go you? 
(915)  *! can meet you at 10 tomorrow. Does that go to/for you? 
In  conclusion,  while  both  GO  and  ALLER  express  'evaluation',  they  accomplish  this 
differently.  GO's evaluative use  is  obtained by  construing 'localization at w'  as  a temporal 
endpoint (more specifically, as  the outcome of an event), while in ALLER's evaluative use, 
the  anti-deictic  center  is  interpreted  as  'ideal  version  of X', and  the  maximally  general 
relation Ris construed as 'conespondence to this ideal'. 
5.11 Appropriateness/belonging 
I  now  turn  to  a  discussion  of  how  GO  and  ALLER  can  be  used  to  express 
'belonging/appropriateness', as in (916) and (917). 
(916)  Ce couteau-là va dans le tiroir à gauche. 
(917)  Le livre va en haut de la bibliothèque. 
(918)  'couteau' 
---------+  R ('couteau', w) 
1  1 
1  1 
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In these sentences, the generic tense supports a construal of the orientation as a property that 
holds  true  at  all  points  in  time.  Thus,  sentence  (917),  whose  compositional  meaning  is 
represented in (918), expresses that 'the knife is oriented at all points intime toward relating 
to w'. The PP complement dans ce tiroir-là specifies the nature of the relation (in this case, 
containment)  and  identifies  w  as  'that  drawer'.  Since  the  latter  is  a  concrete  entity,  we 
construe the containment relation spatially (i.e. as concrete containment). 
However,  world  knowledge  about  the  subject's  referent  (a  knife  is  an  inanimate  object 
incapable  of self-movement)  rules  out  a  'motion'  construal,  so  GO's  meaning  must  be 
interpreted abstractly. We saw above (section 5.10) that w, as a point other than that which is 
accessible to the Subject of Consciousness, can be construed as an ideal (in opposition to the 
deictic  center  construed  as  the  real  world).  A  sentence  like  (916)  and  (917)  above  can 
therefore describe an entity's being permanently oriented toward an ideal relation, i.e. toward 
the way things should be. 
The  'appropriateness/belonging'  use  illustrated  in  these  sentences  thus  involves  an  SC's 
intentional view of the world: the knife is oriented toward containment in a drawer because a 
Subj ect of Consciousness judges that it should be there. For this reas on, sentences like (916) 
and  (917)  can  be  used  felicitously  regardless  of whether  the  particular  spatial  relation 
expressed by the PP (dans ce tiroir-là, en haut de  la  bibliothèque, etc.) is  actualized at  the 
time of  the utterance. That is, the knife may or may not effectively be in the drawer in the real 
world (i.e.  the deictic center); what is being expressed is  that according to  sorne Subject of 
Consciousness, the relation expressed by dans ce tiroir-là is  the proper one.  Moreover, this 
reading can arise even when background knowledge tells us  that the relation in question is 
not effectively achieved the majority of  the time. Thus, (919) is acceptable with a 'belonging' 
reading even though its content indicates that the intended relation 'the blocks are in the box' 
is  rarely  achieved  in reality.  That this  use  expresses  a  subjective judgment and  does  not 
therefore  depend  solely  on  objective  properties  such  frequency  of occwTence  is  further 
illustrated by (920). The latter is  strange under a 'belonging'  reading, for we view the fact 
that the sharks' belonging in the sea as part of objective reality rather thanas determined by 
an SC's intentions. In contrast, example (921), if spoken by the director of a marine park, is 
acceptable  because  context and  background  knowledge  indicate  that there  is  a  belonging 269 
relation established by  an SC's (here, the  speaker's) intentionality:  the  sharks  are  intended 
(e.g. by the owners/managers/employees of  the park) to be in a particular aquarium. 
(919)  Ces  blocs  vont  dans  la  boîte  à jouets,  mais  ils  sont pratiquement  toujours 
éparpillés par terre. 
(920)  ??Les requins vont dans la mer. 
(921)  Mais ces requins vont dans l'autre aquarium! Qui les a mis avec les phoques? 
Becaus~ this use is based on an atemporal property and does not therefore involve a transition 
from one state to  another, it does not require the notions of beginning point and  end point, 
notions that rely on localization. This explains why this use is possible for the verb ALLER. 
However,  while  localization  is  not  required  for  a  'belonging'  situation,  it  is  nonetheless 
compatible with such a situation. Consequently, GO can also receive this interpretation, as in 
(922)  and  (923).  In (922)'s  compositional  meaning,  which  is  schematized  in  (924),  the 
preposition  IN  fmiher  specifies  L  as  consisting  of a  containment  relation.  Crucially,  the 
general relation of localization is compatible with containment, and the sentence is therefore 
acceptable. 
(922)  Thal knife goes in the left drawer. 
(923)  Thal book goes on the top shelf. 
(924)  'knife' 
--------+  L ('knife', w) 
1  1 
'in'  'drawer' 
World knowledge can supply further details about the nature of the 'be1onging' relation. For 
example, in (925) and (926), based on what we know about the artifacts involved- i.e.  ovens 
and dishes - we infer that if the dish in question 'belongs in the oven', it  is  because it was 
designed to  be used in the  oven. More specifically,  since we  know that beat is  potentially 
destructive for certain materials, we most naturally interpret this sentence as  expressing that 
the dish in question is  oven-safe, i.e.  resistant to damage from the temperatures produced by 
an oven. Altematively, with proper background knowledge, the sentence could mean that due 270 
to lack of cabinet spa ce the owner of the dish typically stores the latter in the oven when the 
latter is not in use. 
(925)  This dish goes in the aven. 
(926)  Cette assiette va au four. 
When the verb is  followed by a PP expressing accompaniment,  as  in (927) and (928),  the 
sentence expresses that X belongs in  the presence of  another given object. Since the adverbs 
TOGETHER and ENSEMBLE mean roughly 'with Y' (i.e.  The knives are with the forks is 
equivalent  to  The  knives  and forks  are  together),  this  same  idea  can  be  expressed  by 
replacing the WITH/AVEC-PP with the adverb TOGETHERJENSEMBLE, as  in  (929) and 
(930). The notion that the belonging relation is spatial is solely due to world knowledge about 
the arguments'  referents,  for neither GO/ALLER themselves nor the accompaniment tenns 
WITH/  A  VEC/TOGETHERJENSEMBLE  contain  any  intrinsic  spatial  information.  Thus, 
when we  use  an abstract subject and complement as  in (931)  and  (932),  we  infer that  the 
intended  relation  is  also  abstract.  Once  again,  the  same  situation  can  be  expressed  by 
replacing the  accompaniment PP with an adverb  of accompaniment  ((933)  and  (934)).  In 
these sentences, given the abstract nature of  the elements involved, we obtain the idea that the 
elements in question tend to occur in the same circumstances or at the same time. 271 
(927)  These krlives go with the other silverware. 
(928)  Ces couteaux vont avec les autres ustensiles. 
(929)  Should 1 put the knives andforks in separate drawers?-No,  they go together. 
(930)  Devrais-je ranger les couteaux et les fourchettes dans des tiroirs séparés ? Non, 
ils vont ensemble. 
(931)  Which adjectives go with the word "fe  ar"? 
(932)  Quels adjectifs vont avec le mot« peur» ? 
(933)  The words  "morbid" and ''fear" go together. 
(934)  Les mots «peur» et« maladive» vont ensemble. 
The notion of 'belonging/appropriateness' expressed in this use is highly general, for when a 
Subject of Consciousness judges  that  a  given  object  should be  in  a  given  relation,  this 
judgment can be based on a variety of  propetties. The type of  properties involved depends on 
our world knowledge of the arguments involved in the sentence. Sentences (935) and (936) 
are in fact ambiguous. On the one band, the belonging that is expressed may be attributable to 
frequent co-occurrence, as in examples (931) through (934) above: the pants and shitt belong 
together because some person (e.g. some Subject of Consciousness) habitually wears them at 
the same time. 
(935)  These pants go with that shirt. 
(936)  Ce pantalon va avec cette chemise. 
Alternatively, the belonging relation may come from workplace standards (i.e. if the clothes 
in question are a  unifonn and the  sentence is  spoken by a manager to  a trainee).  Another 
possibility is that the two pieces of clothing are sold together (for example, if the sentence is 
spoken  by  a  salesperson  to  a  customer  to  infmm  the  latter  that  the  clothes  cannot  be 
purchased separately).  Y  et another (and perhaps the most salient) possible interpretation is 
one in which the belonging relation is established based on aesthetic considerations. Here, the 
speaker is expressing a judgment about how visually harmonious the clothes are wh en worn 272 
together. The sentences become unambiguous if we  introduce an evaluative modifier, as  in 
(937) and (938). 
(937)  These pants go weil with that shirt. 
(938)  Ce pantalon va bien avec cette chemise. 
Here,  the  evaluative  modifier (ex pressing conespondence between a real  situation and  its 
ideal  counterpart)  indicates  that  when  the  co-occunence relation  is  realized,  the  situation 
approaches an ideal. This notion of a gradable conespondence to an ideal is compatible with 
the notion of harmonious accompaniment:  in  our subjective view of the world,  objects can 
have  visual properties  that make  their  co-occurrence pleasing or displeasing  (i.e.  visually 
hatmonious) to varying degrees. 
If the entities involved are human, given the much broadcr range of  properties we attribute to 
humans compared to  inanimate objects, there is  a greater number of propetiies that can be 
compared and evaluated subjectively for  harmoniousness. Thus, while  (939) and (940)  can 
mean that John and Mary have visual propctties that make them appear good together, the 
sentence is also acceptable if the relation of belonging is based on abstract propetiies such as 
personality  traits.  When  the  elements  refened  to  by  the  subject  are  themselves  abstract 
qualities,  as  in  (941)  and (942),  the  intended judgment of harmoniousness involves purely 
abstract considerations. That is, in this case the speaker expresses that the two abstract traits 
in question are somehow contradictory. 
(939)  John and Mary go well together. 
(940)  Jean et Marie vont bien ensemble. 
(941)  These two personplity traits do not go (well) together. 
(942)  Ces deux traits de personnalité ne vont pas (bien) ensemble. 
The 'harmonious accompaniment' reading seen in (937) and (938) can also be obtained by 
using a French dative clitic (ME/TE/LUI/etc.) or an À-phrase to refer to a person, as in (943) 
through (946). In these examples, ALLER's complement LUI indicates that the harmonious 
accompaniment relation holds with respect to a person. World knowledge about the subject's 
referent allows us  to  infer the specifie kind of relation involved.  Given the properties of a 273 
shili,  (943)  most likely  describes  visually harmonious  accompaniment (i.e.  the  shirt looks 
good on the person because of its co lors, the way it fits her/him, etc.), while in (944), we infer 
that  indignation  is  pmiicularly  compatible  with  what  the  speaker  knows  of the  person's 
personality traits, behavior, etc. Although these sentences cannot be translated word for word 
into English (e.g. *This shirt goes her weil; *This shirt goes weil to Mary), this is presumably 
because neither the English  indirect pronoun form  nor the  preposition TO  have as  wide a 
range of functions  as  the French dative clitic and the preposition À,  respectively. Note that 
the  preposition ON, which can describe a relationship of wearing (What does she have on 
today?),  makes  it  possible to  express harmonious  accompaniment in sentences  like  (947), 
though not in an abstract situation, as in (948)
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(943)  Cette chemise lui va bien. 
(944)  L'indignation lui va bien.  (Grand Robert de la langue française) 
(945)  Cette chemise va bien à Marie. 
(946)  L'indignation va bien à Marie. 
(947)  This shirt goes weil on Mary. 
(948)  *Indignation goes well on her. 
Before leaving  the  present discussion of 'appropriateness/belonging'  uses,  1 would like  to 
point out a related use, illustrated in (949). Unlike tl!e specifie 'belonging in a location' use 
discussed above (  e.g. This fork goes in thal drawer), which in  volves a generic tense depicting 
the orientation as an atemporal property, in case of (949) the future tense is used, yielding the 
idea not of a stable relation, but rather of a transition. In this sentence, the complement PP 
refers to a specifie kind of location: a containing space. The future tense expresses a potential 
event contingent on some implied circumstance (  e.g. 'if y  ou  try  to  put these clothes in the 
suitcase, ...  ').The resulting interpretation is an assessment of  X's potential of being contained 
126 Note that WITH is  also impossible (*Indignation goes weil with  her),  because  the situation being 
described is not simply one of co-occurrence, but rather of  possession of  a quality. 274 
in the container. Since this sense involves the notion of transition, which hinges on the notion 
of source localization, ALLER is inadequate for this use, as shawn in (950). Instead, a verb 
like RENTRER, whose semantics explicitly encodes the nature of the end relation and thus 
allows us to infer the nature of the source relation, is used to express this situation. 
(949)  1 don 't think al! these clothes will go in your suitcase. 
(950)  *Penses-tu que tous ces vêtements vont aller dans la valise? 
(951)  Penses-tu que tous ces vêtements rentreront dans la valise? 
5.12 Action 
In this section 1 turn to a discussion of  uses in which the subject of GO and ALLER refers to 
a persan, yielding the 'action' interpretation seen in sentences (952) and (953), whose basic 
semantic content is represented in (954) . 
(952)  John is not goingfast enough. 
(953)  Jean ne va pas assez vite. 
(954)  'John' 
------+LIR ('John', w) 
- - --- - - - - -,- - - - - - - - -
'fast' 
Taken out of context, these sentences are a priori ambiguous. On the one band, because we 
strongly associate speed with movement, a motion reading can be obtained if GO/ALLER's 
end-relation is  construed spatially as  a physical location and the orientation is  construed as 
movement toward this end location. But speed is  not exclusively a property of movement: it 
can  apply  to  any  action  or  process  that  occurs  over  time.  Thus,  if these  sentences  are 
pronounced  by  a  boss  commenting  on the  progress  of an  employee  who  is  striving  to 
complete an important project, the notion of speed combines with contextual knowledge to 
lead  us  to  construe GO's/ALLER's  orientation as  the  intrinsic temporal  orientation of an 
event towards  its  own  temporal  endpoint.  In this  case, the  event  is  an  action supplied by 275 
context: 'working on the project' 
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. The subject refers to a persan, and crucially a persan can 
be used metonymically to  refer to  the action of which this persan is  the agent. This persan-
for-action metonymy exists independently of GO and ALLER, as shown in (955) and (956), 
where  the  notion of speed  expressed  by  the  adjective,  though  predicated of a  persan,  is 
interpreted  as  describing  a  prope1iy  of the  person's  actions  (i.e.  'sorne  action  that  John 
performs is fast'). 
(955)  John is fast. 
(956)  Jean est rapide. 
Speed,  the  property  expressed  by  the  adverb  in  (952)  and  (953)  above,  is  one  salient 
characteristic of actions, but it is not the only one. When sentential elements describe other 
salient characteristics such as  extent (e.g. far/loin  in (957) through (960)) or intensity (e.g. 
lightlyldoucement in (961)  and  (962)),  we  once  again are  led  to  interpret GO/ALLER as 
refening to an implicit action that can be identified from contextual knowledge. 
(957)  He'!/ go far in /if e. 
(958)  Il ira loin dans la vie. 
(959)  Y  ou are going too far (in your attempts to win). 
(960)  Vous allez trop loin (dans vos tentatives de gagner). 
(961)  Go lightly on the butter. 
(962)  Vas-y doucement avec le marteau: tu vas casser le mur! 
Note that unlike modifiers expressing speed (e.g.  vite in (953)) and extent (e.g.  loin in (958) 
and (960)), adverbs of intensity do not imply orientation to  an endpoint. Renee, in (962), in 
order to  obtain an action reading (which relies on the presence of a temporal endpoint), the 
127  See  Lamarche (1998)  on ALLER's ability  to  refer to  an  action provided by discursive context: 
"Comme la situation est en quelque sorte donnée, le verbe n'a pas à l'identifier directement : il sert en 
quelque sorte de pro-verbe, dont l'antécédent est une situation déjà présupposée dans le  discours" (p. 
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locative  Y  is  used.  When  this  element  IS  omitted,  the  sentence  becomes  slightly  less 
acceptable, as shown in (963). 
(963)  (?)Va doucement avec le marteau: tu vas casser le mur! 
Actions,  unlike  time  periods,  can be  characterized along  a variety of dimensions: we  can 
attribute to  them a measure along sorne axis of magnitude other than time. Renee, sentential 
information suggesting an action reading for GO/  ALLER can also come from a complement 
expressing a limit along sorne non-temporal dimension. In examples (964) and (965), the PP 
expresses completeness, and we thus obtain the idea of full accomplishment of the action (in 
this  case,  'solving  the  mystery').  Similarly, when GO  and  ALLER are  combined  with  a 
complement describing a limit along the dimension of effort as in (966) and (967), the result 
is  a sentence expressing that the action performed involves a ce1iain effort. Likewise, if the 
complement refers to an amount of money ((968) and (969)), this yields the idea of an action 
possessing a limit along the dimension of  priee, so we infer th at the unmentioned action is a 
financial transaction. 277 
(964)  He  was  determined to  go ali the way to  the bottom of  the mystery.  (Adapted 
from Webster 's Third New lnternationa!) 
(965)  Jean était résolu à aller au fond de ce mystère. 
(966)  He went so far asto study the strategies of  his adversaries in great detail. 
(967)  Il  est  allé jusqu'à  étudier  les  stratégies  de  son  adversaire jusque dans  les 
moindres détails
128
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(968)  J'tl give you $500, but 1 can 't go any higher titan that. (Longman) 
(969)  Je vous donne 500 dollars pour ça,  mais je ne peux pas aller plus loin que ça. 
We  can also be led to  interpret GO/  ALLER's orientation as  refening to an implied action if 
the verb's modifier describes an element (such as a rule, a desire, etc.) which, according to 
our world knowledge, constitutes a force capable of  influencing the orientation of a volitional 
being's actions. 
(970)  She decided togo by the rules. 
(971)  Il y est allé selon son envie. 
Another way to provide contextual material to suggest the performance of an action is via the 
mention of an instrument or means. One common way to express instrument in French is via 
a PP headed by the highly general preposition DE, as  shown in (972) through (974). Thus, 
when we combine ALLER with a DE-phrase expressing an instrument or means, this leads us 
to  infer that ALLER refers to  an unrnentioned action. Given our knowledge about the entity 
named in the DE-phrase, we infer the specifie way in which the entity is used to contribute to 
the  accomplishment  of the  action's  goal.  For  example,  in  (975)  the  argument  chanson 
suggests  that  the  action  is  'singing or playing  an  instrument',  and  further  content  in  the 
128  This  'extent of effort' interpretation can also be obtained by combining GO with a TO-PP as  in 1 
went to  a great deal of  effort/trouble/to great lengths to  make this party a success. The impossibility 
of this particular construction in French (  e.g.  *Il est allé à beaucoup d'effort afin que cette soirée soit 
une réussite) may be due to differences in the intrinsic semantics of TO and À which I have not been 
able to identify.  However, cf the acceptable sentence Il y est allé de beaucoup d'effort, an use which 1 
account for below. 278 
sentence  indicates  that  this  singing/playing  constitutes  a  contribution  to  the  activity 
'dancing'. In (976), the means refeued to  by the DE-phrase is  an amount of money.  Given 
our knowledge of  money and of the other elements involved in the situation, we infer that the 
action is a purchase. Note the presence in these sentences of the generallocalizer Y, without 
which there would be no element to provide the notion of  end localization necessary to obtain 
an action construal of ALLER. Due to the absence of  an equivalent to the highly abstract DE 
in English, this use is impossible for GO, as shown in (977) and (978)
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(972)  Jean a tué Paul d'une balle à la tête. 
(973)  Il est entré en poussant du coude. 
(974)  Elle était chaussée de hautes bottes. ( 
(975)  Il y est allé de sa chanson, (et tout le monde s'est mis à danser). 
(976)  J'ai  dû  y  aller de  toutes mes économies  (pour  acheter cette  maison).  Grand 
Robert de la langue française) 
(977)  *He went ojlfrom his song, and everyone began to dance. 
(978)  *! had togo of/from ali of  my savings to buy this house. 
In the 'action' examples examined so far,  information about the nature of the unmentioned 
action is obtained at least partly from sentential elements such as modifiers or comP.lements. 
But  when  background  knowledge  about  the  extra-linguistic  situation  strongly  and 
unambiguously identify the intended action, no explicit sentential information is needed. This 
129 As  I showed in  my discussion of the  'recent past' use of VENIR (section 4.12), the absence of a 
direct DE-equivalent in  English is  also at the root of the  impossibility of the  'recent past' sense for 
COME.  For the  present 'means/instrument of action'  use,  one  might object that English does  have 
other prepositions such as  WITH which are capable of  expressing the notion of instrument/means, but 
which nonetheless do not allow us  to  obtain an  'action' use  with GO:  *He went with  his song,  and 
everyone beg  an to dance;*! had togo with al! of  my savings to buy this house. However, this is equally 
true of WITH's French equivalent AVEC: *Il y est allé avec sa chanson/ses économies  ...  Crucially, 
prepositions like  A  VEC/WITH can be assumed to have richer,  more specifie semantic content than 
DE, for the  latter  is  far  more  multifunctional.  The identification of the  semantic properties of these 
specifie instrument prepositions that make them inadequate to  ob tain an 'instrument/means of action' 
reading with GO/ALLER goes beyond the scope of  this study. 279 
is  the  case,  for  example,  in  the  context  of a  sport or other  game  in which  the  context 
unambiguously indicates that the agent's action is  to play successfully and thus to  win  (by 
doing whatever specifie actions are necessary to win). Thus, GO and ALLER can be used to 
express encomagement to a hearer engaged at the moment of speech in an action of this ki nd, 
in sentences such as (979) and (980). 
(979)  Go John, you can doit! 
(980)  Vas-y,  Jean, t'es capable 1 
Once again, in the case of  ALLER, the locative Y is necessary in order to provide the notion 
of end  point;  otherwise  the  sentence  is  unacceptable,  as  shown in  (981)  below.  Note that 
ALLER can be acceptably used without any complement only when the verb is  in  the 2"d 
person plmal (982).  This morphological restriction points to a case of phraseology:  the 2"d 
person plmal use in (982)  is  not a free,  compositional use of ALLER, but rather a frozen, 
lexicalized form (perhaps with the status of an interjection).  In contrast to  ALLER, in  the 
case of GO, which contains end-localization, no complement is  needed to  obtain an action 
use, be it in the singular or the plmal (983) and (984). 
(981)  *Va Jean! 
(982)  Allez les Nordiques! 
(983)  Go John! 
(984)  Go Habs, go! 
When  context  and/or  background  knowledge  strongly  indicates  that  the  referent  of 
GO/ ALLER's subject is expected to perform an action but bas not yet begun this action at the 
moment of the utterance, we natmally infer that the sentence describes 'beginning an action', 
as in (985) through (988). Once again, since ALLER does not intrinsically express orientation 280 
toward localization at an endpoint, it cannot express action unless the explicit locative Y is 
used to provide this notion
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(985)  (In the context of  a board game)  You can go now: it's your turn. 
(986)  The preparations have been completed and we're ready togo. (Longman) 
(987)  Vas-y,  c'est ton tour maintenant./*Va,  c'est ton tour maintenant. 
(988)  Les préparatifs sont terminés et nous sommes prêts à *(y) aller. 
In certain cases, when context is sufficiently rich, GO can even be used to  refer to  a highly 
specifie  action  such  as  a  bodily  function.  Thus,  in  (989)  GO  expresses  urination  or 
defecation. ALLER's highly general semantics is inadequate for us to  obtain such a specifie 
sense.  On the one hand, it does  not contain the localization necessary to  set up  a temporal 
reading - and thus an action reading - without sorne element in the sentence to  provide the 
notion of localization (  construable as  temporal endpoint). On the other hand, including an 
element like  Y  presumably not only contributes  the  notion of endpoint  but also  cmcially 
foregrounds this notion and thus insists on end-state rather thau on the process itself, making 
ALLER inadequate for the expression of a bodily process like the ones involved here
131
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130 It should be noted that in sorne dialects/registers of English, it  is  possible to  explicitly specify the 
action being begun via a TO+GERUND complement, as in They went to fighting among themselves, as 
construction  that  is  impossible  in  French,  whose  closest  equivalent  to  the  English  gerund  is  the 
infinitive:  *Ils sont allés à se battre.  Given that that this use of GO  appears  to  be subject to  dialectal 
variation, I have  excluded  it  from  the  present analysis.  Note that the sentences  becomes acceptable 
when the verbal complement is introduced by a limit-expression (They went so far asto fight; Ils sont 
allés jusqu 'à se battre). This corresponds to the 'ex  te nt of  action' use discussed ab  ove. 
131 Although this  use once  existed  for ALLER, it is judged by  modem speakers as  odd:  Une  bonne 
médecine composée pour hâter d'aller (Molière, cited in the Grand Robert de la langue française). As 
for informa! transitive expressions in which a determinerless complement specifies the bodily function 
in question (  e.g. go pee), I consider these to be at !east potential idiomatic expressions. 281 
(989)  Can we stop at the next gas station? 1 real/y have togo! 
(990)  *Est-ce qu'on peut s 'arrêter à la prochaine station d'essence ? Je dois vraiment 
M aller! 
So  far we have looked only at  'action' uses of GO/ALLER in which the subject refers to  a 
human. However, world knowledge tells us that like humans, certain machines can also cany 
out  actions  on  their  own.  Thus, just  as  the  presence  of a  human  subject  can  lead  us  to 
construe GO's meaning as describing an implied action, when GOis combined with a subject 
refeiTing  to  a  machine  associated  (in  our  world  knowledge)  with  an  easily  identifiable 
function/operation, as in (991) below, we obtain a 'function/operation' use. 
(991)  Hejinally succeeded in getting the motor togo. 
But whereas humans typically cany out actions that are intentionally directed at achieving 
sorne  desired  outcome,  machines  cany out processes  non-volitionally.  Since  the  machine 
itself cannot be seen as  being oriented toward a future desired outcome, this semantic use is 
not compatible with the explicit expression of an endpoint, which, as pointed out above, has 
the effect offoregrounding the endpoint of the process. In the case of GO this does not pose a 
problem: this verb already contains the localization needed to provide the notion of endpoint, 
so it does not require explicit mention of this endpoint on a separate lexical item.  But since 
ALLER does not contain such an element and therefore relies on Y to provide the endpoint, it 
is  inadequate  to  express  the  functionloperation  of a  machine,  as  (992)  and  (993)  show. 
Moreover, for both verbs, when the subject refers to an inanimate object that cannot function 
autonomously (and thus cannot be seen as having its own orientation toward accomplishing 
something), neither verb can be used to obtain this sense, as shown in (994) and (995). 282 
(992)  *Il a enfin réussi à faire aller le moteur. 
(993)  *Le moteur();) va. 
(994)  *The knif e is going. (intended meaning =  'cutting') 
(995)  *Le couteau va.  (intended meaning =  'cutting') 
5.13 leonie specification of GO-action 
As 1 showed in the preceding section, GO  and ALLER can be used  to  describe an action 
situation when there  is  sufficient  suppmi from  contextual  information and/or background 
knowledge. Aside from linguistic means of describing an action, we also have at our disposai 
paralinguistic means of achieving this  end.  That is,  when an action has  visual or auditory 
properties tbat can be imitated iconically- i.e. imitated via gestme or sound- such imitations 
can be used to describe the content of the action. Thus, just as a linguistic element functions 
as a modifier and leads us to construe GO as referring to an action (available from context), if 
we use as  a modifier of GO a paralinguistic element that represents an action by re-creating 
some of its perceptual properties, this once again leads us to  interpret GO as  refening to  an 
action.  One way to  represent an action iconically is  to  imitate its  visual prope1iies,  i.e.  via 
gesture, as in  (996) and (997). In these examples, GO is accompanied by a simultaneous or 
temporally  juxtaposed  physical  movement  on  the  part  of the  speaker.  Combining  the 
linguistic  and  paralinguistic  elements  present  in the  speech  act  in  (996)  with  the  verb's 
semantics,  we  obtain  the  representation  in  (998). We  most  natmally  interpret  the  iconic 
gesture as  describing the manner of the  situation referred  to  by GO. Renee, the  sentence 
indicates that the GO-action consists of a movement whose visual prope1iies  are specified 
iconically via the gesture. 
(996) 
(997) 
John went (like this) [gesture], but 1 couldn 't tell what he was painting at. 
ln one scene of  the mo vie,  the clown slips on a banana peel and goes (like this) 
[gesture]. 283 
(998)  'John' 
--- - --_.L ('John', ro) 
---------,---------
1 
[gesture] 
Given  that  events  are  perceived  primarily  via  the  senses  of sight and  hearing,  the  other 
logically possible way to describe an event iconically is by producing sounds. In (999) below, 
the element following GO is  an onomatopoeia, i.e.  an acoustically iconic linguistic sign. The 
hearer infers from the characteristics of this sound (together with the temporal orientation of 
GO, construed as the temporal orientation of an event) th at this sound is meant to stand for an 
event with certain auditory propetiies. On the other band, when the subject refers to a piece 
of  music, two different types of iconic modifiers (or a combination of both) can be used. This 
follows directly from om real-world knowledge of music: the latter involves melody, but it 
can  also  optionally  involve  linguistic  content,  i.e.  words.  Thus,  in  (1000)  below  GO  is 
followed by 1) a hummed melody, 2) a string of words, or 3) a string of words accompanied 
by the conesponding melody, depending on the exact natme of the referent (i.e. instrumental 
or vocal music) and on the aspect of the music that the speaker wishes to  focus  on (music 
only, or words and music). This material functions iconically to describe the properties of an 
event, and we thus construe GO as referring to an action
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(999)  When the ba  !loon popped,  it went (like this): "bang!" 
(1 000)  Remember thal song? ft goes (like this): [melody and/or words]. 
Like noises and music, speech acts are also events that can be represented iconically, in this 
case, in the form of either auditory or written material. This is precisely what we do when we 
use direct discourse (the verbatim reproduction of an utterance) as  in (1001) below. Thus, in 
(1 002), where GO is followed by an utterance, there is an au di tory or textual imitation of  the 
event via linguistic material. We infer that the action to which GO refers is a speech act, and 
132  Although a song is  not in itself an event, it can only be experienced via an event,  i.e.  by being 
performed or played (whether live or via a recording). 284 
the linguistic material following GO provides us  with the precise content of this speech act. 
The use in (1003) is  sirnilar, except that the subject is  a text rather than a person.  Here we 
infer from our world knowledge about texts (  complex elements composed of  linguistic signs) 
that the adjunct consisting of  a chain of  words refers to the content of the text itself. Note that 
nouns denoting texts like story are acceptable in the 'action' use of GO because they can be 
construed metonyrnically as  actions:  a story (or other text) bas a temporal dimension when 
we read or recite it. 
(1001)  You  know  what John  said when  I  asked him  about  the  broken  dish?  "Don't 
biarne mel I didn 't do  it. " 
(1002)  I told her the news, and then she went:  "No way!" 
(1003)  The story goes like this: once upon there was a princess who ... 
Nôte that despite  superficial appearances,  these  uses  do  not involve a transitive  structure. 
Rather, the iconic element functions as  a modifier, as  evidenced by the fact that inclusion or 
omission of the  demonstrative  expression like  this  (see  examples  above)  to  int:roduce  the 
iconic element has no impact on the semantic relation between this  iconic element and GO. 
Because  the  'iconic  specification  of action'  uses  do  not  simply  involve  the  use  of 
paralinguistic  means  (gestures,  sounds)  in  para/le!  ta  speech,  but rather  the  use  of these 
paralinguistic elements as modifiers of a linguistic element (GO), these uses tend to appear in 
the informai register, a register in which the boundary between linguistic and paralinguistic 
elements is more easily blmred than in neutral or formai settings. 
We saw in the preceding section that since ALLER does  not contain localization and thus 
cannot provide  the  (temporal)  endpoint on which  an action construal depends,  it is  more 
limited than GO in its  ability to  describe actions.  Crucially, iconic paralinguistic modifiers 
such as gestmes and sounds merely describe the manner of an action: they do not provide the 
notion of endpoint. Consequently, it is impossible to use such iconic elements in combination 
with ALLER to  obtain the  'iconic specifie of action' reading observed for GO, as  shawn in 
(1004) through  (1007).  Note that inclusion of the  locative Y  to  express endpoint does  not 
improve  the  acceptabi1ity  of  these  sentences.  This  is  because  Y  bas  the  effect  of 
foregrounding the endpoint, placing emphasis on temporal progression toward the outcome 285 
of the event. This foregrounding of outcome is incompatible with the uses under examination 
in  the  present  section,  which  center  on  the  event's  perceptual  prope1ties  rather  than  its 
outcome. 
(1004)  'gesture': *Elle est allée comme ça avec sa main [gesture]. 
(1005)  'sound': *Le ballon est allé  «bang!». 
(1006)  'music': *La chanson va (comme ça/ceci)[humming/singing/reciting lyrics] 
(1007)  'verbal  communication':  *Je  lui  raconte  la  nouvelle,  puis  elle  va:  «c'est 
impossible, ça se peut pas!». 
The same observation does not hold for texts, however:  since our world knowledge tells us 
that a text contains an intrinsic, fixed endpoint that is reached inevitably whenever we read 
entirely through it, a subject referring to a text can provide the notion of endpoint needed to 
arrive at a temporal construal of  ALLER, making sentences like (1008) acceptable. 
(1 008)  'tex t' : L'histoire va comme suit : il était une fois une princesse qui  ... . 
Finally,  it  should  be  noted  that  unlike  ALLER,  the French  verb  FAIRE  can be used  in 
roughly the same range of contexts as GO with an 'iconic specification of action' reading, as 
shawn in examples (1009) and (1010). However, the identification of the semantic property 
responsible for FAIRE's iconic use goes beyond the limits of the present study. 
(1009)  Elle a fait comme ça avec sa main [gesture]. 
(1010)  Le ballon a fait  «bang!» 
5.14 Non-occunence 
We have already seen that when world/contextlbackground knowledge strongly suggests that 
an entity X (  e.g. a pers  on or machine) is expected to  be involved in a given action, and the 
subject of GO refers to  this entity, GO's orientation can be interpreted temporally, yielding 
the  idea that the entity (standing metonymously for the action it is  perfonning) is  oriented 
toward localization at the action's temporal endpoint. Renee, GO expresses that the entity is 
effective/y performing the action. But crucially, GO's semantics does not intrinsically encode 286 
the notion of action or of effective performance. Thus,  the other logical possibility is also 
compatible  with  GO's  semantics:  we  can  use  GO  to  describe  a  situation  in  which  the 
expected action does not occur. 
When we combine GO with a subject referring to an entity, and when GO is accompanied by 
explicit modifiers specifying  1)  a period of time and 2) a state of non-occurrence of sorne 
action, as in (1011), we obtain the compositional meaning schematized in the representation 
in (1012). 
(1011)  John went for one week without eating. 
(1012)  'John' 
- -------.L ('John', w) 
----------T-------· 
'without eating' 
'one week' 
1  1 
,_ - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ï 
1  1 
This meaning is paraphrasable as:  'John is oriented toward being localized at the endpoint w, 
this orientation holding during a period of one week and being characterized by the property 
without eating'. The temporal expression 'one week' brings us to interpret GO as describing 
orientation toward a temporal endpoint (i.e. end localization at w). In other words, a bounded 
temporal period is being predicated of  John. 
The modifier  without eating  expresses  a  property  that  holds  during  this  time  period and 
which consists of the absence of  an action. Since the property is described as applying during 
on! y a specifie time period, we infer that outside this period, ·the property does not hold.  In 
other words, John's default property is  one of eating on a regular basis, an inference that is 
reinforced by world knowledge according to which humans typically eat several times every 
day.  The full meaning obtained for the sentence is  thus paraphrasable as  follows:  'During a 
period  of one  week,  John  was  oriented  toward  the  endpoint  of the  period  and  bad  the 
exceptional property of  not eating'. 287 
We have already seen th at sim ply stating that an entity (  e.g.  a person) is  oriented toward a 
temporal  point  is  uninformative,  because  we  view  all  entities  as  being  subject  to  the 
inevitable flow  of time. Thus, when  GO  is  used to  predicate a temporal  orientation of an 
entity,  we  look  to  background  and  contextual  knowledge  for  information  to  make  the 
sentence  informative.  In  the  preceding  section,  we  saw  that when background knowledge 
provides a salient,  easily identifiable action în which the entity is  involved, we  take  GO's 
subject to  stand metonymously for  this action, with GO  describing the  action's orientation 
toward its  own endpoint. In (1011) above, an explicit component of the sentence- without 
eating- describes the absence of an action; so here, the subject entity stands metonymously 
for an expected but unrealized action involving that entity, and GO is  taken to  descbbe the 
passing of time (orientation toward an end point) during this period of  non-occurrence. 
Since all events automatically inherit time's intrinsic orientation, any sentence describing an 
event automatically implies a temporal orientation toward an endpoint. Consequently, the use 
of GO to describe an event's temporal orientation gives this event a marked status and signais 
a departure from the unmarked situation. Moreover, marked, negative forms such as  without 
(1013),  only  (1014)  and  adjectives  fonned  with  a  privative  morpheme  like  un- ((1015) 
through (1017)) or bare- (1018) all explicitly present properties as  marked, and bence they 
are compatible with GO'  s foregrounding of the temporal orientation 
133
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133  The insight in this paragraph is due in large part to Denis Bouchard (persona! communication). ( 10 13)  The vol  cano went forty years without erupting. 
(1014)  John wentfor a week eating on/y bread. 
(1015)  The dishes went unwashed/without being washedfor two days. 
(1016)  The letter went unread/unansweredfor months. 
( 10 17)  His warnings went unheeded  for a long ti me. 
( 10 18)  John went barefoot/bareheaded  for a week. 
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On the other hand,  in general,  formally unmarked adjectives  and verbs  express  unmarked 
propetiies.  And  since  such  properties  are  not  special,  they  are  incompatible  with  the 
foregrounding effect produced by GO, as shown in (1019) through (1022). As for the patiial 
acceptability  of (1023)  and  (1024),  it  is  due  to  world/background  knowledge  about  the 
entities and actions involved. In (1023), the speaker's presentation (via GO) of 'eating bread' 
as a marked propetiy is marginally acceptable if we know that John never eats bread, that he 
cannot stand the tas te of bread, etc. Likewise, sentence (1 024) is marginally acceptable if we 
know that John never wears  a hat/shoes,  if he finds  the wearing of these items  as  highly 
uncornfortable, etc. 
(1 0 19)  ?  ?The vol  cano went for forty years erupting. 
(1020)  *The dishes went washedlbeing washedfor two days. 
(1021)  *The letter went read/answeredfor months. 
(1022)  *His warnings went heededfor a long time. 
(1023)  ?John wentfor a week eating bread. 
(1024)  ?John wentfor a week wearing a hatlshoes. 
Wh  en the time expression is omitted, as in (1 025) through (1 027), the effect is  to background 
the interval's  precise dmation, which we are  left to infer from  background knowledge.  In 
such  cases,  the  temporal  endpoint  could  be  virtually  any  time,  including  the  maximally 
distant temporal boundary corresponding to the dmation 'forever'. (1025)  The letter went unreadlunanswered. 
( 1  026)  His warnings went unheeded. 
(1027)  John likes togo barefoot/bareheaded. 
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Unlike GO,  ALLER's intrinsic content provides no  temporal endpoint.  We saw above that 
when background knowledge provides an easily identifiable action and contextual material 
(such as  a modifier expressing speed) strongly suggests an event, we can obtain an  'action' 
use for ALLER, as  in (1028). But in the  'non-occunence' use illustrated above for  GO, the 
· verb  is  used  in  combination with  a  negative/marked modifier to  express  that  an expected 
event does not occur. While events can be qualified in tenns of  properties such as speed, non-
events  cannot.  Renee,  the  'non-occurrence'  use  is  incompatible with  modifiers  expressing 
temporal properties like speed, as shown in (1029). And crucially, without such elements, we 
cannot use ALLER to  construct the  notion of orientation toward a temporal endpoint.  As  a 
result, the 'non-occurence' use is impossible for ALLER, as shown in (1030) through (1033). 
(1 028)  Jean va vite. 
( 1  029)  *John went fast for one week without eating. 
(1030)  *Jean est allé deux semaines sans manger. 
(1031)  *L'auto est allée deux semaines sans être lavée. 
(1032)  *Toutes ses lettres sont allées sans réponse. 
(1033)  *Jean aime aller sans chaussures/sans chapeau. 
Before moving on, note that in the case of (1030), replacing the verb ALLER with PASSER 
(the equivalent of  English SPEND in its temporal use) makes the sentence acceptable. This is 
to  be expected, und er the reasonable assumption that PASSER con  tains in its semantics the 
idea of a person being in a given state for a bounded interva1 of time. Note also that sentences 
like (1033) are acceptable with a 'motion' reading, but not with the abstract, stative reading 
being discussed here. 290 
5.15 GO/ALLER+ VERB: negative evaluation of action 
We  saw  above  (section  5.2)  that  when  GO/ALLER  is  combined  with  an  adjunct  verb 
expressing an action, one possible interpretation is a 'motion+ action' situation: the subject's 
referent (a concrete, mobile entity) undergoes a motion through space and performs an action 
either during or at the end of  this movement, as in (1034). 
(1034)  Va aider ton frère à mettre la table. 
However, since GO and ALLER do not intrinsically encode notions of movement or space, 
'motion'  is  not  the  only  possible  reading  for  the  combination  GO/ALLER  +  ACTION-
VERE. In particular, the deictic center ('that which is accessible to  an SC') and its negative 
counterpa1t  CD  ('an  element  other  thau  the  deictic  center')  can  receive  an  abstract 
interpretation if context and background knowledge support such a reading. This is  the case 
in  sentence  (1035),  where  the  adjunct  INF  phrase  se  mettre  dans  une  situation  difficile 
expresses an abstract action. Recall that in a progredience construction such as this, the INF 
applies to the relation encoded in the main verb's semantics. So here, the INF phrase is taken 
as describing the relation R which ho1ds at the end of the orientation between 'Jean' and CD,  as 
schematized in (1036). 
(1035)  Jean est allé se mettre dans une situation difficile/défavorable. 
(1036)  'Jean' 
-------.R ('Jean', CD) 
1 
'se mettre dans une situation difficile ... ' 
Crucially, actions can be abstractly accessible to us by belonging to  our habits, beliefs, etc., 
so  the  implied deictic center can be interpreted as  'the SC's way of acting,  habits, beliefs, 
etc.'. ALLER+INF can thus be used to express that 'by doing the !NF-action, X establishes a 
relation with  something outside  the  SC's own behavior/beliefs/etc.'.  More  specifically, in 
(1035) the speaker expresses that by carrying out the !NF-action, Jean distanced himselffrom 
'my way of doing things'. 291 
The precise reasons for the negative evaluation expressed by this semantic use are determined 
by  background knowledge.  In  (1035), by suggesting that the difficult/unfavorable situation 
was avoidable, the speaker implies that he considers Jean's actions to be unwise. In (1037), 
due  to  the  element  ridicule,  the  speaker's  negative  judgment  takes  the  form  of strong 
(perhaps mocking) disapproval of the action. In (1038), context and background knowledge 
suggest  a  slightly  different  reading.  Sin  ce  the  INF -action  consists  of an  affinnation of a 
mental content ('que le  sujet de  la phrase monte'), the  action's lying outside the  world as 
immediately  accessible  to  the  speaker  is  specifically  construed  as  lying  outside  truth 
according to  the  speaker,  i.e.  the speaker's beliefs.  In  sum,  the  speaker is  suggesting that 
Jean's  affirmation  is  erroneous  or  untrue.  In (1039),  'telling  the  secret'  is  appraised  as 
'wrong' in sorne sense by the speaker, but only further context and/or background knowledge 
can indicate whether this judgment is based on moral, practical, logical, etc.  reasons.  Note 
that  sentences  like  (1038)  and  (1039)  contain  no  lexical  elements  other  than  ALLER 
explicitly  indicating  a  negative judgment.  For this  reason,  taken  out of context,  they  are 
ambiguous  with a concrete progredience reading. However,  if we  know that Jean  did not 
undertake any movement in order to  accomplish the action (for example, if the speech acts 
described in these sentences were carried out over the phone), the ambiguity disappears  and 
only an abstract 'negative evaluation' reading is possible. 
(1037)  Jean est allé se mettre dans une situation ridicule. 
(1038)  Jean est allé dire que le sujet de la phrase monte
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(1039)  Jean est allé raconter le secret à tout le monde. 
Because this semantic use expresses a negative judgment on the part of the speaker (based on 
a  comparison  between  himself and  X's action),  it  is  also  compatible  with  situations  of 
admonition, such as  example (1040). In this  sentence the speaker tells  'you' not to  create 
sorne  relation  R  with  w by  the  action  'imagine  that.. .'.  Given  the  nature  of the  action 
1 34 Example pointed out by Denis Bouchard (persona! communication). 292 
'imagine', we  infer (as  in  (1038) above) that the speaker's negative evaluation is  based on 
Jean's own beliefs lying outside the realm oftruth (as deterrnined by the speaker). 
(1040)  N'allez pas imaginer que j'ai l'intention de vous aider. 
The analysis presented here departs from that of Bouchard (1995), who proposes that in this 
semantic use, the anti-deictic center indicates that the action involves or impacts people other 
than the  speaker.  That is,  the wor1d  is  portrayed as  the witness  of the action (p.  158-160). 
Crucially, such an analysis cannat account for sentences such as N'allez pas imaginer que  ...  , 
in which the !NF-action is  an internai event, i.e.  a psychological state undergone by  X,  for 
this type of state is inaccessible to  the world-as-observer. Instead, as 1 have shown here, the 
common thread uniting examples  like (1035)  through  (1040)  lies  in  the  construal of w as 
'actions that lie outside the speaker's way of acting/thinking'. 
Like ALLER, GO does not intrinsically encode notions of space or movement, so its meaning 
is a priori compatible with the abstract 'wrong action' use illustrated for ALLER. However, 
as we saw in section 5  .2.2, due to properties of the English bare INF the English progredience 
construction is restricted to  sentences where GO  is  itself in the bare infinitive f01m preceded 
by a modal (1 041) or future marker ( 1  042), or wh en it is in the imperative (1 043); elsewhere 
it is impossible (e.g. (1044) and (1045)). 
(1041)  He intends to/can/mustlshouldletc. go buy sorne bread. (Modal+ INF) 
(1042)  He will go buy sorne bread. (Future) 
(1043)  Go buy sorne bread! (Imperative) 
(1044)  *He goes buy(s) sorne bread. (Present) 
(1045)  *He went buy (bought) sorne bread.  (Past) 
For the same reason, an attempt to directly translate sentences (1037) and (1039) into English 
yields unacceptable utterances, as shown in (1046) and (1047) below. If, on the other band, 
GO  is  in  one of the  morphological  forms  that  are  compatible with  progredience, the  use 
becomes acceptable ((1048) through (1050)). 293 
(1046)  *John has gone get/put himselfinto a ridiculous situation. 
(1047)  *John has gone tell the secret to everyone. 
(1 048)  1  just knew John would go ge  tl  put himself  into a ridiculous situation. 
( 1  049)  1 know John will go get!pLLl himself  into a ridiculous situation (again). 
( 1  050)  Now don 't go ru in the surprise byte/ling everyone. 
Because GO/ALLER+INF can be construed abstractly to  convey a negative judgment, and 
because it is  co111111on in both languages to use negatively connoted action verbs figuratively 
and in the imperative to  express insults (e.g.  (1051) and (1052)), it is  not surprising to find 
that the  GO/  ALLER+INF construction cau also  be used to  fmm an insult,  as  in  examples 
(1053)  and (1054).  Here,  the INF adjunct describes  a negatively connoted (i.e.  unpleasant) 
action, and this negative connotation is reinforced by ALLER's semantics:  these actions are 
depicted as lying (far) outside 'what the speaker would do'. 
(1051)  Biteme! 
(1052)  Mange d'la marde! (Queb.) 
(1053)  Go hang yourself! 
(1054)  Va tefairefoutre! 
Because  GO  and  ALLER  differ  in  the  nature  of the  intrinsic  end-relation  they  express, 
differences arise for the expression of 'negative evaluation'. First, recall that the 'motion + 
action' sense cau be expressed not only via GO +INF, but also via GO+ AND+ VERB, as in 
(1055). Sinularly, in a context supporting construal of w as  'things lying outside the speaker's 
behavior/beliefs', as in (1056) through (1058), the action expressed by the second verb in the 
coordination is  depicted as  distinct from what the speaker would do  and hence as  somehow 
wrong
135
• 
135  For an  alternative, cognitive semantic analysis of this  GO  + AND + V construction in terms of 
image schemas, see Matsumoto (20 1  0). 
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(1 055)  Go and help them set the table. 
(1056)  Don 't go and imagine that 1 intend to help you! 
( 1  057)  John went and told everyone the secret. 
(1058)  John has gone and !ost the car keys again! 
But as  we  have  seen  elsewhere, because  ALLER's  end-relation component  is  maximally 
general, this verb tends to be incompatible with uses in which no sentential element provides 
information about the nature of the end-relation. Thus, unlike sentence (1059), in which the 
INF  adjunct applies  to  R (as  schematized in (1060)), when the  second verb  is  linked by  a 
coordinating conjunction (e.g. sentence (1061), represented in (1062)), there is no element to 
directly provide information about the relation with  ro. Thus, we  do  not have the necessmy 
information in the semantic structure to anive at a construal ofR ('Jean', ro)  as  'John's doing 
something th at lies outside the speaker' s own behavior/beliefs'. 
(1059)  Jean est allé se mettre dans une situation ridicule. 
(1060)  'Jean' 
--------.R ('Jean', ro) 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
\se mettre dans ... ' 
(1061)  *Jean est allé et s'est mis dans une situation ridicule. 
(1062)  'Jean' 
-------+ 1} ('Jean', ro) 
+ 
'Jean s'est mis dans  ... ' 
1 
1 
1 
1 
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Recall that the construction GO +V  -ing can also yield a 'motion+ action' reading: when GO 
is used with a  V-ing modifier expressing a concrete action, as  in (1063),  V-ing can apply to 
the end-relation L (X, w), producing the compositional meaning: 'John underwent movement 
to  a  location other than the  SC's location, and at that location, he undertook the action of 
fishing',  with  world  knowledge  allowing  us  to  infer  that  'fishing'  is  the  purpose of the 
movement in question. When instead the V-ing verb (together with information from context 
and/or background knowledge) favors an abstract construal and suggests disapproval on the 
part of  the speaker, as in (1065) and (1066), we obtain a 'negative evaluation' reading. 
(1063)  John wentfishing yesterday. 
(1064)  'John' 
-------•L ('John', w) 
1 
1 
'fishing' 
(1065)  It's a secret, so don't go lelling everyone. 
(1 066)  Don 't go imagining th at 1 intend to help you. 
Finally, we have already seen that due to  properties of the French "gérondif' en  V-ant,  the 
latter cannat be taken to modify the end-relation of ALLER's orientation, accounting for the 
unacceptability of the spatial use in (1067). For the very same reason, ALLER+ V-ant cannot 
be used to express 'negative evaluation' in sentences like (1068) and (1069). 
(1 067)  *Jean est allé au lac en pêchant. 
(1068)  *C'est un secret, alors ne va pas en le racontant à tout le monde! 
(1069)  *N'allez pas en imaginant que j'ai l'intention de vous aider. 
In the present chapter I have examined in detail the various senses observed for the verbs GO 
and ALLER.  As  in the previous chapter on COME and VENIR, I have demonstrated that 
these uses, though highly diverse in terms of the specifie situations they describe, all folllow 296 
from a single semantic representation. Both GO and ALLER express  'orientation toward a 
relation with the anti-deictic center w, a point other than o', so these verbs share many of the 
same  contextual  uses.  On  the  other  hand,  because  they  encode  a  different  end-relation 
(localization in the case GO vs.  the maximally general R in the case of  ALLER), and because 
the range of possible contextualized uses of these verbs is determined in pmt by propetties of 
the English and French grammar and lexicon, GO and ALLER show many differences in the 
specifie situations that they can be used to describe. CONCLUSION 
The present dissertation in lexical semantics bas examined the phenomenon of polysemy (i.e. 
the existence of  multiple, rclatcd senses for a single word) from two angles: first, the problem 
of polysemy's status in the lexicon, and second, the problem of the causes for cross-linguistic 
variation of polysemy.  These  issues  have  been examined with English and French deictic 
verbs capable of expressing situations of 'motion' (COME, GO, VENIR and ALLER). More 
specifically, this study bas addressed the following researcb questions: 
•  Question 1: Are English and French deictic motion verbs lexically monosemous? 
•  Question 2: Why do these verbs show the cross-linguistic similarities that we observe 
in their uses? 
•  Question 3: Why do these verbs show differences that we observe in their uses? 
To answer these questions, I consulted dictionaries, a small corpus and speaker intuitions and 
this allowed me to identify for the se four verbs a broad set of  possible senses spanning ac ross 
many different do mains. I th en identified the invariant lexical semantic content of the each of 
these verbs by analysing them within the dual framework of Bouchard's (1995) monosemist 
approach and the Sign Theory of  Language (Bouchard, 2002, in press). 
Thus, in  response  to  my first  research  question,  the English and  French  deictic  "motion" 
verbs COME, GO, VENIR and ALLER are monosemous. As shown in Chapter III, each of 
these verbs bas a single, abstract representation consisting of a small number of components. 
Moreover,  I  showed  in  Chapters  IV  and  V  precisely  how  these  representations,  in 
combination with inferences based on contextual, background and world knowledge, account 
for ail of the semantic uses discussed in this study. The high degree of contextual polysemy 
of these  items  follows  from  the  highly  abstract  character  of their  invariant  semantic 
components ('orientation', 'Subject of Consciousness', 'accessibility', 'localization', and the 
maximally general combinatorial relation R), which can  thus  take  on a virtually limitless 
number of  manifestations depending on context. 298 
In response to  Question 2, the reas on that these pairs of verbs share a large number of senses 
is  that  each  English  verb  is  nearly  identical  in  semantic  structure with  the  conesponding 
French verb. That is,  COME and VENIR both express  that 'X is  oriented toward being in 
sorne relation with the deictic center, i.e.  a point that is  accessible to  an SC'. Likewise, GO 
and ALLER both express that 'X is  oriented toward being in a relation with the antideictic 
center,  i.e.  a point other than the  deictic center'. That these semantic components  smface 
from one language to another is not surprising, for as I show in Chapter III, these components 
are rooted in general (i.e. extralinguistic) cognition. 
In  response  to  Question  3,  differences  in  the  semantic  uses  of the  pairs  of motion  verbs 
exarnined in this study follow frrst and foremost from the fact that their invariant meanings 
differ via a single pair of highly abstract components: the English verbs contain localization 
(L)  as  an  end-relation,  while  their  French  counterparts  contain  the  maximally  general 
combinatorial  relation  R.  Because  the  semantic  representations  of these  verbs  are  highly 
abstract, this slight difference in invariant meaning interacts with non-lexical knowledge to 
give  rise  to  abundant  surface  differences.  In  addition,  the  two  languages  differ  in  their 
grammatical systems and in the set of lexical items available to  act as  arguments, and these 
asymmetries also bring about cross-linguistic differences in the ways  the  each verb can be 
used. 
The monosemous approach adopted in the present study has thus made it possible to propose 
an analysis of polysemy and variation that is both far-reaching and parsimonious. The results 
obtained provide strong suppo1t for the idea that words tend to be lexically monosemous and 
that their semantic components (both those that recur cross-linguistically and those that vary) 
are rooted in properties of  general cognition. Thus, contrary to what is affirmed in polysemist 
approaches - in patticular Cognitive Semantic analyses - the variety of senses of these verbs 
is  not  due  to  the  existence  of multiple  meanings  forrning  a  complex  network organized 
around  prototypical  'motion'  uses  and  structured  by  mechanisms  such  as  metaphor.  As 
pointed out by B"ouchard (1995), the 'motion' uses of these verbs, together with all of their 
other uses, are  merely the product of contextualized construal of the invariant meaning of 
each verb. 299 
The findings of the present disse1iation are relevant to several domains of research in which 
polysemy and cross-linguistic variation are studied. First and foremost, by providing crucial 
insight into the  lexical status of polysemy and the causes of cross-linguistic variation,  this 
study contributes  to  the  understanding of two  problems  at the  heart of current theoretical 
work in lexical semantics. In addition, these findings are relevant to psycholinguistic research 
on the mental  lexicon, a field  in which experimental evidence does not,  at present, show a 
clear tendency toward single-entry or multiple-entry storage of meaning. Finally, the insight 
provided by this study is  relevant to the fields of second language acquisition/pedagogy and 
natural  language  processing,  two  domains  in  which  polysemy  and  its  cross-linguistic 
variation pose a considerable challenge. 
The approach adopted  in  this  study needs to  be  pursued in the  fonn of in-depth,  detailed 
analysis of semantic uses of other verbs exhibiting a high degree of intra- and cross-linguistic 
sense  variation,  such  as  other  "motion"  verbs  and  other  semantic  classes  of verbs  (e.g. 
physical contact, as in Ruhl, 1989; perception, as in Piron, 2006; and verbs describing speech 
acts and mental events). Research within this approach must also be extended to  other word 
categories,  in  particular  adjectives  as  well  as  nouns.  One  interesting  problem  will  be  to 
dete1mine whether, like the "motion" verbs studied here, polysemous nouns with spatial and 
abstract uses also possess unified, abstract lexical meanings, or if,  instead,  nouns  exhibit a 
greater tendency toward lexicalized polysemy. Finally, the present line of research must also 
be  pursued via comparative studies  involving several other languages, which will possibly 
uncover needs to refine the semantic representations proposed here. A
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 APPENDIX E 
SEMANTIC USES OF COME AND VENIR 
Use type  COME  VENIR 
1. motion  J  olm is co  ming to Montreal.  Jean vient à Montréal. 
A package came for you  *Un colis est venu pour toi 
toda  y.  aujourd'hui. 
John came tome about his  *Jean est venu à moi à 
problems.  propos de ses problèmes. 
2. motion+  Come see wbat I've found.  Viens voir ce que j'ai 
action  trouvé. 
*John will come to the  Jean viendra au restaurant 
restaurant eat breakfast  déjeuner avec nous. 
with us. 
*John cornes eat(  s) breakfast  Jean vient  déjeuner avec 
with us.  nous. 
John came ice-skating with  *Jean est venu en patinant 
us.  avec nous. 337 
Use type  COME  VENIR 
3. static spatial  This road cornes from  Cette route vient de 
extension  Montreal.  Montréal. 
The path cornes through the  ??Le sentier vient à travers 
valley.  la vallée. 
*John cornes me to the  Jean me vient à l'épaule. 
shoulder. 
Jean cornes (up) to my  *Jean vient à mon épaule. 
sho.ulder. 
4. actualization  When the time cornes to  Quand vient le temps de 
leave, 1 am always sad.  partir, je suis toujours triste. 
When the baby came, the  *Quand le bébé est venu, la 
family's routine changed.  routine de la famille a 
changé. 
How is y  our proj ect co ming?  *Comment ton projet vient-
il? 
Computers have come a long  *Les ordinatems sont venus 
way since the 1970s.  très loin depuis les années 
70. 
5. individual  Good fortune will come to  La bmme fortune viendra à 
experience  y  ou if  y  ou are patient.  toi si tu es patient. 
*A big headache came to  Il lui est venu un gros mal 
him.  de tête. 
This idea came to me  Cette idée m'est venue hier. 
yesterday. --------~--------------------
338 
Use type  COME  VENIR 
6. state-entering  John came to the conclusion  Jean en est venu à la 
that Mary bad been lying.  conclusion que Marie lui 
avait menti. 
?Jean est venu à la 
conclusion que Marie lui 
avait menti. 
Y  our bill cornes to 25  *Votre facture (en) vient à 
dollars.  100 dollars. 
After walking for hours, the  *Après des heures de 
weary hikers came to a  marche, les randonneurs 
bridge.  épuisés (en) sont venus à un 
pont. 
If by chance John came to  Si (par hasard) Jean venait à 
lose his job  ...  perdre son emploi ... 
7.COME+ADJ  Her dreams came bue.  *Ses rêves sont venus vrais. 
The figures in the painting  *Les figures dans le tableau 
came alive.  sont venues vivantes. 
The shoes came untied.  *Les chaussures sont 
venues détachées. 
8.order  P cornes before Q in the  P vient avant Q  dans 
alphabet.  l'alphabet. 
Freedom cornes well before  La liberté vient bien avant 
material comfort in my  le confort matériel dans mes 
priorities.  priorités. 
9. origin  This word cornes from  Ce mot vient du grec. 
Greek. 
This wine cornes from Italy.  Ce vin vient d'Italie. 
This idea cornes from Plato.  Cette idée vient de Platon. 339 
Use type  COME  VENIR 
9. origin  His sadness cames from the  Sa tristesse vient des 
circumstances.  circonstances. 
10. possession  Severa! thousand dollars  J'ai dû vendre un domaine 
came to him from his uncle.  qui me vient de ma tante. 
The spirit oftrue humility  La vraie humilité vient à 
cames to those who seek it  ceux qui la cherchent 
diligently.  activement. 
Writing/painting/humor  L'écriture/La 
comes natmally to ber.  peinture/L'humour lui vient 
naturellement. 
Y  ou will get ail the credit  *Tu auras tout le crédit qui 
that is coming to you.  te vient. 
11. existence with  Dogs come in many shapes  *Les chats viennent en 
a property  and sizes.  diverses formes et tailles. 
This sofa comes in four  *Ce sofa vient en quatre 
different colors.  couleurs différentes. 
This computer cames with a  *Cet ordinateur vient avec 
monitor.  un monitem. 
12. recent past  *John co  mes from eating.  Jean vient de manger. 
13.  *Don't come (and) tell me  Ne viens pas me dire que 
COME/VENIR+  that John is ill!  Jean est malade! 
VERB: impact 
on the SC  *Nothing will ever come  Rien ne viendra jamais 
(and) contradict the results of  contredire les résultats de 
this experiment.  cette expérience. APPENDIXF 
SEMANTIC USES OF GO AND ALLER 
Use type 
1. motion 
GO 
John is going to Paris this 
summer. 
Are you going to the 
concert? 
-Y  es, I'm going. 
Go!  The light is green! 
It is late. I really must go. 
2. motion+ action  John went to buy some 
bread. 
John went and helped them 
set the table. 
If  y  ou need ad  vice, y  ou 
should go to J  olm. 
John should go buy some 
bread. 
ALLER 
Jean va à Paris cet été 
Vas-tu au conceti? 
- *Oui, je vais. 
-Oui j'y vais. 
*Va! Le feu est veti! 
Vas-y!  Le feu est veti! 
Il est tard. *Il faudrait 
vraiment que j'aille./ 
Il faudrait vraiment que j'y 
aille. 
*Jean est allé pour acheter du 
pain. 
*Jean est allé et les a aidés à 
mettre la table. 
*Si tu as besoin de conseils, 
tu devrais aller à Jean. 
Jean devrait aller acheter du 
·pain. Use type 
2. motion + action 
3. static spatial 
extension 
4. abstract extent 
GO 
John went fishing/ice-
skating. 
This road goes (from 
Toronto) to Montreal. 
*This road goes from 
Montreal. 
The road goes through the 
middle of  the forest. 
That door goes to the 
cellar/balcony. 
The salaries of  executives 
go from 100,000 to 
200,000 dollars. 
Symptoms (  can) go from 
very mild fever to severe 
pa  m. 
The period going from 
1939 to 1945 
*The period going from 
1939 
*The period going to 1945 
341 
ALLER 
*Jean est allé en 
pêchant/patinant. 
Cette route va (de Toronto) à 
Montréal. 
*Cette route va de Montréal. 
??La route va à travers la 
forêt. 
*Cette porte va au/sur le 
balcon. 
*Cette porte va au sous-sol. 
Les salaires des cadres vont 
de 100,000 à 200,000 dollars. 
Les symptômes peuvent 
aller/vont d'une très légère 
fièvre à des douleurs 
intenses. 
La période allant de 1939 à 
1945 
*La période allant de 1939 
*La période allant à 1945 342 
Use type  GO  ALLER 
S. change of state  The sky was going from  Le ciel allait du bleu au gris à 
blue to gray as the clouds  mesure que les nuages 
appeared.  arrivaient. 
John went into a rage/a  Jean est *allé dans une 
depressionlecstasy.  rage/une dépression/en 
extase. 
*The priee of  fuel went  Le prix du carburant allait en 
increasing/growing.  croissant. 
John went  *Jean est allé 
crazy/Republican/red in the  fou/républicain/rouge. 
face. 
The plane went invisible  *L'avion est allé invisible à 
on the radar screen.  1' écran radar. 
6. possession  The relief funds went to  Les fonds de secours sont 
the people who needed it  allés à ceux qui en avaient le 
the most.  plus grand besoin. 
The inheritance went to the  L'héritage est allé au fils 
eldest son.  ainé. 
A house like this would go  *Une maison comme celle-ci 
for 250,000 dollars.  irait pour 250,000 dollars. 
7. resource/  Most people don't know  *La plupart des gens ignore 
contribution  about all the toxic  les substances toxiques qui 
substances that go into  vont aux/dans les produits 
cleaning products.  ménagers. 
A considerable effort went  *Un effort considérable est 
into this project.  allé à/dans/sur ce projet. 
A bit of this cleaner goes a  *Une petite quantité de ce 
long way.  produit va loin. 343 
Use type  GO  ALLER 
8. ceasing/ending  If John goes, who will take  * Si Jean va, qui prendra sa 
his place in the company?  place au sein de l'entreprise? 
These antiquated policies  *Ces politiques désuètes 
have togo.  doivent aller. 
The light bulb in the  *L'ampoule dans la salle de 
bathroom is statiing to go.  bain commence à aller. 
My hearing is statting to  *Mon ouïe commence à aller. 
go. 
9. temporal uses  Summer is going fast.  L'été va vite. 
*John is going write a  Jean va écrire un livre 
book. 
John is going to write a  *Jean va à écrire un livre. 
book. 
10. evaluation  The day/exam/dinner  La journée/L'  examen/la 
party/construction of the  fête/la construction du pont 
bridge went well/is going  va bien. 
well. 
*John is going well.  Jean va bien. 
*The economy is going  L'économie va bien. 
weil. 
*This knife goes badly.  Ce couteau va mal. 
-At 10 o'clock?  -À lûh? 
-*Y  es, that goes (for) me.  - Oui, ça me va. 344 
Use type  GO  ALLER 
11.  That knife goes in the left  Ce couteau-là va dans le 
appropriateness/  drawer.  tiroir à gauche. 
belonging 
This dish goes in the oven.  Cette assiette va au four. 
These pants go (well) with  Ce pantalon va (bien) avec 
that shirt.  cette chemise. 
*Indignation goes weil  L'indignation lui va bien. 
on/with her. 
Do you think all these  *Penses-tu que tous ces 
clothes will go into your  vêtements vont aller dans la 
suitcase?  valise? 
12. action  John is not going fast  Jean ne va pas assez vite. 
enough. 
*He went of/from his  Il y est allé de sa chanson, et 
song, and eve1yone began  tout le monde s'est mis à 
to dance.  danser. 
Go John, you can doit!  *Va Jean! T'es capable! 
Vas-y Jean! T'es capable! 
The preparations have been  Les préparatifs sont terminés 
completed and we're ready  et nous sommes prêts à *(y) 
togo.  aller. 
13. iconic  John went (like this)  *Jean est allé comme ça avec 
specification of  [gesture  ], but I couldn't tell  sa main [gesture], mais je ne 
GO-action  what he was pointing at.  voyais pas ce qu'il pointait. 
When the balloon popped,  *Le ballon est allé  « bang !». 
it went "bang!". 
Remember that song? It  *La chanson va (comme 
goes (like this) ...  ça/ceci) ... 345 
Use type  GO  ALLER 
13. iconic  I told ber the news, and  *Je lui raconte la nouvelle, 
specification of  then she went: "No way!"  puis elle va : « c'est 
GO-action  impossible, ça se peut pas! ». 
14. non- John went for one week  *Jean est allé deux semaines 
occurrence  without eating.  sans manger. 
The dishes went  *L'auto est allée deux 
unwashed/without being  semaines sans être lavée. 
washed for two days. 
The letter went  *Toutes ses lettres sont allées 
unread/unanswered for  sans être lue/sans réponse 
months.  pendant des mois. 
15. GO/ ALLER+  *John bas gone get/got/put  Jean est allé se mettre dans 
VERB: negative  himself into a ridiculous  une situation ridicule. 
evaluation of  situation. 
action 
!just knew John would go  Je savais que Jean allait se 
get/put himself into a  mettre dans une situation 
ridiculous situation.  difficile. 
John has go ne and got/put  *Jean est allé et s'est mis 
himself in a ridiculous  dans une situation ridicule. 
situation. 
Don't go (and) imagine  N'allez pas imaginer que j'ai 
that I intend to help you.  l'intention de vous aider 
*N'allez pas et n'imaginez 
pas que j'ai l'intention de 
vous aider. 
Don't go imagining that I  *N'allez pas (en) imaginant 
intend to help you.  que j'ai 1' intention de vous 
aider. REFERENCES 
Antonopoulou, E. et K. Nikiforidou. 2002. « Deictic Motion and the Adoption of  Perspective 
in Greek ». Pragmatics, vol.  12, no 3, p. 273-293. 
Apresjan, J.  1974. « Regular Polysemy ». Linguistics, vol.  12, no 142, p. 5-32. 
Ariel, M.  1990. Accessing Noun-Phrase Antecedents. New York: Routledge. 
Bastonnais, E. 2000. « Où viens-tu? La transposition du centre déictique ».Revue québécoise 
de linguistique, vol. 28, no 2, p. 65-97. 
Bastonnais, E. 2001. «Je viens chez toi: la transposition du centre déïctique ». Mémoire de 
maîtrise. Montréal : Université du Québec à Montréal. 
Beretta, A., R. Fiorentino et D. Poeppel. 2005. «The Effect ofHomonymy and Polysemy on 
Lexical Access: An MEG Study ».Cognitive Brain Research, vol. 24, p. 57-65. 
Bogaards, P. 2001. « Lexical Units and the Learning of  Foreign Language Vocabulary ». 
Studies in Second  Language Acquisition, vol. 23, no 3, p. 321-343. 
Boons, J.-P. 1987. « La notion sémantique de déplacement dans une classification syntaxique 
des verbes locatifs ». Langue française, vol. 76, p. 5-40. 
Botne, R. 2005. « Cognitive Schemas and Motion Verbs: COMING and GOING in Chindali 
(Eastern Bantu) ». Cognitive Linguistics, vol.  16, no  1, p. 43-80. 
Bouchard, D.  1995. The Semantics ofSyntax. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 
--------- 1997. « L'effet existentiel ». In Exploration du lexique, sous la dir. de J.  Auger et Y. 
Rose. Québec: Ciral. 
--------. 2002. Adjectives, Humber and Interf aces:  Why languages vary. Amsterdam: Elsevier. 
--------. sous presse.  The Nature and Origin of  Language: Matters of  Substance. Oxford: 
Oxford University Press.  347 
Brugman, C.  et G. Lakoff. 1988. «Cognitive Topology and Lexical Networks ». In Lexical 
Ambiguity Resolution, sous la dir. de S. Small, G. Cottrell et M. Tanenhaus, p. 477-507. 
Palo Alto (CA): Morgan Kaufmann. ----------------------------------------------------~ 
Bueti, D.; Walsh, V. 2009. «The Parietal Cortex and the Representation ofTime, Space, 
Number and Other Magnitudes ». Philisophical Transactions of  the Royal Society, vol. 
364, p.  1831-1840. 
Burenhult, N.  2003.  «Attention, Accessibility, and the Addressee: The Case of the Jahai 
Demonstrative Ton ». Pragmatics, vol.  13, no. 3, p. 363-379. 
Choi-Jonin, I. et L. Sarda. 2007. «The Expression of Semantic Components and the Nature 
ofGround Entity in Orientation Motion Verbs: A Cross-Linguistic Account Based on 
French and Korean ». In The Categorization of  Spatial Entities in Language and 
Cognition, sous la dir. de M. Hickmann, M. Aumague et L. Vieu, p.  123-149. 
Amsterdam: J  olm Benjamins. 
Croft, W. et D. A. Cruse. 2004. Cognitive Linguistics. Cambridge (CA): Cambridge 
University Press. 
Cruse, D.A. 2000. « Aspects of  the Microstructure ofWord Meanings ». In Polysemy: 
Theoretical and Computational Approaches, sous la dir. de Y. Ravin etC. Leacock, p. 
30-51. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Csabi, S. 2004. «A Cognitive Linguistic View ofPolysemy in English and its Implications 
for Teaching ». In Cognitive Linguistics, Second Language Acquisition, and Foreign 
Language Teaching, sous la dir. de M., Niemeier et S. Achard, p. 231-254. Berlin: 
Mouton de Gruyter. 
Da Silva, A. S. 2003. «Image Schemas and Category Coherence: The Case of the Pmiuguese 
Verb deixar ». In Cognitive Approaches to Lexical Semantics, sous la dir de H. Cuyckens, 
R. Dirven et J. R. Taylor, p. 281-322. Berlin: Mouton de Gruyter. 
Deignan, A., D. Gabrys et A.  Solska. 1997. « Teaching English metaphors using cross-
linguistic awareness-raising activities ». ELT Journal,  vol. 51, no 4, p. 352-360. 
Desclés, J. P. 2005. «Polysémie verbale, un exemple: le verbe "avancer"». In La Polysémie, 
sous la dir. de O. Soutet, p.  111-136. Paris: Presse de l'Université Paris-Sorbonne. 
Desclés, J. P.; V. Flageul, C. Kekenbosch, J. M. Meunier et J.F. Richard. 1998. «Sémantique 
cognitive de l'action: 1. contexte théorique». Langages, no 132, p. 28-47.  348 
Desclés, J. P. et Z. Guentcheva. 2005. «Doit-on tenir compte de la polysémie verbale en 
typologie ? Un exemple contrastif entre français et bulgare ».Langue  française, vol. 1, no 
145, p. 93-107. 
Di Meola, C.  1994. Kommen und Gehen: Eine kognitiv-linguistische Untersuchung der 
Polysemie deiktischer Bewegungsverben. Tübingen: Niemeyer. --------. 2003. « Non-deictic Uses of the Deictic Motion Verbs kommen and gehen in 
Gennan ». In Deictic Conceptualisation of  Space, Time,  and Persan, sous la dir. de F. 
Lenz, p. 41-68. Philadelphia: John Benjamins. 
Elston-Güttler, W. 2008. « First Language Polysemy Affects Second Language Meaning 
Interpretation: Evidence for Activation ofFirst Language Concepts During Second 
Language Reading». Second Language Research, vol. 24, no 2, p.  167-187. 
Evans, V. 2005. « The Meaning ofTime: Polysemy, the Lexicon and Conceptual Structure ». 
Journal ofLinguistics, vol. 41, no  1, p. 33-75. 
Fenyvesi-Jobbagy, K. 2003. «Non-litera! and non-metaphorical uses ofDanish komme 
'come': a case study». Jezikoslovlje, vol. 4, no 2, p. 225-244. 
Jaen, J.F. 2006. « Diachronie Cognitive Semantics of  Acostarse ». Estudios de Linguistica 
Universidad de Alicante, vol. 20, p.  131-148. 
Fillmore, C.  1966. « Deictic Categories in the Semantics of  'Come' ». Foundations of 
language, vol. 2, no 3, p. 219-227. 
Fillmore, C. J.  1975. Santa Cruz lectures on deixis. Bloomington: Indiana University Club. 
Fillmore, C. et B.T.S. Atkins. 2000. « Describing Polysemy: the Case of'crawl' ». In 
Polysemy: Theoretical and Computational Approaches, sous la dir. de Y. Leacock etC. 
Ravin, p. 91-110. New York: Oxford University Press. 
Gandour, J.  1978. « On the Deictic Use ofVerbs ofMotion Come and Go in Thai ». 
Anthropologicallinguistics, vol. 20, no 9, p. 381-394. 
Gibbs, R. W. Jr. 2002. « Embodied Standing and the Psychological Semantics of  Stand». In 
The linguistics of  sitting, standing, and lying,  sous la dir. de J. Newman, p. 387-400. 
Philadelphia : John Benjamins. 
Grand Robert de la langue française : version électronique. 2011. Paris : Le Robert. 
http://gr.bvdep.com/ 
Goddard, C.  1997. « The Semantics ofComing and Going ». Pragmatics, vol. 7, no 2, p. 147-
162.  349 
Guillaume, G. et R. Valin. 1971. Principes de linguistique théorique de Gustave Guillaume. 
Québec: Les Presses de l'Université Laval. 
Jackendoff, R.  1990. Semantic Structures.  Cambridge (MA): MIT Press. 
------------------ 2002. Foundations of  Language: Brain, Meaning, Grammar, Evolution. 
Oxford: Oxford University Press. Jarbou, S. 2010.  « Accessibility vs. Physical Proximity: An Analysis ofExophoric 
Demonstrative Practice in Spoken Jordanian Arabie». Journal of  Pragmatics, vol. 42, no. 
11, p. 3078-3097. 
Johnson, C.  1999. «Metaphor vs. Conflation in the Acquisition ofPolysemy: The Case of 
see». In Cultural, psychological and typological issues in cognitive linguistics, sous la 
dir. de M. K. Hiraga, C. Shina et S. Wilcox, p. 155-170. Philadelphia: John Benhamins. 
Kleiber, G.  1999. Problèmes de sémantique: la polysémie en questions. Lille: Presses 
Universitaires du Septentrion. 
--------. 2008. «Petit essai pour montrer que la polysémie n'est pas un sens interdit». In 
Congrès Mondial de Linguistique Française- CMLF'08 (Paris), sous la dir. de Durand, 
J., B. Habert et B. Laks, p. 87-101 . Paris: Institut de linguistique française. 
Klein, D.E., et G.L. Murphy. 2001. «The representation ofPolysemous Words ». Journal of 
Memory and Language, vol. 45, p. 259-282. 
Lakoff, G.  1987. Women, Fire and Dangerous Things: What Categories Reveal About the 
Mind. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 
Lakoff, G., M. Jolmson. 1980. Metaphors we live by. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 
Langacker, R.  1987. Foundation of  Cognitive Grammar: Theoretical Prerequisites. 
Standford (CA): Standford University Press. 
--------. 1991. Foundations of  Cognitive Grammar: Descriptive Application. Standford (CA): 
Standford University Press. 
Lemrnens, M.  2002. «The Semantic Network ofDutch Posture Verbs ». In The Linguistics of 
Sitting, Standing and Lying, sous la dir. de J. Newman, p.  103-140. Philadelphia: John 
Benjamins. 
Levinson, S. C.  2000. Presumptive Meanings: The The01·y of  Generalized Conversational 
Implicature. Cambridge (MA): MIT Press.  350 
Lexis : le dictionnaire érudit de la langue française. 2009. Paris : Larousse. 
Lien, C. 2005. « Verbs ofVisual Perception in Taiwanese Southem Min: A Cognitive 
Approach to Shift ofSemantic Domains ».Language and Linguistics, vol. 6, no 1, p. 
109-132. 
Longman English Dictionary Online. 2008. London: Longman. http://www.ldoceonline.com/ 
Lyons, J.  1977. Semantics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Matsumoto, N. 2010. «The Pragmatics ofMulti-Verb Sequences: The Case of  the Verb Go». 
Lodz Papers in Pragmatics, vol. 6, no 1, p.  117-143. 
Meex, B. 2004. «Motion, Path, and Aspect: The Case of  the German Path Adpositions Über 
and Durch ». Belgian Journal of  Linguistics, vol. 18, no 1, p. 299-322. 
Mel'cuk, I.  1989. « Semantic Primitives from the Viewpoint of  the Meaning-Text Linguistic 
Them·y ».  Quaderni di semantica, vol.  10, no 1, p. 65-102. 
Mel'cuk, I., A. Polguère et A.  Clas. 1995. Introduction à la lexicologie explicative et 
combinatoire. Louvain-la-Neuve: Duculot. 
Merriam-Webster's Third New International Dictionary Unabridged. 2002. Springfield, 
(MA): Merriam-Webster.  http://unabridged.merriam-webster.com/ 
Miller, G.  1995. « WordNet: A Lexical Database for English ». Communications of  the ACM, 
vol. 38, no 11, p. 39-41. 
Newman, J.et S. Rice. 2004. «Patterns of  Usage for English SIT, STAND, and LIE: A 
Cognitive!  y Inspired Exploration in Corpus Linguistics ».  Cognitive Linguistics, no 15, p. 
351-396. 
Nunberg, G.  1995. « Transfers ofMeaning ».Journal ofSemantics, vol.  12, p.  109-132. 
Oxford Dictionary of  English. 201 O.  Oxford University. http://www.oxfordreference.com/ 
Pavlenko, A. 2009. « Bilingual Lexicon and Second Language Vocabulary Learning ».In 
The Bilingual Mental Lexicon: Interdisciplinary Approaches, sous la dir. de. A. Pavlenko. 
North York: Multilingual Matters. 
Picoche, J.  1986. Structures sémantiques du lexique français. Paris: Nathan. 
--------. 1994. « 'Intérêt' et ses dérivés au croisement de divers réseaux lexico-sémantiques ». 
Languefrançaise, vol.  103, no 1, p. 23-31. 
--------. 1995. «Combien y a-t-il de coeurs en français?». Langue française, vol.  105, no  1, 
p.  120-125.  351 
Piron, S. 2006. Analyse et représentation des connaissances en sémantique verbale: 
l'interface syntaxe-sémantique du  verbe Entendre. Thèse de doctorat. Montréal : 
Université du Québec à Montréal. 
Pustejovsky, J.  1995. The Generative Lexicon. Cambridge (MA): MIT Press. 
Radden, G.  1996. «Motion Metaphorized: The Case ofCorning and Going ».In Cognitive 
Linguistics in the Redwoods: The Expansion of  a New Paradigm in Linguistics, sous la 
dir. de E. Casad, p. 423-458. Berlin: Mouton de Gruyter. Rajaona, S. 1972. Structure du malgache: étude des formes prédicatives. Fianarantsoa: 
Ambozontany. 
Ravin, Y., etC. Leacock. 2000. « Overview ». In Polysemy: Theoretical and Computational 
Approaches, sous la dir. de Y. Leacock etC. Ravin, p. 1-27. New York: Oxford 
University Press. 
Ruhl, C.  1989. On Monosemy: A Study in Linguistic Semantics. Albany: State University of 
New York Press. 
Ruwet, N.  1990. «En et y: deux pronoms clitiques antilogophoriques ».Langages, vol. 25, 
no 97, p. 51-81. 
Saussure, F. de. 1916. Cours de linguistique générale. Paris: Payot. 
Shen, Y.M. 1996. « The Semantics of the Chinese verb 'come' ». In Cognitive Linguistics in 
the Redwoods: The Expansion of  a New Paradigm in Linguistics, sous la dir. de E. Casad, 
p. 507-540. Berlin: Mouton de Gruyter. 
Sivonen, J. 2005. « An Exercise in Cognitive Lexical Semantics: The case of  the Finnish 
Motion Verb Kiertaa ». SKY Journal of  Linguistics, vol.  18, p. 311-340. 
Sjostrom, Soren. 1999. « From Vision to Cognition: A Study of Metaphor and Polysemy in 
Swedish ».  In Cognitive Semantics: Meaning and Cognition, sous la dir. de J. Allwods et 
P. Gaerdenfors, p. 67-85. Philadelphia: John Benjamins. 
Sperber, D., et D. Wilson. 1995. Relevance: Communication and Cognition, 2. Oxford: 
Blackwell. 
Talmy, L. 2000. Toward a Cognitive Semantics. Cambridge (MA): MIT Press. 
Trésor de la langue française informatisé. 1994. Analyse et traitement infonnatique de la 
langue française. http:/  /atilf.atilf.fr/ 
Tyler, A., Evans, V. 2003. The Semantics ofEnglish Prepositions: Spatial Scenes, Embodied 
Meaning and Cognition. Cambridge (CA): Cambridge University Press.  352 
Vandeloise, C.  1986. L'espace en français. Paris: Le Seuil. 
------------. 1987. «La préposition à et le principe d'anticipation ». Langue française, vol. 76, 
p. 77-111. 
------------. 1991. Spatial prepositions.  Chicago: The University of Chicago Press. 
Viberg, A.  1999. « The Polysemous Cognates Swedish Ga and English Go: Universal and 
Language-Specifie Characteristics». Languages in Contras!, p. 87-1 13. --------. 2003. «The Polysemy of  the Swedish Verb Komma 'Come'». In Meaning Through 
Language Contrast, sous la dir. de K. M. Turner et K. Jaszczolt, p. 75-105. Amsterdam: 
John Benjamins. 
Victorri, B. etC. Fuchs. 1996. La polysémie: construction dynamique du sens. Paris: 
Hetmès. 
Walsh, V.  2003. «A Theory of  Magnitude: Common Cortical Metrics ofTime, Space and 
Quantity ». Trends in Cognitive Sciences, vol. 7, no  11, p. 483-488. 
Wierzbicka, A.  1989. « Semantic primitives: the expanding set». Quaderni di semantica, vol. 
10, no 2, p. 309-332. 
Wilkins, D. P. et Hill, D.  1995. « When GO Means COME: Questioning the Basicness of 
Basic Motion Verbs ».Cognitive Linguistics, vol. 6, no 2-3, p. 209-260. 
Winston, M. 1988. Deictic Verbs : Use and Acquisition. Thèse de doctorat. University of 
Connecticut. 
Wittgenstein, L.  1953. Philisophical Investigations. Oxford: Blackwell. 
Yin, H.  2002. «A Cognitive Approach to the Japanese Verb Kum 'Come'». In Proceedings 
of  the North West Linguistics Conference, sous la dir. de G.  S. Morrison et L. Zsoldos, p. 
67-82. Vancouver: Simon Fraser University Linguistics Graduate Student Association. 
Zuercher, B. 201 O.  Multiplicité d'emplois et représentation unique : analyse monosémique du 
verbe malgache AVY 'venir'. Manuscrit non publié. Université de Montréal. 